The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ALYCE R. ANDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) 2:22CV209-PPS/JEM
)
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT )
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Alyce Anderson has a bone to pick with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. That much is clear. What it’s all about is less so. She has filed this lawsuit
in federal court complaining that she has repeatedly advised the EEOC that she does not
consent to, and vehemently objects to, the EEOC’s use of her email address. Does
Anderson have a matter pending before the EEOC? What is the EEOC using her email
address for? Anderson’s complaint does not make this clear. She alleges that someone
“pretending to be the Plaintiff went on the US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission online public portal and registered the Plaintiff[‘s] personal and private
email address,” and then “a second time register[ed] a fake email...not belonging to the
Plaintiff.” [DE 1 at 2.] Anderson does not explain what communications she has
received from the EEOC to her email address, nor why the emails are “harassment,
severe misconduct, and abusive behavior” that has “been very upsetting, emotionally
draining, and extremely stressful” for her. [DE 1 at 2, 3.] The relief Anderson seeks is an
order that the EEOC “cease and desist from using Plaintiff[‘s] personal and private email
address, forever.” [DE 1 at 3.]
Because Anderson wants to file the case without paying the customary filing fee
[DE 2], the complaint is subject to review and potential dismissal if on its face it lacks
merit. Anderson’s information establishes that she is financially qualified to file without
payment of the fee, but her complaint does not pass muster when subjected to the
associated review of its merits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), “[n]otwithstanding
any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that . . .(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” A document filed pro se is to
be liberally construed, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nonetheless, Anderson’s
complaint is subject to dismissal because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
In the 20th century, the average experience of daily life inevitably involves
numerous unwanted contacts and communications from other people and organizations
of all sorts, particularly in the form of email. Anderson makes clear that the EEOC’s
communications with her via email are unwanted, but she has not offered facts that
explain why that is particularly so, and (more importantly for present purposes) why
those contacts would support any legal cause of action or relief via a lawsuit. The
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standard of review under §1915(e)(2)(B) borrows from Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), which
authorizes a motion challenging the sufficiency of a complaint “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” The Supreme Court interpreted the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading
standard in the cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires “a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” which in turn requires factual allegations sufficient to permit a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. Anderson’s complaint fails on both counts.
The Seventh Circuit has described Twombly as establishing “two easy-to-clear
hurdles,” namely that (1) the complaint describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the
defendant fair notice of the claim and the basis for it, and (2) the allegations plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084
(7th Cir. 2008), quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Concentra Health
Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “Plausibility” in this context minimally
requires that “the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case
to present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th
Cir. 2010). Anderson does not describe a claim that gives the EEOC (or the court) fair
notice of the claim and the basis for it, and the allegations do not present a story that
holds together and suggests that Anderson has any right to legal relief for the annoyance
of receiving emails (of an uncertain nature and number) from the EEOC.
The uncertainly of Anderson’s issues with the EEOC is compounded by her prior
history of litigation in this court, in Anderson v. Alvarez, Case No. 2:21CV170-JEM, and
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Anderson v. Kramer, Case No. 2:21CV218-JEM. In April of 2021, Anderson initiated an
Order of Protection proceeding in the Superior Court of Lake County, Indiana against
Alison D. Alvarez, an attorney who represented the United States Postal Service in two
EEOC proceedings initiated by Anderson. [No. 2:21CV170, DE 1 at 1-2.] The United
States government removed the case to this court, where it was assigned Case No.
2:21CV170-JEM. [Id.] The Kramer case involved a similar removal of Anderson’s state
court petition for an Order of Protection against an administrative law judge for the
EEOC who was assigned to a complaint filed by Anderson against the postal service.
[No. 2:21CV218, DE 10 at 1.] Judge Martin dismissed both the Alvarez and Kramer cases
on sovereign immunity grounds. [No. 2:21CV170, DE 19 at 3-4; No. 2:21CV218, DE 10 at
2-3.]
The record in both of those cases suggests that Anderson had initiated
proceedings before the EEOC. How this jibes with the allegations in the present action
about identity theft having some relation to the EEOC’s use of Anderson’s email address
is unclear. Furthermore, in both Alvarez and Kramer, Judge Martin noted that “Plaintiff
seeks to have all legal communication regarding her workplace discrimination claims
sent to her on paper through the mail and filed the underlying petition for order of
protection against Defendant to prevent her from communicating with Plaintiff via
email.” [No. 2:21CV170, DE 19 at 2; No. 2:21CV218, DE 10 at 2.] Wouldn’t Anderson’s
initiation of proceedings before the EEOC reasonably explain and justify the EEOC’s use
of her email address to communicate with her?
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So although the reasons for Anderson’s objection to the use of her email address
are unexplained, she has pursued the issue by means of several other lawsuits
previously, further muddying the waters. Piecemeal litigation poses risks of the waste of
judicial resources, inconsistent outcomes, and unfairness to the parties. Anderson has
now had three attempts to obtain judicial relief on the same issue, without success on
any. Although the dismissal of this action will be without prejudice for failure to state a
claim, Anderson is advised that any future litigation of the same issue should be careful
to spell out her allegations fully to support a claim to relief that is plausible on its face
and permits a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Failure to do so may result in a dismissal of Anderson’s complaint with
prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY:
Alyce R. Anderson’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [DE 2] is GRANTED.
The case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B) because it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: August 9, 2020.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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