Perkins v. Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LAQUAN PERKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-00711-GCS

)

CHRISTINE BROWN, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION

Now pending before the Court is Defendant Christine Brown’s motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 63, 64, 77).1 Defendant Brown argues that she is entitled to

summary judgment in that she lacks personal involvement to be held liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983; that no reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff’s medical care

constituted deliberate indifference; and that she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing that according to the Illinois Department of Central

Case Management Services, Defendant Brown has the sole authority to approve or deny

1 Along with the motion for summary judgment, Defendant Brown filed the required

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 notice informing Plaintiff of the consequences of failing to

respond to the motion for summary judgment and what is required in responding to a motion

for summary judgment. (Doc. 65).

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treatment. (Doc. 74). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion for

summary judgment.

Plaintiff Laquan Perkins, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center

(“Pinckneyville”), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 25, 2021. (Doc. 1). On February 6,

2020, Plaintiff alleged he was transferred to an outside hospital for dental work to have

his #32 lower, right wisdom tooth extracted. Id. at p. 6. He was warned by the oral

surgeon that he might lose sensation in his tongue and lip. He was provided with pain

medication and transferred back to Pinckneyville. Once the pain medication wore off,

however, Plaintiff had no feeling in the right side of his face, including his right eye. Id.

at p. 7. He also could not hear out of his right ear. Id.

On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff was transferred back to the hospital for complaints

of loss of feeling, diminished eyesight, and loss of hearing. (Doc. 1, p. 7). The oral surgeon

informed Plaintiff that the issues were unrelated to his surgery, and he was referred to a

neurologist. From February 18, 2020, to October 19, 2020, Plaintiff submitted twelve sick

call slips seeking care for the issues with his face. Id. He asserted that he received no

medical care. He informed Defendant Brown of his issues, but she refused to provide any

additional care. Id. Plaintiff continues to suffer from loss of facial sensation, diminished

eyesight, and hearing in his right ear, which he fears might be permanent. Id. at p. 8.

On December 7, 2021, the Court conducted a preliminary review of the complaint

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Brown for failing to provide him with

care for his loss of facial sensation and issues with his eyesight and hearing. (Doc. 11).

FACTS

The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

Plaintiff has been incarcerated in Pinckneyville since December 14, 2016.

Defendant Christine Brown served as the Healthcare Unit Administrator (“HCUA”).

On February 6, 2020, Plaintiff went to an outside hospital for dental work to have

his #32 lower, right wisdom tooth extracted. After submitting a sick call request, Plaintiff

was seen by medical staff the next day for complaints of a swollen jaw and a numb lip.

The medical staff added Plaintiff to the dental line on February 10, 2020. Thereafter, on

February 19, 2020, Plaintiff saw medical for an earache. During this visit, Plaintiff stated

that he has had numbness to the right side of his face since his oral surgery, and he could

not hear out of his right ear. The medical provider noted that Plaintiff had an

appointment with the oral surgeon the next day. Plaintiff saw the oral surgeon on

February 20, 2020. The oral surgeon opined that it was impossible to have numbness as

reported from the oral surgery.

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Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that on February 19, 2020, Plaintiff was

approved in urgent collegial for a return to the oral surgeon for the pain, tingling, and

numbness the Plaintiff was experiencing after the oral surgery on February 6, 2020.

Subsequently, on February 27, 2020, Plaintiff saw a medical doctor for complaints

of pain, tingling, and numbness to his face. The doctor noted that Plaintiff was scheduled

to see the surgeon.

On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff submitted two nurse sick slip calls. One complained

about his right eye, and the other complained that he still could not hear out of his right

ear. A week later, Plaintiff was seen on the nurse practitioner line for the numbness to the

right side of his face. The provider made notations about Plaintiff’s movement ability in

his face, inter alia, that Plaintiff had no feeling with touch of face, ear/check, hearing, and

smell and advised him to return to nurse sick call as needed. Two days later, Plaintiff was

referred to neurology based on the loss of facial sensation.

On April 2, 2020, collegial approved Plaintiff for a neurology exam to be scheduled

after the Covid-19 “shut in.” Thereafter, on April 6, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a nurse sick

call request slip stating that it had been two months, and he still had not been seen about

his right ear or about his facial numbness. Plaintiff was seen again by the LPN regarding

his face/ear problems on April 8, 2020. During this visit, Plaintiff was informed of the

collegial approval to see a neurologist once the Covid-19 precautions were lifted.

