Mean v. Pinckneyville Correctional Center

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARNELL MEAN, )

Y51826, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

PINCKNEYVILLE CORR. CTR., )

SCOTT REIS, C/O MUNCH, )

C/O GOODMAN, J KH, )

J BUTTROM, )

SUMMERFIELD, JOHN DOE 1, )

NURSE CLAP, NURSING STAFF, )

D. PAYNE, DIANE SKORCH, )

LT. RANSEN, DAVID MITCHELL, )

C/O LIVELY, )

MARAMONY CHENAULT, ) Case No. 23-cv-4011-DWD

RECORDS OFFICE STAFF, )

B WALLA, CHRISTAL CROW, )

DOCTOR MYERS, )

NURSE PRACTITIONER BOB, )

NURSE PRACTITIONER APRIL, )

NURSE PRACTITIONER JAMIE, )

PAIGE LONG, LATOYA HUGHES, )

TRAVIS BAYLOR, )

JEREMY BONNETT, )

MARGARET MADOLE, )

GREGORY LITTLE, )

SLOWERS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Darnell Mean, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Pinckneyville), brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional

rights. Initially, Plaintiff presented allegations styled as a petition for a writ of

mandamus. (Doc. 1). The Court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction but invited

an amended pleading. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) was also

found to be insufficient to state a claim (Doc. 15), but he has now filed a timely Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 16).

Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter

out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that

is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must

be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se

complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d

816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16)

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint names 29 defendants employed at two

facilities—Robinson Correctional Center and Pinckneyville Correctional Center.

Plaintiff’s allegations begin in May of 2023, at which time he claims that Defendant Reis

began to retaliate against him for a PREA (Prison Rape Elimination Act) report

concerning a longstanding Wexford nurse. Reis began by confiscating a medically

approved pillow, which Plaintiff needed to address breathing issues while he slept. (Doc.

16 at 12). Without the pillow Plaintiff had breathing problems, choked, and nearly passed

out one day at the officers’ station. At one point, an emergency code was called related

to his breathing difficulty.

Plaintiff was fearful of Reis’s conduct, so he requested a transfer to another facility

for his safety. He claims the transfer was approved by the transfer coordinator’s office in

July of 2023, but a related grievance was denied by Defendants Maramony Chenault and

Margaret Madole. (Doc. 16 at 13).

Next, Defendant Reis confiscated some of Plaintiff’s extra sheets despite Plaintiff

having a medical permit for extra sheets related to his allergies. Reis wrote a disciplinary

ticket related to the sheets that resulted in a brief commissary restriction. (Doc. 16 at 14).

On November 7, 2023, Reis instructed another employee to seize Plaintiff’s walker.

On November 12, 2023, Defendants Much and Goodman spoke with Plaintiff and

told him that Defendant Reis was “coming for [him] before retirement.” (Doc. 16 at 15).

Despite this verbal caution, Plaintiff faults Much and Goodman for failing to act and

denying him equal protection.

Plaintiff claims that on November 13, 2023, Reis carried out a premediated

retaliatory act when he went to Plaintiff’s zone (where he was not assigned) for a zone

inspection. (Doc. 16 at 15). Reis began to remove sheets from Plaintiff’s bed while

Plaintiff attempted to stand from his wheelchair to plead with Reis about the sheets.

Plaintiff alleges that as he reached for the sheet, Reis tackled him to the ground in a fit of

rage and shouted for him to stay down. (Doc. 16 at 16). Reis sprung up from the ground

as Plaintiff got to his knees, and Reis fled to another area of the room and fell where he

appeared trapped. Reis then stood and called an emergency via his radio. At the urging

of fellow inmates, Plaintiff agreed to be cuffed by Reis.

Ultimately, a disciplinary report was prepared that alleges Plaintiff was

pummeling Reis with closed fists, and that he shoved Reis down causing injuries to his

back and ribs. (Doc. 16 at 17). Defendants J KH and Buttrom were both majors on duty

during the incident, and they approved his temporary confinement and continued

confinement. (Doc. 16 at 17).

Around 9p.m. on November 13, 2023, Defendants Summerfield and John Doe 1

Investigator sought Plaintiff out in segregation to speak with him. Despite demands,

threats and also assurances that any information exchanged would remain at the

institution, Plaintiff felt unsure about speaking without a lawyer and refused to sign

reports prepared by the two. (Doc. 16 at 17-18). Mr. Summerfield indicated that he would

include in his report that Plaintiff was not examined by a Wexford nurse. (Doc. 16 at 18).

