William Shecoby Palmer v. Petalas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

WILLIAM SHECOBY PALMER,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO.: 2:19-CV-252-TLS-JEM

PEGGY KATONA, LAKE COUNTY

TREASURER; JOHN PETALAS, LAKE

COUNTY AUDITOR; and HAROLYN

WILLIAMS, TAX DEED PETITIONER

LAKE COUNTY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [ECF No. 15], filed by Defendants Peggy

Katona, Lake County Treasurer, and John Petalas, Lake County Indiana Auditor (collectively the

“Defendants”) on December 20, 2019. The Defendants argue Plaintiff William Shecoby

Palmer’s Complaint must be dismissed because he lacks standing to sue and the Indiana Tax

Court has exclusive jurisdiction over his claim. Br. in Support of Defs.’ FRCP Rule 12(b)(1)

Mot. to Dismiss 1-2, ECF No. 16. The Court construes the Plaintiff’s February 7, 2020 FRCP

Rule 12B(c) and March 5, 2020 FRCP Rule 12(c) as his response. ECF Nos. 28–29. For the

following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. He contests a tax deed sale of a residential property in

Gary, Indiana. He has made over thirteen filings in addition to the Complaint, all of which are

difficult to decipher and many of which contain repetitive arguments. See, e.g., Burdon of Proof

for the Redemption of Debt Under title 15 USC 1692 For Franchise No:45–08–04–156–010.000–

004, ECF No. 2; Aff. of Fact’s for Violation of Due Process of Law by Constitution Officer for

the State of Ind., ECF No. 21; FRCP Rule 12B(C), ECF No. 28; FRCP Rule 12(C), ECF No. 29.

In addition to and in support of his claim, the Plaintiff advances various “sovereign citizen”

arguments. The Plaintiff’s sovereign citizen beliefs are evidenced by his assertion that the

Defendants were required to prove that an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act

applied to the Plaintiff before the Defendants could proceed against him, see FRCP Rule 11

Sanctions Mot. 14, ECF No. 20, that the district court has admiralty jurisdiction over this claim,

see FRCP Rule 12(C) 10, and that the state may not seize property when the property owner has

not paid his taxes, see id. at 9.

The relevant facts of the case are as follows. Richard L. Williams, who is not a party to

this action, owned a residential property in Gary, Indiana. Delinquent Tax Sale Record, Defs.’

Br. Ex. A, ECF No. 16-1. He failed to pay his property taxes, and the property was ultimately

auctioned off at a tax sale for a tax sale deed. See Verified Petition for an Order Directing the

Lake County Auditor to Issue a Tax Deed, Defs.’ Br. Ex. C, ECF No. 16-3. Defendant Harolyn

Williams won the auction and filed a Verified Petition to receive the tax deed. Id. The Lake

County, Indiana, Circuit Court granted the petition. Order to Issue a Tax Deed, Defs.’ Br. Ex. D,

ECF No. 16-4. The Tax Deed was then issued. Tax Deed, Defs.’ Br. Ex. E, ECF No. 16-5. The

Plaintiff objected to the Tax Deed in state court. See Defs.’ Br. 2, ECF No. 16.

The Plaintiff initially styled this federal action as a “Removal” of the state court

litigation, although no removal occurred. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. He ultimately paid

the filing fee and filed his Complaint seeking relief under § 1983 because Defendants had

violated his civil rights by selling the property in a tax deed sale. Corrected Compl., ECF No. 8-

2. He asserts that he has attempted to serve Defendant Harolyn Williams. See Notice Titled Proof

of Service, ECF No. 31. Although much of the Plaintiff’s many filings are incoherent or

indecipherable, the core of his argument is that the Defendants violated his rights by auctioning

the disputed property because its property taxes were unpaid. The Plaintiff argues that he was the

true owner of the property through either adverse possession or his possession of an allodial title

and land patent. See Rule 12(C) 8, ECF No. 29.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “tests the jurisdictional sufficiency of the complaint.”

Bultasa Buddhist Temple of Chi. v. Nielsen, 878 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ezekiel v.

Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995)). “When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of

Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554

(7th Cir. 1999)); see also Nielsen, 878 F.3d at 573.

However, a movant may present evidence to support a contention that there is in fact no

subject matter jurisdiction, despite a facially valid complaint, and “the court is free to weigh the

evidence to determine whether jurisdiction has been established.” United Phosphorus, Ltd. v.

Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Minn-

Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The law is clear that when considering a

motion that launches a factual attack against jurisdiction, the district court may properly look

beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been

submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.”)

(quotation marks and brackets omitted). The presumption of correctness accorded “to a

complaint’s allegations falls away on the jurisdictional issue once a defendant proffers evidence

that calls the court’s jurisdiction into question.” Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 856 (7th

Cir. 1999). “The plaintiff has the obligation to establish jurisdiction by competent proof.” Id. at

855–56.

The Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The Court “liberally construe[s] the pleadings of

individuals who proceed pro se.” Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.

2001). “The essence of liberal construction is to give a pro se plaintiff a break when, although he

stumbles on a technicality, his pleading is otherwise understandable.” Id. (quoting Hudson v.

McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998)). However, the Court “still holds Plaintiff to the

same substantive standards as other civil litigants when it considers the motion [to

dismiss].” Runnels v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (C.D. Ill. 2000).

ANALYSIS

The Defendants raise two arguments in support of their Motion—that the Plaintiff lacks

standing and that the Indiana Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over his claim. The Court

begins its analysis by considering whether the Plaintiff has provided competent proof of standing

to assert a § 1983 claim.

Federal courts are only permitted to decide legal questions that occur in the context of an

actual case or controversy. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009) (citing U.S. Const., Art. III,

§ 2); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (noting that “no principle is

more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the

constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies”) (quoting

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (brackets omitted))). Jurisprudence on the legal

concept of standing is rooted in the Constitution’s case-or-controversy limitation on federal

judicial authority. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

180 (2000).

Because it is a jurisdictional requirement, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

standing.” Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443. To meet the minimum standing requirements of Article

III, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) he suffered or will suffer a concrete and

particularized injury that is actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

defendant’s action; and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 560–61 (1992); Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–

81). “When . . . a case is at the pleading stage, the pleading must clearly allege facts

demonstrating each element.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975)). “If the plaintiff

lacks standing, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the suit must be dismissed

under Rule 12(b)(1).” Taylor v. McCament, 875 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2017).

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may make a facial or factual challenge to subject matter

jurisdiction. Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443–44. A facial challenge asserts that the plaintiff’s

complaint is insufficient to allege jurisdiction. Id. at 434. A factual challenge concedes that the

plaintiff’s complaint alleges jurisdiction, but it asserts that there is in fact no jurisdiction. Id. at

444. The Court considers evidence outside of the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion

on a factual challenge because the Court has the duty to determine whether it has subject matter

jurisdiction over a case. Id. If a plaintiff’s standing is challenged as a factual matter, the plaintiff

is required to respond with “competent proof” that standing exists. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330

F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Retired Chi. Police Assoc. v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856,

862 (7th Cir. 1996)).

The Court will analyze the Defendants’ Motion as a factual challenge to subject matter

jurisdiction because the resolution of this issue turns on whether the Plaintiff owns the disputed

property.

A plaintiff who does not own the property cannot demonstrate injury-in-fact for a claim

based on ownership of property. Notre Dame Affordable Hous., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 838 F.

App’x 188, 190–91 (7th Cir. 2020). If a plaintiff brings claims that are not based on ownership of

the property, the plaintiff may have standing notwithstanding the plaintiff’s lack of ownership.

Cherry v. Five Bros. Mortg. Co. Servs. & Securing, Inc., No. 18 C 03326, 2019 WL 4014066, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2019).

The Plaintiff fails to establish standing by competent proof. The Defendants provided the

Delinquent Tax Sale Record [ECF No. 16-1] and the Maintenance Report [ECF No. 16-2], both

of which list Richard Williams as the disputed property’s owner at the time of the auction. The

disputed property was then sold to Harolyn Williams. The Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no

statement that he owned the property at issue when the tax sale occurred. See Corrected Compl.

The Plaintiff’s various filings do not support that he owns the property. The Plaintiff asserts that

he owns the contested property through adverse possession. See Aff. of Truth for Deprivation of

Rights 2, ECF No. 3. He provides no evidence to show he has adversely possessed the disputed

property.

The Plaintiff also alleges that his allodial title and land patent prove his ownership of the

disputed property. Proponents of allodial titles and land patents believe that they provide superior

title to any other claim over real property and can prevent seizure of property in a foreclosure or

for delinquent taxes. Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-C-1191, 2013 WL 1192767, at *2

(E.D. Wis. Mar. 22, 2013). “Courts have considered these types of claims in other cases and have

uniformly rejected them, with most courts deeming the claims frivolous.” Id. Self-drafted land

patents are frivolous and hold no legal weight. Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir.

1986). Even the existence of a valid federal land patent does not have any relationship to

subsequent property claims under state law. Id. (citing Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176

(7th Cir. 1985)).

The Plaintiff’s purported allodial title and land patent, see Rule 12(C) 8, do not constitute

competent proof of his ownership of the disputed property. The Plaintiff’s purported allodial title

and land patent is a self-drafted document. Id. It is not competent proof of the Plaintiff’s

ownership of the property.

The Defendants submitted evidence that the disputed property was owned by Richard

Williams at the time of the auction. The Plaintiff’s claim is based on his alleged ownership of the

disputed property, but he has not produced any competent evidence that he owned the disputed

property. Thus, the Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Tax Deed, and consequently, the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claim, including his claim against Harolyn

Williams. The Court need not address the exclusive jurisdiction issue because the Plaintiff’s lack

of standing prevents the Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s

claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS the Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1)

Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [ECF No. 15]. The

Plaintiff’s claim against all Defendants is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter Judgment against the Plaintiff and in favor of all the

Defendants.

SO ORDERED on September 28, 2021.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT