Mosher v. Koebel Reed

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BROOKE L. MOSHER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-CV-22-NJR

LAUREN KOEBEL REED,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

In 2022, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) initiated

child welfare proceedings against Plaintiff Brooke L. Mosher due to allegations of child

abuse and neglect. (Doc. 9). At the conclusion of those proceedings, Mosher’s parental

rights were terminated, and her son was removed from her care. (Id.).

Mosher has now filed a civil lawsuit against Lauren Koebel Reed, the public

defender appointed by the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, to represent her in

the juvenile abuse proceedings. (Id.). In her Amended Complaint, Mosher alleges Reed:

provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; violated

the Illinois Public Defender Act by failing to provide adequate representation; violated

Mosher’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying her the

opportunity to present critical evidence in her defense; violated Mosher’s right to counsel

under the Illinois Constitution, Article I, Section 10; and violated Mosher’s right to be free

from the unreasonable seizure of her child under the Fourth Amendment. (Id.).

Pending before the Court are three motions filed by Mosher, including a Motion

for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 4), a Motion for Recruitment of

Counsel (Doc. 5), and a Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 6).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), an indigent party may commence a federal court action

without paying the required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the

inability “to pay such fees or give security therefor” and stating “the nature of the action,

defense or appeal and the affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1).

The Court previously addressed Mosher’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP,

finding that Mosher is indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). (Doc. 8). But as the Court

explained, that does not end the inquiry. Under Section 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen

the Amended Complaint and dismiss it if it is clearly frivolous or malicious, fails to state

a claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges

have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously,

and thus save everyone time and legal expense.”).

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that the Madison County court appointed

Reed as Mosher’s public defender for the juvenile abuse proceedings. (Id.). During the

course of those proceedings, Mosher attempted to communicate with Reed via phone and

email but received no response. (Id.). Because Reed failed to communicate, Mosher

alleges, she was denied the opportunity to present evidence in her defense, including

evidence that the allegations against her were baseless and motivated by malice. (Id.).

Ultimately, a result of Reed’s deficient representation, Mosher claims her parental rights

were terminated, and she lost custody of her child. (Id.). As relief, Mosher requests

compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that Reed’s conduct violated her

constitutional and statutory rights, and an order compelling the return of her child to her

care. (Id.).

As an initial matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state-court decisions,

including those involving the termination of parental rights, under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 396 (7th Cir. 2023). Rooker-Feldman applies

to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). As the Seventh Circuit recently

explained, while “the natural temptation for losing parties to keep fighting and to look

for new forums” is understandable, “it is well established that federal district and circuit

courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions.” Id.

“The doctrine is limited to federal claims that ‘directly’ challenge a state court

judgment or are ‘inextricably intertwined with one.’” Id. (quoting Andrade v. City of

Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2021)). To determine whether a plaintiff’s federal

claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment, a district court must

ask whether the plaintiff is alleging an injury caused by the state court judgment. Id.

Here, while Mosher frames her injuries as the violation of her constitutional rights

by appointed counsel, the relief she seeks, in part, is an order compelling the return of

her child to her care. In other words, she is asking this Court to reject the judgment of the

state court that terminated her parental rights. Rooker-Feldman prevents this Court from

doing so. See Hadzi-Tanovic, 62 F.4th at 401 (“For a federal court to find that the state court

deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional right to familial association, the federal court

would have to find that the state court erred in applying state family law. This Rooker-

Feldman forbids.”); see also Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir.

2019) (Rooker-Feldman applied where a finding for plaintiffs, who alleged that their

animals were seized in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, would “call into

question the state court’s judgment that there was probable cause the animals were being

neglected”). The Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to provide the relief Mosher seeks, i.e.,

a reversal of the state court order terminating her parental rights.

Mosher also, however, requests compensatory and punitive damages for Reed’s

deficient representation. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring an action for

money damages against a defendant who has deprived her of a federal constitutional

right if the defendant was acting under color of state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1983. And Mosher’s

Amended Complaint alleges Reed violated her constitutional rights to due process and

effective assistance of counsel.

As this Court previously explained, however, a court-appointed special public

defender is not a state actor and cannot be sued under § 1983. “[P]rivate defense

attorneys—even appointed public defenders who are paid by the state—are not

considered state actors under § 1983.” Bartole v. Hughes, No. 2:22-CV-257-PPS-JPK, 2022

WL 10542267, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2022) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325

(1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a

lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”);

McDonald v. White, 465 F. App’x 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] court-appointed public

defender is not a state actor, and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). While

Mosher may be able to bring a malpractice action against her attorney in state court, she

cannot raise these claims under § 1983.

Finally, to the extent Mosher is seeking a declaration that Reed violated her

constitutional and statutory rights, the Court finds there is no actual controversy within

its jurisdiction that would allow the Court to declare the parties’ rights. See Amling v.

Harrow Indus. LLC, 943 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Declaratory judgment actions are

ripe and otherwise justiciable when the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show

that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of

sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”).

Because it is clear that Mosher cannot state a claim that is properly raised under

this Court’s jurisdiction, the Amended Complaint (Doc. 9) is DISMISSED with

prejudice. The Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 4), Motion for

Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 5), and Motion for Service of Process at Government

Expense (Doc. 6) are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 22, 2024 Tl (cating I

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NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL □

Chief U.S. District Judge

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