On November 14, 2023, the medical doctor, Wexford nursing staff, and Nurse Clap

saw Plaintiff in segregation to deliver his daily medications. Nurse Clap took his vitals

but otherwise ignored his complaints of injuries. (Doc. 16 at 19). About an hour later

Plaintiff was informed that he was being transferred.

Upon arrival at Pinckneyville, Plaintiff was greeted by Wexford nursing staff, but

his complaints of injuries were ignored. (Doc. 16 at 19). He claims it was made obvious

that because he assaulted a lieutenant he had to suffer, but he was also told he could make

sick call requests. (Doc. 16 at 20). He was told where the request slips are kept, and the

door to his segregation cell was slammed shut. Plaintiff alleges that he did not get vital

medications “for days.” (Doc. 16 at 20).

On November 17, 2023, Defendant Payne delivered a disciplinary ticket to

Plaintiff’s cell, but refused to take the stub where Plaintiff had listed witnesses. (Doc. 16

at 21). On November 20, 2023, Plaintiff arrived for his disciplinary hearing and was met

by “aggressive” comments from Defendant Little. (Doc. 16 at 22). Little refused to hear

Plaintiff’s full statement, told him to give the written copy to Defendant Skorch, and

insisted Plaintiff plead guilty or not guilty. Plaintiff realized that all three disciplinary

members—Defendants Little, Skorch, and Ransen—were lieutenants, which made him

feel the hearing was biased because Reis was also a lieutenant. He asked for the hearing

to be rescheduled with no success. (Doc. 16 at 22-23).

On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Mitchell (the Warden) a letter

about the unfair hearing and his need for medical care, but Mitchell ignored him. (Doc.

16 at 23-24). Mitchell also declined emergency status for a grievance on the same issues.

Having no other obvious path of recourse, Plaintiff then chose to file the writ of

mandamus that was the initiating document in this case. (Doc. 16 at 24).

At some point, Plaintiff alleges he also tried to explain that the disciplinary report

was libelous to Defendant Ransen, but Ransen thought it seemed a bit “sketchy and

unbelievable.” (Doc. 16 at 24-25). Plaintiff also contacted the Illinois State Police about

his allegations against Reis, but he was referred back to the Internal Affairs Unit at the

prison. (Doc. 16 at 25).

While in restrictive housing at Robinson, Plaintiff sought cleaning supplies to

clean his mat and floor due to a lack of medical supplies for his incontinence, but he was

denied cleaning supplies. (Doc. 16 at 25). He also was not allowed out of cell time, and

he was not allowed to attempt therapy for the loss of function of his right leg. He claims

grievances about these issues were denied by Defendant Lively. (Doc. 16 at 25).

On December 20 and 21, 2023, Defendant Slowers handcuffed Plaintiff inside of

his segregation cell to remove his cellmate. Plaintiff showed Slowers an administrative

directive, but Slowers continued with is behavior. (Doc. 16 at 26).

On December 12, 2023, Plaintiff sought a segregation cut so that he could see a

medical doctor. (Doc. 16 at 26). Because he knew about Plaintiff’s mandamus action,

Defendant Walla arbitrarily and capriciously denied Plaintiff’s request. Despite Walla’s

actions, right after the holidays Plaintiff was granted a seven-day cut. (Doc. 16 at 27).

Plaintiff additionally claims that Walla omitted facts in the disciplinary report. (Doc. 16

at 27).

Plaintiff asked the Pinckneyville Records Office for a copy of his final disciplinary

summary but was told that it was “never received try back at a later date.” (Doc. 16 at

27-28). He claims that he should have received the final summary within 30 days for

purposes of appeal, and he cites the Code of Federal Regulations for this proposition.

(Doc. 16 at 28). He filed a grievance about not getting a timely final summary report, and

after he had been released from restrictive housing on January 4, 2024, Defendants Paige

Long and Latoya Hughes concurred on a grievance about this issue. (Doc. 16 at 28).

Plaintiff claims that while in segregation, Dr. Myers repeatedly ignored or

cancelled his appointments because it is “customary” to not be seen by the doctor while

in restrictive housing. (Doc. 16 at 28-29). After being released from restrictive housing,

the call pass line was cancelled on at least three occasions. On February 16, 2024, he was

furloughed out for an orthopedic consult about foot problems. Defendants Bonnett,

Baylor, Lively and Crow all denied grievances or grievance appeals about his medical

needs. (Doc. 16 at 29).

Eventually, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant April began retaliating against him by

insisting that he ingest his medications in crushed form. (Doc. 16 at 29). He complained

to Defendant Bob about the retaliation, but Bob retaliated on behalf of April or did not

intervene. He also claims that at one point he should have been placed on a seizure

watch, but Bob did not conduct it properly after hearing his complaints about April.

(Doc. 16 at 29-30). He was also initially not allowed to use his wheelchair during this

watch. (Doc. 16 at 30).

In response to a grievance about his disciplinary proceedings, the Administrative

Review Board found that the charge of “assault with injury” was not substantiated, so it

directed the prison to amend the records. (Doc. 16 at 30). Plaintiff was not afforded a

new hearing, instead, the records of the discipline were changed, and he just received a

new final summary for the reduced charge. (Doc. 16 at 30-31). Plaintiff claims that

Defendant Walla told him he should just be satisfied that it was no longer an assault with

injury charge. (Doc. 16 at 31).

Plaintiff alleges that he is still being punished because he is only allowed two

phone calls per month, and he is not being allowed to contact his family to prepare

appropriate release plans for July of 2024.

He also faults Defendants Baylor and Hughes for denying one of his grievance

appeals in March of 2024.

In closing, he argues his due process rights were violated by the false disciplinary

report and faulty disciplinary proceedings. He further alleges punishment was imposed

as retaliation for seeking redress from the Courts, and that the record changes reflect an

abuse of power meant to infringe his First Amendment rights. Finally, he alleges medical

indifference and neglect by “Wexford medical staff completely ignoring request and

customary procedure specifically in RH (restrictive housing) is egregious and speaks

clearly of the Monell claim.” (Doc. 16 at 32). Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive

relief. He wants to be transferred to a minimum-security prison.

In support of the complaint, Plaintiff submitted various grievance and disciplinary

documentation, limited medical records, and other documents. (Doc. 16 at 44-94).

Based on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court designates

the following counts:

Claim 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Reis

for taking Plaintiff’s pillow, his walker, and his additional

sheets (all of which were medically approved) in the Spring

of 2023 at Robinson, and for the physical altercation in

November of 2023;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against

Defendants Munch and Goodman for acknowledging

Reis’s conduct but failing to act;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Clap for ignoring or refusing to address

Plaintiff’s injuries on November 14, 2023;

Claim 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

the Wexford nursing staff for refusing to address Plaintiff’s

injuries upon intake at Pinckneyville;

Claim 5: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendant Payne for refusing to take Plaintiff’s witness list

when he served the disciplinary ticket on November 17,

2023;

Claim 6: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendants Little, Skorch, and Ransen for their roles in the

disciplinary proceedings, including refusing to hear

Plaintiff’s statement;

Claim 7: Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant

Mitchell for ignoring Plaintiff’s letter and grievances about

the biased disciplinary hearing and his ongoing medical

needs;

Claim 8: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim

against Defendant Slowers for handcuffing Plaintiff within

his segregation cell on two dates in December of 2023;

Claim 9: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendant Walla for refusing Plaintiff’s segregation cut in

December of 2023, which he sought for medical reasons;

Claim 10: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Dr. Myers for cancelling Plaintiff’s

appointments or refusing to see him while in restrictive

housing;

Claim 11: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants

April or Bob for their handling of Plaintiff’s medications

and his need for care;

Claim 12: Conditions of confinement claim about Plaintiff’s stay in

restrictive housing at Robinson;

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissals

Plaintiff names Pinckneyville Correctional Center as a defendant, but an inmate

cannot sue the physical prison itself, so this defendant is dismissed with prejudice.

Additionally, in the closing remarks of his complaint he suggests a Monell claim against

Wexford, the corporate medical provider, but his allegations are too vague to sustain such

a claim, and he did not properly list Wexford as a defendant, so these allegations do not

state a valid claim.

Plaintiff names N.P. Jamie in his case caption, and in his listing of defendants, but

this individual is not mentioned in the factual narrative. In the listing of defendants,

Plaintiff explains that Defendant Jamie denied him eyeglasses and supplies for his

incontinence as an act of retaliation. While the denial of medical supplies could be a

freestanding claim, or could possibly be a retaliation claim, Plaintiff has not provided

enough information about Jamie’s actions to proceed. Accordingly, Defendant N.P.

Jamie will be dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff faults Defendants J KH Major, J. Buttrom, Summerfield, and John Doe 1

for their initial roles immediately following the incident with Defendant Reis on

November 13, 2023. Specifically, he claims J KH and Buttram were on duty at the time,

and they approved his temporary and continued placement in confinement.

Summerfield and John Doe 1 (investigator) came to talk to him in segregation about the

incident, but he was reluctant to talk to them and declined to sign any statements. None

of these allegations align with an easily identifiable constitutional right. Approving

temporary placement in a different housing location after a staff-inmate physical

altercation is commonplace, and Plaintiff does not allege there was anything wrong with

the conditions of the area he was placed. He also does not make it clear that Summerfield

or John Doe 1 did anything wrong, but rather seems to suggest he just did not trust them

when speaking about the incident. Because none of the allegations against these four

align with a clearly identifiable constitutional right, these individuals will be dismissed

without prejudice from the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff named the Records Office Staff at Robinson as a defendant, but this is not

a valid method to state a claim because 1983 claims are premised on personal

responsibility, and generally cannot stand against an unidentified group or entity.

Additionally, Plaintiff faults the record staff for refusing to give him a copy of his final

disciplinary summary, but they merely informed him they did not yet have a copy and

that he could inquire further later. Plaintiff indicates this is a problem by reference to the

Code of Federal Regulations, and he attached a copy of that code, but it deals with Federal

Bureau of Prisons inmates, and not state inmates. Even if there was a prison rule that

mandated quick release of the final summary, prison rules or regulations do not give rise

to § 1983 claims. As such, there is no valid claim against the Records Office Staff, and this

defendant is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges at various junctures throughout his pleading that Defendants C/O

Lively, Maramony Chenault, Chrystal Crow, Paige Long, Latoya Hughes, Travis Baylor,

Jeremy Bonnett, and Margaret Madole all participated in processing and rejecting his

various grievances. The mere role of processing grievances, even erroneously, is not

sufficient to give rise to a freestanding claim under § 1983. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations

against these defendants are insufficient, and they will all be dismissed without prejudice

from this action. If Plaintiff believes he could bring a valid amended claim related to

these individuals, it would be properly placed in the severed case because it appears he

interacted with these individuals at Pinckneyville, not Robinson.1

Discussion

Turning to the substance of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court

finds it most efficient to discretionarily sever this matter into two cases—one case for

the events at Robinson, and one for the events at Pinckneyville. See e.g., Dorsey v. Varga,

55 F.4th 1094, 1107 (7th Cir. 2022) (a court may sever into a new case mis-joined claims).

Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide certain limitations

on the presentation of different claims against different parties in a single lawsuit. “A

litigant cannot throw all of his grievances, against dozens of different parties, into one

stewpot.” Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012).

Multiple defendants may not be joined in a single action unless the plaintiff asserts at

least one claim to relief against each respondent that arises out of the same transaction or

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and presents a question of law or fact

common to all. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has

cautioned that courts should guard against “scattershot” pleading strategies, and that

1 The sole exception is Defendants Chenault and Madole, who allegedly reviewed a grievance while he was

at Robinson about his request to transfer. If he believes he has some additional claim against these

individuals related to Robinson, it would belong in this case.

they should “target for dismissal ‘omnibus’ complaints—often brought by repeat

players—that raise claims about unrelated conduct against unrelated defendants.”

Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 503 (7th Cir. 2018). Even if claims may be eligible for

joinder under Rule 20, a Court still possesses discretion to separate the claims into distinct

lawsuits. See e.g., Dorsey, 55 F.4th at 1103.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims are loosely united by an overarching theory of retaliation,

or perhaps by his theory of a due process violation, but simply because there are some

commonalities across claims, the Court is not required to allow all claims to proceed in a

single lawsuit. In this scenario, Plaintiff has now included claims against 29 defendants

concerning a rather wide variety of issues, spanning from retaliation about a PREA

report, to a physical altercation with a staff member, and to conditions of his confinement

and access to medical care for chronic issues at a separate facility. The potentially uniting

theories of retaliation are due process are thinly plead, and do not convince the Court

that judicial efficiency would be best served by allowing claims to proceed en masse in

this single case. Instead, the Court finds it significantly more efficient to allow Claims 1-

3 about Robinson to proceed in this lawsuit, while Claims 4-12 about events at

Pinckneyville will be severed into a new case.

Claim 1

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in May of 2023, Defendant Reis started a campaign

of retaliation against him related to a PREA investigation of a long-time Wexford nurse.

As part of this campaign, Reis confiscated a medically necessary pillow, extra bed sheets,

and a walker. After these confiscations, Defendants Munch and Goodman, personally

told Plaintiff that Reis had it out for him. In a fourth act of retaliation, Plaintiff claims

that in November of 2023, Reis entered his housing area for an inspection and initiated a

physical altercation with Plaintiff over bedsheets. Plaintiff suggests that Reis’s account

of the altercation was inaccurate and led to false discipline.

“First Amendment retaliation cases require the petitioner to show that the speech

or activity was constitutionally protected, a deprivation occurred to deter the protected

speech or activity, and the speech or activity was at least a motivating factor in the

decision to take retaliatory action.” Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020).

The ‘motivating factor’ amounts to a causal link between the activity and the unlawful

retaliation.” Id. The test of actionable retaliation is usually whether the retaliatory

conduct alleged would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from the exercise of his First

Amendment rights. Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002).

The Court will assume for purposes of analyzing the complaint, that Plaintiff’s

PREA activity is sufficient to constitute protected activity for purposes of initial review.

He claims that after he initiated a PREA complaint, Reis began to act out against him by

confiscated necessary items such as his pillow, sheets, and walker. He further alleges that

two other guards told him Reis was out to get him before he retired. Even after the

warning from other staff, Reis took another overt act against Plaintiff when they got in a

physical altercation. Given the progression of events and the alleged conversation

between Plaintiff, Munch and Goodman, the Court will allow him to proceed against

Defendant Reis for retaliation at this initial juncture. Ultimately this claim would turn

first on if Plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity, and then if there is a

causal link between his activity and Reis’s that can be substantiated.

Claim 2

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Munch and Goodman admitted in conversation

that they knew Reis had it out for him, but they failed to take an action to stop Reis’s

behavior. In Doxtator v. O’Brien, the Seventh Circuit summarized as follows:

An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law

enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is

liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know: (1) that excessive force

was being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that

any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement

official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent

the harm from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)

(emphasis omitted). In sum, an officer must know that a citizen's rights are

being infringed, and he must have a “realistic opportunity” to intervene.”

39 F.4th 852, 864 (7th Cir. 2022).

Here, Plaintiff alleges clearly that Munch and Goodman knew or believed Reis

was targeting him, though he does not specifically indicate if they knew of Reis’s

previous acts or if they knew Reis had a plan for a future interaction with Plaintiff. He

does not allege that either Munch or Goodman were present on the day of the altercation

in his cell, or that they specifically knew this interaction may occur. It is a very close call

whether Plaintiff’s allegations against Munch and Goodman are sufficient to proceed for

failure to intervene, but at this early stage the Court must read the pleading broadly in

Plaintiff’s favor. Reading the pleading broadly, Plaintiff could have a plausible claim that

Munch and Goodman knew of ongoing or upcoming retaliation but failed to act. Claim

2 may proceed against Munch and Goodman.

Plaintiff also mentions Equal Protection in relation to Munch and Goodman, but

this assertion is threadbare and is not supported by any obvious assertions that Plaintiff

was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates or that he was singled out

based on a protected characteristic. Accordingly, no theory of Equal Protection will

proceed.

Claim 3

Plaintiff alleges that the day after the altercation he was seen in segregation by

Defendant Clap for routine medications and a check of his vitals. Despite Clap being

physically present, she allegedly refused to inspect or provide care for his injuries. While

these allegations could give rise to a classic deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff does

not provide any detail about the injuries he may have sustained during the altercation

with Defendant Reis. Without information about his physical state, the Court cannot find

that Plaintiff has made a threshold showing of a serious medical need. Accordingly,

Claim 3 against Defendant Clap is dismissed without prejudice.

To the extent that Plaintiff also attempted to name a doctor or generic Wexford

nursing staff in association with the visit on the morning of November 14, 2023, he cannot

proceed for the same reasons related to Nurse Clap.

In sum, Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed on Claims 1 and 2 against Defendants

Reis, Goodman and Munch. All other allegations about occurrences at Robinson are

dismissed as insufficient to state a claim. All allegations related to Pinckneyville that are

associated with Claims 4-12 will be severed into a new case. Service will proceed as

described below.

Motion for Recruitment of Counsel

Plaintiff has moved for recruited counsel (Doc. 15) on the premise that he does not

have formal knowledge of legal procedures. There is no right to the appointment of

counsel in civil matters. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010). When

presented with a request to appoint counsel, the Court must consider: “(1) has the

indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively

precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff

appear competent to litigate it himself [.]” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).

This is Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Counsel. His first was denied in part because he did

not provide of his efforts to seek his own counsel, and in part because he appeared

competent to represent his interests. In the Second Motion (Doc. 15), Plaintiff has

included proof that he has contacted at least one law firm, and a few other entities for

assistance with this case.

Despite Plaintiff’s efforts to secure his own assistance, the Court must also

determine if he is capable at this time of representing his own interests. On this front,

Plaintiff indicated he has some college education and that he can read, understand, and

learn with some lapses related to his seizure disorder and past brain damage. At this

early juncture of the case, the Court finds Plaintiff competent. He has prepared two

amended pleadings, the second of which is sufficient to proceed. The next steps of the

case will require a basic exchange of information and an inquiry into the exhaustion of

administrative remedies. These tasks are guided by clear scheduling orders and should

be within Plaintiff’s abilities. Plaintiff may renew his motion later in this case if necessary.

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 18)

On June 6, 2024, the Court received Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. 18), wherein he discusses a wide variety of issues including a state court

criminal prosecution against him related to Defendant Reis, a change in his prison

security classification, and problems accessing a wide variety of medical care, among

other things. As for the state court criminal prosecution, it seems that perhaps he is

seeking court intervention on this issue, but federal courts almost always refrain from

interfering in ongoing state court criminal matters, and this Court presently sees no basis

to intervene in any such proceeding. Plaintiff has not alleged he is unable to genuinely

dispute issues before the state court, and that is where he should raise any type of

challenge he has to those proceedings.

All other aspects of his Motion (Doc. 18) relate to his confinement at Pinckneyville,

and thus to the claims being severed into a new case. As such, the Motion (Doc. 18) will

be DENIED without prejudice in this case. The Court could direct that the Motion (Doc.

18) be filed in the newly severed case, but it will not do so because many of the issues

discussed in the Motion pertain to things that do not relate to Claims 4-12. To secure

injunctive relief, an inmate must have a likelihood of success on underlying claims, and

the relief sought must align with the claims presented. See e.g., Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810,

818 (7th Cir. 2020); Bentz v. Ghosh, 2018 WL 4084388 at * 1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2018) (injunctive

relief must relate to the underlying claims, relief lying outside the issues of the suit is

beyond the power of the court). The purpose of injunctive relief is to maintain the status

quo during litigation, not to stop issues unrelated to the litigation. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 18) will also be DENIED with respect to ongoing issues at

Robinson because the allegations are too broadly and are largely unrelated to the

potential operative claims. Plaintiff may re-file a motion for injunctive relief in the

severed case if he feels it is appropriate.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Claims 4-12 are severed into a new lawsuit. Claims

4-12 concern Defendants: Wexford Nursing Staff, D. Payne, Diane Skorch, Lt. Ransen,

Gregory Little, David Mitchell, Slowers, B. Walla, Doctor Myers, N.P. Bob, and N.P. April.

In the new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:

• This Memorandum and Order;

• The Second Amended Complaint (Doc 16).

The only claims remaining in this case are Claim 1 against Defendant Reis and Claim 2

against Defendants Munch and Goodman. Claim 3 is dismissed without prejudice as to

Defendant Clap.

Any potential claim against the remaining defendants is dismissed for failure to

state a claim, for a reason stated in this Order, or because it has been severed into a new

case. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendants: Pinckneyville

Correctional Center, J KH Major, J. Buttrom, Summerfield, John Doe 1, Nurse Clap,

Nursing Staff, D. Payne, Diane Skorch, Lt. Ransen, David Mitchell, C/O Lively,

Maramony Chenault, Records Office Staff at Robinson, Chrystal Crowe, Dr. Myers,

Nurse Practitioner Bob, Nurse Practitioner April, Nurse Practitioner Jamie, Paige Long,

Latoya Hughes, Travis Baylor, Jeremy Bonnett, Margaret Madole, Gregory Little, and

Defendant Slowers.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants Reis, Munch and Goodman: (1)

Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form

6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy

of the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), and this Memorandum and Order to the

defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a defendant fails to sign and

return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the

date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service

on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28

US.C. § 1915(£)(2)(A).

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

Plaintiff's Second Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 15) is DENIED

without prejudice, and his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 18) is also

DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. □□ i

bol,

Dated: June 19, 2024

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged.