Spann-El v. Miami Correctional Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RICHARD A. SPANN-EL,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-450-JD-MGG

MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

WARDEN, INDIANA STATE OF,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Richard A. Spann-El, a prisoner without a lawyer, began this case by filing a

motion asking for a preliminary injunction. ECF 1. Though he did not file a complaint, a

“document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,” so the court will construe the

motion as also being his complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Spann-El did not pay the filing fee nor seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis unless

he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury because he has filed three cases1

which were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See Abdul-

Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996). In order to meet the imminent

danger standard, the threat complained of must be “real and proximate.” Ciarpaglini v.

1 (1) Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-785-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Sept. 17, 2020),

dismissed September 22, 2020, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim; (2) Spann-El v.

State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-CV-741-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed Aug. 31, 2020), dismissed September 3, 2020,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim; and (3) Spann-El v. State of Indiana, et al., 3:20-

CV-595-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. filed July 16, 2020), dismissed September 3, 2020, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A for failure to state a claim.

Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Allegations of past harm do

not suffice; the harm must be imminent or occurring at the time the complaint is filed.”

Id. In plain terms, only “genuine emergencies” qualify as a basis for circumventing 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g). Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). Additionally,

“[c]ourts don’t accept allegations of danger uncritically.” Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957,

960 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t has

never been the rule that courts must blindly accept a prisoner’s allegations of imminent

danger.”). Courts “routinely” deny leave to proceed where imminent-danger

allegations “are conclusory or ridiculous, or where they concern only past injuries.”

Taylor, 623 F.3d at 485 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Spann-El raises one valid claim of imminent danger, two conclusory claims

of imminent danger, and several claims of imminent danger clearly without merit. In

his valid claim, he asserts he has severe mental illness and is suicidal. He alleges he is

not receiving medication or mental health treatment. This is a valid claim of imminent

danger. The Miami Correctional Facility Warden has both the authority and the

responsibility to ensure Spann-El receives constitutionally adequate mental health

treatment and is protected from harming himself. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d

311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). The Warden will be added as a defendant and Spann-El will be

granted leave to proceed against him on an official capacity claim for permanent

injunctive relief.

Spann-El’s conclusory claims allege he is denied medical treatment (for his

physical health) and is not being protected from attack by unidentified assailants. Other

than alleging that fear is causing heart failure and that he has been harmed in the past

by someone, he provides no details about these claims. These conclusory statements are

insufficient to plausibly allege he is in imminent danger. Spann-El’s claims clearly

without merit allege he is not honored as a human being, has no access to the law

library, no access to copy documents, no GTL tablet, and cannot get a response to his

request for interview forms. These are the sort of allegations “that do[] not come within

shouting distance of” an imminent danger claim.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th

Cir. 2007).

Spann-El asks the court for a preliminary injunction ordering that he be

transferred to a different prison. “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and

drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing,

carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). “A

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “Mandatory

preliminary injunctions – those requiring an affirmative act by the defendant – are

ordinarily cautiously viewed and sparingly issued [because] review of a preliminary

injunction is even more searching when the injunction is mandatory rather than

prohibitory in nature.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks

omitted). Additionally,

[t]he PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court’s authority to enter an

injunction in the corrections context. Where prison conditions are found to

violate federal rights, remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right, and use the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right. This section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly

made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison

officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the

institutions they manage.

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations

omitted).

The least intrusive way for the Warden to provide Spann-El with constitutionally

adequate mental health treatment and prevent him from committing suicide may be to

transfer him, but there may be other options too. Perhaps he can be placed on suicide

watch at the Miami Correctional Facility. Perhaps he can receive medications and

therapy for his severe mental health problems at the Miami Correctional Facility.

Perhaps the Warden can demonstrate Spann-El is already receiving constitutionally

adequate medical treatment or that the allegations are otherwise untrue. The Warden

will be ordered to respond to the preliminary injunction motion. Spann-El will then

have fourteen days to file a reply before the court rules on the motion.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) DIRECTS the clerk to separately docket the preliminary injunction motion

(ECF 1) as a complaint;

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to add the Miami Correctional Facility Warden as a

defendant;

(3) GRANTS Richard A. Spann-El leave to proceed against the Miami

Correctional Facility Warden in an official capacity to obtain permanent injunctive relief

to provide him with constitutionally adequate treatment for his severe mental health

problems and to prevent him from committing suicide as required by the Eighth

Amendment;

(4) DISMISSES all other claims;

(5) DISMISSES Miami Correctional Facility and State of Indiana;

(6) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service

from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to serve process on) the

Miami Correctional Facility Warden at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a

copy of this order and the preliminary injunction motion (ECF 1) which is also the

complaint;

(7) DIRECTS the clerk to fax or email a copy of the same documents to the Miami

Correctional Facility Warden at the Miami Correctional Facility;

(8) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), the Miami Correctional Facility

Warden to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.

Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to

proceed in this screening order; and

(9) ORDERS the Miami Correctional Facility Warden to file and serve a response

to the preliminary injunction, as soon as possible but not later than July 7, 2022, (with

supporting medical documentation and declarations from other staff as necessary)

describing/explaining how he is providing Richard A. Spann-El with constitutionally

adequate treatment for his severe mental health problems and preventing him from

committing suicide.

SO ORDERED on June 15, 2022

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT