Chairs v. Wills

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STANLEY CHAIRS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 22-CV-3090-SPM

ANTHONY WILLS, Warden,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Following a jury trial in St. Clair County, Illinois, Petitioner Stanley Chairs

was convicted of first-degree murder. (Doc. 6, p. 1). He was sentenced to a term of

imprisonment for forty years. (Id.). He is currently in the custody of the Illinois

Department of Corrections at the Menard Correctional Center.

He brings this Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc.

6). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) grants jurisdiction to the federal courts to entertain a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an individual who is in custody

pursuant to a judgment of a state court on the grounds that the individual is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Chairs

seeks an evidentiary hearing and reversal of his conviction and sentence on three

grounds. (Id. at 13-14). The following Claims are currently before this Court:

1. The Illinois State Courts erred in ruling that the legality of Chairs’ arrest

under the Fourth Amendment was waived. (Doc. 6, pp. 6-8).

2. The Illinois State Courts erred in ruling that Chairs’ statement was made

voluntarily and not induced by promises of leniency. (Doc. 6, pp. 9-11).

3. Chairs’ trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise all

surrounding circumstances that overwhelmed his will, leading to Chairs

making a self-incriminating statement. (Doc. 6, pp. 11-13).

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 2011, the State of Illinois charged Chairs with one count of first-

degree murder. People v. Chairs, 2022 IL App (5th) 210038-U, ¶ 5.1 Prior to trial,

Chairs filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the police after his arrest.

People v. Chairs, 2015 IL App (5th) 130415-U, ¶ 2. The trial court denied Chairs’

motion, finding that the police did not exert undue influence during the course of

the interrogation. Specifically, the trial court found that the officers stating that

only the State’s Attorney could make promises regarding sentencing saved the

statement from being suppressed.

On April 9, 2013, Chairs was found guilty. (Doc. 6, p. 1). On May 30, 2013, he

was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for forty years, with a fifteen-year

enhancement for the use of a firearm. (Id.).

A. Direct Appeal

Chairs appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police and that his sentence

excessive. (Doc. 15-2, p. 5). The appellate court held that the officers who interrogated

Chairs did not make promises of leniency that would render his statement

involuntary. People v. Chairs, 2015 IL App (5th) 130415-U, ¶ 19. The court further

1 The facts underlying petitioner’s conviction as determined by the state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which Chairs has not done here. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).

held that Chairs did not make an unambiguous request for an attorney after being

read his Miranda rights so no constitutional violation resulted from his being

questioned. Id. at 26. Lastly, Chairs’ forty-year sentence was affirmed after finding

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Chairs. Id. at 30. On

May 25, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Chair’s Petition for Leave to Appeal.

People v. Chairs, 400 Ill.Dec. 654 (2016). On December 5, 2016, the Supreme Court of

the United States denied Chairs’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Chairs v. Illinois,

580 U.S. 1023 (2016).

B. Petitions for Postconviction Relief

On January 12, 2017, Chairs filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.

People v. Chairs, 2021 IL App (5th) 180429-U, ¶ 24. Counsel was appointed and two

amended petitions were filed. Id. at ¶ 25-26. In the operative postconviction petition

Chairs argued that:

1. His Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police entered his home

without consent or a warrant to arrest him.

2. His statement to the police was not voluntary because he was given promises

of leniency if he made a statement.

3. His forty-year prison sentence was excessive as he had turned eighteen one

month prior to the shooting.

Id. at ¶ 26. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that the claims

were either waived, barred by res judicata, or lacked support such as an affidavit. Id.

at ¶ 25. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that Claim 1

was both waived and not supported by an affidavit and Claims 2-4 were barred by res

judicata. Id. at ¶ 28. The trial court denied Chairs’ motion to reconsider its ruling. Id.

at ¶ 29.

Chairs appealed the dismissal of his petition to the Illinois Appellate Court.

While the dismissal of his first postconviction petition was on direct appeal, Chairs

filed a motion for leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief. People v.

Chairs, 2022 IL App (5th) 210038-U, ¶ 11. The successive petition raised the sole

claim that Chairs’ statement should have been suppressed because it was made after

he invoked his constitutional right to have counsel present during questioning. (Doc.

6, p. 2). The trial court denied Chairs’ motion because it failed to meet the cause-and-

prejudice standard. People v. Chairs, 2022 IL App (5th) 210038-U, ¶ 11.

The court of appeals held that postconviction counsel acted reasonably while

representing Chairs and Chairs had not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness.

