finding that a grievance that omitted the names of prison administrators was still sufficient for exhaustion purposes where it clearly gave the prison notice of an issue and a chance to fix it
How later courts described this case
- finding that a grievance that omitted the names of prison administrators was still sufficient for exhaustion purposes where it clearly gave the prison notice of an issue and a chance to fix it
- “[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JUSTIN TACKETT, )
Y46731, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Case No. 22-cv-1260-DWD
DAVID MITCHELL, )
PERCY MYERS, )
CHRISTINE BROWN, )
MARCIA HILL, )
BILL LOY, )
LANE, )
PHIL MARTIN, )
)
Defendants.1 )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Justin Tackett, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
currently detained at Robinson Correctional Center (Robinson), brings this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case concerns the care that Plaintiff has received
for chronic lung and sinus issues, first at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, and then
again at Robinson after his transfer to that facility in October of 2022. Defendants Loy
and Martin (both individuals who have interacted with Plaintiff at Robinson) have filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) on the issue of whether Plaintiff exhausted
his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the Prison
1 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct Defendant Lane’s name to Joshua Lane (Doc. 61).
Additionally, Defendant Martin is listed twice on the docket sheet, once as “Martin” and once as Phil
Martin. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE “Martin,” and to leave “Phil Martin.”
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff responded. (Doc. 79). The evidence
supports Plaintiff’s contention that he exhausted administrative remedies so the Motion
will be denied. All other defendants had the opportunity to file motions on the issue of
exhaustion but did not file anything, so the case is now ready to advance to merits
discovery.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that his problems began in October of 2021 with significant pain
and discomfort in his lungs. After multiple rounds of amending his complaint, Plaintiff
was allowed to proceed against Defendants Dr. Myers, Nurse Hill, Warden Mitchell, and
Healthcare Unit Administrator Brown for their roles in addressing his medical needs or
investigating and resolving his repeated grievances and correspondence about the same
while he was at Pinckneyville. (Doc. 17). Service of process issued and these parties’
filed answers. Before anyone filed a motion on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a third amended complaint on August 8, 2023.
Ultimately, the Court granted his request on August 30, 2023, and it designated
one additional claim against Defendants Lane, Loy, and Martin—three officials at
Robinson. Plaintiff alleged that he had been transferred to Robinson in the Fall of 2022.
Initially, he received medical attention that he felt was promising. However, as time
progressed he became concerned that his symptoms persisted and that he was not being
treated for his ongoing issues. He alleged that he submitted grievances that Defendant
Loy (the Warden) was a signatory for, but his grievances did not result in adequate care.
He also alleged that Defendant Martin, the healthcare unit administrator, had
acknowledged grievances about his medical issues, but had not taken any responsive
action.
Based on the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint, which are more fully
recounted in the Order of Initial Review (Doc. 42), the Court designated one claim to
proceed against Lane, Loy, and Martin:
Claim 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Bill Loy, Martin, and Lane for failing to ensure
adequate follow-up care for Plaintiff’s chest/lung infection or
condition after his admission to Robinson up until present.
(Doc. 42 at 4).
The Defendants have submitted 279-pages of grievance documentation, while
Plaintiff has responded with just a single grievance, and responses. The Court finds that
Plaintiff’s exhibits are all that is necessary to resolve this motion, so it will not summarize
the defendants exhibits at length. Suffice it to say, the Defendants identified six
grievances about medical care that Plaintiff fully exhausted before filing the Third
Amended Complaint (Doc. 77-1 at 30-49), and they identified an additional 11 grievances
about medical care that Plaintiff had filed at Robinson, but that had not yet been fully
exhausted by the time he filed his Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 77 at 9-14).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Grievance number 23-0500E was submitted as an emergency grievance by Plaintiff
on April 19, 2023. (Doc. 79 at 7). It was deemed a non-emergency, and it received a
routine response from the counselor on May 4, 2023. The grievance officer responded on
May 12, 2023, and the Warden concurred on May 16, 2023. (Doc. 79 at 6). On June 12,
2023, the Administrative Review Board (ARB) responded. (Doc. 79 at 9).
In the April 19, 2023, grievance, Plaintiff wrote at length about his concerns with
the healthcare he was receiving. He stated, “Phil Martin is fully aware of my situation.
Doctors have ordered CT scans and the have been approved. The chest CT has been
approved for months since end of January 2023[.]” (Doc. 79 at 8). Plaintiff goes on to
explain that he has been on medication, but he does not feel it is helping and he describes
his physical symptoms as deteriorating. He explains that he has yet to undergo the CT
scan, despite it being approved for quite some time. In closing he writes, “I feel with the
symptoms I’m having the CT scans have been approved they need to get me out to see
what’s causing it how bad it is and see the damage its caused and fix it. I have no choice
at this point my next step will be legal action for medical neglect.” (Id.). Plaintiff sought
emergency review of this grievance, but the Chief Administrative Officer declined
emergency review. (Doc. 79 at 7).
In response to the grievance, the counselor indicated, “Per HCUA Martin, you had
another issue that the MD wanted tested for and asked to schedule the more acute issue
before the CT for sinuses. Per medical records Director J. Lane, he had these completed
on 4.25.23.” (Doc. 79 at 7). The grievance officer parroted the counselor’s response and
recommended that the grievance be “partially affirmed,” without further explanation of
what that meant. (Doc. 79 at 6). The Chief Administrative Officer concurred. (Doc. 79 at
6). On June 12, 2023, the ARB denied the grievance as appropriately addressed by the
facility. (Doc. 79 at 9).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In
determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is
not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to
exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). After hearing evidence, finding
facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the claim to
proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th
Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.
Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021); Miller v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., 2017 WL
951399 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2017).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring
a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion
requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”
Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the
administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process
outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
The regulations first require an inmate to file his grievance with his counselor within 60
days of the discovery of an incident, occurrence, or problem that gave rise to the
grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). Administrative regulations require the
grievance “contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject
of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If
the names of the individuals are unknown to the offender, he can still file the grievance
but “must include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id.
Further, the Seventh Circuit has held that an inmate is required to provide enough
information to serve a grievance’s function of giving “prison officials a fair opportunity
to address [an inmate’s] complaints.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011).
If the complaint is not resolved through the counselor, the grievance may be
submitted to a grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations
in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e).
The CAO then provides the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with
the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s
decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer
and CAO to his appeal. Id. The ARB submits a written report of its findings and
recommendations to the Director, who them makes a final determination. 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE § 504.850(d), (e).
B. Analysis
The Court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment can be resolved on paper
without a Pavey hearing. It is indisputable that Plaintiff had access to the grievance
procedure, that he knew how to use it, and that he adequately used the procedure to
exhaust many medical grievances in recent years. This leaves only the issue of if any of
Plaintiff’s grievances are sufficient to exhaust the claims against Defendants Martin and
Loy for allegedly turning a blind eye or failing to investigate and address alleged
shortfalls in Plaintiff’s medical care at Robinson.
The defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have any sufficient grievances, but
this argument is almost baffling given the available grievance record. In grievance 23-
0500E, Plaintiff plainly named Defendant Martin and indicated that Martin was aware of
his ongoing need for a CT scan, and outstanding medical orders for the same, but that no
one had ensured Plaintiff was sent out for the CT scan. Martin argues that this does not
meet the “particularity” requirement of §1997e(a) without describing what that standard
is, or how Plaintiff failed to meet it. Reading the grievance in Plaintiff’s favor, it is
reasonable to infer that by saying Martin knew of all his issues, and then complaining
nothing had yet been done, that Plaintiff was complaining Martin had not helped him
secure care that he knew Plaintiff needed. This is more than enough to exhaust a claim
against Martin concerning his role in securing the needed care. Martin also participated
in responding to the grievance, and part of his response confirmed that Plaintiff still had
an outstanding need for a CT scan. In the face of this evidence, it is hard to understand
how Martin could try to claim he had no warning of Plaintiff’s claims or chance to resolve
them.
It should also be noted that Plaintiff filed four other fully exhausted grievances
prior to grievance 23-0500E concerning his desire for medical care at Robinson.
Grievance numbers 23-0232E (February 28, 2023), 23-0146E (January 26, 2023), 22-1150E
(October 26, 2022), 22-1347E (December 13, 2022). (Doc. 77-1 at 30-48). Martin
participated in responding to every single one of these grievances, and they all addressed
Plaintiff’s ongoing desire for access to treatment or medication for his lungs/sinuses.
Notably, in response to the January 26, 2023, and February 28, 2023, grievances, Martin
noted that Plaintiff had pending orders for a chest CT, and he reported in response to the
January 2023 grievance that he had contacted Defendant Lane who was supposed to be
scheduling the CT. (Doc. 77-1 at 29, 35). Given all of this information, it is clearly
established that Plaintiff sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies as to Martin.
As for Loy, he argues he was not personally named in any of Plaintiff’s many
grievances, but as Plaintiff has always contended, Loy as Warden was repeatedly made
aware of his complaints about the adequacy of medical care because one of his roles was
to approve or reject emergency designation for grievances, a role he performed for
grievance 23-0500E. The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert officials to a problem
so that they have a chance to fix it, not to give a potential defendant notice of a future
lawsuit. See e.g., Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 720-22 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that a
grievance that omitted the names of prison administrators was still sufficient for
exhaustion purposes where it clearly gave the prison notice of an issue and a chance to
fix it). As the first recipient of Plaintiff’s emergency grievance about ongoing lung and
sinus issues and his desire for a CT, Loy had adequate warning and a chance to address
the situation.
Courts have found that prison officials who are named in grievance responses, or
who directly participate in fielding grievances have ample notice for exhaustion
purposes. See e.g., Smith v. Thompson, 2020 WL 2616307 at *5 (S.D. Ill. May 22, 2020)
(finding that two officials who participated in responding to a grievance were provided
sufficient notice of an inmate’s problem for purposes of exhaustion); Miller v. Mahone,
2011 WL 5508976 at * 3 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2011) (rejecting a warden’s contention that a
claim was not exhausted against him where he was not named in the grievance because
the ARB’s response named the warden). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s many
grievances seeking adequate healthcare at Robinson, including grievance 23-0500E, are
adequate proof that Warden Loy had ample notice of his dissatisfaction with the care,
and he had an opportunity to investigate and intervene if necessary. This satisfies the
purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
DISPOSITION
The Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 77) is
DENIED. A merits discovery schedule will issue separately.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket sheet consistent with
footnote 1.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 5, 2024
s/ David W. Dugan
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge