Hollis v. Fear

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KEVIN E. HOLLIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-CV-1211-NJR

KEITH FEAR, NANCY FEAR,

WILLIAM HEAP, and KEVIN PARKER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) filed by Plaintiff Kevin E. Hollis. (Doc. 7). Hollis filed a Complaint and Request

for Injunction on May 2, 2024, alleging violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 24 C.F.R.

982. (Doc. 3). Hollis now seeks to proceed in federal court without prepayment of the

required filing fees.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), an indigent party may commence a federal court

action without paying required costs and fees by submitting an affidavit asserting the

inability “to pay such fees or give security therefor” and stating “the nature of the action,

defense or appeal and the affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1). Destitution is not required to proceed IFP; an affidavit demonstrating that

the plaintiff cannot, because of his poverty, provide himself with the necessities of life is

sufficient. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948).

The Court is satisfied from Hollis’s affidavit that he is indigent. (Doc. 7). Hollis

reports that he is unemployed, has $270 in a checking account, and owns one operable

vehicle, a 1994 Pontiac Sunbird. (Id.). He also pays monthly housing and utility bills,

which are past due. (Id.). The Court therefore finds that Hollis is indigent under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1).

But that does not end the inquiry. Under Section 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen

an indigent plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss the complaint if it is clearly frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir.

2003) (“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently

defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense.”). Thus,

resolution of the motion to proceed IFP requires the undersigned to review the allegations

of the complaint.

In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts all factual allegations as true,

construing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645

(7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements, however, are not enough. The complaint must

allege sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v.

United States, 721 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2013). That means “a plaintiff must do better than

putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest

that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.

Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead, “the plaintiff must give enough

details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Id. at

404.

Here, as best the Court can tell, Hollis is alleging that he purchased a mobile home

in 2014 that was permanently attached to land. (Doc. 3 at p. 5). He received assistance in

purchasing the mobile home from a Federal Homeless Prevention Grant. (Id.). He now

claims he is being illegally evicted from the property and has been placed in jail four

times since the eviction action in Jasper County, Illinois, began in 2022. (Id.).

Hollis’s IFP motion refers to Jasper County case number 2022EV2, which provides

some clarity to his vague allegations in this case. See Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728,

743 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of the actions of other courts or

the contents of filings in other courts.”). From the court filings in Jasper County, it appears

that Keith Fear and Nancy Fear, Defendants in this matter, own the land on which Hollis’s

mobile home is located.1 Defendant William Heap is the attorney representing the Fears

in Jasper County, and Defendant Kevin Parker is the circuit judge presiding over the

eviction matter. The Fears obtained a default judgment against Hollis, and Hollis was

ordered to remove the mobile home from the Fears’ property by May 6, 2022. Hollis did

not remove the mobile home, leading to a finding of contempt. As of May 13, 2024, the

eviction matter is still proceeding, with the parties having agreed that Hollis would

remove the mobile home from the property. A status review hearing has been set for June

11, 2024.

1https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_history.jsp?court=IL040015J&ocl=IL040015J,2022EV2,IL040

015JL2022EV2P1 (last visited May 30, 2024).

Based on the limited information available, it appears that Hollis’s federal court

case must be dismissed. Under certain doctrines, called abstention doctrines, a federal

court must “decline to exercise its jurisdiction where doing so would intrude upon the

independence of the state courts and their ability to resolve the cases before them.” SKS

& Assocs., Inc. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2010). One such abstention doctrine,

Younger abstention, “requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over

federal constitutional claims that seek to interfere with or interrupt ongoing state

proceedings.” Id.; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger is based on the

principles of equity, comity, and federalism, including a respect for separate state

governments. Id. “Underlying the Younger abstention doctrine is ‘the assumption that

state courts are co-equal to federal courts and are fully capable of respecting and

protecting [a plaintiff’s constitutional] rights.’” J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 724 (7th Cir.

2021) (quoting Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2018)).

The Younger abstention doctrine applies when an ongoing state proceeding is

(1) judicial in nature, (2) involves important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate

opportunity to raise constitutional claims, (4) as long as no extraordinary circumstances

exist that make abstention inappropriate. Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658,

662 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, the ongoing Jasper County case is judicial in nature, and it implicates

important state interests. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has applied

Younger abstention to an eviction action where, like here, the party sought to enjoin the

state court proceeding. SKS, 619 F.3d at 679.; see also Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments,

134 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1036 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (“[E]viction is a relatively complex procedure

extensively regulated by state law, which dictates stringent notice requirements and the

nature of the eviction proceedings themselves.”). In SKS, the plaintiff was the manager

of residential real estate properties and filed suit in federal court to compel the Illinois

circuit court to process evictions more quickly. Id. at 676. The Court of Appeals found

that, while SKS was not the defendant in the state court eviction actions (as Hollis is here),

it sought to have a federal court tell a state court how to manage a category of cases

pending before it. Id. at 679. That, the Court of Appeals held, would “reflect a lack of

respect for the state’s ability to resolve the cases properly before its courts.” Id. Hollis asks

this Court to do the same—to tell the Jasper County court how to handle its eviction case.

This Court must decline to do so.

The Court also finds that Hollis could raise his constitutional claims in state court,

as there is no indication that he has attempted to raise them before Judge Parker. See

Berrada Properties Mgmt. Inc. v. Romanski, 608 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (E.D. Wis. 2022)

(quoting SKS, 619 F.3d at 680) (“ ‘[A] federal court should assume that state procedures

will afford an adequate remedy [for those claims], in the absence of unambiguous

authority to the contrary.’ ”). Finally, there are no extraordinary circumstances that

would make abstention inappropriate here.

For these reasons, the Court finds that this case is inappropriate for resolution by

a federal court. The Complaint (Doc. 3) is therefore DISMISSED without prejudice.

However, in an abundance of caution, the Court will GRANT Hollis leave to amend his

complaint to provide a more detailed statement of his claim. If Hollis chooses to file an

amended complaint, he should do so on or before July 1, 2024. In the meantime, the Court

RESERVES RULING on Hollis’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 7).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 31, 2024

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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