The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
JEFFREY CHANEY,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-205-JD-MGG
WILLIAM HYATTE,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Jeffrey Chaney, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed this lawsuit against four
defendants alleging he is not being protected from attack by fellow inmates at the
Miami Correctional Facility. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. “In order to state a
claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him
of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state
law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a constitutional duty to
protect inmates from violence. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008).
But, “prisons are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts, and many
prisoners have a propensity to commit more.” Id. Therefore, a failure-to-protect claim
cannot be predicated “merely on knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention
facility.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005). “[T]he fact that an inmate
sought and was denied protective custody is not dispositive of the fact that prison
officials were therefore deliberately indifferent to his safety.” Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d
549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997). Instead, the plaintiff must establish that “the defendant had
actual knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious,
culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to
prevent it.” Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010).
To establish deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants sued
individually, Klebanowski needed to show that the officers acted with the
equivalent of criminal recklessness, in this context meaning they were
actually aware of a substantial harm to Klebanowski’s health or safety, yet
failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from the specific danger.
Klebanowski testified during his deposition that he told officers twice on
September 8 that he was afraid for his life and he wanted to be transferred
off the tier. Those statements, and the officers’ knowledge of the first
beating, are the only pieces of evidence in the record that can assist
Klebanowski in his attempt to show that the officers were aware of any
risk to him. We have previously held that statements like those made by
Klebanowski are insufficient to alert officers to a specific threat. Butera,
285 F.3d at 606 (deeming insufficient to establish deliberate indifference
statements by a prisoner that he was “having problems in the block” and
“needed to be removed”). In Butera, we deemed the inmate’s statements
insufficient to give notice to the officers because they did not provide the
identities of those who threatened the inmate, nor state what the threats
were. Id.
The facts of this case make clear our reason for requiring more than
general allegations of fear or the need to be removed. By Klebanowski’s
own testimony, the officers knew only that he had been involved in an
altercation with three other inmates, and that he wanted a transfer
because he feared for his life. He did not tell them that he had actually
been threatened with future violence, nor that the attack on September 8
was inflicted by gang members because of his non-gang status. Without
these additional facts to rely on, there was nothing leading the officers to
believe that Klebanowski himself was not speculating regarding the threat
he faced out of fear based on the first attack he suffered. This lack of
specificity falls below the required notice an officer must have for liability
to attach for deliberate indifference.
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted).
Here, Chaney alleges he sought, but was denied protective custody since 2018.
He alleges his grandmother has been extorted to pay thousands of dollars because he is
a sex offender. He alleges he has reported concerns about three prison gangs: the Hell
Razors, the Gangster Disciples, and the Aryan Brotherhood. He alleges he was attacked
on February 5, 2020, by three members of the Aryan Brotherhood. He alleges he has
repeatedly injured himself and been placed on suicide watch. He alleges he told each of
the four defendants he needed protective custody, but he does not clearly say what he
told them nor when. As Santiago and Klebanowski explained, without specific knowledge
of an impending harm easily preventable, the defendants cannot be found to be
deliberately indifferent.
A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here, the complaint does
not provide sufficient facts to state a claim against any of these four defendants for
failing to protect him from attack on February 5, 2020. Chaney argues some of the
defendants should be held liable because they supervise others, but “public employees
are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555
F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). Therefore he has not
stated a claim for monetary damages.
Nevertheless, he alleges he is in danger and seeks injunctive relief to protect him
from future attacks. He asks “to be housed in G-Dorm for PC reasons and allow[ed] to
keep my job in PEN Products . . . at minimum wage . . ..” ECF 1 at 3. But,
[t]he PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court’s authority to enter an
injunction in the corrections context. Where prison conditions are found to
violate federal rights, remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and use the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right. This section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly
made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison
officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
institutions they manage.
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted). Therefore if the court were to find that Chaney was not being protected from
attack by other inmates as required by the Eighth Amendment, the court could only
order that he be provided with protection which meets the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. If that could be done without him being employed by PEN Products at
minimum wage while living on G-Dorm, then the PLRA would not permit injunctive
relief requiring those conditions.
The Miami Correctional Facility Warden has both the authority and the
responsibility to ensure that Chaney is protected from attack as required by the Eighth
Amendment. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). Therefore,
Chaney will be allowed to proceed on an official capacity claim for permanent
injunctive relief against the Warden.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Jeffrey Chaney leave to proceed against William Hyatte in his
official capacity as the Warden of the Miami Correctional Facility for permanent
injunctive relief to protect him from attack by fellow inmates as required by the Eighth
Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Nathan Angle, Harbough, and Johnson;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk to request Waiver of Service from (and if necessary the
United States Marshals Service to serve process on) William Hyatte in his official
capacity as the Warden of the Miami Correctional Facility at the Indiana Department of
Correction with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 1), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d);
(5) ORDERS William Hyatte in his official capacity as the Warden of the Miami
Correctional Facility to file a sworn statement (with supporting records and reports
from others as necessary) by April 9, 2020, explaining what risks Jeffrey Chaney faces
from other inmates as well as what precautions are being taken to protect him from
attack by them; and
(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that William Hyatte in his
official capacity as the Warden of the Miami Correctional Facility respond, as provided
for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims
for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED on March 10, 2020
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT