Dodd v. Indiana Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JERMAINE D’SHANN DODD,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:21-CV-153-JD-MGG

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Jermaine D’Shann Dodd, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint alleging

correctional officers at the Indiana State Prison subjected him to unconstitutional

conditions and were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. “A document filed

pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,

must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a

prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. The court applies the same standard as when deciding

a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v.

Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a

claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d

599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Dodd alleges that on February 6, 2019, he was transferred to a different section of

the Indiana State Prison (ISP). His new cell had faulty light fixtures with wires

protruding, no light bulbs, a toilet that did not flush, and a sink that had very high-

pressure cold water. Officer Mao, who is not named as a defendant in this action, told

Dodd he would report the situation to the custody and maintenance officers—Major

Nowatski and Officer Boyini. Dodd does not allege he himself attempted to inform

those officers or any others of the condition of the cell, nor does he allege he filed a

grievance about it at that time.

On March 18, 2019, at approximately 11:00 PM, Dodd tripped over a ½” bolt

protruding from the floor. His right shin, ankle, and heel were injured. Dodd informed

Correctional Officer Swann, Sergeant Jackson, and other unnamed officers he needed

help, but they refused for two days straight. He was told to submit a medical request

form instead. On March 20, 2019, Lieutenant McNeal and Officer Crockett, neither of

whom are named as defendants, assisted Dodd by calling the infirmary for assistance

and transporting him there via wheelchair. Once he arrived, a nurse gave him Tylenol

and an ice pack and told him to elevate his leg. He was given x-rays two days later.

Dodd does not indicate the results of the x-ray in his complaint.1 Dodd filed a grievance

1 However, in a grievance appeal form dated May 2, 2019, which was attached to the complaint,

Dodd states the results of the x-ray showed no broken bones. ECF 1-1 at 31.

about the events resulting in his injury on March 28, 2019, and the next day at

approximately 9:25 AM, a maintenance crew removed the protruding bolt from Dodd’s

cell. The grievance response Dodd attaches to the complaint also indicates he was

moved to a different cell sometime after the incident. See ECF 1-1 at 29.

On April 15, 2019, Dodd filled out a healthcare request form regarding his right

shin, heel, and ankle. On April 29, 2019, he filled out another form requesting a

specialist or therapy for his injuries. On May 2, 2019, a nurse assisted him by providing

direction on stretches designed to loosen up his shin muscles and Achilles tendon.

In September of 2019, Dodd filled out two additional healthcare request forms

because his Achilles tendon was “stiffening up sometimes and freezes and Charley

Horses,” it was painful to walk, he was feeling “discomfort [and] pain,” and he was

forced to walk with a limp. ECF 1 at 8. Dodd alleges he has not been taken to an outside

hospital or therapist since his injury. Dodd has sued the Indiana Department of

Correction (IDOC), Officer Swann, Sergeant Jackson, Major Nowatski, and Officer

Boyini for injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates

“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773

(7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts

conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994). The objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently

serious” that the action or inaction of a prison official leads to “the denial of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). Although “the

Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene

materials, and sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v.

Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). On the subjective prong, the prisoner must

show the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has

acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the

defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious

risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to

prevent that harm from occurring even though he could

have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

Here, Dodd alleges Officer Mao—who is not a defendant in this case—was aware

his cell had faulty lighting, a toilet that did not flush, and a sink that sprayed cold water

when it was turned on. Even assuming, arguendo, that these conditions were sufficiently

serious to trigger Eighth Amendment protections, Dodd does not plausibly allege any

of the named defendants were aware of those issues or knew he was at risk of being

harmed. Dodd claims Officer Mao told him he would notify custody and maintenance

of the conditions of the cell, but he does not allege any of the defendants received that

notice or that he personally sought to inform them of the issues via grievance or

otherwise at that time. He suggests Major Nowatski and Officer Boyini were in charge

of the custody and maintenance departments, but that is insufficient to impute

knowledge to them or to subject them to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See J.K.J. v. Polk

Cty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020) (officials cannot be held liable simply because they

hold supervisory positions at the prison); see also Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th

Cir. 2018) and Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009) (both noting that

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on personal responsibility, and supervisory

defendants cannot be held liable for the misdeeds of other prison staff). Thus, Dodd has

not stated a plausible claim against any of the defendants regarding the general

conditions of his cell.

As to the protruding bolt, Dodd does not allege that anyone—even Officer

Mao—knew of its existence prior to his injury. The fact that a ½” bolt protruded from

the concrete floor is not, in and of itself, a constitutional violation. There is no plausible

suggestion the bolt was left in the cell intentionally. At most, the complaint suggests

maintenance workers may have performed their inspection duties negligently.

However, “negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness as the term is used in tort

cases is not enough” to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d

420, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, Dodd admits that the day after he filed a formal

grievance about the matter, the bolt was removed from the floor. He also attaches a

document to the complaint indicating he was moved from the cell not long after the

incident; he does not dispute this fact, nor does he allege he was reinjured by the bolt in

the interim. Thus, he has not stated any plausible claims regarding the bolt either.

Dodd also alleges his medical needs were ignored by the officers after he was

injured. To establish liability for claims of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need

was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that

medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a

physician has diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a

lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley,

414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). On the second prong, inmates are “not entitled to

demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir.

2019), nor are they entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267

(7th Cir. 1997).

Here, Dodd alleges he tripped over the bolt causing injuries to his right shin,

ankle, and heel, which left him in significant pain. He further alleges Officer Swann and

Sergeant Jackson ignored his repeated requests for help for two full days, leaving him

sprawled on his cell floor without any medical care. Giving Dodd the inferences to

which he is entitled at this stage, he has alleged both an objectively serious medical

need and that Officer Swann and Sergeant Jackson were deliberately indifferent to it

from March 18, 2019, through March 20, 2019, when he was finally taken to the

infirmary by different officers. See e.g. Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020)

(“[I]nexplicable delay in responding to an inmate’s serious medical condition can reflect

deliberate indifference,” particularly where “that delay exacerbates an inmate’s medical

condition or unnecessarily prolongs suffering.”) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Accordingly, Dodd has stated plausible Eighth Amendment claims for

monetary damages against Officer Swann and Sergeant Jackson.

That said, nothing in the complaint plausibly suggests any of the named

defendants are individually responsible for the alleged lack of continuing medical care.

Dodd admits he was taken to medical on March 20, 2019. Once there, a nurse, who is

not named as a defendant in this action, gave him Tylenol and an ice pack and told him

to elevate his foot. She also ordered an x-ray, which was performed two days later. In

documents attached to the complaint, Dodd admits the x-ray was negative for any

broken bones, but he alleges the injury continued to bother him because his muscles

were torn. He subsequently submitted several health care requests, which resulted in

various stretching exercises being prescribed by a different nurse, who is also not

named as a defendant, but little else in terms of treatment. However, it is not reasonable

to infer that any of the officers knew about, and ignored, those healthcare requests or

Dodd’s need for continuing care, so he has not stated any claims against them on this

basis either. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who

cause or participate in the violations are responsible.”).

Dodd has requested injunctive relief asking that he be examined by a qualified

physician and that arrangements be made for further physical therapy by a practitioner

with “expertise in the treatment and restoration and function of the plaintiff’s right

ankle, Achilles tendon, and shin muscle.” ECF 1 at 18. In general, the Warden has both

the authority and the responsibility to ensure inmates at the facility are provided

constitutionally adequate medical treatment as required by the Eighth Amendment. See

Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). In this case, Dodd describes, in

detail, the care he initially received in the month and a half following his injury—pain

medication, ice packs, elevation, and the direction to perform stretching exercises.

Based on this information, it is not reasonable to infer he failed to receive adequate

medical care during that time period. He goes on to state he filed two additional

requests for healthcare in September of 2019 because his injuries had not fully healed

and he was still in pain, but the complaint is short on further facts, dates, and specifics

regarding that care (or lack thereof). Instead, he simply states “[a]fter (23) months, the

plaintiff Mr. Dodd has not been taken to an outside hospital, nor a therapist.” ECF 1 at

8. Based on these sparse allegations, it is not plausible to infer he is currently failing to

receive adequate care. As noted above, while inmates are entitled to constitutionally

adequate medical care, they are “not entitled to demand specific care,” Walker, 940 F.3d

at 965, nor are they entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. The fact

that Dodd has not been evaluated by an outside provider is insufficient—without

additional supporting details regarding his condition in the many months since he

alleges he last submitted a health care request—to state a plausible claim for injunctive

relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption

that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.”) (quotation

marks, citations and footnote omitted); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that,

in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to

her that might be redressed by the law.”) (emphasis in original).

Finally, Dodd names the Indiana Department of Correction as a defendant, but

this state agency has Eleventh Amendment immunity. de Lima Silva v. Dep’t of Corr., 917

F.3d 546, 565 (7th Cir. 2019).

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS Jermaine D’Shann Dodd leave to proceed against Correctional

Officer Swann and Sergeant Jackson in their individual capacities for compensatory and

punitive damages for being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs from

March 18, 2019, to March 20, 2019, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

(2) DISMISSES all other claims;

(3) DISMISSES the Indiana Department of Correction, Major Nowatski, and

Officer Boyini;

(4) DIRECTS the clerk to request Waiver of Service from (and if necessary, the

United States Marshals Service to serve process on) Correctional Officer Swann and

Sergeant Jackson at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a copy of this order and

the complaint (ECF 1), under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

(6) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name, date

of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service if

it has such information; and

(7) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Correctional Officer Swann and

Sergeant Jackson to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in this screening order.

SO ORDERED on November 9, 2021

/s/JON E. DEGUILIO

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT