Mapes v. Cable One

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

ERIC JOSHUA MAPES and JENELLE- )

MACKENZIE KELLY-MAPES )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 2:22-cv-203-PPS-JEM

)

CABLE ONE d.b.a SPARKLIGHT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiffs, Eric-Joshua Mapes and Jenelle-Mackezie Kelly-Mapes, filed a

complaint and a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. [DE 1; DE 3.] In

addition, Plaintiffs filed a request for disability accommodation [DE 4] and a motion to

show just cause [DE 5]. The named defendant is Cable One d/b/a Sparklight, a cable

company. [DE 1.]

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.

Discussion

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1915, provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal

courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (“The federal in forma pauperis statute . . . is

designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal

courts.”). To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must make two

determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the

action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal

court, without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting

an inability “to pay such fees or give security therefor.” Id. § 1915(a)(1). Here, the

request to proceed in district court without prepaying the filing fee is signed by both

Plaintiffs, Eric Joshua Mapes and Jenelle-Mackenzie Kelly-Mapes, but it seems to detail

only Mr. Mapes’ financial status. Nevertheless, the motion establishes that Mr. Mapes

is unable to prepay the filing fee.

Under the second inquiry, a court must look to the sufficiency of the complaint to

determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief can

be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). District courts have the power under § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen

complaints even before service of the complaint on a defendant and must dismiss the

complaint if it fails to state a claim. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999).

Courts apply the same standard under § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

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722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to prisoner and non-

prisoner complaints alike, regardless of fee status. Rowe, 196 F.3d at 783.

To state a claim, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing Plaintiffs’ complaint, the

Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in his

favor. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 645 (7th Cir. 2018).

A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and “a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

The Mapes’ complaint arises out of a dispute with their cable provider. The

complaint alleges that around June 12, 2022, Plaintiffs contacted Sparklight’s technical

support because they were having speed issues with their modem (presumably they

were having Internet difficulties). [DE 1 at 5.] Although a tech support person visited,

they did not swap out their device, and Plaintiffs believe the person “used disabilities of

Mr. Mapes to treat him less favorable.” Id. Plaintiffs allege they are both disabled

individuals, and that Mr. Mapes has hearing and speech disabilities. [Id. at 2, 9.] Over

the course of the next few months, Plaintiffs had continuing problems with the speed of

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their Internet, and they filed a complaint with the FCC on July 6, 2022. [Id. at 5.] They

continued to have problems getting call backs from the cable company and were

refused services. Id. Although they scheduled for a technician to come to their place on

July 15, 2022, the provider never showed up. [Id. at 6.] Their Internet and modem device

issues continued, and have not been fixed. Id.

The complaint articulates a cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”). Plaintiffs base their claims on Title III of the ADA, dealing with places of

public accommodation. Section 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides: “[n]o individual shall be

discriminated on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public

accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of

public accommodation.” Implicit in this complaint is Plaintiffs’ belief that Cable One

d/b/a Sparklight, a cable operator, is a place of public accommodation. However, this

runs contrary to the plain language of the statute and its regulations.

The ADA specifically includes an exhaustive list of private entities that qualify as

public accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181. This list includes, inter alia: inns, hotels

(and other places of lodging), restaurants and bars, theatres and stadiums, grocery

stores and other shopping center stores, laundromats, beauty places like a barber shop

and spas, hospitals and professional offices of a health care provider, terminals or

stations used for public transportation, museums and galleries, libraries, parks, zoos,

schools, day care centers, gymnasiums, bowling alleys, golf courses, and other places of

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exercise or recreation. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7). As the court in Torres v. AT&T Broadband,

LLC, 158 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1037-38 (N.D. Cal. 2001), recognized, “[a] digital cable system

is not analogous to any of these categories or examples. . . . the plaintiff’s home cannot

reasonably be classified as a place of public exhibition or entertainment. Thus, neither

the digital cable system nor its on-screen channel menu can be considered a place of

public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA.” I concur with this analysis,

and agree that a cable company does not fit into the ADA’s definition of a covered

public accommodation.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs refer to sections of the Indiana Code (such as

section 35-42-2-2 for criminal recklessness and 35-45-2-1 for intimidation, and others

[DE 1 at 7]), these are criminal statutes detailing charges that may be brought by the

government against a perpetrator, not statutes providing a basis for a civil lawsuit in

this court.

Although I would normally give a plaintiff an opportunity to amend his or her

complaint before dismissing it, the Court may deny leave to amend where an

amendment will be futile. Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2015);

Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015). In this case, an amendment

will not correct the problems presented by Plaintiffs’ claims, because ADA claims

against Defendant are not authorized by that statute.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ request to proceed without prepayment of fees is

denied, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the complaint [DE 1] is DISMISSED

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without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs’ Request to Proceed in District Court

Without Prepaying the Filing Fee [DE 3] is DENIED and the complaint is DISMISSED

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 11, 2022.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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