Opinion

Caldwell v. Patston

Court
District Court, N.D. Indiana
Filed
Sep 28, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.4%

“[N]o Indiana court has explicitly recognized a private right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution.” (quoting Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)

How later courts described this case

  • “[N]o Indiana court has explicitly recognized a private right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana Constitution.” (quoting Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
  • noting that Indiana has yet to recognize a civil remedy for violations of the Indiana Constitution
  • “[O]ur supreme 13 court has held that the Act applies to all torts.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

CHASE CALDWELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:19 CV 428

)

JOHN PATSTON, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION and ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

(DE # 63.) For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 16, 2019, defendant Sgt. Steve Kobitz, defendant Lt. John Patston,

and defendant Sgt. Christopher Allison, responded to a report of a suspicious male

subject who had hit a woman while riding his bicycle and rode away. (DE # 64-1 at 1;

DE # 64-2 at 1.) Other officers identified the suspect as the plaintiff, Chase Caldwell.

(DE # 64-1 at 1.)

Based on Sgt. Allison’s prior knowledge that Caldwell had been confrontational

with police officers in the past, and that he fled from another officer the previous

weekend, Sgt. Allison drove to the area to assist. (Id. at 2.) Officers indicated that

Caldwell appeared to be headed toward his home. (Id.) In response, Sgt. Allison drove

toward that area. (Id.) Sgt. Allison observed Caldwell riding his bicycle on the sidewalk

while two squad cars followed with their emergency lights on and using their sirens.

(Id.) One of the officers yelled at Caldwell to stop. (DE # 64-3 at 10.) Caldwell did not

make any effort to stop. (DE # 64-1 at 2.) Sgt. Kobitz was already parked in front of

Caldwell’s home and signaled for Caldwell to stop as Caldwell approached him. (Id.)

Caldwell dismounted his bicycle, ran past Sgt. Kobitz, toward the back of his home. (Id.)

Sgt. Allison exited his squad car and ran after Caldwell, along with other officers. (Id.)

As the officers reached the back door, Caldwell went inside the house and locked the

door. (Id. at 2-3.) Sgt. Allison used his window punch tool to shatter the glass on the

back door, to unlock the door from the inside. (Id. at 3.) Sgt. Kobitz, Sgt. Allison, and a

third officer, entered the home and searched for Caldwell. (Id.) The officers found a side

door open and an open storm door, and concluded that Caldwell had exited the home

and continued running. (Id.)

Officers remained in the area waiting for Caldwell to return home. (Id.) While

they were waiting, Sgt. Allison and another officer did a second, more detailed search

for Caldwell within the residence. (Id.)

Lt. Patston heard over the radio that Caldwell had fled his home. (DE # 64-2 at

1.) A passerby told officers that they saw an individual running down Glendale Blvd.

(Id. at 2.) Lt. Patston went to that area and pulled into the CVS parking lot. (Id.) He then

saw Caldwell walking down Glendale Blvd. (Id.) Lt. Patston pulled out of the parking

lot and Caldwell ran when he saw Lt. Patston’s police vehicle. (Id.) Lt. Patston and Sgt.

Kobitz intercepted Caldwell at an intersection, placed him in handcuffs, and informed

him that he was under arrest. (Id.) As a result of these events, Caldwell was charged

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with the misdemeanor of resisting law enforcement, pursuant to Indiana Code 35-44.1-

3-1(a)(3). (DE # 64-3 at 1.)

Prior to September 16, 2019, Sgt. Allison had prior contacts with Caldwell. (DE #

64-1 at 3.) Sgt. Allison explained that, based on his prior experiences with Caldwell,

Caldwell was unpredictable, unstable, erratic, exhibited paranoid behavior, and seemed

mentally ill. (Id.) Sgt. Allison also had knowledge of prior interactions Caldwell had

with other law enforcement officers. (Id.) Sgt. Allison knew that Caldwell had suddenly

and aggressively approached officers, yelled at officers, and postured himself in a

fighting stance. (Id.) Two days before this incident, Sgt. Allison learned that Caldwell

had threatened to abduct women and children from the park. (Id.)

Caldwell subsequently filed this suit. Liberally construing his pro se amended

complaint (DE # 31), he alleges that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights

by arresting him and pursuing him into his home without a warrant. He also alleges

that defendants violated Indiana tort law and the Indiana Constitution.1

Defendants now move for summary judgment. (DE # 63.) This matter is fully

briefed and is ripe for ruling.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to

1 While Caldwell’s amended complaint appears to make an excessive force claim

regarding his arrest, he clarifies in his response brief that he does not intend to state

such a claim. (DE # 68 at 2.)

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establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

identify specific facts establishing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595

(7th Cir. 2003). In doing so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone,

but must present fresh proof in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;

Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). A dispute about a material

fact is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If no reasonable jury could find for

the non-moving party, then there is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007).

The court’s role in deciding a summary judgment motion is not to evaluate the

truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable

fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. In viewing the facts presented on a motion for

summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of

that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party asserting that a fact is

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials

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in the record, or show that the materials cited do not establish the absence of a genuine

dispute. If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(c), the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). The enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is left to the

sound discretion of the district court. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101,

1109–10 (7th Cir. 2014).

Additionally, in the Northern District of Indiana, Local Rule 56-1(b)(2) requires

that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment file a response brief or appendix

that contains a section labeled “Statement of Genuine Disputes” that identifies the

material facts that the party contends are genuinely disputed so as to make a trial

necessary. “[D]istrict courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the record

looking for factual disputes and may adopt local rules reasonably designed to

streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst

Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994). A Statement of Genuine Disputes “is a critical

element of any response to a motion for summary judgment, because without it, the

movant’s version of the facts are accepted as undisputed.” Carragher v. Ind. Toll Road

Concession Co., 936 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 2013); see also Caldwell v. Klemz,

No. 2:14-CV-455, 2017 WL 4620693, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 2017). It is within the district

court’s discretion to require strict compliance with its local rules governing summary

judgment. Friend v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U, 789 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir.

2015); Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). Even pro se litigants must

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comply with local rules governing summary judgment procedures, or risk the court’s

adoption of the movant’s statement of facts. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th

Cir. 2006).2

Caldwell, who is proceeding without a lawyer, was provided with the required

notice to pro se filers, setting forth his burden at the summary judgment stage. (DE # 66.)

It was Caldwell’s responsibility to clearly identify any disputes of material fact, with

appropriate citation to evidence in the record. In light of his failure to do so, defendants’

statements of material facts, as supported by the evidence in the record, are deemed

admitted.

B. Caldwell’s Arrest

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Caldwell’s

Fourth Amendment claim regarding his arrest because they had probable cause to

arrest Caldwell for resisting law enforcement, under Indiana Code 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). (DE

# 64 at 7.) Indiana Code 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) provides that a person who “knowingly or

intentionally” “flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or

audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency

lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop” “commits resisting

law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor[.]”

“The existence of probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any § 1983

claim against a police officer for false arrest or false imprisonment.” Abbott v. Sangamon

2 While the court adopts defendants’ statement of material facts, the court must

still view those facts in the light most favorable to Caldwell. See id.

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Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013). “Probable cause to justify an arrest exists if

the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest

would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that the arrestee had

committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Id. at 714.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Caldwell’s false arrest claim.

The undisputed evidence demonstrates that officers attempted to speak to Caldwell

after it was reported that he hit a woman on his bicycle. It is further undisputed that

Caldwell knowingly or intentionally fled from the officers after the officers signaled and

then verbally ordered him to stop. Thus, the facts and circumstances known to the

officers at the time of Caldwell’s arrest would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in

believing that Caldwell had committed a violation of Indiana Code 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).

C. Entry of Caldwell’s Home

“The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that police officers get a warrant

before entering a home without permission. But an officer may make a warrantless

entry when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ create a compelling law enforcement need.”

Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2021). “The exception enables law enforcement

officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a compelling need for official

action and no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 2017 (cleaned up). For example, an officer

may enter a home without a warrant to: render emergency assistance to an injured

occupant; protect an occupant from imminent injury; ensure the officer’s own safety;

prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; or prevent a suspect’s escape. Id. “In

those circumstances, the delay required to obtain a warrant would bring about some

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real immediate and serious consequences—and so the absence of a warrant is excused.”

(Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

The Supreme Court has held that when “a minor offense alone is involved, police

officers do not usually face the kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless home

entry.” Id. at 2020. A suspect’s flight changes this calculus, but not so much that pursuit

of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect is categorically an exigent circumstance. Id. at 2016,

2021. “An officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine

whether there is a law enforcement emergency. On many occasions, the officer will

have good reason to enter—to prevent imminent harms of violence, destruction of

evidence, or escape from the home. But when the officer has time to get a warrant, he

must do so—even though the misdemeanant fled.” Id. at 2024. The ultimate question in

this analysis is whether the officers’ actions were reasonable. Id. at 2017.

Here, defendants first argue that Sgt. Allison’s warrantless entry into Caldwell’s

home was reasonable because Caldwell fled and they were in active pursuit of

Caldwell. (DE # 64 at 9.) Defendants’ argument is precisely the type of categorical

application of the hot pursuit exigent circumstance exception that the Supreme Court

rejected in Lange.3 Moreover, the only case defendants cite, White v. Hefel, 875 F.3d 350,

357 (7th Cir. 2017), is plainly distinguishable, as the suspect in White fled into a

stranger’s home, rather than his own.

3 The court notes that Lange was decided after defendants’ motion was filed.

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Defendants also argue that exigent circumstances exist because Sgt. Allison

reasonably believed that Caldwell posed a danger to the officers on the scene and there

was also a risk that Caldwell would escape. (DE # 64 at 10.) Defendants point to Sgt.

Allison’s knowledge of Caldwell’s prior interactions with law enforcement, where he

shouted and took a fighting stance, and generally behaved in an erratic and

unpredictable manner. Defendants also point to Sgt. Allison’s knowledge that Caldwell

had been accused of knocking a woman over while he was riding his bicycle and the

fact that, two days earlier, Sgt. Allison learned that Caldwell had threatened to abduct

women and children from the park.

This case presents a close question. However, given all that Sgt. Allison knew of

Caldwell’s history, a reasonable officer in his shoes would have been justified in the

belief that an emergency situation existed and a warrantless entry into Caldwell’s home

was necessary to protect the officers, public, and/or prevent Caldwell’s escape.

In his response brief, Caldwell asserts that Sgt. Allison unlawfully entered his

house a second time, after Caldwell escaped from the house. (DE # 68 at 1.) Even

liberally construing his amended complaint, Caldwell did not raise a claim regarding a

second entry of his home, and he cannot amend his complaint through arguments in his

response brief to a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d

989, 998 (7th Cir. 2012). However, even if he had raised such a claim, defendants would

be entitled to summary judgment, as Sgt. Allison’s two entries were part of a single,

continuous search or seizure. See e.g. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575

U.S. 600, 612 (2015); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978). Sgt. Allison was not

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required to justify the continuing emergency with respect to his re-entry, because he re-

entered the house to ensure that Caldwell was not still hiding in the house. Id.

D. Qualified Immunity

Even if defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on Caldwell’s

warrantless entry claims, defendants would nevertheless be entitled to summary

judgment on their defense of qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity

shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Marshall v. Allen,

984 F.2d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 1993). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986). The United States Supreme Court holds that if no constitutional right was

violated, there is no necessity for further inquiries. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). However, if a violation could be made, the next step is to ask whether the right

was clearly established; this inquiry must be undertaken in light of the particular

circumstances of the case. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that the

conduct was unlawful in the situation the officer confronted. Id. “A constitutional right

is ‘clearly established’ for qualified-immunity purposes where [t]he contours of the

right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 731 (7th Cir.

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2013). “A case holding that the exact action in question is unlawful is not necessary.”

Alicea v. Thomas, 815 F.3d 283, 291 (7th Cir. 2016).

In 2013, the Supreme Court found that an officer was entitled to qualified

immunity for chasing a fleeing misdemeanant onto the curtilage of a home because of a

split in federal and state case law on the propriety of doing so. Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S.

3, 10–11 (2013). Since Stanton, the law in this area has remained unsettled. See e.g.

Rodriguez v. City of Berwyn, No. 16 C 5106, 2018 WL 5994984, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15,

2018) (“[E]xisting Fourth Amendment precedent does not clearly resolve whether

pursuing a suspect from the site of misdemeanor resistance into his home counts as a

hot pursuit of the sort that justifies entering the suspect’s home without a warrant[.]”);

Burns v. Vill. of Crestwood, No. 12-CV-484, 2016 WL 946654, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2016)

(“There is uncertainty in the law concerning whether the hot pursuit of a person

suspected of a misdemeanor is sufficient to constitute an ‘exigent circumstance’ that

frees police from the warrant requirement.”). In fact, it was not until this June (long

after the incident in this case) that the Supreme Court settled the question in Lange and

found that, depending on the circumstances of the case, hot pursuit of a suspected

misdemeanant may constitute an exigent circumstance. Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2024.

“Qualified immunity is supposed to protect officers in the close case, and it

therefore must apply to the officer’s snap judgment in a legally hazy area.” White v.

Stanley, 745 F.3d 237, 241 (7th Cir. 2014). That is precisely the type of case Sgt. Allison

faced when deciding whether to pursue Caldwell into his home. In light of the unsettled

state of the law at the time, Sgt. Allison’s decision was not “plainly incompetent” or

11

“beyond debate,” see Stanton, 571 U.S. at 10-11, and therefore Sgt. Allison would be

entitled to qualified immunity for his warrantless entry into Caldwell’s home, to the

extent that his entry violated the Fourth Amendment.

E. Claims under the Indiana Constitution

Caldwell also purports to bring claims under the Indiana Constitution. “A few

states have enacted statutes creating or regulating claims for damages for state

constitutional torts. Indiana, however, has no statutory provision comparable to 42

U.S.C. section 1983 creating an explicit civil remedy for constitutional violations by

either individual officers or governmental entities.” Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488,

493 (Ind. 2006). In Cantrell, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to adopt a general

position regarding private rights of action under the state constitution. Instead, the

Court held that there was no private right of action for damages under Article I, § 9 of

the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 507.

Since Cantrell, both Indiana and federal courts have consistently declined to find

an implied right of action for damages under the Indiana constitution. See e.g. City of

Indianapolis v. Cox, 20 N.E.3d 201, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“[N]o Indiana court has

explicitly recognized a private right of action for monetary damages under the Indiana

Constitution.” (quoting Smith v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 871 N.E.2d 975, 985 (Ind. Ct. App.

2007)); Hoagland vs. Franklin Township Community School Corp., 10 N.E.3d 1034, 1040

(Ind.Ct.App.2014) (“[T]here is no express or implied right of action for monetary

damages under the Indiana Constitution”); Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645

12

(7th Cir. 2014) (noting that Indiana has yet to recognize a civil remedy for violations of

the Indiana Constitution); Higdon v. Town of Lakeville, No. 3:15-CV-234-RLM-CAN, 2015

WL 5353266 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2015) (collecting cases); Williams v. Sch. Town of Munster,

No. 2:12-CV-225-APR, 2014 WL 1794565, at *8 (N.D. Ind. May 6, 2014); Ferris v. Williams,

No. 1:11-CV-836-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6201074, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 2012).

This court will likewise decline to recognize an implied cause of action under the

Indiana Constitution. “[R]ecognizing [] an implied right to sue for damages under the

Indiana Constitution would work a dramatic change in Indiana law . . .. If such a step is

to be taken, it will need to be taken by the Indiana courts, not by a federal court whose

duty is to apply existing Indiana law.” Estate of O’Bryan v. Town of Sellersburg, No.

3:02CV00238-DFH-WGH, 2004 WL 1234215, at *21 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2004). Thus,

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on any claim for damages based

on violations of the Indiana Constitution.

F. State Law Claims

Caldwell’s amended complaint also appears to allege violations of Indiana tort

law. Defendants argue that any such claim is barred because Caldwell failed to file a

timely tort claims notice in accordance with the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). Ind.

Code § 34-13-3-8.

Tort claims brought under Indiana law are subject to the ITCA’s procedural and

substantive requirements. Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 648 (7th Cir.

2006) (citing Bienz v. Bloom, 674 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ( “[O]ur supreme

13

court has held that the Act applies to all torts.”)). “Compliance with the ITCA is a

prerequisite to pursuing a tort claim . . . regardless of whether suit is filed in state or

federal court.” Id.

Here, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Caldwell failed to provide the

notice required to pursue a tort claim under Indiana law. (DE # 64-4 at 2.) Accordingly,

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Caldwell’s Indiana tort

claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE # 63) is GRANTED. The court

directs the Clerk to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT stating:

Judgment is entered in favor of defendants John Patston, Steve Kobitz,

and Christopher Allison, and against plaintiff Chase Caldwell, who shall

take nothing by way of the complaint.

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 28, 2021

s/James T. Moody

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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