The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER L. SCRUGGS,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO. 3:17-CV-467-PPS-MGG
SGT. MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
After screening Christopher L. Scruggs’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, I granted him leave to proceed on claims against: (1) Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair
for using excessive force against him on November 14, 2016; (2) C.O. Washington and
C.O. Peterson for failing to intervene in Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair’s use of excessive
force on November 14, 2016; (3) Capt. Earhart,1 Director Salyer,2 Superintendent Seiver,
and Assistant Superintendent Payne for retaliating against him by having him placed in
an unsanitary cell and depriving him of his personal effects for his complaining about
the food safety conditions of the jail; and (4) Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair in their
individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against
him by assaulting him on November 14, 2016, for complaining about the food safety
conditions of the jail. ECF 10; ECF 49. The defendants have now filed a motion pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for partial judgment on the pleadings, asserting
1 While sued as Captain Earheart, he will be referred to by the correct spelling of his name in this order.
2 While sued as Director Salery, he will be referred to by the correct spelling of his name in this order.
that Scruggs did not plead sufficient facts to support his allegations that C.O.
Washington and C.O. Peterson failed to intervene in Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair’s use
of excessive force on November 14, 2016 or that Capt. Earhart, Director Salyer,
Superintendent Seiver, and Assistant Superintendent Payne retaliated against him by
having him placed in an unsanitary cell and depriving him of his personal effects for his
complaining about the food safety conditions of the jail. The defendants also assert that
they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims for the same reasons.
While the motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), I
must apply the same standard that is applied to motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs. Grp., Inc., 778 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir.
2015). Given that the court screens prisoner cases in part under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard,
the motion is akin to a motion to reconsider, which is generally disfavored absent a
manifest error of law or fact. Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982),
aff’d, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). Treated either as a motion to reconsider or a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the operative standard for this pleading stage remains dispositive
nonetheless: the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Luevano v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d
1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). Consistent with this standard, the court construes all
reasonable inferences in Scruggs’s favor.
In my screening order (ECF 10), entered more than three years ago, I
summarized Scruggs’s allegations in part as follows:
[O]n November 4, 2016, [Scruggs] observed Sgt. Miller handling
food in an unsanitary manner. Scruggs told Lt. Creasy, Capt. Earheart, and
Director Salery about Sgt. Miller’s actions, but nothing was done. Scruggs
then began telling visitors, filing grievances, and even went on a hunger
strike to protest Sgt. Miller’s handling of food.
On November 14, 2016, Scruggs was taken into a hallway where Sgt.
Miller and Sgt. SinClair were waiting for him. When Scruggs entered the
hallway, Sgt. Miller and Sgt. SinClair told him that he “would learn to keep
his mouth closed.” ECF 2 at 3. Miller and SinClair then proceeded to attack
Scruggs. During this time, C.O. Washington, C.O. Peterson and an
unidentified officer were present, watched the events unfold and did
nothing to stop the attack. Then, at the direction of Capt. Earheart, Complex
Director Salery, Superintendent Seiver, and Assistant Superintendent
Payne, Scruggs was placed into a filthy cell and denied his personal effects,
in retaliation for him speaking about Sgt. Miller’s actions.
ECF 10 at 1-2.
In analyzing Scruggs’s allegations that C.O. Washington and C.O. Peterson failed
to intervene in the sergeants’ use of excessive force, I noted that “[p]olice officers who
have a realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating
a plaintiff’s right through the use of excessive force but fail to do so [may be] held
liable.” Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2000) (referencing Yang v. Hardin, 37
F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1994). I found that, when Scruggs is given the inferences to which
he is entitled at the screening stage, he alleged a plausible claim that C.O. Washington
and C.O. Peterson knew that the other officers were engaging in excessive force, had an
opportunity to prevent them from using more force than was necessary under the
circumstances, and nevertheless failed to intervene. ECF 10 at 2. I acknowledged that
further factual development may show that these defendants acted reasonably under
the circumstances, or did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene, but I found that
Mr. Scruggs had alleged enough to proceed on this claim. Id. at 2-3.
In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the defendants assert that the
“facts as pled fail to establish a sufficient causative basis for personal liability.” ECF 285
at 5. They assert that there is a lack of facts showing a realistic opportunity to prevent
the use of force. Id. Defendants fault Scruggs for not specifying what the officers were
doing or whether it was possible for them to intervene. Id. Defendants note that it is
plausible that C.O. Washington and C.O. Peterson were engaged with another offender,
tending to a medical emergency with another offender, could not see the purported
assault, or that there was insufficient time for them to react. Id. at 6. All these things are
indeed plausible. However, the plausible inferences go to Scruggs, not the defendants.
Here, I found that, based on Scruggs’s allegation that C.O. Washington and C.O.
Peterson were present, watching the events unfold, and did nothing to stop the attack, it
was reasonable to infer that they had an opportunity to prevent the use of excessive
force. The complaint alleges that the other officers “watched as lookouts.” ECF 2 at 4.
This suggests the officers were aware of what was going on and not otherwise engaged
with a task that prevented them from intervening. The defendants have pointed to no
manifest error of law or facts in the screening order, and I thereby stand by my
determination that Scruggs pled sufficient facts to state a claim against C.O.
Washington and C.O. Peterson for failure to intervene.
In regard to Scruggs’s allegations that Capt. Earheart, Director Salery,
Superintendent Seiver and Assistant Superintendent Payne, ordered him to be placed
into a filthy cell and denied his personal effects in retaliation for him speaking about
Sgt. Miller’s handling of food, I noted the following:
“To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, [Scruggs] must
show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2)
he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment
activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a
motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory
action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, Scruggs’s complaints about food safety conditions at the prison, if
true, could constitute protected speech. Based on the allegations contained
in the complaint, these defendants made the decision to place him in a
filthy cell and deprive him of his personal effects based on his protected
speech. Though further fact finding may reveal otherwise, Scruggs has
adequately plead his retaliation claim.
ECF 10 at 4.
In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants assert that Scruggs’s
complaint does not adequately plead a link between the protected activity and the
deprivation. ECF 285 at 4. Defendants fault Scruggs for not pleading “facts that
specifically state how or why the cell transfer order was issued.” Id. They suggest the
complaint should “outlin[e] Defendants’ thought patterns or professional reasoning in
relation to the transfer.” Id. They again set forth plausible explanations inconsistent
with liability: “it is entirely plausible that that [sic] these Defendants had no knowledge
of Plaintiff’s complaints, or otherwise made their decision in accordance with the
facility’s standard penological objectives as would be typical.” Id. These explanations
certainly are plausible, and they had the opportunity to develop them during discovery.
But it is also plausible that the decision to place him in a filthy cell was based on his
speech, an inference which I found reasonable at the screening stage, based on the
complaint as a whole. This includes the timeline leading up to this occurrence, and the
frequency and manner in which Scruggs made his complaints known. During the
attack, Sgt. Miller allegedly said that Scruggs “would learn to keep his mouth close[d].”
ECF 2 at 3. He was taken to the filthy cell immediately after this attack. Id. And, when
Scruggs told the officers that they needed to clean the cell, they responded by saying
that they had the prior offender removed “just so they could put [Scruggs] in [the other
offenders] shitty cell.” Id. The defendants have pointed to no manifest error of law or
fact my conclusion that these allegations state a claim.
The defendants also argue that, for the same reasons that are outlined above,
they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects government
officials from civil liability when performing discretionary functions so long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the pleadings provide
insufficient facts to permit me to conclude that the defendants conduct did not violate
Scruggs’s clearly established rights under the First and Eighth amendments. See Delgado
v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 521 (7th Cir. 2002). While the matter may have been suitable for
summary judgment, the defendants opted not to file a motion for summary judgment
by the deadline.
Finally, Scruggs filed a motion asking for additional time to respond to the
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively, for a stay in briefing. ECF 286.
Because the defendants’ motion must be denied even in the absence of a response from
Scruggs, his motion for additional time or a stay in briefing will be denied.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) DENIES Christopher L. Scruggs’s motion for additional time or a stay in
briefing (ECF 286); and
(2) DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF 284).
SO ORDERED on April 21, 2021.
s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT