Hartsock v. Indiana Dept of Corr

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JOSEPH HARTSOCK,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-63-JD-MGG

INDIANA DEPT OF CORR, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Joseph Hartsock, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a 275 paragraph complaint

against twenty defendants raising twenty-two claims.1 ECF 1. “A document filed pro se

is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless,

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and

dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

In Count One, Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson and Inmate

Clerk Aaron Jordan retaliated against him. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 181-84. “To establish a prima

facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in activity

1 The counts in the complaint are numbered one to twenty, but there are two Counts Six and two

Counts Seven. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 195-206.

protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter

First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at

least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.”

Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Hartsock

alleges Director Stinson announced to more than 100 other inmates they could no

longer volunteer to work for hospice if they had already completed the 320 community

service hours required for the PLUS program. He alleges Director Stinson made the

announcement on May 3, 2021, because Hartsock had requested more shifts, raised

complaints about shifts, and threatened legal action. ECF 1 at ¶ 72. After making the

announcement, he is alleged to have told Hartsock he did it in response to Hartsock’s

request for a religious exemption. ECF 1 at ¶ 74. As a result, more than twenty inmates

told Hartsock they were upset with him and one threatened him with physical harm.

These allegations state a claim against Director Stinson who made the announcement,

but not against Inmate Clerk Jordan. Hartsock alleges “the inmate clerk Aaron Jordan

was only carrying out Stinson’s orders.” ECF 1 at ¶ 65. Hartsock speculates they

conspired to retaliate against him but “mere suspicion that persons adverse to the

plaintiff had joined a conspiracy against him or her [i]s not enough.” Cooney v. Rossiter,

583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).

In Count Two, Hartsock alleges the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC)

violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). ECF 1 at

¶¶ 185-86. RLUIPA provides, “[n]o government shall impose . . . a substantial burden

on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . unless

the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person – (1) is in

furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means

of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Hartsock

alleges his religious beliefs require he work with hospice patients four hours every

night except the sabbath. He alleges he was once allowed to do so. ECF 1 at ¶ 59. He

alleges he was later banned from working in the hospice program. ECF 1 at ¶ 67. These

allegations state a claim.

In Count Three, Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson,

Correctional Officer Jennifer Christian-Tague, and Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan retaliated

against him for his First Amendment activities by searching his property. ECF 1 at ¶¶

187-190. Retaliatory searches can state a claim if they are significantly different than

routine, random searches. See Sobin v. Lowry, 2016 WL 2643456 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (alleging

repeated searches which lasted longer and caused more damage than ordinary

searches). Hartsock acknowledges he was subject to being randomly searched. ECF 1 at

¶ 77. Because all inmates expect to be randomly searched, he has not plausibly alleged a

single non-random search would “dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in

future First Amendment activity.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015).

“Prisoners may be required to tolerate more than public employees, who may be

required to tolerate more than average citizens, before an action taken against them is

considered adverse.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2020).

In Count Four, Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson,

Correctional Officer Jennifer Christian-Tague, and Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan retaliated

against him for his First Amendment activities by filing conduct report WCC-21-05-90.

ECF 1 at ¶¶ 191-94. He alleges Officer Christian-Tague fraudulently asserted she found

a crochet hook in his property box on May 5, 2021. ECF 1 at ¶ 81. He alleges she did this

because he was “complaining about how the PLUS and hospice [wa]s being run . . ..” Id.

at ¶ 79. Only she is alleged to have written conduct report WCC-21-05-90. Id. at ¶¶ 82

and 86. He speculates Director Stinson and Inmate Jordan conspired with her to search

his property before the crochet hook was allegedly found by her. Id. at ¶ 87. These

allegations state a claim against Officer Christian-Tague, but not the other defendants

because “mere suspicion [is] not enough.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir.

2009).

In Count Five, Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson,

Correctional Officer Jennifer Christian-Tague, and Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan also

violated his Substantive Due Process rights by filing the false conduct report (WWC-21-

05-90) from Count Four. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 191-94. In Count Fifteen, Hartsock alleges

Correctional Officer Margarita Velazquez and Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts

violated his due process rights in connection with the prison disciplinary proceeding for

that conduct report. Id. at ¶¶ 232-34. In Count Seventeen, he raises the same claim

against Correctional Officer Nash and Warden Watts based on the rehearing of that

conduct report. Id. at 238-40.

“[A]n allegation that a prison guard planted false evidence which implicates an

inmate in a disciplinary infraction fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted

where the procedural due process protections as required in Wolff v. McDonnell are

provided.” Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984). Hartsock alleges he was

denied Wolff’s due process protections. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 89-102. However, Wolff only

requires due process before the loss of a liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

487 (1995). Here, his habeas corpus challenge to WCC-21-05-90 shows he ultimately did

not suffer such a loss. See Hartsock v. Warden, 3:21-cv-732 (N.D. Ind. filed September 29,

2021). Because Wolff did not require due process, the allegations in Counts Five, Fifteen,

and Seventeen do not state a claim.

In the first Count Six, Hartsock alleges Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and

Wexford of Indiana, LLC, retaliated against him for his First Amendment activities by

filing conduct report WCC-21-05-91. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 195-98. He alleges employees of

Wexford fraudulently asserted he tried to bribe them on May 5, 2021. Id. at ¶¶ 109-110.

He alleges they did this because of his grievances “concerning the unsafe nature of how

Hospice was being run.” Id. at ¶ 113. A private company performing a state function

can be held liable to the same extent as a state actor under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir.

2012) (Monell framework applies to private company providing medical care at prison).

“Monell liability is difficult to establish precisely because of the care the law has

taken to avoid holding a municipality responsible for an employee’s misconduct. A

primary guardrail is the threshold requirement of a plaintiff showing that a municipal

policy or custom caused the constitutional injury.” J.K.J. v. Polk Cty., 960 F.3d 367, 377

(7th Cir. 2020), (en banc). “A municipal action can take the form of an express policy

(embodied, for example, in a policy statement, regulation, or decision officially adopted

by municipal decisionmakers), an informal but established municipal custom, or even

the action of a policymaker authorized to act for the municipality.” Id. Hartsock alleges

Wexford did not have a policy prohibiting retaliation. ECF 1 at ¶ 197. He alleges

Wexford had “a policy, practice, or custom of First Amendment retaliation against

inmates who exercised their First Amendment activities, so much that Plaintiff had

received a conduct report less than one year prior for complaining about health care

provided to him, which was eventually dismissed.” Id. Though he alleged the existence

of a policy, he has not plausibly alleged any facts showing such a policy existed. Rather,

the fact he alleges about a prior conduct report relates to a practice or custom.

Claims not involving an allegation that the municipal action itself

violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal

rights, present much more difficult problems of proof. That a plaintiff has

suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a municipal

employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and

causation; the plaintiff will simply have shown that the employee acted

culpably. We recognized these difficulties in Canton v. Harris, where we

considered a claim that inadequate training of shift supervisors at a city

jail led to a deprivation of a detainee’s constitutional rights. We held that,

quite apart from the state of mind required to establish the underlying

constitutional violation—in that case, a violation of due process—a

plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a

facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s

rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with

deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences. A

showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406–07 (1997) (quotation

marks and citations omitted). Thus, “the path to Monell liability based on inaction is

steeper because, unlike in a case of affirmative municipal action, a failure to do

something could be inadvertent and the connection between inaction and a resulting

injury is more tenuous. For these reasons, where a plaintiff claims that the municipality

has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so,

rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the

municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” J.K.J. v. Polk Cty.,

960 F.3d 367, 378 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation

omitted). Here, Hartsock has not plausibly alleged Wexford was deliberately indifferent

to First Amendment retaliation by its employees.

In the first Count Seven, Hartsock alleges Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and

Wexford of Indiana, LLC, also violated his Substantive Due Process rights by filing the

false conduct report (WCC-21-05-91) from Count Six. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 195-98. In Count

Sixteen, Hartsock alleges Correctional Officer Margarita Velazquez and Assistant

Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts violated his due process rights in connection with

prison disciplinary proceeding for that conduct report. Id. at ¶¶ 235-37. For the same

reasons explained in the discussion of Counts Five, Fifteen, and Seventeen, Hartsock

was not entitled to due process because his habeas corpus challenge to WCC-21-05-91

shows he did not suffer such a loss. See Hartsock v. Warden, 3:21-cv-625 (N.D. Ind. filed

August 23, 2021). Because Wolff did not require due process, the allegations in the first

Count Seven and Count Sixteen do not state a claim.

In the second Count Six, Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson,

Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts, and Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan retaliated

against him for his First Amendment activities by removing him from working in the

hospice program. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 199-202. In Count Eight, he alleges they retaliated against

him by removing him from the PLUS program. Id. at ¶¶ 207-10. These are functionally

identical claims stated in slightly different ways because hospice is one of several

programs in the PLUS program. Id. at ¶ 67.

Hartsock alleges Director Stinson told him he met with Warden Watts on May 3,

2021, to discuss Hartsock’s complaints and how to remove him from the PLUS

program. Id. at ¶ 70. Hartsock alleges Warden Watts, as Director Stinson’s supervisor,

“condoned and/or helped facilitate the First Amendment retaliation . . ..” Id. He alleges

Director Stinson removed him from the hospice program hours later. Id. at ¶ 67. He

alleges “[t]he negative 3380 job/work evaluation authored by Stinson [was] the basis

for Plaintiff’s removal from the PLUS program . . ..” Id. at 131. He speculates Inmate

Aaron Jordan conspired with them. Id. at ¶¶ 201, 209, and 220. These allegations state a

claim against Director Stinson and Warden Watts, but not Inmate Jordan because “mere

suspicion [is] not enough.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).

In the second Count Seven,2 Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom

Stinson, Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts, and Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan

retaliated against him for his First Amendment activities by prohibiting him from

“wearing his hat and prescription eyeglasses to accommodate his physical disability

which allowed him to participate in PLUS program classes and utilize the Offender

Television Network . . ..” ECF 1 at ¶ 204. Hartsock says he has severe photo sensitivity

and cannot “read the chalkboard or see the videos playing without these

2 ECF 1 at ¶¶ 203-06.

accommodations. Id. at ¶ 69. Hartsock alleges Director Stinson denied him these

accommodations on May 3, 2021. Id. Unlike the allegations in the second Count Six,

Hartsock does not allege Director Stinson talked to Warden Watts about this alleged act

of retaliation. These allegations state a claim against Director Stinson, but not the other

two defendants because “mere suspicion [is] not enough.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d

967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).

In Count Nine, Hartsock alleges Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts

retaliated by threatening to transfer him to another prison to moot any possible

injunctive relief claim he might have arising out of being transferred to a different

housing unit at the Westville Correctional Facility. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 211-13. “Watts told

plaintiff that if he filed a grievance or lawsuit about it ‘someone’ would just ‘transfer me

to a different prison’ so I ‘would not get the [injunctive] relief [I am seeking.]’” Id. at ¶

125. This allegation states a claim against Warden Watts in his individual capacity for

monetary damages. It also states a claim against him in his official capacity for

injunctive relief.

In Count Ten, Hartsock alleges IDOC Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr., IDOC

Executive Director of Classification Jack Hendrix, IDOC Legal Services Director Robert

Bugher, IDOC Classification Supervisor Jennifer Farmer, Deputy Warden Dawn Buss,

IDOC Deputy Commissioner James, PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson, Assistant

Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts, Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan, and Correctional Officer

Christian-Tague violated his substantive due process rights with a State created danger

by transferring him to a housing assignment in GSC where he was subsequently

injured. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 214-17. Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a

constitutional duty to protect inmates from violence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844

(1994). Where a constitutional amendment “provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection against . . . governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the

more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing

these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Because failure to protect

claims are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, these allegations do not

state a substantive due process claim.

Hartsock is very precise in the claims he is attempting to raise in connection to

each count. He does not present an Eighth Amendment claim in connection with Count

Ten, perhaps because he recognizes it would not state a claim if he had done so.

“[P]risons are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners

have a propensity to commit more.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir.

2008). A failure to protect claim cannot be predicated “merely on knowledge of general

risks of violence in a detention facility.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005).

“[T]he fact that an inmate sought and was denied protective custody is not dispositive

of the fact that prison officials were therefore deliberately indifferent to his safety.”

Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997). Instead, the plaintiff must establish

that “the defendant had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so

that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the

defendant’s failure to prevent it.” Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010).

To establish deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants sued

individually, Klebanowski needed to show that the officers acted with the

equivalent of criminal recklessness, in this context meaning they were

actually aware of a substantial harm to Klebanowski’s health or safety, yet

failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from the specific danger.

Klebanowski testified during his deposition that he told officers twice on

September 8 that he was afraid for his life and he wanted to be transferred

off the tier. Those statements, and the officers’ knowledge of the first

beating, are the only pieces of evidence in the record that can assist

Klebanowski in his attempt to show that the officers were aware of any

risk to him. We have previously held that statements like those made by

Klebanowski are insufficient to alert officers to a specific threat. Butera,

285 F.3d at 606 (deeming insufficient to establish deliberate indifference

statements by a prisoner that he was “having problems in the block” and

“needed to be removed”). In Butera, we deemed the inmate’s statements

insufficient to give notice to the officers because they did not provide the

identities of those who threatened the inmate, nor state what the threats

were. Id.

The facts of this case make clear our reason for requiring more than

general allegations of fear or the need to be removed. By Klebanowski’s

own testimony, the officers knew only that he had been involved in an

altercation with three other inmates, and that he wanted a transfer

because he feared for his life. He did not tell them that he had actually

been threatened with future violence, nor that the attack on September 8

was inflicted by gang members because of his non-gang status. Without

these additional facts to rely on, there was nothing leading the officers to

believe that Klebanowski himself was not speculating regarding the threat

he faced out of fear based on the first attack he suffered. This lack of

specificity falls below the required notice an officer must have for liability

to attach for deliberate indifference.

Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted). Here, the

complaint does not plausibly allege any of the defendants had actual knowledge of an

impending harm easily preventable before Hartsock was injured in GSC.

In Count Eleven, Hartsock alleges Director Stinson and Inmate Clerk Jordan

retaliated against him with a negative job evaluation as a pretext for removing him from

the PLUS program. Id. at ¶¶ 218-21. The allegation about a negative job evaluation

being a pretext for his removal does not state an independent claim. Rather, it is a

factual allegation supporting his claims that he was removed from hospice and the

PLUS program in retaliation for his First Amendment activities. Since Hartsock is

proceeding on those functionally identical claims in the second Count Six and Count

Eight, he would gain nothing by also proceeding on this underlying allegation

separately.

In Count Twelve, Hartsock alleges PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson, PLUS

Program Director B. Whittinghill, IDOC Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr., IDOC

Executive Director of Classification Jack Hendrix, IDOC Legal Services Director Robert

Bugher, IDOC Classification Supervisor Jennifer Farmer, IDOC Classification

Supervisor Derek Christian, IDOC Education Executive Director Dr. John Nally, Deputy

Warden Dawn Buss, IDOC Deputy Commissioner James Basinger, Westville

Correctional Facility Warden John Galipeau, Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts,

and Inmate Clerk Aaron Jordan retaliated against him by preventing him from being re-

admitted to the PLUS program. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 222-25. Hartsock does not say when he re-

applied, when he was rejected, or by whom. He alleges he was told the admission

decisions are made a person named Gann. Id. at ¶ 150. He did not sue Gann nor

plausibly allege how any of the named defendants were involved in preventing him

from rejoining the PLUS program. “[M]ere suspicion [is] not enough.” Cooney v.

Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).

In Count Thirteen, Hartsock alleges Deputy Warden Dawn Buss, IDOC

Executive Director of Classification Jack Hendrix, IDOC Classification Supervisor

Jennifer Farmer, IDOC Education Executive Director Dr. John Nally, IDOC Legal

Services Director Robert Bugher, IDOC Classification Supervisor Derek Christian, and

IDOC Deputy Commissioner James Basinger retaliated against him by not intervening

to have him reinstated to the PLUS program. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 226-28. Hartsock alleges he

wrote to them, but they would not intercede. Id. at ¶¶ 137 and 138. The “view that

everyone who knows about a prisoner’s problem must pay damages implies that he

could write letters to the Governor . . . and 999 other public officials, demand that every

one of those 1,000 officials drop everything he or she is doing in order to investigate a

single prisoner’s claims, and then collect damages from all 1,000 recipients if the letter-

writing campaign does not [resolve the problem]. That can’t be right.” Burks v. Raemisch,

555 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2009). “[P]ublic employees are responsible for their own

misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Id. at 596. “Only persons who cause or participate

in the violations are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007).

In Count Fourteen, Hartsock alleges the Indiana Department of Correction,

IDOC Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr., IDOC Executive Director of Classification Jack

Hendrix, IDOC Legal Services Director Robert Bugher, and IDOC Deputy

Commissioner James Basinger retaliated against him by enforcing IDOC Policy 00-02-

301: the IDOC grievance policy. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 229-31. Hartsock alleges the grievance

policy is being uniformly enforced to prevent all inmates from successfully filing

grievances. Id. at ¶ 159. Thus, this count does not state a claim because the uniform

enforcement of the policy shows “the action would have been taken anyway,

independently of any retaliatory animus.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261 (2006).

In Count Eighteen, Hartsock alleges the Indiana Department of Correction

violates due process by systematically prohibiting in-person witnesses during prison

disciplinary hearings. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 241-43. In Count Nineteen, he allege it violates due

process by systematically withholding exculpatory evidence. ECF 1 at 244-46. Hartsock

lacks standing to bring these claims.

Our cases have established that the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’

of standing consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered

an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the

defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

decision. The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the

burden of establishing these elements. Where, as here, a case is at the

pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each

element.”

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), (quotation marks, citations and ellipsis

omitted). Hartsock points to his prison disciplinary proceedings in WCC-21-05-90 and

WCC-21-05-91, but as previously explained, he was not entitled to due process in those

cases. Therefore, he has not alleged he has suffered an injury related to the claims in

Counts Eighteen or Nineteen.

In Count Twenty, Hartsock alleges the Indiana Department of Correction, IDOC

Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr., Warden John Galipeau, Assistant Deputy Warden

Kenneth Watts, IDOC Deputy Commissioner James Basinger, Final Reviewing

Authority Elise Gallagher and IDOC Legal Services Director Robert Bugher failed to

supervise and train Correctional Officers Margarita Velazquez and Nash. However,

failure to train and supervise claims can only be brought against a municipality. Sanville

v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2001) citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

841 (1994) (affirming dismissal of failure to train and supervise claims brought against

State warden). None of these defendants are a municipality.

Hartsock also filed a motion asking for a preliminary injunction enjoining the

Indiana Department of Correction “from: preventing Plaintiff from working with

hospice patients daily.” ECF 5 at 1. “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and

drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing,

carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). “A

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Additionally,

[t]he PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court’s authority to enter an

injunction in the corrections context. Where prison conditions are found to

violate federal rights, remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right, and use the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right. This section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly

made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison

officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the

institutions they manage.

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations

omitted).

As to the first prong of the preliminary injunction test, “the applicant need not

show that it definitely will win the case.” Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d

760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020). However, “a mere possibility of success is not enough.” Id. at

762. “A strong showing . . . normally includes a demonstration of how the applicant

proposes to prove the key elements of its case.” Id. at 763 (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Hartsock is proceeding on a claim against the Indiana Department of Correction

to obtain a permanent injunction to permit him to work with hospice patients four

hours every night except the sabbath. Preliminary injunctive relief within the scope of

that claim is what Hartsock must demonstrate.

As to the second prong, “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a

possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with . . . injunctive relief as an

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff

is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. “Mandatory preliminary injunctions –

those requiring an affirmative act by the defendant – are ordinarily cautiously viewed

and sparingly issued [because] review of a preliminary injunction is even more

searching when the injunction is mandatory rather than prohibitory in nature.” Mays v.

Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Though Hartsock

phrases his motion as if he were merely asking the defendant to not prevent him from

working with hospice patients, because he is a prisoner, permitting him to do so would

likely require numerous affirmative acts by the defendant.

As to the third prong, the court must balance the equities of Hartsock’s RLUIPA

protected religious exercise against the “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and

execution of policies and practices that in [a prison administrator’s] judgment are

needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”

Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 783 (7th Cir. 2020) quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547

(1979). In this case, that could mean having to balance RLUIPA’s requirement for

accommodating Hartsock’s religious exercise with the least restrictive imposition on

him against the PRLA’s requirement that injunctions in the prison context must be the

least intrusive imposition on prison officials.

As to the fourth prong, the court’s public interest considerations must include

not merely the public at large, but also the healthcare providers at the prison and other

inmates. The impact on other inmates who work in the hospice program will be

relevant as will the inmate patients in hospice. Additionally, non-hospice patients in the

infirmary could also be impacted by the ruling on this preliminary injunction request.

All inmates at the prison rely on the infirmary and its staff for their healthcare. Potential

disruptions to the delivery of healthcare services within the prison is a significant public

interest that must be considered.

All of these, and likely many more, issues need to be fully briefed before the

court can decide how to address the preliminary injunction motion. The Indiana

Department of Correction will be ordered to file a response to the motion with its

answer. Pursuant to N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(d)(3)(B), Hartsock would normally have only

seven days to file a reply, but that is insufficient time given the number of issues

involved here. The deadline will be enlarged and he will be granted twenty-eight days

after the response is filed. If he needs additional time, he may file a motion asking to

enlarge the deadline further.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to proceed on Count One against PLUS

Program Director Tom Stinson in his individual capacity for compensatory and

punitive damages for retaliating against him in violation of the First Amendment on

May 3, 2021, by telling more than 100 other inmates they could no longer volunteer to

work for hospice if they had already completed the 320 community service hours

required for the PLUS program because Hartsock had requested more shifts, raised

complaints about shifts, threatened legal action, and requested a religious exemption;

(2) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to proceed on Count Two against the Indiana

Department of Correction to obtain a permanent injunction, if required by the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, to permit him to work with hospice

patients four hours every night except the sabbath;

(3) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to proceed on Count Four against

Correctional Officer Jennifer Christian-Tague in her individual capacity for

compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against him in violation of the First

Amendment by filing conduct report WCC-21-05-90 which fraudulently asserted she

found a crochet hook in his property box on May 5, 2021, because he complained about

how the PLUS and hospice programs were being run;

(4) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to on the functionally equivalent second

Count Six (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 199-202) and Count Eight against PLUS Program Director Tom

Stinson and Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts in their individual capacities for

compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against him in violation of the First

Amendment by removing him from the hospice and PLUS programs on May 3, 2021,

because he requested more shifts, raised complaints about shifts, threatened legal

action, and requested a religious exemption;

(5) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to proceed on the second Count Seven (ECF

1 at ¶¶ 203-06) against PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson in his individual capacity

for compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against him in violation of the

First Amendment by prohibiting him from wearing his hat and prescription eyeglasses

to accommodate his physical disability on May 3, 2021, because he requested more

shifts, raised complaints about shifts, threatened legal action, and requested a religious

exemption;

(6) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to proceed on Count Nine against Assistant

Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts in his individual capacity for compensatory and

punitive damages for retaliating against him in violation of the First Amendment by

threatening to transfer him to another prison to moot any possible injunctive relief

claim if he filed a grievance or lawsuit about being transferred to a different housing

unit at the Westville Correctional Facility;

(7) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock leave to proceed on Count Nine against Assistant

Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts in his official capacity to obtain a permanent injunction

prohibiting a retaliatory transfer to a different prison because Hartsock filed a grievance

or lawsuit about being transferred to a different location at the Westville Correctional

Facility;

(8) DISMISSES all other claims;

(9) DISMISSES Robert Carter, Jr., John Galipeau, John Nally, Jack Hendrix,

Jennifer Farmer, Dawn Buss, James Basinger, Robert Bugher, Margarita Velazquez,

Nash, B. Whittinghill, Elise Gallagher, Derek Christian, Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

Wexford of Indiana, LLC, and Aaron Jordan;

(10) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service

from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to

locate and serve process on) the Indiana Department of Correction, PLUS Program

Director Tom Stinson, Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth Watts, and Correctional

Officer Jennifer Christian-Tague at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy

of this order and the complaint (ECF 1);

(11) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name,

date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive

service if it has such information;

(12) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), the Indiana Department of

Correction, PLUS Program Director Tom Stinson, Assistant Deputy Warden Kenneth

Watts, and Correctional Officer Jennifer Christian-Tague to respond, as provided for in

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for

which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order;

(13) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to separately respond to the

preliminary injunction motion (ECF 5) at the same time it responds to the complaint;

and

(14) GRANTS Joseph Hartsock twenty-eight (28) days after the defendant’s

response to the preliminary injunction motion to file a reply.

SO ORDERED on March 17, 2022

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT