Quiles v. Upton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARK QUILES,

#Y34209,

Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-03383-SPM

v.

J. UPTON, KIMBERLY WEITL, and

ANTHONY WILLS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Mark Quiles, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who is

currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The First Amended Complaint is now before the

Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion

of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief

must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro

se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,

821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on March 14, 2023, while at Menard Correctional Center (Menard),

he attempted to self-harm by hanging himself. When Correctional Officer Upton and other

correctional officers came to his cell, they assaulted him and used excessive force. Although he

was not a threat to any staff member, the officers deployed O.C. spray into his cell. The officers

then entered the cell and exacerbated his asphyxiation by pulling his body downward further

impeding his airway, instead of holding him up and cutting him down from the rope. The officers

continued to pull down on his body until the rope snapped causing a twelve-inch laceration on his

neck. Plaintiff was then handcuffed, and his face was pushed into a pool of the O.C. spray that was

on the mattress. The officers started to strike him with closed fists, kick him, and pulling his hair.

Plaintiff was lifted to his feet and forced to walk in a crouched position. Plaintiff informed the

officers that he had a documented shoulder injury, and in response, they forced him onto his

stomach and dragged him by his hair and arms, causing pain and further damage to his shoulder.

(Id.).

Plaintiff was then denied medical attention and treatment. (Doc. 13, p. 6). He was seen by

a nurse, but the nurse stated, “He’s alright. Man the fuck up” and called Plaintiff dramatic. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that prior to the incident, he filed requests for mental health treatment

directed at mental health professionals, as well as Kimberly Weitl, the director of mental health

services, and Anthony Wills, the warden of Menard, but his requests were ignored. (Doc. 13, p.

6).

PRELIMINARY DISMISSAL

The Court dismisses any claims Plaintiff is attempting to bring for the denial of medical

care following the use of excessive force by Upton and other correctional officers. These claims

are only associated with a nurse, who is not listed as a defendant. The Court will not treat parties

not listed in the caption as defendants, and any claims against them are dismissed without

prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations and his articulation of his claims, the Court designates the

following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Weitl and Wills for deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s mental health needs.

Count 2: First Amendment claim against Weitl and Wills for retaliating

against Plaintiff by ignoring his requests for mental health treatment.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Upton for the use of excessive

force against Plaintiff on March 14, 2023.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

First Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed

without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly1 pleading standard.

Count 1

Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment Claim against Weitl and Wills, both of

whom are supervisory officials. Under Section 1983, liability is “direct rather than vicarious;

supervisors are responsible for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to

ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029

(7th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff, however, “can plead a deliberate indifference claim against a

supervisor, but to do so, he must show that the supervisor had actual knowledge of the injury and

he or she condoned the situation or turned a blind eye.” Peters v. Tanner, No. 20-cv-689-DWD,

2022 WL 2356958, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 30, 2022) (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782

(7th Cir. 2015). Such a claim is “adequately pled where administrators received many letters or

received multiple highly detailed grievances and other correspondence.” Id.

Plaintiff asserts that he “continuously filed requests for mental health treatment” directed

to mental health professionals, as well as Kimberly Weitl and Anthony Wills, who ignored pleas

“for help.” This allegation is insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim against Weitl and

1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Wills. Plaintiff does not provide any information regarding his requests for mental health

treatment, such as their contents, dates they were sent, or who exactly to whom they were sent.

The First Amended Complaint does not provide enough factual support for the Court to plausibly

infer that Weitl and Wills had actual knowledge that Plaintiff was suicidal and posed a risk of harm

to himself and then disregard that risk. Accordingly, Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice.

Count 2

As to his claim in Count 2, “First Amendment retaliation cases require the [plaintiff] to

show that the speech or activity was constitutionally protected, a deprivation occurred to deter the

protected speech or activity, and the speech or activity was at least a motivating factor in the

decision to take retaliatory action.” Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). “The

‘motivating factor’ amounts to a causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim against Weitl and Wills. Plaintiff states only

in conclusory fashion that Defendants ignored his requests for mental health treatment in

retaliation for writing requests seeking assistance. (Doc. 13, p. 6). But he fails to allege any

supporting facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that his written requests for assistance

were a motivating factor in the alleged denial of care. Thus, the retaliation claim is dismissed

without prejudice.

Count 3

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim of excessive force against Upton. See Hendrickson

v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (the core requirement for [an excessive force claim]

is that [the defendant] used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”) (citations omitted).

MOTION FOR STATUS

Plaintiff’s motion for status is DEEMED moot in light of this Order. (Doc. 14).

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order (TRO)

“from the offending staff/correctional officers.” (Doc. 13, p. 8).

The Court will not issue a TRO unless “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint

clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before

the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Here, it is not

exactly clear what type of action on the part of Defendants Plaintiff is seeking to prevent or enjoin,

and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to include any recognizable allegations that he is

facing an immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage if the Court does not issue a TRO.

Accordingly, the request for a TRO is DENIED.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the First Amended Complaint survives preliminary review

pursuant to Section 1915A. COUNTS 1 and 2 are DISMISSED without prejudice. COUNT 3

will proceed against Upton. The Clerk of Court SHALL TERMINATE Weitl and Wills as parties

on the docket, as there are no surviving claims against them.

Because Plaintiff claims involve physical injury, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Upton the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit

and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is directed to mail these forms, a copy of the First Amended Complaint and this

Memorandum and Order to the defendants’ place of employment. If Defendant fails to sign and

return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the

forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and

the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his or her last

known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for

formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk.

Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the First Amended

Complaint in a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant only needs to respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2024

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will

enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.