The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
EDWARD MICHAEL STRAUSS,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO.: 2:19-CV-423-TLS-JEM
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
JANE DOE, in her official and individual
capacity, JILL DOE, in her official and
individual capacity, and YOUTUBE LLC
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant YouTube LLC’s Motion to Transfer or
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 14]. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant’s
Motion is granted, and the case is dismissed without prejudice.1
On November 5, 2019, Plaintiff Edward Michael Strauss filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1]
in which he brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim and a misconduct claim against Defendant
YouTube LLC. In addition to the claims against Defendant YouTube LLC, the Plaintiff also filed
claims against two unnamed defendants and the United States Postal Service. On July 21, 2021,
the Court dismissed the claims against Defendant United States Postal Service for lack of service
of process. See ECF No. 19. Defendant YouTube LLC has filed a Motion to Transfer or Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 14]. The Plaintiff has not filed a response, and the time to do so
has passed.
1 Defendant YouTube LLC requests that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California or be dismissed. The Plaintiff’s claim is baseless and without merit. The
Court finds it is in the interest of judicial economy to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims at this time.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the viability of a complaint
by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A.
Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court presumes that all well-
pleaded allegations are true, views these well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Reynolds v. CB Sports
Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). Surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following allegations are contained in the Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1]. The
Plaintiff, on or about October 21, 2019, entered the United States Post Office in Merrillville,
Indiana. Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1. On that date, he took a video of an altercation between another
individual and two post office employees. Id. at ¶¶ 9–12. Sometime after taking the video, the
Plaintiff uploaded the video to the online video sharing and social media platform YouTube. Id.
at ¶ 13. On October 22, 2019, the Plaintiff received notification that a complaint had been
submitted to Defendant YouTube LLC regarding his video. Id. He received an additional
notification, on October 25, 2019, that the video had been removed from the video sharing
platform for privacy violations. Id.
ANALYSIS
The Plaintiff has alleged a § 1985 claim (Count III) and a misconduct claim (Count V)
against Defendant YouTube LLC. Aside from these claims, the Plaintiff has also alleged claims
against unnamed postal workers (Count I, Count II, and Count V). The Court first considers the
two claims against Defendant YouTube LLC and then considers the claims against the unnamed
postal workers.
A. Section 1985 Claim Against Defendant YouTube LLC
The Plaintiff alleges that,
[o]n or about October 25th, 2019[,] Defendant YouTube LLC acted under color of
custom or policy when they conspired with Defendants Jane and/or Jill Doe on a
report of a Privacy Violation for a video that was lawfully recorded and
distributed in the Town of Merrillville, County of Lake, State of Indiana[,] with
the intent to restrict the further publication of [its] public interest content of the
interactions with a government official.
Compl. ¶ 31. He further alleges that, by doing so, “Defendant YouTube LLC’s conduct deprived
[the Plaintiff] of his rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.” Id. at ¶ 33; see also id. at ¶ 34.
To recover under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish:
(1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) a purpose of depriving a person or class of
persons of equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy, and (4) an injury to person or property or a deprivation of a right or
privilege granted to U.S. citizens.
Juillerat v. Town Council of Andrews, No. 1:15-CV-98, 2016 WL 1660480, at *4–5 (N.D. Ind.
Apr. 27, 2016) (quoting Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 297 (7th Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “to
establish the purpose of the conspiracy under prong two, ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate racial,
ethnic, or other class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.’”
Id. (quoting Xiong, 700 F.3d at 297) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Plaintiff
has not alleged that the Defendants’ actions were motivated by racial or other class-based
discriminatory animus. The Plaintiff’s allegations do not support the basic elements of a
§ 1985(3) claim; therefore, his § 1985 claim is dismissed. See id.
B. Misconduct Claim Against Defendant YouTube LLC
Count V is a claim of “intentional willful and wanton misconduct against all the
defendants.” Compl. p. 10. This Count contains three paragraphs, one incorporating the
allegations set forth in the prior forty-three paragraphs, one detailing the relief the Plaintiff is
seeking, and one alleging
[t]hat the wrongful conduct of all Defendants as alleged herein constitutes bad
faith and wanton, willful and malicious conduct in that Defendants acted or failed
to act when they knew or had reason to know that their conduct created
unreasonable risk of physical and/or emotional damage to [the Plaintiff], and that
a high probability that substantial harm would result.
Compl. ¶ 45.
Defendant YouTube LLC has provided reasons why the Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim
against it for the cited conduct. The Court need not assess these arguments, as Count V is clearly
deficient on its face. Count V of the Plaintiff’s Complaint does nothing more than conclude that
Defendant YouTube LLC committed willful and wanton misconduct, which is insufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.
The Plaintiff, in Count V, does not specify what type of claim he is attempting to bring or
distinguish what conduct is actionable under such a claim. It appears, based on the language of
paragraph forty-five, that the Plaintiff is attempting to assert an Indiana negligence claim. Under
Indiana law:
Willful or wanton misconduct consists of either: “1) an intentional act done with
reckless disregard of the natural and probable consequence of injury to a known
person under the circumstances known to the actor at the time; or 2) an omission
or failure to act when the actor has actual knowledge of the natural probable
consequence of injury and his opportunity to avoid this risk.
Sportsdrome Speedway, Inc. v. Clark, 49 N.E.3d 653, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Ellis v.
City of Martinsville, 940 N.E.2d 1197, 1204–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). Such an action “has ‘two
elements: 1) the defendant must have knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a
course of misconduct calculated to result in probable injury, and 2) the actor’s conduct must
have exhibited an indifference to the consequences of his own conduct.’” Id. (quoting Miner v.
Sw. Sch. Corp., 755 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). The Indiana Supreme Court has
explained that “‘wanton and willful’ and ‘reckless’ seem to imply the same disregard for the
safety of others.” Id. (quoting Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. 1986)).
The Plaintiff’s Complaint does not articulate how Defendant YouTube LLC, by removing
the Plaintiff’s video, held a disregard for his safety, had knowledge of an impending danger, or
calculated that its conduct would result in probable injury. The Plaintiff offers only conclusions,
which do not meet the pleading requirements. Seemingly, the Plaintiff is treating his Indiana
negligence claim as a vehicle for recovery for any conduct he deems inappropriate. Such types of
claims are not supported by the law. In addition, claims alleging willful and wanton misconduct
are not free claims that can be bootstrapped to any lawsuit. They, like any other claim, require
the Plaintiff to make sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level. In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to meet such requirements, and his willful and wanton
misconduct claim is dismissed.
C. Claims Against Unnamed Postal Workers
Finally, the Plaintiff brings allegations against unknown defendants identified in the
Complaint as Jane Doe and Jill Doe. “[I]t is pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in
federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1997) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims against the unnamed
defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant YouTube LLC’s Motion to
Transfer or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 14] and DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant YouTube LLC without prejudice. Additionally, the Court DISMISSES the
Plaintiff’s claims against the unnamed defendants Jane Doe and Jill Doe in this case without
prejudice. As none of the Plaintiff’s claims remain pending, the Clerk of Court is directed to
close this case.
SO ORDERED on July 23, 2021.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT