Opinion

Santamaria v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
May 31, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.4%

noting that ‘[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that ‘[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”
  • noting plaintiff never successfully completed the grievance process despite twenty-one tries

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EVARISTO SANTAMARIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-01539-GCS

)

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )

et al., )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Evaristo Santamaria, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”),

brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In his original complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 2020, his bunk bed

collapsed while he was on the top bunk and his cellmate was laying in the bottom bunk.

When the bunk broke, Plaintiff fell to the concrete floor and sustained injuries to his right

knee and shoulder. Plaintiff and his cellmate called for a med tech or a nurse to come to

the cell. Sergeant John Doe and Officer Lawson arrived and ignored the requests for

medical assistance. John Doe and Lawson placed Plaintiff and his cellmate in handcuffs

and treated them as if they had done something wrong. Plaintiff continued to request

medical help for his injuries, but he was denied medical care. He alleges that Wexford

Page 1 of 14

deliberately understaffs the healthcare unit resulting in the denial of care and treatment

for his medical needs. Plaintiff continues to suffer from pain. (Doc. 1).

On May 19, 2022, the Court conducted its preliminary review of the complaint.

Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against John Doe and

Lawson for denying him medical care and an Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford

for maintaining policies that resulted in him being denied medical care. (Doc. 7). On

February 8, 2023, the Court appointed counsel, Mark Brown, for Plaintiff, because

Plaintiff could not speak or write English and because he only had an eighth-grade

education. (Doc. 33, p. 6).

The Court gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 33, p. 7).

Plaintiff, through counsel, filed an amended complaint on May 8, 2023. (Doc. 45). On May

10, 2023, the Court conducted a screening Order of the amended complaint and found

that Plaintiff “articulated a colorable federal cause of action against Defendants Wexford,

Wills, Siddiqui, Caldwell, Lawson, Crain, Jeffreys, and Nitzsche for constitutional

violations and related state law claims.” (Doc. 47).

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies filed by Defendant Caldwell, (Doc. 79, 80, 93), and

a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies

filed by Defendants Crain, Jeffreys, Lawson, Nitzsche, and Wills. (Doc. 87, 88, 100).1

1 Defendants Wexford and Siddiqui did not file motions for summary judgment on the

issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Page 2 of 14

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

filing the present lawsuit because he did not file any grievances which address his claims

against these Defendants pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Illinois

Administrative Code. Plaintiff opposes the motions arguing, inter alia, that Defendants’

failure to make the grievance procedures available in a meaningful way thwarted his

attempt to use the grievance process. (Doc. 91, 92). On May 14, 2024, the Court held an

evidentiary hearing on the motions, heard testimony from Plaintiff, and took the matter

under advisement. (Doc. 109).2 Based on the following, the Court DENIES the motions

for summary judgment.

FACTS3

During all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate in the IDOC and housed at

Menard. Plaintiff claims his primary language is Spanish, and his ability to communicate

in English is limited.

On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations

stem from injuries he allegedly sustained on or about July 30, 2020, when the metal chain

securing his top bunk broke. As a result, Plaintiff fell to the floor. Approximately three

days later, Plaintiff alleges he underwent x-rays of his body, but he did not receive

2 Interpreter Fernando Torres translated the proceedings for Plaintiff.

3 The Court will only discuss the three grievances addressed during the hearing on May 14,

2024: grievance dated July 30, 2020 (#15-8-20), grievance dated April 8, 2021, and grievance dated

June 20, 2021 (#215-6-21).

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treatment for the pain he was experiencing in his shoulder, back, hand, right knee, and

right leg. Plaintiff further claims he was not treated for over one year.

On July 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance #15-8-20 marked “medical

treatment” and “other - chain of top bunk broke, and I fell out of bunk.” This grievance

does not name Defendants. Plaintiff states that he fell and injured his right leg, hip, right

shoulder, and hand. Further, Plaintiff states: “I wanted them to take me to the Health

Care Unit but they said they couldn’t and that a Med tec would come and look at me, the

Med Tec said I would see the Doctor on Monday! . . . I can not speak good English,

therefore, I am having my Cell Mate (McCallister B23693) write this for me, and because

he was here when all this happened.” In the relief requested, Plaintiff asked for x-rays,

pain meds, and a brace for his leg. (Doc. 83-3, p. 35-45). The Chief Administrative Officer

(“CAO”) deemed this an emergency on August 8, 2020. The grievance officer responded

that the grievance was moot on October 21, 2020, and the CAO concurred with this

recommendation on October 23, 2020. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”)

received the grievance on September 30, 2021, and the ARB returned the grievance as

untimely noting it would not be addressed as it was received 30 days after the CAO’s

decision. (Doc. 88-3, p. 32-38).

On April 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance marked “medical treatment”

complaining about pain he was experiencing in his right shoulder and knee on March 14,

2021, which stemmed from the incident on July 30, 2020. Also contained in this grievance,

Plaintiff stated he needed a Spanish translator to communicate with medical staff.

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Specifically, Plaintiff’s grievance states: “[t]o be clear I am a Spanish speaking person; I

am not bilingual - therefor it is important that I have access to an interpreter! Nothing is

more important than having my medical issues explained to me in my native language!”

The relief requested states: “[i]t is imperative that I have access to a Spanish speaking

interpreter, in order for me to explain what my medical issues are. Nothing is more

important to me than that! By not allowing me to have my medical issues conveyed to

me in Spanish is a direct indifference to my rights. By not doing so allows the staff to

assume that my ailments are psychosomatic when in fact they are not!” (Doc. 88-3, p. 42).

Defendants were not named in this grievance. The ARB received the grievance on

September 30, 2021, and the ARB returned the grievance without further review on

October 1, 2021. The ARB requested Plaintiff provide the original grievance, including

the counselor’s response, and a copy of the grievance response from the Grievance Officer

and the CAO, if timely. The ARB also indicted that medical issues are to be reviewed at

the current facility prior to review by the ARB, and the documentation submitted failed

to follow the procedures set forth in DR 504. (Doc. 88-3, p. 39-45).

Next, Plaintiff filed a grievance #215-6-21 on June 20, 2021, regarding lack of

medical treatment from July 30, 2020. Plaintiff requested the following relief: “[m]edical

treatment for injuries caused by Menard Correctional Center’s broke bunk.” This

grievance names the following individuals: N.P. Zimmer, Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Ritz, and

Nurse Crain. The grievance officer denied the grievance on October 18, 2021, and the

CAO concurred that same day. The ARB received the grievance on November 5, 2021.

Page 5 of 14

On November 16, 2021, the ARB retuned the grievance without further review on the

merits as untimely and duplicative of a grievance addressed by the ARB on October 5,

2021. (Doc. 88-3, p. 27-31).

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Lawson and

Nitzsche were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to obtain medical

care for him after the bunk detached from the wall; he also alleges state law intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims against them. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendant Crain was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to respond

to his request for medical treatment; that Defendant Caldwell was deliberately indifferent

to his medical needs when he denied his request for a more effective pain medication and

failed to consider alternative medications; that Defendant Wills was deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs for failing to hire sufficient medical staff and for failing

to address deficiencies in the nurse sick call protocol; and that Defendant Jeffreys was

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs for failing to ensure inmates receive

necessary medical treatment and for failing to address deficiencies in the nurse sick call

protocol. (Doc. 45).

During the hearing on May 14, 2024, Plaintiff testified through an interpreter that

he is not able to understand English either orally or written. Further, Plaintiff testified

that when he arrived at Menard, he was not given a Spanish orientation manual

regarding the exhaustion of administrative procedures. He also never signed a document

indicating that he received a Spanish orientation manual. He also testified that he

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repeatedly requested a Spanish manual from prison staff, but he was never given one. He

further averred that no one from the prison ever told him of the deadlines/appeal times

for filing grievances, that no one from the prison told him who he had to identify in his

grievances, and that another inmate helped him prepare his grievances.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures

and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are]

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467

(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent

part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983

of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting

that ‘[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion

must occur before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is

pending. Id.

Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in

the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry,

Page 7 of 14

286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a prison’s

grievance process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and

the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. The purpose

of exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the inmate’s claims

internally, prior to federal litigation. See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006)

Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the

defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by

a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th

Cir. 2008). Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an

affirmative defense, the Court set forth the following procedures:

The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is

therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion

and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate.

(2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative

remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b)

or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to

exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from

exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust

(provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison

authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being given a runaround); or (c) the

failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in which event the case is over. (3)

If and when the judge determines that the prisoner has properly exhausted his

administrative remedies, the case will proceed to pretrial discovery, and if

necessary a trial, on the merits; and if there is a jury trial, the jury will make

all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of)

any of the findings made by the district judge in determining

that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies.

Id. at 742.

Page 8 of 14

As an inmate confined in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),

Plaintiff was required to follow the regulations contained in the IDOC’s Grievance

Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to exhaust his claims. See 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures first require inmates to file their

grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance form must:

contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is

the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision

does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of

individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive

information about the individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through

routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§504.820(a). The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written

response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall

consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to

the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). “The

Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise

the offender of his or her decision in writing. Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the Chief Administrative Officer’s response, he

or she can file an appeal with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures

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specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer,

the offender still believes that the problem, complaint or grievance has not been resolved

to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must

be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the

decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The inmate shall attach copies of the

Grievance Officer’s report and the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision to his appeal.

Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its

findings and recommendations.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d). “The Director shall

review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination

of the grievance within 6 months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when reasonably

feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the Director’s

decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(e).

DISCUSSION

Defendants maintain that the record reflects that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust

his administrative remedies as to the allegations against them. Plaintiff opposes the

motions contending, inter alia, that the grievance process at Menard was unavailable to

Plaintiff. The Court agrees with Plaintiff.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense in an action

against prison officials, and the burden of proof is on the officials. Here, the undersigned

finds Defendants have not met their burden. Plaintiff has an eighth-grade education and

is unable to read or write in English. Thus, he would not have been able to read the

Page 10 of 14

grievance procedures, even if they had been provided to him in English. A remedy is

available if it is “’capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’”

Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850,

1859 (2016)). In Ross, the Supreme Court provided examples of situations in which

administrative remedies are unavailable: when prison officials are “consistently

unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates,” when the “administrative scheme

[is] so opaque it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,” or when “prison

officials thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1859–60.

Unavailability does not necessarily have to be caused by the misconduct of the

defendants. A process can be unavailable where an “inmate, through no fault of his own,

could not [access] the grievance process.” Lanaghan v. Koch, 902 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir.

2018). “The ‘unavailable’ exception is meant to be narrow.” Wallace v. Baldwin, 55 F.4th

535, 543 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 2022)). It is also

a fact-specific inquiry. See Lanaghan, 902 F.3d at 688.

The Seventh Circuit has noted that administrative “remedies are available only if

a prisoner has been notified of their existence,” and if the existing remedial processes are

“communicated in a way reasonably likely to be understood.” Ramirez, 906 F.3d at 535.

“That analysis must also account for individual capabilities.” Id. An inmate’s language

barrier may mean that the prison’s administrative remedies are unavailable because the

process was not communicated in a way reasonably likely to be understood. In Ramirez,

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“no one at [the prison] ever remedied the failure to communicate the grievance process

to [the plaintiff] despite widely shared knowledge of his lack of English proficiency,” and

the “record show[ed] that nothing gave [the plaintiff] even a clue about the grievance

process.” Id. at 536–537. In addition, the prison's orientation and manual were presented

only in English, but Ramirez’s English-language skills were so limited that he could not

comprehend the oral presentation or the written materials. Id. at 534-535. As a result, the

Seventh Circuit concluded that administrative remedies were not available to the

plaintiff. Id. at 538.

Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit remanded a case for an evidentiary hearing to

determine if a plaintiff with a low IQ score and a lack of understanding of the grievance

process made exhaustion unavailable. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 314

(7th Cir. 2023) (noting plaintiff never successfully completed the grievance process

despite twenty-one tries). In Smallwood, the Seventh Circuit noted that “when a prisoner’s

ignorance of the process is not within his control – that is, because he has not been

informed of the process” either due to misconduct of the prison or due to his own

personal circumstances, the process is unavailable. Id. at 315.

Like Ramirez, Plaintiff testified that the specifics of the grievance procedures were

never communicated to him in a way that he could understand what was required of

him. Plaintiff is not able to understand either spoken or written English. Plaintiff testified

that when he arrived at Menard, he was not given a Spanish orientation manual

regarding the exhaustion of administrative procedures and that he never signed a

Page 12 of 14

document indicating that he received a Spanish orientation manual. He also testified that

he requested but never received a Spanish manual and that another inmate had assisted

him in preparing his grievances. Plaintiff further indicated that he had no idea if his

grievances were correct or not.

Defendants offered the declaration of Kelly Pierce, grievance officer, and Plaintiff’s

Cumulative Counseling Summary to demonstrate that Plaintiff was aware of the

grievance process at Menard. Specifically, Pierce declares in part:

When individuals in custody are transferred to Menard Correctional Center,

they are provided an orientation manual, which outlines many of the policies

and procedures at Menard, including but not limited to the grievance process.

If an individual in custody is primarily Spanish-speaking with limited

understanding of English language, they are issued an orientation manual in

Spanish.

. . . Grievance forms are available in both English and Spanish.

If an individual in custody submits a grievance written in Spanish, there are

designated individuals, who are employed by the Illinois Department of

Corrections in various capacities, who translate those grievances into English.

. . .

(Doc. 100-1, p. 1-2).

The Cumulative Counseling Summary reads in part:

5/6/2019 08:59:19 Offender participated in Orientation process and was provided

with the Orientation Manual. Issued Orientation Manual in Spanish to Offenders

with poor English skills. Offenders signed for manuals. Offender Pre-Release

Identification Checklist initiated. Provided Telephone Pin # form and Visiting List

form and explained procedures. All Offenders were informed of House Bill 569 and

explained process for application. PREA procedures discussed during orientation.

(Doc. 100-3, p. 6).

Page 13 of 14

Ms. Pierce’s declaration indicates what information is supposed to be given to

inmates at orientation and that Spanish grievance forms are available to inmates. Her

declaration, however, does not explicitly state that Plaintiff received the Spanish manual

or received the Spanish grievance forms. Similarly, Plaintiff's Cumulative Counseling

Summary lacks exact information as to Plaintiff as it can be read to be applied generally

to Spanish speaking inmates. In fact, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff's signed form

indicting that he received the Spanish Manual. Ms. Pierce’s declaration and Plaintiff's

Cumulative Counseling Summary notes simply do not rebut Plaintiff’s testimony that he

did not receive adequate information about the grievance process. Construing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendants have not

carried their burden regarding exhaustion. Thus, the Court finds that the grievance

process was unavailable to Plaintiff, and the Court need not address Defendants’ other

arguments pertaining to exhaustion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc 79, 87).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by

DATED: May 31, 2024. Mika 2. Bae TT se 53

13:41:49 -05'00'

GILBERTC.SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

Page 14 of 14

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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