Huff v. Elkhart County Sheriff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MICHAEL ALLEN HUFF,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-1054-DRL-MGG

ELKHART COUNTY SHERIFF et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael Allen Huff, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint. ECF

8. A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court still must review the merits of a prisoner

complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.

The court applies the same standard as when deciding a motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir.

2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff can plead himself out of court

if he pleads facts that preclude relief. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir.

2007); McCready v. Ebay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006).

Mr. Huff’s original complaint was dismissed because it failed to state any claims.

See ECF 7. Specifically, the court found he had not plausibly alleged his three-week

detention in the Elkhart County Jail—after he had allegedly been ordered released on his

own recognizance and on bond in two state court criminal matters—was objectively

unreasonable considering his continuing detention in another case. Id. at 5–7. The court

also determined he had not plausibly alleged any of the named defendants were

personally involved in the assault or property loss he suffered at the Elkhart County Jail,

and the court concluded his claim regarding the “head commissary lady” placing him in

segregation was impermissibly vague. Id. at 7–8.

In his amended complaint, Mr. Huff, who is currently a prisoner at the Indiana

State Prison (ISP), is suing three defendants for events that happened at the Elkhart

County Jail. He alleges that on October 16, 2018,1 he was transferred to the Elkhart County

Jail for a court date in two of his state criminal cases.2 He claims he was ordered released

1 Mr. Huff’s original complaint was docketed on December 28, 2020, and the envelope has a mail-

stamped date of December 21, 2020. ECF 1 at 5. However, he allegedly signed his complaint and

deposited it into the prison mail system on October 16, 2020, at 4:30 AM. Id. at 4. Although the

timing raises questions and possible statute of limitations concerns, at this stage of the litigation

Mr. Huff is entitled to the prison mailbox rule, so his original complaint is deemed filed as of

October 16, 2020. See Edwards v. United States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing prison

mailbox rule). His amended complaint was docketed on September 7, 2021, and it was deposited

into the prison mail system on August 22, 2021. ECF 8 at 4.

2 He does not list the cause numbers in his amended complaint, but according to his original

complaint, those cause numbers were: 20H02-1605-CM-00334 and 20D04-1701-F6-00029. See ECF

1 at 2.

in one of the cases on October 17, 2018, and on October 18, 2018 in the second case for

which he posted bond that same day. He alleges the Elkhart County Jail Commander told

him that, because his next court date was only a few weeks away, he was going to be held

there despite the fact that the court had ordered his release related to those two cases.

During the approximately three weeks he was at the Elkhart County Jail, Mr. Huff

alleges, “I lost all of my legal and religious material I’d taken with me to Elkhart” as well

as his clothing and some commissary items he had purchased while there. ECF 8 at 2–3.

He also alleges he informed the “head commissary lady” via email that he was going to

sue her because she took an additional $0.77 off his account for a razor he never received.

Id. at 3.3 According to Mr. Huff, she wrote him up for threatening and asked a

classification officer to have him moved to segregation on October 25, 2018. On October

31, 2018, he was removed from segregation by the Jail Commander, but he was placed in

a different cell and “lost my spot on the church count letter because of this.” Id.

Mr. Huff states he was returned to the Pulaski County Jail on November 9, 2018.

However, because of the allegedly unlawful three-week detention in the Elkhart County

Jail, Mr. Huff claims that, when he arrived at the Pulaski County Jail, he discovered:

I had lost my cell, lost my Bunkie, lost a large portion of my property, lost

mail, missed visits, missed grievance deadlines, was removed from my

class that was part of my sentence in 66C01-1611-F4-9, missed church

services, and more due to this unlawful action/decision that neither the

sheriff nor jail commander had legal authority to make.

3 Specifically, Mr. Huff states, “I told the commissary lady through e-mail that I will sue over

$0.77.” ECF 8 at 3. He also indicates she wrote him up for “saying I planned to sue.” Id.

Id. Mr. Huff has sued the Elkhart County Sheriff, the Elkhart County Jail Commander,

and the “Head Commissary Lady” for monetary damages. Id. at 4.

The Fourth Amendment applies to “wrongful pretrial custody” claims. See

Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2020). In Williams, the plaintiffs—all of whom

had been arrested and charged with felonies—alleged the Cook County Sheriff held them

in jail for up to two weeks after the Cook County trial courts had ordered them released

on bail subject to electronic monitoring. Id. at 629–30. According to the plaintiffs, the

sheriff did so because he disagreed with the state’s new pretrial detention policies that

favored broad access to pretrial release. Id. at 629. The district court dismissed the suit,

finding the plaintiffs had not stated a claim as the “Fourth Amendment does not apply

because probable cause was uncontested and pretrial ‘conditions of confinement’ are

governed by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 632. The court of appeals disagreed, holding

that, after Manuel v. City of Joliet, --- U.S. ----, ----, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017), the Fourth

Amendment applies when wrongful pretrial custody itself—as opposed to wrongful

pretrial conditions of confinement—is challenged. Id. In so finding, the court recognized

probable cause was not at issue,4 and it analogized detention after court ordered bail-

release to holding an individual in jail after a non-prosecution decision (or acquittal or

conviction)—both situations potentially being violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at

633. The court noted “a core function of the Fourth Amendment is to put neutral decision-

4 “This case is not about the probable cause standard. No one in this case disputes the existence

of probable cause to detain each plaintiff. The dispute is over procedure. . . . [T]he Sheriff

arrogated to himself a decision that was not his to make” Id. at 632.

makers between unchecked official discretion and invasions of private liberty by search

or seizure” and determined the decisions to substitute prolonged detentions for court-

ordered release on specified terms were not the sheriff’s to make. Id. at 633–34. Once

legally authorized detention has ceased, “whether by acquittal after trial, release on

recognizance bond, completion of jail time in the sentence or otherwise,” the Fourth

Amendment provides that further detention is lawful only to the extent the time leading

up to release is reasonable in any given case. Id. at 635 (citing Driver v. Marion Cty. Sheriff,

859 F.3d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 2017) and Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 581 F.3d 511, 514–15 (7th

Cir. 2009)). In conclusion, the court determined the plaintiffs had stated a proper Fourth

Amendment claim, noting “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require any particular

administrative arrangement for processing bail admissions. It does require, however, that

whatever arrangement is adopted not result in seizures that are unreasonable in light of

the Fourth Amendment’s history and purposes.” Id. at 636.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 917. “The touchstone

of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in

objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.

33, 39 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts have “consistently

eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the

reasonableness inquiry.” Id.

Here, Mr. Huff claims he was unlawfully detained by the Elkhart County Jail for

approximately three weeks. He cited to two state court criminal cases in his original

complaint, in which he alleges the court ordered him released on his own recognizance

and on bond. The publicly available state court docket5 in one of those cases does show a

hearing was held on October 18, 2018, in which Mr. Huff appeared by video and was

released on his own recognizance by the court, with a later hearing set for March 25, 2019.

See State v. Huff, 20H02-1605-CM-000334 (filed May 24, 2016), docket sheet available at:

https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search. The state court docket in the other

case is less clear. There, a journal entry on September 19, 2018, notes Mr. Huff was not

present for a previous hearing because he was incarcerated in the Pulaski County Jail. See

State v. Huff, 20D04-1701-F6-000029 (filed Jan. 5, 2017), docket sheet available at:

https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search. A transportation order was issued

that same day, and the hearing was continued to October 17, 2018. Id. On October 17,

2018, Mr. Huff was produced via video by the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department, and

a hearing was held during which Mr. Huff entered a guilty plea to Theft, a Level 6 felony.

Id. The cause was set for sentencing on November 7, 2018; no mention was made of Mr.

Huff being released at that time. Id. On November 7, 2018, a sentencing hearing was held,

and a judgment was entered. Id. Mr. Huff was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with a credit

of 10 days, and 339 days of his sentence to be suspended. Id. At that time, Mr. Huff was

“ordered released under this cause. Bond released. PD withdrawn. All per order.” Id.

5 The court is permitted to take judicial notice of public court records. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Daniel

v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 742 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of the actions

of other courts or the contents of filings in other courts.”).

Mr. Huff is adamant his version of events is correct.6 At this stage, the court must

accept his assertions as true. However, even crediting those allegations—namely, that he

was “ordered released” in one case on October 17, 2018, and in the other case the next

day—his claim would still fail. As noted in the court’s previous order:

What Mr. Huff does not directly acknowledge—but tangentially references

when he notes he was ‘transferred’ (ECF 1 at 2) to the Elkhart County Jail

on October 16, 2018—is that he was ordered detained in a separate cause

number before, during, and after the events in question. See State v. Huff,

66C01-1802-F4-000006 (filed Feb. 23, 2018), docket sheet available at:

https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search. On March 2, 2018, the

state charged Mr. Huff with being a Prisoner Possessing a Deadly Weapon,

Battery Against a Public Safety Official, and Intimidation. Id. Bond was set

in the amount of $40,000, and there is no indication Mr. Huff paid that bond

or was otherwise ordered released. Id. The docket references various

transport orders between jails (and later the Department of Correction)

throughout 2018 and 2019, but at no point does it note Mr. Huff was not

incarcerated. Id. The case is still pending; as of the date of this order, a jury

trial is scheduled for late 2021.7 Id.

ECF 7 at 6. The allegations in his amended complaint—wherein he admits he was

transferred back to the Pulaski County Jail on November 9, 2018, where he had been

incarcerated prior to being transported to the Elkhart County Jail for the hearings—make

it clear that Mr. Huff was in lawful custody before, during, and after the events in

6 He states, “If the court papers differ from what I say in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, or 8, then subpoena

for the court in court recordings, or charge me with perjury. I don’t care what the docket or

ANYTHING/ANYONE else says.” ECF 8 at 3.

7 An updated review of the docket as of April 19, 2022, shows the case is still pending and a bench

trial is set for June 1, 2022. See State v. Huff, 66C01-1802-F4-000006 (filed Feb. 23, 2018), docket

sheet available at: https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search.

question.8 A plaintiff can plead himself out of court if he pleads facts that preclude relief.

See Edwards, 478 F.3d at 830; McCready, 453 F.3d at 888.

Accordingly, even if the court credits Mr. Huff’s assertions that he was to be

“released” by October 18, 2018, in the two cause numbers he referenced in his original

complaint, Mr. Huff has not plausibly alleged the choice to keep him at the Elkhart

County Jail until after the hearing on November 7, 2018, was objectively unreasonable

considering his continuing detention in another case (or other cases). Essentially, Mr.

Huff is claiming he should have been held in a different jail as opposed to the Elkhart

County Jail, but that was not his determination to make. The sheriff or jail commander’s

decision to keep him there pending the quickly approaching hearing, rather than

transport him back to the jail from which he came, was reasonable in light of the

circumstances and violated neither the state courts’ orders nor the Constitution. Thus,

Mr. Huff has failed to state a claim on this ground.

Moreover, to the extent Mr. Huff is attempting to allege his due process rights

were violated by the transfer from one jail to another or by his one week stay in

segregation while at the Elkhart County Jail, those claims fail as well. The Fourteenth

Amendment says state officials cannot “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

8 Mr. Huff also mentions that, prior to his transport to the Elkhart County Jail, he was in a class

at the Pulaski County Jail as “part of my sentence in 66C01-1611-F4-9.” ECF 8 at 3. The publicly

available docket for that case shows he pled guilty to a felony intimidation charge and was

sentenced to a term of incarceration of twenty-four (24) months at the Pulaski County Jail on May

25, 2018 (the order for which was entered on August 2, 2018). See State v. Huff, 66C01-1611-F4-

000009 (filed Nov. 2, 2016), docket sheet available at:

https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search.

without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. That said, due process is only

required when punishment extends the duration of confinement or imposes “an atypical

and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 374–

75 (7th Cir. 2005) (prisoner not entitled to process for discipline of two months in

segregation, the loss of prison job, the loss of privileges, and a transfer to another facility);

Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims that inmate “lost his preferred

prison living arrangement, his prison job and his eligibility for rehabilitative programs

and that the disciplinary report has damaged his prison record” were not significant

enough to trigger due process concerns) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976)

(transfer to a substantially less agreeable prison and an unfavorable classification for

rehabilitative programs did not require due process)). Inmates have no liberty interest in

avoiding short-term transfer to segregation, Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 766 (7th Cir.

2008), or in avoiding restrictions “that do not substantially worsen the conditions of

confinement,” White v. Scott, 849 F. Appx. 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2021); see also DeTomaso v.

McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]risoners possess neither liberty nor

property in their classifications and prison assignments.”); Healy v. Wisconsin, 65 Fed.

Appx. 567, 568 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates do not have a protected liberty interest in a

particular security classification.”) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486).

Here, Mr. Huff alleges he lost his preferred cell and bunkmate at the Pulaski

County Jail and that he missed visits, mail, and church services due to the three-week

extended stay at the Elkhart County Jail. These alleged deprivations are not “sufficient

collateral consequences” to establish any due process violations. Cochran, 381 F.3d at 641.

Moreover, he does not allege the one week he spent in segregation presented any

“atypical and significant hardship[s].” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see also Lekas v. Briley, 405

F.3d 602, 610–14 (7th Cir. 2005) (even ninety-day placement in disciplinary segregation

where inmate was “prohibited from participating in general population activities,”

deprived of contact with other inmates, and barred from “educational and work

programs” did not trigger due process concerns). Therefore, Mr. Huff has not stated any

claims on these grounds either.

Mr. Huff also claims his legal and religious materials, clothing, and commissary

items were lost while he was at the Elkhart County Jail. However, he does not plausibly

allege any of the named defendants were aware of or responsible for those losses. There

is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burks v. Raemisch, 555

F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). “[P]ublic employees are responsible for their own misdeeds

but not for anyone else’s.” Id. at 596. “Only persons who cause or participate in the

violations are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). Moreover,

to the extent he is attempting to state a due process claim with regard to these items, a

state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can seek reimbursement

for the negligent loss or intentional depravation of property meets the requirements of

the due process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees,

the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a

suitable post deprivation remedy.”). Indiana’s Tort Claims Act, see Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1

et seq., and other laws provide for state judicial review of property losses caused by

government employees and provide an adequate post deprivation remedy to redress

state officials’ accidental or intentional deprivation of a person’s property. See Wynn v.

Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post deprivation

remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”). Therefore, Mr.

Huff has not stated any claims with regard to the loss of his property.

Finally, Mr. Huff claims the “head commissary lady” retaliated against him. “To

establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged

in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would

likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity

was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.”

Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The law recognizes that due process claims and retaliation claims—even when

both relate to disciplinary sanctions—are analyzed differently, in part, because

“[c]onduct that does not independently violate the Constitution can form the basis for a

retaliation claim, if that conduct is done with an improper, retaliatory motive.” Hoskins,

395 F.3d at 375. It is undisputed that “[a] prisoner has a First Amendment right to make

grievances about conditions of confinement, including the mistreatment of his personal

property.” Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 798 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Hasan v. U.S. Dep’t of

Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2005) (addressing a prisoner’s grievance about a

guard’s tampering with his typewriter)). That right must be exercised “in a manner

consistent with his status as a prisoner.” Id. (emphasis original, citation omitted).

In Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 554 (7th Cir. 2009), an inmate alleged he had

communicated a protected grievance when he “threatened the Defendant that he was

going to file a grievance against her because it was inappropriate for her to kick his cell

door, turn his lights on and off, and slam his cell trap while he was sleeping.” In rejecting

that argument and affirming the district court’s dismissal order, the court of appeals

noted, “it seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First

Amendment-protected grievance.” Id. at 555 (emphasis in original); see also Clark v. Reed,

772 Fed. Appx. 353, 355 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Bridges and finding qualified immunity

applied to shield the defendant because it had not been clearly established “that a threat

to file a grievance was protected”); Cobian v. McLaughlin, 717 Fed. Appx. 605, 612–13 (7th

Cir. 2017) (citing Bridges and finding the inmate’s “threat to go to court” if the prison staff

member did not perform research and update his file as requested was not a protected

activity); but see Ashley v. Seamon, 32 Fed. Appx. 747, 748–50 (7th Cir. 2002) (inmate who

asked prison official whether she knew he “work[ed] in the law library” was allowed to

proceed on a retaliation claim, though the court noted further development could show

the threat of legal action was illegitimate).

Here, Mr. Huff alleges he told the “head commissary lady” he was going to sue

her because she took $0.77 out of his account for a razor he failed to receive. He claims

she immediately filed an incident report for threatening and then asked a classification

officer to move him into segregation, where—beginning on October 25, 2018—he stayed

for one week before the Jail Commander rectified the situation. Mr. Huff does not allege

he actually filed a grievance or lawsuit regarding the commissary funds before the

alleged retaliation; rather, he indicates he warned the “head commissary lady” he was

going to do so via email. Accordingly, it is not plausible that his threat to sue constituted

a First Amendment protected activity. See Bridges, 557 F.3d at 555. Therefore, this claim

will be dismissed as well.9

Because Mr. Huff’s amended complaint fails to state any claims, the court

DISMISSES this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

SO ORDERED.

April 19, 2022 s/ Damon R. Leichty

Judge, United States District Court

9 Mr. Huff does not state a retaliation claim against the Elkhart County Sheriff or the Elkhart

County Jail Commander either because he does not allege they participated in the retaliatory action. In

fact, he states that the Jail Commander released him from segregation when he was informed of the

events that had transpired. See Hoskins, 395 F.3d 372 at 375.