People v. Chairs, 2021 IL App (5th) 180429-U, ¶ 49. The court affirmed the dismissal

of Chairs’ postconviction petition Id. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to

appeal the ruling. People v. Chairs, 456 Ill.Dec. 49 (2022).

C. Petition for Relief from Judgment

On September 30, 2020, Chairs filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment

pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. People v. Chairs, 2022 IL App (5th) 210038-U, ¶ 14.

Chairs argued that his sentence violated the Illinois Constitution because the

accomplice liability theory under which he was convicted had identical elements to

conspiracy but a harsher penalty. Id. The petition further alleged that the statute of

limitations did not apply because Chairs was arguing that the judgment against him

was void. Id. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition for deficient service of

process, untimeliness, for presenting legal, not factual, issues, and because all of the

facts raised in the petition were known by Chairs at the time of trial. Id. at ¶ 15. On

December 18, 2020, the trial court dismissed Chairs’ petition, finding that there were

no meritorious arguments that could excuse the late filing. Id. at ¶ 17. The trial court

denied Chairs’ pro se motion to reconsider its ruling. Id. at ¶ 18.

The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Chairs’ petition. First, it held

that Illinois no longer recognized a void sentence as a basis to excuse the statute of

limitations. People v. Chairs, 2022 IL App (5th) 210038-U, ¶ 22. Further, Chairs

raised an as applied as opposed to a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the

statute used to convict him, meaning his judgment could not have been void ab initio.

Id. The court also held that Chairs waived his accountability claims by not objecting

to its use during trial or in a posttrial motion. Id. at ¶ 23. Lastly, it was noted that

“[a]ccountability is not in and of itself a crime” but is a “mechanism through which a

criminal conviction may be reached.” Id. at ¶ 24. Chairs did not petition the Illinois

Supreme Court for leave to appeal the ruling. (Doc. 6, p. 5).

D. Federal Habeas Proceedings

On December 27, 2022, Chairs filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Doc. 1). On February 21, 2023, the Court dismissed the Petition without

prejudice because it contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims for relief.

(Doc. 3). Chairs filed an amended Petition (Doc. 4) on March 3, 2023, which was

similarly dismissed without prejudice to remove the unexhausted claims. (Doc. 5).

Chairs filed a second amended Petition on April 5, 2023. (Doc. 6). Anthony Wills, the

Warden at Menard Correctional Center, filed a response to the second amended

Petition.2 (Doc. 14).

LEGAL STANDARD

This Petition is subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act, known as the AEDPA. “The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-

court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685, 693 (2002).

Habeas is not merely another round of appellate review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

restricts habeas relief to cases where the state court determination “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”

or “a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id.

A judgment is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if the state court

“contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Coleman v.

Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405

2 Chairs named the State of Illinois as a respondent in his second amended Petition, but the proper

respondent in a § 2554 action is solely the warden of the facility in which the petitioner is

incarcerated. See Rule 2(a) of the FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS.

(2000)). A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” clearly established

federal law if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from

[Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case.” Coleman, 690 F.3d at 814 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407).

Federal habeas review serves as “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the

state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through

appeal.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court

has repeatedly emphasized that the Section 2254(d) standard “is intentionally

‘difficult to meet.’” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting White v.

Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014), and Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 358

(2013)).

In addition to the requirement for timely filing under the AEDPA, a habeas

petitioner must clear two procedural hurdles before the Court may reach the merits

of his habeas corpus petition: exhaustion of remedies and procedural default. See

Bolton v. Akpore, 730 F.3d 685, 694-696 (7th Cir. 2013). Before seeking habeas relief,

a petitioner is required to bring his claim(s) through “one complete round of the

State’s established appellate review process” because “the exhaustion doctrine is

designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal

constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal

courts.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

Under the Illinois two-tiered appeals process, petitioners such as Chairs must fully

present their claims not only to an intermediate appellate court, but also to the

Illinois Supreme Court, which offers discretionary review in cases such as this one.

See Id.

If a petitioner has pursued his state-court remedies to exhaustion, the

claims may nevertheless be barred by procedural default. See Perruquet v. Briley,

390 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the habeas petitioner has failed to fairly

present to the state courts the claim on which he seeks relief in federal court and

the opportunity to raise that claim in state court has passed, the petitioner has

procedurally defaulted that claim.” Id. A fairly presented claim “must place before

the state court both the controlling law and the operative facts in a manner such

that the state court was sufficiently alerted to the federal constitutional nature of

the issue to permit it to re-solve the issue on that basis.” Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d

513, 530 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). A petitioner may be

excused from procedural default only “if the petitioner can show both cause for

and prejudice from the default or can demonstrate that the district court’s failure

to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Bolton,

730 F.3d at 696.

ANALYSIS

1. Claim 1 is Procedurally Defaulted due to Chairs’ Failure to

Properly Raise it before the State Courts.

Claim 1 alleges that the Illinois Appellate Court erred in holding that Chairs

waived the ability to challenge the legality of his arrest under the Fourth

Amendment. The Court is unable to consider this Claim on the merits because it is

procedurally defaulted.

Federal courts “may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted

in state court – that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and

independent state procedural rule.” Davilla v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 528 (2017); 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The Illinois Appellate Court held that this Claim was waived

because it was not raised prior to trial or on direct appeal. People v. Chairs, 2021 IL

App (5th) 180429-U, ¶ 46. Chairs cannot rely on ineffective assistance of counsel to

excuse procedural default because he failed to present any facts before the state court

which would support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Lewis v. Sternes,

390 F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel can

only excuse default if it itself had been fairly presented before the state courts); see

also (Doc. 6, pp. 2-6) (showing absence of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

before state courts).

Even if this Claim was not procedurally defaulted, the Court could not reach

this Claim on the merits because an illegal arrest, by itself, is not a valid basis for a

federal court to grant habeas relief. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474

(1980); See also Sanders v. Israel, 717 F.2d 422, 423 (7th Cir. 1983).

2. Claim 2 is Denied on the Merits because the Decision of the Illinois

Appellate Court was not Contrary to or an Unreasonable

Application of Clearly Established Federal Law.

Claim 2 argues that Chairs’ statement to the police was involuntary because

he was promised leniency by the police. There was no bright-line rule from the

Supreme Court regarding when false promises make a confession involuntary while

the case was on direct appeal.3 See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 304 (7th Cir.

2017). Supreme Court precedent allows the police to encourage suspects to cooperate

during questioning. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). Further, the

factual record from the state courts shows that the officers clearly qualified their

statements by warning that only the State’s Attorney could give promises about

sentencing. See People v. Chairs, IL App (5th) 130415-U, ¶ 6. As there is no precedent

on whether the statements made by the police rendered the statement involuntary,

the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court cannot be said to be contrary to clearly

established federal law.

3. Claim 3 is Procedurally Defaulted due to Chairs’ Failure to Raise it

through One Complete Round of State Court Review.

Claim 3 alleges that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to

raise all the surrounding circumstances that lead Chairs to make a self-incriminating

statement to the police. The Court cannot decide this Claim on the merits because it

is procedurally defaulted.

For a claim to be decided on the merits it must first be raised through one

complete round of state court review. See Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 934 (7th

Cir. 2009). Chairs admits that this Claim was not presented in state court but alleges

that it is not defaulted due to postconviction counsel’s refusal to raise it. (Doc. 6, p.

13). This is not sufficient cause to excuse default. Ineffective assistance of state

3 “Clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the

relevant state court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Here, the time of the

decision of the Illinois Appellate Court on direct appeal is reference point for determining clearly

established federal law.

postconviction counsel can only excuse procedural default if the petitioner provides

“specific, nonconclusory factual allegations explaining why his postconviction counsel

was ineffective.” Garcia v. Cromwell, 28 F.4th 764, 773 (7th Cir. 2022). Chairs has

not done this, only stating that postconviction counsel’s refusal to include the claim

is the reason why it was not presented. (Doc. 6, p. 13).

Even had it not been procedurally defaulted, this Claim is without merit. The

issues Chairs alleges trial counsel should have raised, his age and inexperience with

the legal system, were reviewed by the Illinois Appellate Court and found to not

change the result of the hearing. People v. Chairs, 2015 IL App (5th) 130415-U, ¶ 19.

Based on this, Chairs has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the

result would have been different had trial counsel raised these factors in the trial

court. Chairs has therefore failed to establish that his defense was prejudiced and

this claim is without merit. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner Stanley Chairs’ Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 6) is DENIED in its entirety.

This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. All pending motions are DENIED as

MOOT. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close

the case.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this Court

must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse

to the applicant.” A certificate should be issued only where the petitioner “has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

In order for a certificate of appealability to issue, a petitioner must show that

“reasonable jurists” would find this Court’s “assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Buck v. Davis,

137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017). Here, no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether

this Court’s rulings were correct. Accordingly, the Court denies a certificate of

appealability.

Chairs may reapply for a certificate of appealability to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 3, 2024

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge