Spann v. Indiana State of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RICHARD A. SPANN-EL,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-611-MGG

BENNET, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Richard A. Spann-El, a prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, was granted leave

to proceed against Officer Madison Easley, Lieutenant Josh Morgan, Captain Robert

Bennett, Officer Jonathan Cruz, Unit Team Manager (“UTM”) Nathanael Angle, and

Deputy Warden Sharon Hawk (“Defendants”) in their personal capacity for money

damages for denying him sanitary living conditions as required by the Eighth

Amendment. (ECF 10.) Specifically, he claims that in July 2020, his cell was flooded with

water containing urine and feces for four days. (Id.) Defendants now move for summary

judgment. (ECF 81.) Mr. Spann-El has responded to the motion (ECF 97), and

Defendants have replied thereto (ECF 99). The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

Before turning to the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim, however, the court

must address two additional filings by Mr. Spann-El. First, he moves for a preliminary

injunction. (ECF 91.) Defendants have filed a response objecting to the motion (ECF 96),

and he has filed a reply thereto (ECF 100).

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that

should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of

persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in original). “A

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). On the first prong,

“the applicant need not show that [he] definitely will win the case.” Illinois Republican

Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020). However, “a mere possibility of

success is not enough.” Id. at 762. “A strong showing . . . normally includes a

demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its case.” Id.

at 763 (quotation marks omitted). In assessing the merits, the court does not simply

“accept [the plaintiff’s] allegations as true, nor do[es] [it] give him the benefit of all

reasonable inferences in his favor, as would be the case in evaluating a motion to

dismiss on the pleadings.” Doe v. Univ. of S. Indiana, 43 F.4th 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2022).

Instead, the court must make an assessment of the merits as “they are likely to be

decided after more complete discovery and litigation.” Id.

As to the second prong, “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a

possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with . . . injunctive relief as an

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff

is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Mandatory preliminary injunctions—

“those requiring an affirmative act by the defendant”—are “cautiously viewed and

sparingly issued.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). Additionally, in the

prison context, the court’s ability to grant injunctive relief is significantly circumscribed;

any remedial injunctive relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than

necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and use the least intrusive means to

correct the violation of the federal right.” Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.

2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th

703, 711-13 (7th Cir. 2022) (outlining the strict limitations on granting injunctive relief in

the prison setting).

Some of Mr. Spann-El’s handwriting his quite difficult to decipher, but he

appears to argue that he is in need of an immediate transfer to a different facility. He

claims that his personal property and legal papers have gone missing, including

photographs, religious books, documents pertaining to his post-conviction petition, and

documents pertaining to civil rights cases he has pending in this District. (ECF 91, 100.)

This case pertains to the conditions of Mr. Spann-El’s confinement during a four-day

period in July 2020 when it was allegedly flooded with water. There is no indication

from either his complaint or his present filings that flooding presents an ongoing

problem for him, nor was he was granted leave to proceed on a claim for injunctive

relief in this case. This court cannot grant him injunctive relief on issues outside the

scope of this lawsuit. See Westefer, 682 F.3d at 681. The court notes that Mr. Spann-El has

sought preliminary injunctive relief in two other pending cases claiming he needs to be

transferred to another facility immediately. See Spann-El v. Miami Correctional Facility,

No. 3:22-CV-450-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed June 10, 2022); Spann-El v. Miami Correctional

Facility, No. 3:22-CV-541-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed July 13, 2022). To the extent he needs

relief in those cases, he must seek it in those cases. He has not demonstrated an

entitlement to relief in this case based on these arguments.

He also argues that it is a “conflict of interest” to keep him at his current facility

because he is suing staff members there. (ECF 91.) That alone is not a basis to grant him

the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. Were it otherwise, a prisoner

could effectively obtain a transfer simply by filing suit against a staff member at their

current prison. A prisoner cannot be permitted to “engineer” a constitutional violation

in this fashion. Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952, 953 (7th Cir. 2005). This would also

contravene the principle that where best to house a prisoner is a matter on which prison

officials are entitled to substantial deference. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224

(1976); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996).

To the extent he is raising issues about his ability to respond to the motion for

summary judgment, those issues appear to have been resolved. He states that he lost his

copy of the motion for summary judgment, but the court sent him an additional copy in

early August 2022 and granted him more time to file a response.1 (EF 90.) It appears the

court’s order and the additional copy of the motion may have crossed in the mail with

his current filing. In any event, it is evident that he eventually obtained a copy of the

motion, because he has filed a response to the motion containing a detailed analysis of

1 He received two extensions, and a total of approximately four months, to file his response to the

motion for summary judgment. (See ECF 88, 90.)

the Defendants’ arguments and supporting documentation.2 (ECF 97.) The court

declines to order any relief in connection with his assertions about his personal

property, and he has not otherwise demonstrated an entitlement to the extraordinary

remedy of an immediate transfer while this case is pending. The motion for a

preliminary injunction is denied.

Mr. Spann-El’s second filing bears the label, “Motion to Correct Magistrates

Response with Evidences and Claims to add to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment Response.” (ECF 98.) The content of this filing suggests he intended it to

supplement his response to the motion for summary judgment. Notwithstanding the

labeling, it appears he may have been trying to separate out his legal arguments and his

evidence by filing these documents separately. See N.D. IND. L.R. 56-1(b). In deference to

his pro se status, the court will grant the motion and consider this filing in deciding the

motion for summary judgment. With these issues resolved, the court returns to the

motion for summary judgment.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court “shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A

genuine dispute of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 610

2 The court notes that in one of his other pending cases, he has raised similar concerns about his

legal documents being confiscated during a move to segregation. See Spann-El v. Indiana, 3:20-CV-760-

RLM-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Sept. 10, 2020), ECF 68, 70. At a hearing held in that case on September 2,

2022, Mr. Spann-El represented to this court that had since regained access to his legal documents. (ECF

72.)

(7th Cir. 2018). In deciding whether a genuine dispute of fact exists, the court must

“consider all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, and . . . draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party

opposing summary judgment.” Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the court cannot “weigh conflicting

evidence” or “make credibility determinations,” as this is “the province of the jury.”

Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations

omitted). Instead, the court’s sole function is “to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014).

In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and

a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong

asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction

of a prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's

necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). Although “the Constitution does not mandate

comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to

“adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, and utilities.” Hardeman

v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2019).

On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show that the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy this

standard, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the prison officials knew of and

disregarded a serious risk to his health or safety. The official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 694 (7th

Cir. 2021) (citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). The standard “requires

more than negligence or even gross negligence; a plaintiff must show that the defendant

was essentially criminally reckless, that is, ignored a known risk.” Huber v. Anderson,

909 F.3d 201, 208 (7th Cir. 2018). A prison official’s subjective knowledge can be shown

by “inference from circumstantial evidence.” Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 655 (7th

Cir. 2020). “For example, if an inmate provides evidence that the risk of serious harm

was obvious, a factfinder could reasonably infer that the official knew of the risk.” Id.

“Likewise, a factfinder could typically infer an official’s knowledge from evidence that

the inmate complained to the official” about the issue. Id.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants each submit an

affidavit. (ECF 81-1 to ECF 81-6.) UTM Angle attests that at the time of this incident, he

“did not have day-to-day interactions with offenders in Housing Unit A” (the

segregation unit where Mr. Spann-El was housed) and has no records to show he was

notified about flooding in Mr. Spann-El’s cell. He also does not “recall” speaking with

Mr. Spann-El during this period or anyone telling him about any flooding in Mr. Spann-

El’s cell. (ECF 81-1 ¶¶ 8-12.) He attests that “staff at the Miami Correctional Facility

have expressed concerns that offenders may have been purposefully flooding their cells

with water from their toilet in order to get out of their cells more frequently,” and that

staff “cannot reward” this practice by letting them out of their cells. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)

Captain Bennett, in turn, attests that he does “not recall interacting with the

Plaintiff. . . about any incident involving his toilet or flooding in his cell,” nor does he

“recall ever being made aware that Mr. Spann-El was experiencing issues with his toilet

or with flooding in his cell.” (ECF 81-2 ¶¶ 5-6.) Officer Cruz likewise attests that he does

not “remember having any interactions with Mr. Spann-El about any issue that he had

with his toilet or flooding in his cell in July of 2020.” (ECF 81-3 ¶ 6.) Deputy Warden

Hawk, now retired, similarly attests that she “did not have contact with offenders

housed in the segregated housing units at Miami Correctional Facility” during this

period and does “not recall having any interactions with Offender Richard Spann-El

about his toilet or flooding in his cell.” (ECF 81-5 ¶¶ 5-6.)

By contrast, Officer Easley does remember speaking with Mr. Spann-El about

water in his cell. However, as she describes the incident, Mr. Spann-El told her that

“water had spilled from the toilet in his cell.” (ECF 81-4 ¶ 7.) She looked in and saw

some water on his floor but “did not see feces in the water.” (Id. ¶ 10.) She further

attests that she offered Mr. Spann-El a mop and other cleaning supplies but he refused

them. (Id. ¶¶ 11-14.) As for Lieutenant Morgan, he also does not “remember” speaking

to Mr. Spann-El about this issue specifically, but he does recall an incident occurring in

July 2020 wherein “several offenders intentionally flooded their cells with water[.]”

(ECF 81-6 ¶¶ 5-7.) He attests that when this happened, “staff worked to ensure that

these cells were cleaned quickly.” (Id. ¶ 8.)

Mr. Spann-El paints a vastly different picture of this incident.3 He attests that the

July 2020 incident did not involve a mere puddle of water in his cell, nor was it caused

3 Mr. Spann-El swears to the facts set forth in his response and the “Motion to Correct” under

penalty of perjury. (ECF 97 at 1; ECF 98 at 1.)

by him trying to flood his toilet. Rather, he attests that due to the “pipes being backed

up” in a certain area of the prison, the “entire bottom range of A-alpha” dormitory

flooded with approximately 2 inches of sewer water that covered the floor for days.4

(ECF 97, 98.) He attests that there was fecal matter floating in the water and that it had a

foul odor, readily discernible to anyone present in the dormitory, including staff

members. (Id.) He further attests that Lieutenant Morgan, Captain Bennett, Officer

Cruz, and Deputy Warden Hawk were all physically present in the dormitory at some

point during this period, and he specifically recalls Deputy Warden Hawk “coming on

the dormitory one day just looking [at] everything.” (ECF 98 at 2.) He attests that UTM

Angle was also present in the dormitory handing out hygiene kits and tried to squeegee

some of the water into the drains without success. (ECF 97 at 2; ECF 98 at 3.) He also

attests that for days Officers Cruz and Easley “would come around passing out ‘chow’

pushing the charts through the contaminated water.” (ECF 98 at 3.) He attests that he

and multiple other inmates repeatedly asked these staff members to be moved out of

the dormitory due to these extreme conditions, but their response was that no one could

be moved, even though he claims another part of the prison had available space during

this period. (ECF 98 at 3.)

There is a clear “swearing contest” between the parties about whether

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Spann-El’s right to be housed under

sanitary conditions of confinement. Notably, all but one of the Defendants attest that

4 He submits a piece of a comb to show the estimated depth of the water, and this piece measures

approximately two inches. (See ECF 98-2 at 1.)

they do not remember speaking with Mr. Spann-El about flooding in his cell. Attesting

that one does not recall something occurring is not the same as attesting that it did not

occur. See Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff’s affidavit

attesting that she did “not recall” seeing a brochure did not refute defendant’s evidence

that the brochure was sent to her). But even if the court reads these affidavits as stating

that the flooding did not occur, Mr. Spann-El swears otherwise. By his account, the

flooding was so severe that it covered the entire floor of the dormitory with two inches

of water containing fecal matter that remained there for days, giving off a foul odor and

requiring staff members to walk through it. Defendants point to the lack of official

records about any incident of large-scale flooding (ECF 83 at 8-9), but the absence of

records does not directly refute Mr. Spann-El’s account based on his own personal

knowledge. He attests that all of the Defendants were physically present in the

dormitory at one point or another during the flooding and saw what was happening,

but left him and the other inmates in these conditions for four days.5 Whose account is

more credible is not something that can be determined at the summary judgment stage.

Instead, a jury must make that determination. Omnicare, 629 F.3d at 704-05.

As for Officer Easley, she attests that the flooding was not severe and did not

involve water containing feces, but Mr. Spann-El refutes this. He attests that she is

describing an entirely different incident wherein a small bit of water flooded from his

5 Defendants point to difficulties experienced by staff during this period due to the COVID-19

pandemic, but they do not submit evidence showing that it was impossible to move Mr. Spann-El for this

reason; rather, their argument is that no flooding on the scale described by Mr. Spann-El ever occurred.

toilet. In their reply, Defendants argue that Mr. Spann-El is trying to change the scope of

his claims by suing over this other incident. (ECF 99 at 1-2.) It appears they have

misread his filing. He makes clear he is suing about the July 2020 incident. He argues, in

effect, that Officer Easley is either lying or misremembering the events of July 2020. In

support, he submits his own account and internal complaints he filed, one about the

July 2020 flooding of the dormitory, and the other about a December 2020 incident in

which Officer Easley allegedly would not give him adequate cleaning supplies after his

toilet flooded. (ECF 98-1 at 1-2.) He claims Officer Easley was well aware of the severe

flooding in July 2020 because she had to push a food cart through the water for days.

(ECF 98 at 3.) Whose account is more credible is not an issue that can be decided by this

court on a motion for summary judgment. Omnicare, 629 F.3d at 704-05.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity “because they did

not violate any right that was clearly established in July of 2020.” (ECF 83 at 1.) “Under

the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are liable for civil damages . . .

only when their conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 656 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether an official is entitled to qualified

immunity on a motion for summary judgment turns on whether the plaintiff has both

(1) alleged that the official committed acts violating a clearly established right and (2)

adduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the official in fact

committed those acts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

As outlined above, Mr. Spann-El’s account is that he was forced to live in a cell

flooded with two inches of water containing feces and urine for four days. He has come

forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact about whether the

conditions existed and whether Defendants knew about them. On these facts,

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020)

(holding that it was clearly established as of 2013 that the Eighth Amendment was

violated when an inmate was held in a cell containing raw sewage for six days);

Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2019) (recognizing clearly established

right of inmates “not to be forced to live surrounded by their own and others’

excrement”); Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (defendants were not

entitled to qualified immunity where inmate claimed the floor of his cell was covered

with water, the sink and toilet did not work, and the walls were smeared with blood

and feces for six days); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing

summary judgment for defendant where evidence showed inmate was housed for three

days in a cell containing feces). Therefore, the case must proceed to trial.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DENIES the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF 91);

(2) GRANTS the plaintiff’s “Motion to Correct Magistrates Response with

Evidences and Claims to add to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Response”

(ECF 98), to the extent that this filing was considered in ruling on the motion for

summary judgment; and

(3) DENIES the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 81).

SO ORDERED on September 20, 2022

s/ Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.

Michael G. Gotsch, Sr.

United States Magistrate Judge