Carson v. Neal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JAMIE CARSON, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:21-CV-807-JD-MGG

RON NEAL,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Jamie Carson, Sr., a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (ECF 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen the complaint and

dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Mr. Carson is

proceeding without counsel, the court must give his allegations liberal construction.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Mr. Carson is an inmate at Indiana State Prison (“ISP”). He alleges that on

November 7, 2019, Warden Ron Neal had him taken to the restrictive housing unit,

where he was held for 12 days.1 He claims that during that period, he was subjected to

unduly harsh conditions, including being denied bed linens, soap, toothpaste, a

toothbrush, and eating utensils. He further complains he was subjected to “freezing

temperatures,” and “constant lighting” making it difficult for him to sleep. Based on

these events, he sues Warden Neal for damages.

In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and

a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong

asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction

of a prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment requires inmates to be

provided with “humane conditions of confinement,” which includes being given

“adequate food, clothing, [and] shelter.” Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719 (7th Cir.

2021). “Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation

in combination when each alone would not do so.” Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493

(7th Cir. 2006). “Generally speaking,” however, “challenges to conditions of

confinement cannot be aggregated and considered in combination unless they have a

mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable need

such as food, warmth, or exercise[.]” Johnson v. Prentice, ---F.4th---, 2022 WL 966879, at

1 In a prior lawsuit, Mr. Carson described the circumstances leading to his placement in

restrictive housing. See Carson v. McCormick, 3:20-CV-132-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind. closed July 7, 2020.) On

November 7, 2019, case worker Sara McCormick wrote him up for a disciplinary infraction, alleging that

he had thrown a food tray at her while she was making her rounds. A disciplinary hearing officer

ultimately found him not guilty, concluding that the tray had fallen and was not thrown. He sued his

case worker for “malicious prosecution” and other wrongdoing, but the case was dismissed under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A.

*6 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On the subjective

prong, the prisoner must allege that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to

his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy this standard, “the official must

have actually known of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Rasho

v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022).

Here, Mr. Carson alleges that for 12 days, he could not brush his teeth or wash

his hands after using the toilet. He further alleges that because he had no eating

utensils, he had to eat with his hands during this period even though they were

unclean. He claims he was also denied showers and clean clothes. He additionally

claims that the temperature in the cell was “freezing,” but he was given no bed linens

and was subjected to “constant” lighting 24 hours a day. This combination of

circumstances plausibly alleges the denial of the minimal civilized measures of life’s

necessities related to his need for adequate hygiene and sleep. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (Eighth Amendment concerns are triggered when inmate is

subjected to low cell temperature at night combined with a lack of blankets); Mejia v.

Pfister, 988 F.3d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 2021) (inmate stated claim that continuous bright

lighting impacted his ability to sleep); Gillis, 468 F.3d at 493 (inmates are entitled to

adequate soap and other articles of personal hygiene). Although these conditions did

not persist for an excessively long period, the court concludes that he has alleged

enough to satisfy the objective prong at the pleading stage.

On the other hand, he describes other conditions that are not sufficiently serious

to trigger constitutional concerns. He complains he was not allowed telephone calls or

visits with family while in restrictive housing, but temporary restrictions on visitation

do not give rise to a constitutional claim. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1984).

He mentions not being able to speak to an “attorney,” but does not include any

allegations to plausibly suggest that he had a need to speak with an attorney during this

brief period or that the restriction otherwise interfered with his Sixth Amendment right

to counsel. See Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1995). He complains that he

had no outside recreation, but a 12-day restriction on recreational privileges does not

violate the Constitution. Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001). Nor does a

temporary disruption of his mail. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)

(sporadic or isolated interruptions to prisoner’s mail do not trigger a constitutional

claim). He mentions that his “legal mail” was interrupted; this type of mail is entitled to

greater protection, but “legal mail” is a term of art that refers to mail to or from the

inmate’s legal counsel that is clearly identified as such on the envelop. Kaufman v.

McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2005). Legal mail cannot be opened outside the

inmate’s presence so as to protect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. Mr. Carson

does describe the mail he is referring to, nor does he allege that prison staff opened or

tampered with mail sent to or from his attorney that was clearly designated as such. He

will not be permitted to proceed further with respect to any of these alleged conditions.

On the subjective prong, Mr. Carson claims that it was Warden Neal who had

him placed in restrictive housing and that the Warden was well aware of the conditions

under which he was being housed. The complaint can be read to allege that the Warden

purposely subjected him to these harsh conditions to punish him, even though he

claims he did nothing wrong.2 He will be permitted to proceed past the pleading stage

on an Eighth Amendment claim against the Warden.

For the reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Warden Ron Neal in his

personal capacity on a claim for monetary damages for allegedly denying him adequate

hygiene items, bedding, and clean clothing, and for exposing him to excessively cold

temperatures and constant lighting during a 12-day period in November 2019 in

violation of the Eighth Amendment;

(2) DISMISSES all other claims;

(3) DIRECTS the clerk to request a Waiver of Service from (and if necessary, the

United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to locate and serve process on)

Warden Ron Neal at the Indiana Department of Correction and to send him a copy of

this order and the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

(4) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the United States

Marshal Service with the full name, date of birth, and last known home address of any

defendant who does not waive service, to the extent this information is available;

(5) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Warden Ron Neal to respond, as

provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to

2 He mentions that the Warden’s office is equipped with surveillance video to monitor inmates in

the restrictive housing unit, but the court does not find this factor definitive. Some of the adverse

conditions he describes would not be readily visible (such as the cold temperatures), nor can the court

plausibly infer that a high-ranking official like the Warden sat in his office 24 hours a day watching one

inmate on surveillance video. Nevertheless, giving the complaint liberal construction, Mr. Carson

includes other allegations that plausibly suggest the Warden was aware of the harsh conditions and

intended to punish him for allegedly throwing a tray at his case worker.

the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening

order.

SO ORDERED on April 14, 2022

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT