The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JAMES MICHAEL WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO. 3:18-CV-614-DRL-MGG
DUSTIN YOUNG,
Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
James Michael Wright, a prisoner without a lawyer, proceeds against one defendant on one
claim: “Dustin Young in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for pointing
his handgun at him during the arrest on May 24, 2018, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Officer
Young now requests summary judgment. Mr. Wright has responded.
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every dispute between
the parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). However, a party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading,
but rather must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.”
Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment “is the put up
or shut up moment in a lawsuit.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008).
Officer Young initiated a traffic stop on May 24, 2018 when he saw a vehicle with an
improperly mounted license plate. Thereafter the material facts prove in dispute. Officer Young says
he saw Mr. Wright exit the stopped vehicle after he turned on his lights and siren. ECF 42-1 at 2. He
says Mr. Wright “suddenly turned towards me [and] placed his hands in his right pants pocket and
reached toward his waistband.” Id. at 2-3. Though he acknowledges drawing his gun, he says he “never
pointed [it] at James Michael Wright.” Id. at 3. In contrast, Mr. Wright describes the event this way:
I was standing outside of the parked vehicle when Officer Young “initiated his traffic
stop.” Officer Young turned on his siren and lights, I turned around to see what was
going on, when I turned around to face him I seen he had his gun drawn and pointed
at me. I immediately put my hands into the air because I was in fear for my life and
Officer Young then ordered me into the vehicle.
ECF 46 at 3.
Officer Young objects that the response brief lacks a section titled “Statement of Genuine
Disputes” as required by N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2). Mr. Wright isn’t represented by counsel, and his
response unambiguously sets forth these disputed facts. Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c)(3) permits the court to consider any materials in the record even if not properly cited. His
statement in his response is consistent with the sworn statement he made in his amended complaint:
“I was outside of my wife’s vehicle when Officer Young pulled up. Office Young used excessive force
by drawing his handgun and ordering me at gunpoint into the driver seat of my wife’s vehicle.” ECF
6 at 2. See James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A] verified complaint—signed, sworn,
and submitted under penalty of perjury—can be considered ‘affidavit material’ provided the factual
allegations otherwise satisfy the affidavit criteria specified in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the declarant complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, which sets forth the requirements for
verification under penalty of perjury.”).
Officer Young objects that Mr. Wright’s statement is speculation. This seems hardly so.
Federal Rule of Evidence 602 permits a person to testify about facts within his personal knowledge.
Mr. Wright says he turned around and saw Officer Young pointing a gun at him. That statement is
about facts within his personal knowledge. It isn’t based on speculation.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Wright, Officer Young pointed his gun
at the back of a person standing beside a car with an improperly mounted license plate. The question
in Fourth Amendment excessive use of force cases is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “The test of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). Rather, the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances” justifies
the officers’ actions. Graham at 396. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the perfect vision of
hindsight. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s
chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. However, “police are not entitled to point their guns
at citizens when there is no hint of danger.” Id. Based on the disputed facts alleged by Mr. Wright,
Officer Young could have had no reasonable fear of danger when he is alleged to have pointed his
gun at Mr. Wright’s back while he was standing next to a car with an improperly mounted license
plate. If proven, a reasonable jury could find that Officer Young used excessive force.
Officer Young also argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. “A public official defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity unless two disqualifying criteria are met. First, the evidence construed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff must support a finding that the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional right. Second, that right must have been clearly established at the time of the
violation.” Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, the defendant’s qualified immunity
argument has not construed the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. When so
construed, that right was clearly established by 2018 when these events occurred because “pointing a
gun at a compliant adult in a non-threatening situation, as in this case, can also constitute excessive
force.” Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2009). Officer Young is not entitled to qualified
immunity on this disputed record.
Accordingly, the court DENIES the summary judgment motion (ECF 41).
SO ORDERED.
August 28, 2020 s/ Damon R. Leichty
Judge, United States District Court