Z.H. v. Garcia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

Z.H.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-CV-101 JD

OFFICER JAMIE GARCIA and CHIEF

JOHN DOUGHTY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Z.H. sued Defendants Officer Jamie Garcia and Chief John Doughty of the

Hammond Police Department in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Z.H. alleges

that Officer Garcia violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right and the

Equal Protection Clause during a ride-along in his police car by subjecting her to unwanted

touching, insinuating comments, and otherwise degrading behavior.1 She also claims that Chief

Doughty is liable for Officer Garcia’s conduct because he failed to train or supervise him.

Defendants Garcia and Doughty moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim and judgment on the pleadings. If the allegations in the complaint are true, Officer

1 In her complaint, Z.H. also alleges that Officer Garcia falsely imprisoned her in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, but she has now withdrawn that claim. (DE 21 at 10.)

Garcia’s conduct toward Z.H. was reprehensible and worthy of discipline. It may have further

implicated state law considerations, but this lawsuit brings claims only under the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, which has a limited scope and which does not

encompass Z.H.’s grievance. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

A. Statement of Facts

Z.H. alleges that Officer Garcia sexually harassed her while she participated in a ride-

along in his police car, and that Chief Doughty knew or should have known that Officer Garcia

had a history of sexual misconduct and failed to prohibit the ride-along. Z.H. seeks punitive

damages against Officer Garcia in addition to compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees against

both Defendants. (DE 1 at 6–7.)

Z.H. was a seventeen-year-old student at Ancilla College in Plymouth, Indiana, when she

participated in a ride-along with Officer Garcia on February 15, 2019. (Id. ¶ 9.) Z.H. needed to

participate in a ride-along as part of her studies and knew Officer Garcia. (Id.) Officer Garcia

picked her up at Ancilla College and drove her to the Hammond Police Department. (Id. ¶¶ 10–

11.) Officer Garcia showed her around and introduced her to several other officers. (Id. ¶ 12.) As

Officer Garcia prepared for his shift, Z.H. observed him take several guns from his personal car

and put them in his police vehicle. (Id. ¶ 14.)

During the ride-along, Officer Garcia touched Z.H. without consent on several occasions.

After Z.H. got into his police car and put on her seat belt, Officer Garcia adjusted her seat belt

and rubbed his arm against Z.H.’s breast. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) At various times while driving around,

Officer Garcia placed his hand on Z.H.’s leg without her consent. (Id. ¶ 20.) At one point,

Officer Garcia and Z.H. got out of the car and were in line at a gas station. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.) While

in line, Officer Garcia put his hand on Z.H.’s buttock without her consent. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Throughout the ride-along, Officer Garcia asked Z.H. about her dating and sex life. (Id. ¶

28.) While driving around, Officer Garcia found a prostitute, introduced her to Z.H., and told her

that Z.H. wanted to do what she was doing. (Id. ¶ 27.) Officer Garcia also made an arrest with

other responding officers during the ride-along. (Id. ¶ 21.) After that arrest, Officer Garcia drove

Z.H. to a secluded location and met another officer there. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Officer Garcia asked

the other officer if he wanted to have sex with Z.H and repeated the question more than once.

(Id. ¶¶ 24–25.) Z.H. felt scared and offended by Officer Garcia’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 24.) At some

point, the ride-along ended.

After Z.H.’s ride-along, Z.H.’s female classmate also went on a ride-along with Officer

Garcia. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 33.) The classmate contacted Z.H. to ask about Officer Garcia’s conduct

toward Z.H. on her ride-along, and both reported their experiences to a teacher. (Id. ¶¶ 30–31.)

That information was reported to the Hammond Police Department. (Id. ¶ 31.)

Chief Doughty was the police chief of the Hammond Police Department at the time of

Z.H.’s ride-along. (Id. ¶ 6.) Chief Doughty knew that Officer Garcia was being sued for sexual

misconduct at the time of the ride-along. (Id. ¶¶ 32–33.) The Hammond Police Department also

had an internal policy prohibiting ride-alongs with minors. (Id. ¶ 13.) Z.H. does not allege that

Chief Doughty participated in the ride-along himself.

Officer Garcia moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for

judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). (DE 17.) He argues that Z.H. has not pled facts

rising to a constitutional violation and that, even if so, he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at

1.) Chief Doughty also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).2 (DE 9.)

B. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143,

1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and raise a right to relief above the speculative

level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, a plaintiff’s claim need

only be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930,

935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a

motion to dismiss is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Next, Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the

pleadings are closed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Defendants have not yet filed their answers to

the complaint, electing instead to file motions to dismiss. Accordingly, in light of the express

2 Chief Doughty also argues that the case should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. He

directs this argument to “any state law claims,” but there simply aren’t any such claims, and Z.H. doesn’t argue

otherwise.

terms of Rule 12(c), Officer Garcia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is premature.3 See

e.g., Mabry v. City of E. Chicago, No. 2:16-CV-402-JVB-JEM, 2020 WL 638897, at *2 (N.D.

Ind. Feb. 11, 2020) (“Because the ECHA Defendants filed an answer to the complaint before

filing the instant motion, the instant motion is a motion for judgment on the pleadings under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).”) However, the practical effect of his motion being filed

too early is inconsequential. While there are several differences between deciding a motion under

Rule 12(c) versus deciding it under Rule 12(b)(6),4 Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard of

review as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339

(7th Cir. 2017).

C. Discussion

(1) Claims against Officer Garcia

Z.H.’s claims against Officer Garcia in his individual capacity for violations of the

Fourteenth Amendment are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As a preliminary matter,

Officer Garcia submits that he was not acting under color of law when taking Z.H. on the ride-

along, so he cannot be sued for constitutional violations. Cf. § 1983 (providing that, for the

liability to attach, the wrongful action must be carried out “under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia”). To

determine if an officer’s actions are under color of law, the Court considers whether, as alleged,

they are related in some way to the performance of his police duties. See United States v.

3 According to Federal Rule of Procedure 7(a), pleadings are: “(1) a complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an

answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party complaint;

(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and (7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.”

4 Under Rule 12(c), either party may move for judgment on the pleadings and both the complaint and the answer, as

well as exhibits, may be considered for purposes of judgment on the pleadings. See N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows,

Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452–53 (7th Cir. 1998).

Christian, 342 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Deciding whether a police officer acted under

color of state law should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts the police officer

performed, rather than on merely whether he was actively assigned at the moment to the

performance of police duties.”). Here, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to infer that Officer

Garcia was acting under color of law when he touched Z.H. without her consent and harassed

her. In particular, the complaint suggests that Officer Garcia was providing the ride-along for the

purpose of giving Z.H. an insight into policing; he was on duty at the time of the ride along; and

he was using a Hamond police car with some incidents occurring inside that car. Although in his

briefs Officer Garcia would like to portray the ride-along as a sequence of events unrelated to his

official duties, such characterization is not supported by the allegations in the complaint. The

complaint suggests that the Hammond Police Department offered ride-alongs as part of its

services to the community. The complaint also indicates that Z.H. was required to participate in a

ride-along with a police officer. Construing all reasonable inferences in Z.H.’s favor, one can

assume that Z.H. was not a mere civilian volunteer, but someone required to participate in a ride-

along, and Officer Garcia was not a random officer assigned to bring her along, who then

transgressed from his duties, but someone who assumed the duty as a Hammond police officer to

provide an educational experience to Z.H. and then used his position to take advantage of her.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges that Officer Garcia acted

under color of law.

Next, Officer Garcia argues that Z.H.’s complaint should be dismissed because he is

entitled to qualified immunity. Pursuant to a qualified immunity defense, Officer Garcia is

entitled to dismissal unless “(1) the plaintiffs adequately alleged facts that, if true, would

constitute a violation of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such that a reasonable public official would have

known his conduct was unlawful.” Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d 584, 592 (7th Cir. 2020). “It is at

this point the Rule 12(b)(6) defense and the qualified immunity defense become intertwined.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), [defendant] can defeat [plaintiff’s] cause of action if their complaint fails

‘to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As the Supreme

Court noted, ‘[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right

asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination

of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.’” C.C. ex rel.

Andrews v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 427 F. App’x 781, 782–83 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Siegert

v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)) (other citation omitted). Therefore, the Court will examine

the complaint to determine if it states a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If it does, the

Court will move to the second step and will determine if the Constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.

(a) Substantive Due Process

A violation of substantive due process occurs when the alleged conduct “shocks the

conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998). “The Supreme Court

has noted that this standard lacks precise measurement, but has stated that the emphasis on

whether conduct shocks the conscience points toward the tort law’s spectrum of liability. Only

conduct falling toward the more culpable end of the spectrum shall be found to shock the

conscience.” King ex rel. King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir. 2007)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). It is clearly established that the liberty protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right “includes bodily integrity” and is infringed

by a serious, as distinct from a nominal or trivial, battery. Alexander, 329 F.3d at 916. Very

serious batteries, such as rape and egregious sexual conduct, have been held as conscience-

shocking deprivations of liberty in violation of substantive due process. Id. (citing Wudtke v.

Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that school district superintendent’s

escalating physical assault over several weeks, including coerced oral sex, was “serious physical

assault” that stated a claim for a violation of substantive due process)).

As reprehensible as Officer Garcia’s conduct toward Z.H. was, as alleged, it did not rise

to the level necessary to violate her right to substantive due process. Z.H. likens her case to Kane

v. Barger, a Third Circuit case, where a police officer violated the bodily integrity of a sexual

assault victim when he took her to a secluded room at a police precinct alone and photographed

her naked private areas on his personal cell phone, without evidentiary purpose. 902 F.3d 185,

188 (3d Cir. 2018). There, the court characterized the right at issue as “an individual’s right not

to be sexually fondled and illicitly photographed by a police officer investigating his or her case,

for the officer’s own gratification.” Id. at 195. Finding that the defendant “acted for personal

gratification rather than investigative ends,” the Court held that his “conduct shocks the

conscience and violated [plaintiff’s] right to bodily integrity.” Id. at 188. In fact, the right at issue

was so “obvious” that it could be deemed clearly established without existing similar cases. Id.

Z.H. also relies on Haberthur v. City of Raymore, an Eighth Circuit case where a police

officer followed the plaintiff home, drove by her house on various occasions, twice threatened to

give her a ticket, repeatedly showed up in uniform at her place of employment, and on one

occasion fondled her chest while making sexually suggestive comments. 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th

Cir. 1997). That court found that “sexual fondling and touching or other egregious sexual

contact” can violate substantive due process, and that the repeated nature of the officer’s

harassment and threats of adverse official action violated her personal integrity. Id. at 724.

But the alleged conduct of Officer Garcia is not as severe as the conduct of the

defendants in Kane and Haberthur so as to shock the conscience. Z.H. does not allege that

Officer Garcia’s conduct took place over multiple encounters or that he threatened adverse

official action as the officer did in Haberthur. Additionally, unlike the officer in Kane, Officer

Garcia did not remove clothing from Z.H. and did not insist on her exposing herself so he could

take pictures on his cell phone for mere self-gratification. Instead, during the same ride-along,

Officer Garcia allegedly touched Z.H.’s breast once as he adjusted her seatbelt, then at various

times placed his hand on her leg while driving around, and finally put his hand on her buttock

while standing in line at a gas station. And, while––no doubt––Z.H. would have felt upset and

even scared at his suggestive comments to the prostitute that she, too, wanted to be a prostitute

and his repeated inquiry of another officer at a secluded location if he wanted to have sex with

Z.H., these allegations fall short of shocking the conscience. See Twyman v. Burton, 757 F. Supp.

2d 804, 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (no substantive due process violation where duration of the

defendant’s harassment was not protracted, the defendant did not use force, and to the extent he

committed an indirect battery by sex toy, the battery was not sufficiently severe); Nagle v.

McKernan, 2007 WL 2903179 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (no substantive due process violation where fire

marshal wrote love note and intimately pressed his face against plaintiff and breathed on her

neck).

Moreover, a court in this district found that an officer who engaged in similar or even

more egregious conduct than Officer Garcia did not violate a ride-along passenger’s substantive

due process rights. In Decker v. Tinnel, No. 2:04-CV-227, 2005 WL 3501705 (N.D. Ind. Dec.

20, 2005), the court held that an officer, who asked his eighteen year-old female ride-along

passenger to strip, drove her to several locations and attempted twice to forcibly kiss her to

which she responded by yelling “no,” grabbed her chest over her shirt, forced his hand between

her closed thighs, coming within an inch of her vagina, and briefly held his hand over her

breasts, did not violate her right of bodily integrity. Id. at *1–2, *7–8.

In finding no violation of substantive due process, the court took into account the fact that

the offensive behavior took place within a relatively short period of time, during one ride along.

The touching lasted only for a matter of seconds and ended when the victim said no. Other than

the touching was unwanted there was no evidence of force and no threats of force or display of

firearms. And, although improper and depraved, the touching at issue did not rise to the level of

egregious physical assaults present in cases that involved forcible rapes or other serious sexual

molestations. Id. at *9. In concluding, the court observed that “[m]any harms, though caused by a

state actor, do not fall within the scope of section 1983, for section 1983 does not turn the

Fourteenth Amendment into a font of tort law that supersedes the tort systems already available

under individual state laws.” Id. (quoting Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1009 (8th

Cir. 1992). As recounted above, Officer Garcia’s conduct was less severe than Officer Decker’s.

Likewise, like in Decker, Officer Garcia did not use a gun or other threat to coerce Z.H. into

complying. Therefore, even if Z.H. allegations were to be proved true, they would not state a

violation for substantive due process.

Z.H. argues that Officer Garcia’s conduct was made worse–– to the point of shocking the

conscience––by the fact that she was seventeen at the time of the ride-along. Yet, her age alone

does not present a sufficient basis to convert her grievance into an actionable complaint for a

constitutional violation. Although she had not yet reached the age of majority, she was already a

college student, and, while various laws understandably accord special considerations to young

people until the day they turn eighteen, cases show that Z.H.’s age alone does not give rise to a

constitutional claim. Rather, the totality of circumstances must be considered. For example, the

Sixth Circuit in Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education noted that a teacher’s rubbing of a

high school student’s stomach, along with a suggestive remark, was “wholly inappropriate, and,

if proved, should have serious disciplinary consequences . . . . But without more, it is not conduct

that creates a constitutional claim.” 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996). In Chama Valley, the Tenth

Circuit held that gender-specific harassment of a twelve-year-old female student, where her

teacher called her a prostitute and permitted her classmates to taunt her, “gives it no greater

claim as a constitutional violation than verbal harassment generally.” Abeyta by & through

Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1996). In

Morris v. Dearborn, the Fifth Circuit held that the right to bodily integrity was not violated for a

pre-school age child that typed sexually explicit messages guided by the instructor while sitting

on the instructor’s lap. 181 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 1999). There, the court distinguished another

Fifth Circuit case, Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th 1994), where a child was

sexually molested by a teacher and held that Doe was “so far removed factually” from the facts

at issue that it did not inform the decision. Id. None of these cases lower the bar of egregious,

conscience-shocking behavior required to make a claim so obviously a violation of substantive

due process based on the plaintiff’s status as a minor. Therefore, Z.H.’s status as a seventeen-

year-old is not a basis for distinguishing this case from Decker, where the defendant’s similar––

or even worse––conduct during a ride-along did not violate the substantive due process rights.

Because Z.H. has failed to plead facts that, if true, could show that Officer Garcia’s conduct

shocked the conscience as that term is understood in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment

jurisprudence, the Court must dismiss her substantive due process claim.

(b) Equal Protection Clause

Next, Z.H. alleges that Officer Garcia violated the Equal Protection Clause and treated

her differently because she is female. To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Z.H.

must show that “a state actor purposefully discriminated” against her because of her

“identification with a particular (presumably disadvantaged) group.” Sherwin Manor Nursing

Ctr., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1220 (7th Cir. 1994). Z.H. must allege that she “has been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis

for the difference in treatment.” Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2012). “To

be considered similarly situated, a plaintiff and his comparators (those alleged to have been

treated more favorably) must be identical or directly comparable in all material respects. The

similarly situated analysis is not a precise formula, but we have stated repeatedly that what is

clear is that similarly situated individuals must be very similar indeed.” LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v.

Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2010).

Z.H. alleges that she was subject to Officer Garcia’s conduct because she is female. She

insists that she has stated a claim for equal protection because it is “plausible that a reasonable

person would conclude that Garcia’s male ride-alongs were not groped, pursued for sexual

intercourse, and subject to an attempt to be pimped out for sexual intercourse.” (DE 21 at 11.)

Yet her complaint does not allege that male ride-along passengers were treated differently5 or

that Officer Garcia acted intentionally to discriminate against her. In fact, the only other person

5In fact, the complaint does not allege that Officer Garcia gave ride-alongs to any males.

mentioned in the complaint as a ride-along passenger with Officer Garcia is her female

classmate. Like with her substantive due process claim, here too, Z.H. must adequately allege the

facts that, if true, would constitute a violation of her rights under the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. However, aside from a conclusory statement in paragraph 35 of the

complaint that “the actions of Defendant Garcia were done with the intent of depriving the

Plaintiff of her liberty, etc., and also in violation of equal protection of the law,” the complaint is

devoid of any allegation that Officer Garcia intentionally treated her “differently from others

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Geinosky,

675 F.3d at 747. Such conclusory allegations do not entitle Z.H. to relief. See McCauley v. City

of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under

the plausibility standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal, we accept the well-pleaded facts in

the complaint as true, but legal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the

elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth.”). In addition, Z.H.’s two-

sentence argument on the subject in her response brief (DE 21 at 11), without any reference to

precedent or legal analysis, is as good as conceding that the complaint fails to state an equal

protection claim. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2016) (“perfunctory and

undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are

waived”). To conclude, the Court finds that Z.H. has failed to state an equal protection claim

against Officer Garcia.6

(2) Claims against Chief Doughty

6 Because Z.H. has failed to state any claims against Officer Garcia for which relief can be granted, she has also

failed to show that Officer Garcia violated a constitutional right, so that the Court does not need to consider the

second step of Officer Garcia’s qualified immunity defense, that is, whether the rights were clearly established at the

time of the ride-along.

Z.H. sued Chief Doughty in his individual capacity under a theory that he failed to train

or supervise Officer Garcia, who allegedly violated her Constitutional rights. Setting aside the

fact that there’s no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, see Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d

592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Liability depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions,” not

the conduct or knowledge of the persons they supervise), Z.H.’s claims against Chief Doughty

fail because, as explained above, she has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted

against Officer Garcia. See Est. of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 596–97 (7th Cir.

1997) (“Having decided that the officers did not violate the Constitution, we must conclude that

neither the City nor Police Chief Arreola can be held liable for Mr. Phillips’ death.”). Without a

viable claim against Officer Garcia, it’s impossible for Z.H. to prevail against Chief Doughty

because the complaint doesn’t suggest that Chief Doughty had any personal involvement with

Z.H. See Kelly v. Mun. Cts. of Marion Cnty., 97 F.3d 902, 909 (7th Cir. 1996) (a § 1983 suit requires

personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation to support a viable claim and the

defendant must cause the deprivation at issue). Therefore, the Court finds that Z.H. has failed to state

a claim against Chief Doughty, and the Court must dismiss all claims against Chief Doughty.

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court––

• DENIES Officer Garcia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as filed prematurely but

GRANTS his motion to dismiss (DE 17) and dismisses Z.H.’s claims against him with

prejudice; and

• GRANTS Chief Doughty’s motion to dismiss (DE 9) and dismisses Z.H.’s claims against

him with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 21, 2022

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO

Chief Judge

United States District Court