On May 18, 2020, Plaintiff saw a registered nurse and asked about when he would

be seen by the neurologist. During this visit, Plaintiff did not report any new symptoms.

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The RN told Plaintiff that the appointment would be scheduled after the Covid-19

precautions were lifted. On May 30 and 31, 2020, Plaintiff submitted two nurse sick calls

slips. One stated that his gums were red, that his gums had sores, and that he could not

eat. The other stated that he ate something he was allergic to, that he had burns in his

mouth, and that he could not eat.

Again, Plaintiff was seen in the healthcare unit for numbness in his face on June 1,

2020. He was told that an appointment would be scheduled when the Covid-19

precautions were lifted. On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff submitted two nurse sick call slips for

the numbness to the right side of his face and his right ear. In one of the sick call slips

Plaintiff asked why he had been waiting six months to see a doctor.

Plaintiff submitted another nurse sick call slip on August 2, 2020, stating that it

had been six months since his tooth was pulled, that he still could not feel the right side

of his face, and that he could not hear. He also asked for help.

The next day, Plaintiff saw medical staff for concerns that he had not been seen by

a neurologist for his facial numbness. The LPN observed Plaintiff’s face was equal on

both sides, with no drooping, his eyes were equal, and there was no slurring of speech.

The LPN advised Plaintiff that he had been approved and was waiting on the Covid-19

precautions to be lifted. The LPN also referred Plaintiff for a hearing test.

On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by an outside neurologist for an evaluation.

On August 25, 2020, the medical records reflect a review on the official transcript

for a neurology exam conducted on August 24, 2020. The records further reflect the

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neurologist requested an MRI, audiology, and labs, all of which were ordered, and the

matter was referred to collegial. Thereafter, on August 26, 2020, Plaintiff was referred to

neurology for a follow-up in three months. He was also referred to radiology for a brain

MRI.

On September 4, 2020, Plaintiff again saw medical for facial numbness and was

advised that they were waiting for collegial approval. On or about September 9, 2020,

collegial approved Plaintiff for an audiology evaluation and a neurology evaluation.

The labs that were previously ordered were completed on September 10, 2020.

Subsequently, on September 22, 2020, Plaintiff went on a medical furlough for his brain

MRI.

In the later part of October 2020, Plaintiff submitted two more nurse sick call slips

complaining of facial numbness and loss of hearing out of his right ear. In one of the slips,

Plaintiff stated that he needed help. On October 20, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by a nurse

practitioner for complaints of facial numbness. The nurse practitioner noted that Plaintiff

was currently following up with neurology, and he was approved in collegial. On

October 21, 2020, Plaintiff saw medical staff for his facial numbness and ear pain.

Plaintiff’s medical furlough was rescheduled due to the Covid lockdown on

December 11, 2020.

Again, on February 6, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a nurse sick call request slip for

facial numbness and loss of hearing. The nurse sick call slip asked for help and stated that

it had been a year.

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On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff was sent on a medical furlough to neurology and was

submitted to collegial for the follow-up MRI requested by the neurologist. Two weeks

later, Plaintiff was referred to audiology for hearing loss in his right ear and complaints

of no sensory innervation in his right face. He was also referred to ophthalmology for

complaints of loss of vision following dental work. Collegial approved Plaintiff for an

ophthalmology evaluation and a hearing test.

On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff submitted another nurse sick call slip complaining that

he could not hear out of his right ear and that his left ear was getting low. He also asked

for help and stated it had been a year. The next day, Plaintiff was seen by medical staff

regarding non-specific discomfort and clogged/decreased sound; he was observed to

have visible wax and was given something to use for the wax build up. Then, on April 9,

2021, Plaintiff saw a doctor for complaints of difficulty hearing. The doctor ordered

Plaintiff to be scheduled for a hearing test.

In the beginning of May 2021, Plaintiff went on a medical furlough to the

ophthalmologist. Upon return, he complained of vision loss throughout the day and was

submitted to collegial for a carotid doppler study. He was also given a hearing

evaluation/test. Subsequently, collegial approved Plaintiff for a carotid doppler on May

13, 2021, and on May 26, 2021, Plaintiff went on a medical furlough for the carotid doppler

study. Upon return, Plaintiff was submitted for approval for an ECHO. Plaintiff was

referred to cardiology for an ECHO based on recommendation following the completed

carotid doppler study.

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In early June 2021, collegial approved Plaintiff for the ECHO. On June 17, 2021,

Plaintiff was sent on another medical furlough to the neurologist. When Plaintiff

returned, he stated that he was not sure where or why he went. The doctor noted they

would contact neurology and obtain notes regarding the furlough. During this visit, the

provider noted that malingering or conversion disorder was suspected. Plaintiff received

his ECHO from SIH Memorial Hospital on June 22, 2021.

Thereafter, Plaintiff refused to be seen on the MD call line on August 6, 2021.

On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff had a hearing evaluation, and on October 13, 2021,

collegial approved Plaintiff for an audiology and ENT.

At the end of November 2021, Plaintiff went on a medical furlough to the ENT.

Upon return, the doctor submitted Plaintiff to collegial for MRI-IAC.

Plaintiff had the MRI due to hearing loss on January 14, 2022. The doctor noted

that Plaintiff would need to be approved for a hearing aid. Plaintiff received the hearing

aids in March/April 2022.

Plaintiff never personally spoke to Defendant Brown about being seen by an

outside medical provider. However, he thinks that she is responsible for that approval

because her name is on some of the medical paperwork. Plaintiff did not receive medical

care from Defendant Brown. Further, Plaintiff has no knowledge of whether Defendant

Brown has any authority over the doctors, dentists, and/or nurse practitioners to

prescribe a certain course of treatment. Plaintiff does not recall any medical professional

ever telling him that his injuries were caused by a delay in treatment. Plaintiff does not

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have medical training.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV.

PROC. 56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue

of material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the

light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the non-moving

party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.

2011). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, and as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth

the facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-

moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving

conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542,

544 (7th Cir. 2014).

DISCUSSION

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and

unusual punishments” if they display deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious

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medical needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652–653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.”). A prisoner

is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm—not to

demand specific care. See Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).

To prevail on such a claim, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge

of constitutionally deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. See Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011). The first prong is whether the prisoner has

shown he has an objectively serious medical need. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750;

accord Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be

serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d

610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (violating the

Eighth Amendment requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The second prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official has subjective

knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health. See Greeno, 414

F.3d at 653. A plaintiff need not show the individual literally ignored his complaint, just

that the individual was aware of the serious medical condition and either knowingly or

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recklessly disregarded it. See Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008).

“Negligence, gross negligence, or even ‘recklessness’ as that term is used in tort cases, is

not enough.” Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Also,

“mere disagreement with the course of the inmate's medical treatment does not constitute

an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference.” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,

591 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

A delay in treatment can rise to the level of deliberate indifference if the plaintiff

presents medical evidence that the delay “exacerbated the inmate’s injury or

unnecessarily prolonged his pain.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777-778 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) and Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d

827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007)); Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013). The Eighth

Amendment does not require that prisoners receive “unqualified access to health care[.]”

Rather, they are entitled only to “adequate medical care.” Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d

1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). Mere disagreement or dissatisfaction as to the treatment

received does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827,

831 (7th Cir. 2007); Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); Ciarpaglini v. Saini,

352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003); Snipes, 95 F.3d at 592.

In a Section 1983 case, a defendant also cannot be held liable via the doctrine of

respondeat superior. See Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2002). To be held

individually liable, a defendant must have personal responsibility for the violation of a

constitutional right. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). The

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personal liability requirement of Section 1983 can be satisfied by showing that the

constitutional deprivation occurred at an official’s direction or with his knowledge and

consent. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). In short, some causal

connection or affirmative link between the action complained about and the official sued

is necessary to recover under Section 1983. Id.

For the purposes of this motion and based on the record before the Court, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s loss of facial sensation and issues with his eyesight and hearing

constitute objectively serious medical needs. However, based on that same record and

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there

is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference, or that

Defendant Brown was personally involved in the Plaintiff’s medical treatment.

As demonstrated in the undisputed fact section above, Plaintiff, from February

2020 through January 2022, received continuous on-going medical treatment for his

complaints of facial numbness and the issues with his eyesight and hearing loss following

his oral surgery on February 6, 2020. The record is replete with several visits with medical

staff at Pinckneyville, various collegial approvals, and many medical furloughs for

outside treatment for Plaintiff’s complaints. In fact, Plaintiff was seen inside the facility

at least 12 times, Plaintiff was approved by collegial for various treatments at least 6

times, and Plaintiff was sent on medical furloughs for oral surgery, a neurology exam, a

brain MRI, 2 neurology visits, an ophthalmologist, a carotid doppler, ECHO, ENT for

audiology, and an MRI due to hearing loss. Thus, there is no evidence that the medical

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decisions/treatment plans given to Plaintiff were such a substantial departure from

accepted professional judgment, or so plainly inappropriate, as to permit the inference

that medical staff intentionally or recklessly disregarded Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs. Further, Plaintiff admitted that he cannot recall any medical professional telling

him that his injuries were caused by a delay in treatment. Additionally, if there was any

delay in treatment, which the Court finds questionable, it appears that it was due to the

Covid-19 pandemic, and not due to the conduct of the various medical treatment

providers. The medical staff and the doctors exercised their professional judgment and

provided Plaintiff with proper care based on the circumstances. Thus, Defendant Brown

is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against her.

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff did establish a claim of deliberate indifference,

which he certainly did not for the reasons stated supra, the Court finds that Defendant

Brown was not personally involved in Plaintiff’s medical care and cannot be held liable.

First, Plaintiff admitted that he never received medical care from Defendant Brown.

Second, Plaintiff also admitted that he had no knowledge of whether Defendant Brown

had any authority over any of the doctors, dentists, and/or nurse practitioners to

prescribe a certain course of treatment. Lastly, Plaintiff admitted that he never personally

spoke to Defendant Brown about being seen by an outside medical provider. Thus,

Plaintiff has not established that Defendant Brown was personally involved in his

medical care. In light of the above, the Court need not address Defendant Brown’s

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argument regarding qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Brown’s motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 63). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgment in favor of Defendant Christine Brown and against Plaintiff Laquan Perkins

and close the case.

In an abundance of caution, and noting Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court advises

Plaintiff as follows. Plaintiff has two means of contesting this order: (1) he may request

this Court review this order; or (2) he may appeal the order to the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals.

If Plaintiff chooses to request this Court to review this order, he should file a

motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

Plaintiff must file the motion within twenty-eight (28) days of the entry of judgment; the

deadline cannot be extended. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 59(e); 6(b)(2). The motion must also

comply with Rule 7(b)(1) and state with sufficient particularity the reason(s) that the

Court should reconsider the judgment. See Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir.

2010); Talano v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir.

2001). See also Blue v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating

that a party must establish either manifest error of law or fact, or that newly discovered

evidence precluded entry of judgment to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

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So long as the Rule 59(e) motion is in proper form and timely submitted, the 30-

day clock for filing a notice of appeal will be tolled. See FED. R. APP. PROC. 4(a)(4). The

clock will start anew once the undersigned rules on the Rule 59(e) motion. See FED. R. APP.

PROC. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(4), (a)(4)(B)(ii). However, if the Rule 59(e) motion is filed outside the

28-day deadline or “completely devoid of substance,” the motion will not toll the time

for filing a notice of appeal; it will expire 30 days from the entry of judgment. Carlson v.

CSX Transportation, Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818,

819–820 (7th Cir. 1977). Again, this deadline can be extended only on a written motion by

Plaintiff showing excusable neglect or good cause.

In contrast, if Plaintiff chooses to go straight to the Seventh Circuit, he must file a

notice of appeal from the entry of judgment or order appealed from within 30 days. See

FED. R. APP. PROC. 4(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The deadline can be extended for a short

time only if Plaintiff files a motion showing excusable neglect or good cause for missing

the deadline and asking for an extension of time. See FED. R. APP. PROC. 4(a)(5)(A), (C).

See also Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the good cause and

excusable neglect standards); Abuelyaman v. Illinois State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir.

2011) (explaining the excusable neglect standard).

Plaintiff may appeal to the Seventh Circuit by filing a notice of appeal in this Court.

See FED. R. APP. PROC. 3(a). The current cost of filing an appeal with the Seventh Circuit

is $605.00. The filing fee is due at the time the notice of appeal is filed. See FED. R. APP.

PROC. 3(e). If Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the entire filing fee up front, he must file a

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motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP motion”). See FED. R. APP. PROC. 24(a)(1).

The IFP motion must set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See FED. R.

App. Proc. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, he

will be assessed an initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He will then be

required to make monthly payments until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2024.

Digitally signed by

i . Judge Sison

tlt Doe Date: 2024.04.25

12:25:20 -05'00"

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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