Finnegan v. Baldwin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HANNAH FINNEGAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 3:20-cv-00218-GCS

KEVIN KINK, RUSSELL GOINS, )

ROBERT WALKER, BRANDON )

DEWEESE, )

)

Defendants )

)

vs. )

)

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc.

209); (Doc. 211). Defendant Robert E. Walker (“Walker”) filed his Motion for Summary

Judgment and Memorandum of Support on June 26, 2023. (Doc. 209, 210). Defendants

Brandon DeWeese (“DeWeese”), Russell Goins (“Goins”), and Kevin Kink (“Kink”) filed

their Motion for Summary Judgment on June 27, 2023. (Doc. 211). Plaintiff filed her

Responses in Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment on July 25, 2023. (Doc.

214, 215). Defendants filed their Replies in Support on August 8, 2023. (Doc. 216, 218). For

the reasons delineated below, the Court DENIES Defendant Walker’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 209), and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Kink, Goins, and DeWeese (Doc.

211).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Hannah Finnegan, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) housed at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”) brought this suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, 14, 67, 133). Plaintiff, a transgender woman, claims

that on or about June 21, 2018, she was moved from disciplinary housing to general

population and placed with another individual in custody. (Doc. 67). Shortly after

transfer into the new cell with inmate Justin Colapietro (“Colapietro”), Plaintiff alleges

that Colapietro sexually assaulted her. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated her

Eighth Amendment rights by exposing her to a substantial risk of serious physical injury

and failing to protect her. (Doc. 16).

Plaintiff filed this action pro se on February 26, 2020.1 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint against Defendants Kink and Goins survived screening on July 24,

2020. (Doc. 16). On November 11, 2020, Defendant Walker was added as a Defendant

pursuant to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 67). On April 9, 2021,

Defendant DeWeese was added as a Defendant pursuant to Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 133).

1 Attorneys Melinda Longford Power and Elizabeth Mazur entered their appearances for

Plaintiff on June 25, 2020, and July 7, 2020, respectively. (Doc. 10); (Doc. 13).

BACKGROUND

In May 2018, Plaintiff was transferred from Centralia Correctional Center to

Lawrence. (Doc. 210, Exh. A, p. 8). Plaintiff was first housed in a restrictive housing unit,

also known as a segregation unit, because she arrived on a disciplinary transfer. Id. at p.

19-21. Plaintiff remained in the same cell while in the segregation unit and did not have

a cellmate. Id. On June 21, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred from the segregation unit to

general population housing and placed in R6, C-wing, cell 6 (R6:CU:06). (Doc. 210, Exh.

B, p. 30). Plaintiff was placed in the cell with inmate Colapietro. (Doc. 210, Exh. C, p. 56,

57). Plaintiff alleges that Colapietro sexually assaulted her while she was housed in the

cell with him on June 21, 2018. (Doc. 210, Exh. A, p. 37-39).

At Lawrence, when an individual in custody is transferred from disciplinary

housing to the general population, the placement officer decides the cell assignment and

the assignment of cellmates. (Doc. 210, Exh. E). The decisions for placement are made,

and relevant cell change forms are sent out the day before the moves occur. (Doc. 210,

Exh. C, p. 42, 43). The placement officer would receive a segregation complete form from

the segregation lieutenant for those leaving the segregation unit the next day. (Doc. 210,

Exh. B, p. 27). Upon receiving this form, the placement officer would look at the

individual’s placement tag, noting their age, height, weight, and affiliation with security

threat groups. Id. The changes would be documented on a daily cell change sheet in

IDOC’s online Offender 360 (“O360”) system. Id. at p. 29. Placement officers are supposed

to look up the inmate on O360 before making a cell assignment. (Doc. 210, Exh. C, p. 13).

Upon arrival, individuals in custody are routinely looked up on O360, and all pertinent

information from O360 would be placed on the placement tag during its creation. Id. at

p. 13, 32.

IDOC’s sexual abuse prevention program includes the vulnerable designation,

which is set forth in IDOC Administrative Directive 04.01.301. (Doc. 213, Exh. 2). Under

A.D. 04.01.301, vulnerable prisoners are identified by IDOC’s Chief of Mental Health as

someone who has been a victim of or is vulnerable to sexual abuse in a correctional

setting. Id. A.D. 04.01.301 requires vulnerable prisoners to be single-celled unless/until a

specific proposed cellmate is screened and approved by prison administrators. Id. The

vulnerable designations would be indicated in O360. Id. Plaintiff claimed that her

vulnerable designation has been reflected in O360 continuously since 2015. (Doc. 213,

Exh. 1, p. 25). Plaintiff’s Offender Special Placement Double Cell Assessment (“Form

303”) for disciplinary housing also indicated her vulnerable designation and transgender

identity, thus indicating that double celling was not recommended. (Doc. 213, Exh. 4).

In 2018, Colapietro was incarcerated for predatory criminal sexual assault and

possession of a shank in a penal institution, and he had a long disciplinary history in

IDOC, including a history of violent assaults. (Doc. 213, Exh. 5, p. 99, 103). As of June 21,

2018, Colapietro was not deemed a sexual predator by the mental health staff at

Lawrence. (Doc. 211, Exh. 4, p. 88). If Colapietro had been screened as a potential cellmate

for Plaintiff in June 2018, he would not have been approved. (Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 145,

146).

A. Defendant Robert Walker

Defendant Walker was the placement officer at Lawrence on June 21, 2018. (Doc.

210, Exh. B, p. 9). On June 20, 2018, Walker sent a daily cell change email to Co-Defendants

DeWeese, Goins, Kink, and sixty other Lawrence personnel. (Doc. 211, Exh. 9). The email

contained a daily cell movement sheet, which did not indicate whether Plaintiff was

transgender or deemed vulnerable on June 20 or 21, 2018, or whether Plaintiff was to be

single or double-celled on June 21, 2018. Id. at p. 2. Defendant Walker made Plaintiff’s

housing change on O360 at 8:32 a.m. on June 21, 2018. (Doc. 210, Exh. B, p. 30, 31).

Defendant Walker claimed he did not know that Plaintiff was marked as

vulnerable when he placed Plaintiff in R6:CU:06 on June 21, 2018. (Doc. 210, Exh. B, p. 30,

42). Defendant Walker stated that he relied solely on the placement tag to determine

whether Plaintiff was vulnerable, and he believed that Plaintiff’s placement tag did not

indicate that she was vulnerable. (Doc. 210, Exh. C, p. 50, 51). Walker also stated that he

did not create Plaintiff’s placement tag, as it would have been created when she arrived

at the facility. Id. at p. 37. In addition, Walker asserts that he had no access to Plaintiff’s

Form 303 before June 21, 2018. (Doc. 210, Exh. B, p. 43, 48). Plaintiff’s IDOC records use

her legal name, John Finnegan, and Walker had not seen Plaintiff in person until he found

out about the instant suit. (Doc. 210, Exh. C, p. 110, 111; Doc. 210, Exh. D; Doc. 210, Exh.

F). Walker also did not know Colapietro before June 21, 2018. (Doc. 210, Exh. B, p. 33).

Plaintiff claims that Walker knew Plaintiff’s vulnerable designation, which is

indicated in O360 (Doc. 215, p. 11). Plaintiff claimed that Walker at least looked at O360

when he decided to double cell Plaintiff on June 20, 2018, and when he went into O360 to

formally change Plaintiff’s cell placement on the system on June 21, 2018. (Doc. 213, Exh.

1, p. 24, 25; Doc. 213, Exh. 3, p. 28, 30; Doc. 213, Exh. 5, p. 85-87; Doc. 211, Exh. 7, p. 35,

36). Plaintiff also believes that Walker had access to Plaintiff’s Form 303 and would have

seen that Warden Kink decided that Plaintiff should be single-celled. (Doc. 211, Exh. 7, p.

27, 35; Doc. 211, Exh. 4, p. 49, 50; Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 65-73). In addition, Plaintiff claims

that her vulnerable designation would have been indicated on her placement tag in June

2018, and Plaintiff notes that Walker admitted this during the internal affairs interview

on September 14, 2018. (Doc. 210, Exh. C, p. 54-56). Defendant Walker also admitted that

he knew of Colapietro before June 21, 2018, as he had handled Colapietro’s cell change

requests and had overheard other IDOC staff’s negative opinions of him. (Doc. 210, Exh.

C, p. 66-69).

B. Defendant Brandon DeWeese

Defendant DeWeese was a correctional lieutenant at Lawrence in May and June

2018. (Doc. 211, Exh. 4, p. 10). Correctional lieutenants oversee the “zones” assigned to

them during the shifts. Id. at p. 15, 16. DeWeese was Defendant Walker's direct

supervisor. Id. at p. 27. DeWeese did not work at Lawrence on June 20, 2018. Id. at p. 32.

On the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift on June 21, 2018, Defendant DeWeese was the Zone 7

lieutenant, also known as the segregation lieutenant, which included the segregation unit

and the Placement Office. Id. at p. 15-17.

Plaintiff claims that before June 21, 2018, Defendant DeWeese knew she was

transgender and designated vulnerable. (Doc. 214, p. 6). Plaintiff stated that Defendant

DeWeese had personal interaction with her when she was in his housing unit, had access

to her Form 303, and had her vulnerable designation listed on a tag in his office. (Doc.

210, Exh. 2, p. 43-46; Doc. 211, Exh. 4, p. 49, 54, 55, 59, 60; Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 59-61; Doc.

213, Exh. 12, p. 36). Plaintiff alleges that DeWeese did not inform Defendant Walker of

her vulnerable designation, did not give Walker Plaintiff’s Form 303, and did nothing

when he received the June 20, 2018, cell change email. (Doc. 210, Exh. B, p. 48; Doc. 211,

Exh. 4, p. 38, 45-50). Plaintiff argues that by doing so, Defendant DeWeese failed to take

reasonable steps to abate a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. (Doc. 214, p. 13,

14).

Defendant DeWeese, as Zone 7 lieutenant, noted that he only made decisions

about segregation placement and had nothing to do with the Placement Office unless

Placement Office personnel asked for help or had an issue. (Doc. 211, Exh. 4, p. 16; Doc.

211, Exh. 5, p. 21, 22, 24; Doc. 211, Exh. 6, p. 13). DeWeese claims that Walker did not

contact him about the June 21, 2018, placement, and he was not involved in it. (Doc. 211,

Exh. 4, p. 38). Defendant DeWeese asserts that he did not know that Plaintiff was

transgender in May and June of 2018. Id. at p. 58. DeWeese also stated that he was not at

Lawrence on June 20, 2018, when the cell assignment at issue was decided, and he did

not physically transfer or escort Plaintiff from her cell in segregation to her cell in the

general population on June 21, 2018. Id. at p. 3-16, 31, 32.

C. Defendant Russell Goins

Defendant Goins was an Assistant Warden of Operations (“AWO”) at Lawrence

in June 2018. (Doc. 211, Exh. 7, p. 6). The AWO supervises the security of the facility, as

well as the barbershop, maintenance, Bureau of Identification, laundry, and placement.

Id. at p. 8, 9.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Goins held a supervisory role as the AWO, was

aware of the importance of placement decisions, and was responsible for ensuring that

Walker knew his responsibilities. (Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 8, 9, 147). Plaintiff claimed that

Defendant Goins knew that the placement office was understaffed, and he failed to

ensure Walker’s understanding of his responsibilities or the oversight of placement. (Doc.

210, Exh. C, p. 131, 132; Doc. 211, Exh. 7, p. 19).

Defendant Goins claims he was not contacted about the placement decisions and

was not involved in the June 21, 2018, placement. (Doc. 211, Exh. 7, p. 12, 13). Defendant

Goins argues that overseeing placement does not make him automatically liable for

actions or inactions of Placement Office personnel. (Doc. 211, p. 9). Defendant Goins also

stated that he typically did not open daily cell change emails, so he probably did not open

the June 20, 2018, email from Defendant Walker. (Doc. 211, Exh. 7, p. 66).

D. Defendant Kevin Kink

Defendant Kink was the Chief Administrative Officer (“Warden”) of Lawrence in

June 2018. (Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 7). Defendant Kink argues that he made no decision in the

June 21, 2018, placement of Plaintiff. Id. at p. 157. Defendant Kink concurred in the

determination that Plaintiff was to be single-celled in the segregation unit on May 29,

2018. (Doc. 213, Exh. 4).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Kink knew her vulnerable transgender status and

that she needed to be single-celled but failed to protect her regardless of this subjective

knowledge of risk. (Doc. 214, p. 14; Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 65-73). Plaintiff argues that as a

Warden, Kink should inform security staff, including Defendant Walker, of her

vulnerable status. (Doc. 213, Exh. 12, p. 19). Plaintiff claims that she wrote a letter to

Defendant Kink on June 6, 2018, expressing her safety concerns upon being transferred

from segregation to the general population, and specifically the fears of suffering

potential sexual assault from being locked in a cell with other intimates, but she alleges

that Kink did nothing in response. (Doc. 1, p. 14).

E. Plaintiff’s Grievance Record and Identification of “John Doe” Defendants

Plaintiff filed her first grievance regarding the June 2018 assault on August 8, 2018.

(Doc. 210, Exh. F, p. 3-4). Therein, Plaintiff described the events leading up to the assault

and expressed concerns about Colapietro’s sexually transmitted infection (“STI”) status.

Id. at p. 4. Given these concerns, Plaintiff requested an STI screening and noted that she

would feel safer in a single cell. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff filed her second grievance regarding

the assault on August 12, 2018. Id. at p. 5-6. Plaintiff requested the following as relief:

“Who was involved in deciding to place me in R6-CU-06” with [Colapietro]? What was the

reasoning behind it? Insurances something similar will never happen again in IDOC to

me or anyone else. Declarations and Apology.” Id. (emphasis added). The ARB reviewed

both grievances together on September 19, 2018. Id. at p. 1. The ARB determined that

Plaintiff’s grievances were “moot” because the allegations were currently being

investigated. Id. The ARB noted that Plaintiff would be notified by the facility of the

outcome of the investigation. Id. The Director of the ARB then concurred with the Board’s

recommendation on September 24, 2018. Id.

Defendant Walker underwent an investigative interview about Plaintiff’s assault

on September 14, 2018. (Doc. 224, Exh. 1). The report stated that during the interview that

Walker “was unsure how Finnegan got put into a cell with Colapietro because Finnegan

ha[d] a tag marked vulnerable on the placement board.” Id. at p. 2. Additionally, the

report notes that Walker stated, “that if he placed Finnegan into a cell with another

inmate it was by total accident.” Id. An Administrative Hearing took place on October

31, 2018. (Doc. 224, Exh. 2). The Employee Review Hearing Office found that there was

credible evidence that C/O Walker violated employee directives on June 21, 2018. Id. at

p. 2. During the hearing, Walker allegedly stated the following:

After I was interviewed, I have thought about this. I was asked if it was

clearly marked, and I was not sure. Now I know he is clearly marked as

vulnerable. This information comes from the MHP as an outlook to

placement and we tag them on the board with a green marker. My name is

on it and I did it.

Id.

Plaintiff filed her lawsuit in this case on February 26, 2020. (Doc. 1). By June 25,

2020, Plaintiff had obtained counsel. (Doc. 10). On July 16, 2020, Plaintiff – through her

attorneys – filed a Motion for Leave to Serve A Subpoena to Identify Defendants Before

the Statute of Limitation Runs. (Doc. 15). On September 1, 2020, while waiting on the

Court to rule on the Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed an Assistant Attorney General

(“AAG”) who recently appeared in the case and requested voluntary production of the

materials Plaintiff sought in her motion. (Doc. 213, Exh. 10).

By September 8, 2020, the AAG filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion, objecting on

the basis that the discovery was overbroad, but stated that she would nevertheless

voluntarily work with Plaintiff’s counsel to identify the appropriate defendants. (Doc. 34,

p. 3-4). On September 10, 2020, the AAG produced to Plaintiff a copy of the IDOCs

Internal Affairs (“IA”) File for the underlying incident and those materials identified

Robert Walker as having made Plaintiff’s cell placement. Id. Neither Plaintiff nor her

Counsel were aware of Walker’s involvement until disclosure of the IA report. (Doc. 34,

Exh. 9); (Doc. 34, Exh. 10).

After obtaining the IA file, Plaintiff’s counsel continued to seek out more

information from IDOC about possible defendants, but IDOC would not voluntarily

provide them with the information. See, e.g., (Doc. 34, Exh. 10) (referencing emails dated

9/22/20 and 9/23/20). By October 10, 2020, the Court entered a scheduling order. (Doc.

64). Among other things, the Order directed the parties to share information to help

Plaintiff identify “John Doe” defendants. Id. In that same order, the Court denied

Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery as moot. Id. at p. 7. (noting that “[i]n light of the deadlines

set in this Order regarding identification of unknown parties, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave

to Serve a Subpoena to Identify Defendants (Doc. 15) is DENIED as MOOT.”).

Following entry of the Court’s October 10th Order, Plaintiff’s counsel initiated a

“meet and confer” with Defendants’ counsel about the fact that the case did not involve

“John Does” in the usual sense. Usually, Plaintiffs seek the identity of John Doe

defendants for the purposes of adding them as defendants. In this case, Plaintiff lacked

information about why or how the celling decision that led to her assault was made.

Plaintiff renewed her requests for depositions during the meet and confer meetings. Id.

Ultimately, Defendants would not agree to the depositions Plaintiff sought.

On January 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for limited discovery after

meet and confer efforts failed. On February 8, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion,

allowing sixty days for the depositions to proceed, and setting a deadline of April 11,

2021, for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 103). Having worked diligently to

identify Defendant DeWeese through depositions, Plaintiff filed her last amended

complaint on April 9, 2021. (Doc. 124).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c); Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d

1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The

movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material

fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). This Court must

consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving factual disputes

in favor of the non-movant. See Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d

1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

See also Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “we are not

required to draw every conceivable inference from the record . . . we draw only

reasonable inferences”) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also

appropriate if a plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. While the Court may not “weigh evidence or engage in fact-

finding[,]” it must determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago,

496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).

In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply

rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence

that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial.

See Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670–671 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 276 (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 324). No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring

the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250 (citations omitted). Accord Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87

F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). In

other words, “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Trade

Finance Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation

omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla

of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”). Instead, the

non-moving party must present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the [summary

judgment] motion.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000)

(internal citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations Defenses

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Walker and DeWeese

are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 210, p. 10-13); (Doc. 211, p. 11-

13). Further, they allege that her claims against Walker and DeWeese cannot be saved by

the relation back doctrine. Id. In response, Plaintiff argues that her claims against Walker

and DeWeese were filed within the applicable statute of limitations because the period

tolled as she pursued her administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. 215, p. 17-19). Alternatively, Plaintiff believes that the doctrine of

equitable tolling should apply to her claims against Walker and DeWeese. (Doc. 214, p.

19-20); (Doc. 215, p. 19). The Court agrees with Defendants regarding tolling under the

PLRA. However, the Court finds that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply,

which saves Plaintiff’s claims against DeWeese and Walker.

Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 borrow the statute of limitations from the state

in which the alleged violation occurred. See Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th

Cir. 1998). Illinois has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See 735

ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/13-202. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims

arising in Illinois is two years. See Woods v. Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services, 710

F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2013).

Federal Courts also borrow the forum state’s principles of tolling. See Smith v. City

of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 839-840 (7th Cir. 1992). Illinois requires tolling by statute

where “the commencement of an action is stayed by an injunction, order of the court, or

statutory prohibition.” 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/13-216. Because the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to

filing suit under § 1983, the limitations period must be tolled while a prisoner completes

the administrative grievance process. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (noting that “[n]o

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); see also Johnson v. Rivera, 272

F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001).

Defendants Walker and DeWeese assert that tolling under the PLRA did not begin

until Plaintiff filed her grievance reporting the assault. (Doc. 210, p. 11); (Doc. 211, p. 11-

13). Their position is that Plaintiff’s statute of limitations began running on June 21, 2018

(the date of Plaintiff’s assault) and did not begin to toll until August 8, 2018 (the date she

filed her first grievance). Id. Plaintiff, on the other hand, believes that her claims against

Defendants tolled from June 18 through September 24, 2018, when Plaintiff concluded

the grievance process. (Doc. 214, p. 18); (Doc. 215, p. 17-19).

Defendants submit two cases that squarely confront the issue of claim accrual and

tolling. In Hatch v. Briley, the Seventh Circuit recognized that a Plaintiff’s claim accrues

when the victim knowns (or should know) that he has been injured. Case No. 05-3204,

230 Fed. Appx. 598, 599 (7th Cir. April 19, 2007) (unpublished). The court recognized this

is distinct from tolling, and that tolling “does not delay the claim’s accrual.” Id. This

holding was reiterated by this Court in Walker v. Porter, wherein the Court noted that “the

tolling period starts when a prisoner files his grievance and ends when the administrative

review process is over.” Case No. 21-cv-1171-NJR, 2023 WL 403946, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 25,

2023).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims accrued on the date of her

assault – June 18, 2018. However, tolling began on August 8, 2018, and then ended on

September 24, 2018 – the date the ARB director affirmed the Board’s determination. Thus,

the fifty days between the date of the incident and the date when Plaintiff filed her

August 8, 2018, grievance count towards the two-year statute of limitations. As such, 680

days remained in Plaintiffs two-year statute of limitations once she received notice of the

ARB’s final determination. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations period

elapsed on August 4, 2020.

However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the doctrine of equitable tolling

should apply to the instant case.2 The doctrine of equitable tolling “pauses the running

of, or ‘tolls’ a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently, but

some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”

Xanthopoulos v. United States Department of Labor, 991 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Madison v. United States Department of Labor, 924 F.3d 941, 946-947 (7th Cir. 2019)). To

satisfy the second element, the circumstances causing the litigants delay must be “both

2 The Court also notes that the Relation Back Doctrine pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c) would not save Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants. As noted in Defendant’s

brief, the Seventh Circuit has confirmed that “naming a John Doe defendant does not constitute

a ‘mistake’ within the meaning of 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).” Herrera v. Cleveland et al., 8 F.4th 493, 498 (7th Cir.

2021). However, the application of the equitable tolling doctrine removes this as a bar. See, e.g.,

Flowers v. Stec, No. 20-cv-06498, 2023 WL 15474, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2023) (noting that the

doctrine of equitable tolling may save a case filed outside of the statute of limitations period);

Foster v. Unknown Cook County Deputy Sheriff, 914 F. Supp. 221, 224 at n.2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1995)

(stating that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is not precluded by failure to meet the

standards of the relation back doctrine).

extraordinary and beyond its control.” Mayberry v. Dittmann, 904 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir.

2018) (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 756

(2016)). Plaintiffs bear the burden to show both diligence and extraordinary

circumstances. See Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2021). The Court

recognizes that equitable tolling is “rare “and courts extend this relief sparingly. Id.; see

also Xanthopoulos, 991 F.3d at 831.

When a pro se plaintiff seeks “to identify unknown defendants,” reasonable

diligence exists if the plaintiff “filed a motion that would help him identify those

defendants, and the statute of limitations expires while the motion is pending.” Bryan v.

City of Chicago, 746 F.3d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 2014). Extraordinary circumstances might

include “legal disability, an irredeemable lack of information, or situations where the

plaintiff could not learn of the identity of proper defendants through the exercise of due

diligence.” See Dickerson v. City of Chicago, Case No. 21-cv-2955, 2022 WL 3369271, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2022) (citing Dandridge v. Cook County, No. 12-cv-5458, 2013 WL

3421834, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013)).

The Court finds that Plaintiff diligently tried to ascertain the identity of DeWeese

and Walker. Plaintiff had no way of knowing who was responsible for transferring her

into a cell with Colapietro or what went into that decision, as the decision was made by

Officers through email correspondence with the support of the facility’s Offender 360

Program and the physical offender tags. Plaintiff had no access to any of these things. All

Plaintiff knew is what happened to her – she was placed into a cell with Colapietro and

that he sexually assaulted her while they were celled together. In Plaintiff’s second

grievance, she requested as relief that she be informed “[w]ho was involved in deciding

to place me in R6-CU-06” with [Colapietro]?” The ARB informed Plaintiff that she would

be notified of the results of the facility’s investigation into the incident. However, Plaintiff

did not receive any information regarding the investigation’s outcome.

Recognizing the complexity of her case, Plaintiff acquired counsel shortly after she

filed this case in June 2020. Plaintiff and her counsel only learned about Walker’s identity

once Defendants’ counsel produced the Internal Affairs Report on September 10, 2020.

Counsel had previously filed a Motion for Leave to Serve A Subpoena to Identify

Defendants Before the Statute of Limitation Runs on July 16, 2020. The Court found the

motion moot on October 10, 2020, given that the scheduling order set out discovery

standards for John Does. Recognizing that Plaintiff’s circumstances were unique,

Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to meet and confer with Defendants’ counsel to address the

issue of identifying additional defendants. However, additional information was not

forthcoming until the Court granted Plaintiff’s renewed motion for limited discovery on

January 25, 2021. Through the depositions ordered by the Court, Plaintiff learned of

DeWeese’s involvement, and she accordingly amended her complaint on April 11, 2021.

Given the facts reiterated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff satisfied the second

prong of the test, thus allowing for the application of equitable tolling. The lack of

substantive information from Defendants’ counsel was a situation that was beyond

Plaintiff’s or her counsel’s control. Plaintiff’s counsel filed two separate motions to

ascertain the identity of additional defendants and even attempted to confer informally

via email with Defendants’ counsel to no avail. Plaintiff and her counsel could not control

opposing counsel’s response to these requests. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s counsel

continuously sought out ways to facilitate cooperation. Repeated and constant attempts

by her counsel to obtain this information is all that Plaintiff could control. Therefore, the

Court will allow Plaintiff’s claims against DeWeese and Walker to proceed.

B. Plaintiff’s Case Against Defendants

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Walker, Kink, DeWeese, and Goins violated her

Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect her from the assault that took place when

she was double celled with fellow inmate Justin Colapietro. (Doc. 215); (Doc. 214).

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment “to protect prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners [.]” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833

(1994). To succeed on a failure to protect claim, “the inmate must show that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that the

prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or safety.” Id.

Demonstrating deliberate indifference towards a prisoner’s safety requires a

showing that individual prison officials had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm to

the prisoner, which they personally disregarded. See Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763,

775 (7th Cir. 2008). It is not enough that a reasonable person should have known that the

prisoner was at risk; the official must actually know of and disregard the risk to incur

culpability. See Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 552-553 (7th Cir. 1997). A prisoner may

demonstrate that prison officials were aware of a specific, impeding, and substantial

threat to their safety, by showing that [they] complained to prison officials about a

specific threat to their safety. See, e.g., LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 843-844 (7th Cir. 2020)

(holding a jury could find prison guard’s actual knowledge of a specific risk when the

plaintiff repeatedly told the officers that he felt unsafe, and the guards knew the cellmate

had previously assaulted a prior cellmate.) “Mere negligence (for example if a prison

guard should know of a risk but does not) is not enough to state a claim for deliberate

indifference under the Eighth Amendment.” Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996).

Thus, liability for failure to protect an inmate materializes only if the individual knew the

inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it. See Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 777.

1. Plaintiff’s Case Against Defendant Walker

Defendant Walker advances two reasons why the Court should grant summary

judgment in his favor. (Doc. 210, p. 9-10). First, Walker asserts that Plaintiff cannot

establish that he acted with deliberate indifference when he placed Plaintiff in cell

R6:CY:06 as he was “unaware of any risk of harm to Plaintiff.” Id. at p. 9. Second, Walker

states he had no personal interaction with Plaintiff prior to making her cell assignment in

the O360 program, and he was otherwise unaware that she is transgender and classified

as vulnerable under IDOC regulations. Id. at p. 10. Plaintiff points to both circumstantial

and direct evidence to demonstrate that Walker knew of Plaintiff’s vulnerable

designation when he made the cell assignment. (Doc. 215, p. 11-12). Accordingly, the

Court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate.

Rarely, if ever, will an official declare, “I knew this would probably harm you, and

I did it anyway!” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). Thus, courts have relied

on circumstantial evidence to establish the requisite knowledge to meet the deliberate

indifference standard in failure to protect cases. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (stating

that “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a

question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including from circumstantial

evidence.”). See also Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that an official’s

actual knowledge of a substantial risk “[c]an be inferred by the trier of fact from the

obviousness of the risk.”).

Here, Plaintiff points to both direct and indirect evidence to support her case. As

direct evidence, Plaintiff supplied the Court with Walker’s investigative interview from

September 14, 2018. (Doc. 224, Exh. 1). In the interview, Walker allegedly stated that he

“was unsure how Finnegan got put into a cell with Colapietro because Finnegan ha[d] a

tag marked vulnerable on the placement board.” Id. at p. 2. Additionally, the report notes

that Walker stated, “that if he placed Finnegan into a cell with another inmate it was by

total accident.” Id. Subsequently, at an Administrative Hearing on October 31, 2018,

Walker stated to the Employee Review Board that Plaintiff “was clearly marked as

vulnerable.” (Doc. 224, Exh. 2, p. 2). He also stated that his name was on Plaintiff’s tag,

indicating that he had created Plaintiff’s tag for the placement board. Id. These statements

directly demonstrate that Walker had knowledge of Plaintiff’s vulnerable status.

However, Plaintiff also provides the Court with substantial circumstantial

evidence to find that Walker had the requisite knowledge to meet the deliberate

indifference standard. Plaintiff indicates that Walker was made aware of Plaintiff’s

vulnerable designation in at least three different ways by virtue of his position as a

placement officer at Lawrence. First, Plaintiff notes that IDOC’s O360 computer system

showed that Plaintiff was vulnerable. See, e.g., (Doc. 213, Exh. 1, p. 9:12-10:12, 14:22-16:19,

24:24-25:23) (noting Brookhart stating that “. . . my recollection is that [Plaintiff] was

already declared vulnerable when she transferred to this [Lawrence] facility”). Plaintiff

notes that Walker would have looked at O360 at least twice in connection with making

Plaintiff’s cell assignment – the first time on June 20, 2018, to double cell her and the

second time when he went into O360 at 8:32 a.m. on June 21, 2018, to formally change her

cell placement in the system. See, e.g., (Doc. 215, Exh. 5, p. 85:22-87:2); (Doc. 211, Exh. 7,

p. 35:12-36:24) (noting that Goins agreed that Walker “should have gone into O360 at least

twice” in connection with Plaintiff’s cell change). O360 also would have informed Walker

that Colapietro was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault, and thus Walker

would know it was dangerous to double cell Colapietro with Plaintiff. See, e.g., (Doc. 211,

Exh. 4, p. 91:2-15) (noting that DeWeese replied that Walker could have determined

Colapietro’s prior history by looking at O360 on June 20th or June 21st).

Second, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s Form 303, a document that showed Plaintiff

was transgender and designated vulnerable, would have provided him with knowledge

about Plaintiff’s status. (Doc. 215, p .12). The Form 303 also showed that Warden Kink

made a final determination that Plaintiff should be single celled as opposed to double

celled. Id. Defendant Kink stated in his deposition that after he signed the document in

May 2018 that he would expect the placement office to have knowledge of the Form 303

determination. (Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 72:7-12). Kink noted that the information would have

been distributed to the placement office electronically or in the office’s physical mailbox

where they would pick-up paperwork relevant to placements. Id. at p. 72:17-20.

Third, Plaintiff notes that “her vulnerable designation would have been clearly

indicated on her ‘tag’ which was on a board in the placement office where Walker

worked. According to IDOC Rule 30(b)(6), each prisoner housed in the facility has a tag

that contains information about them relevant to making cell placement determinations.

(Doc. 215, Exh. 3, p. 20:2-23:15, 38:16-39:20). The placement officer at each facility is

responsible for making the tag for each new offender that arrives at Lawrence, within a

day or so of arrival. Id. at p. 24:1-24:20.

Defendant Walker disputes these facts as constituting sufficient circumstantial

evidence. (Doc. 210, p. 9). Walker states that he relied only on the placement tags, as they

should have reflected each inmates’ status from O360. Id. Walker stated that he was

unsure at the time whether Plaintiff’s tag indicated she was vulnerable, and if it had, he

would have placed her in a single cell. (Doc. 210, Exh. 2 49:21-24); (Doc. 210, Exh. C., 51:8-

9).

Plaintiff, however, points out that the Court need not accept his “self-serving

account.” (Doc. 215, p. 14). Plaintiff points to Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir.

2018) as instructive on this point. In Horshaw, a Menard prisoner alleged that he sent a

note to the warden explaining that he faced a risk of harm. 910 F.3d at 1029. However,

the warden denied receiving the note and proffered evidence that even if his office had

received the note that there would be an indication of receipt in the log. Id. The district

court entered summary judgment in favor of the warden, but the Seventh Circuit

reversed noting that Plaintiff was entitled to an inference at summary judgment that the

prison mail system worked, and that a jury would not credit the warden’s denial of

having received the note. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit refused to draw inferences in

the warden’s favor based on the evidence of his office’s log or about what the warden

would have done had he received the note. Id. at 1029-30. This case is similar. Walker

knew, as the placement officer, that he was required to find out if Plaintiff was designated

vulnerable, and many systems existed to ensure that Walker knew this critically

important information. Plaintiff, at summary judgment is similarly entitled to an

inference that the information systems designed to facilitate Walker’s job duties worked.

Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by Walker’s argument that he lacked the

requisite knowledge of Plaintiff’s vulnerable status because he had not directly interacted

with her prior to making the double cell assignment. (Doc. 210, p. 9-10). In Farmer,

however, the Supreme Court pointed out that a prison official can be found deliberately

indifferent to an individual’s risk of harm not only when they have knowledge of an

excessive risk of attack personal to only him, but also when the official is aware of a risk

of harm faced by all prisoners in such circumstances. 511 U.S. at 843. As a transgender

inmate, Plaintiff belonged to an identifiable group of prisoners that are at a heightened

risk for sexual abuse. See, e.g., Hampton v. Baldwin, Case No. 3:18-CV-550-NJR-RJD, 2018

WL 5830730, at *2-3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2018) (noting that IDOC was ordered to train all

prison staff on transgender issues); Perkins v. Martin, Case No. 3:14-cv-00191-SMY-PMF,

2016 WL 3670564, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (citing Farmer and listing “transgender

prisoner with female characteristics in male prison as a situation “where the prisoner

plaintiff exhibits characteristics that make them more likely to be victimized”); Doe v.

District of Columbia, 215 F.Supp.3d 62, 77 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that a jury could infer that

prison officials “knew Doe faced a substantial risk of rape because of her status as a

transgender woman.”); Zollicoffer v. Livingston, 169 F.Supp.3d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2016)

(citing 2011 data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which “reported that 34.6% of

transgender inmates reported being the victim of sexual assault,” approximately nine

times the rate of other prisoners, and stating that “[t]he vulnerability of transgender

prisoners to sexual abuse is no secret.”). By virtue of Defendant’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s

membership in an established vulnerable group, Defendant’s lack of personal interaction

with Plaintiff is irrelevant.

2. Plaintiff’s Case Against Defendants Goins, DeWeese, and Kink

Defendants assert that Goins, DeWeese, and Kink all lacked sufficient knowledge

of Plaintiff’s substantial risk of serious harm as a transgender inmate. (Doc. 211, p. 10).

However, Plaintiff argues that each of the Defendants did have sufficient knowledge of

Plaintiff’s vulnerable status.

Regarding Defendant Kink, Plaintiff asserts that a letter she sent from segregation,

on June 6, 2018, stating that she had concerns about her safety gave Kink sufficient

knowledge of her vulnerable status necessary to substantiate a failure to protect claim

against him. (Doc. 214, p. 14-15). Specifically, Plaintiff told Kink about her “concerns and

fears for her safety in general and of being raped due to being double celled with inmates

she doesn’t feel safe being locked in a cell with (i.e., all male inmates she doesn’t pick as

cellmates), prior findings of vulnerability and single-cell status, and the need to remain

single celled upon release from the segregation unit.” (Doc. 1, p. 14). Kink admitted that

he would get mail from prisoners when he was warden but did not maintain a log of

what was received. (Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 12:5-13:9). As warden, Kink acknowledged that

he could have told his security staff about prisoners he believed were particularly

vulnerable and he could have told staff they need to pay close attention to the prisoner

in connection with housing and movement. (Doc. 214, Exh. 12, p. 19:2-15).

In Hampton v. Kink, the Court denied summary judgment against Defendant Kink

in a similar case concerning a transgender inmate. Case No. 18-cv-550-NJR-MAB, 2021

WL 2580267 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2021). There, Kink had issued a “keep separate form

(“KSF”)” order for the plaintiff and another inmate who sexually harassed her, but

Lawrence staff claimed to not know about the KSF and allowed the harasser to have

continued access to the plaintiff. Id. at *2. Ultimately, the Court in Hampton found that a

jury could find Kink deliberately indifferent and allowed plaintiff’s claim to proceed

because Kink failed to educate his staff about the KSF order and ensure that the order

was carried out. Similarly, here, Kink failed to notify placement about Plaintiff’s obvious

need to be single celled even when he received advance notice of her planned movement

on June 20th. Kink did nothing to protect her. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

claims against Kink may proceed.

The Court is similarly persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument alleging that Defendant

DeWeese had sufficient personal knowledge of the risk of harm to Plaintiff. In May and

June 2018, DeWeese was the lieutenant in charge of Lawrence’s segregation unit, where

Plaintiff resided for the first month of her stay at Lawrence. DeWeese knew from working

in Plaintiff’s housing unit that she was transgender, designated vulnerable, and was

required to be single celled. (Doc. 211, Exh. 4, p. 54:24-55:23). DeWeese recalled that he

had a personal interaction with Plaintiff, and he recalls her presenting as feminine. (Doc.

210, Exh. 2, p. 43:13-46:7). In combination with the fact that Walker informed DeWeese

about his decision to move Plaintiff in an email on June 20,3 but did not take issue with

Plaintiff’s move given his personal knowledge of Plaintiff’s transgender identity,

deliberate indifference can be inferred.

The Court, however, is not equally persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument about Goins

having substantial knowledge necessary for a failure to protect claim. Plaintiff

acknowledges that Goins does not have the same level of knowledge as DeWeese,

Walker, or Kink – but seemingly argues that his position as the Assistant Warden of

Operations, who was in charge of ensuring that Walker knew what his responsibilities

were with respect to making cell assignments – suffices as personal involvement in this

case. (Doc. 214, p. 17). However, Plaintiff does not put forth any evidence that Goins did

not appropriately train Walker. Plaintiff only notes that Goins knew the office was

understaffed. She does not put forward any specific facts to show that Goins’s oversight

over Walker was insufficient. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims must fail.

Liability under Section 1983 is direct, not vicarious. Section 1983 requires personal

responsibility to establish personal liability. That is, only a defendant’s direct, personal

3 Defendants attempt to downplay the significance of Walker’s emailed cell change memo

by pointing out that several other officers were also copied on the email. (Doc. 211, p. 11).

However, Warden Kink and Brookhart both testified that staff in DeWeese’s position were

expected to read such emails and speak up if they identify issues with an individual’s new cell

assignment. See, e.g., (Doc. 211, Exh. 8, p. 73:6-78:17) (noting Kink stating that “if something was

out of line and needed to be changed [someone should speak up]”); (Doc. 214, Exh. 5, p. 89:10-

90:5) (noting that “Warden Brookhart expected people on the cell change distribution list to read

the cell change memo and raise concerns; it takes a village to make sure that everything is working

the way it should.”).

involvement in a constitutional violation can result in liability. See, e.g., Perez v. Fenoglio,

792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that “[i]t is well established that ‘[f]or

constitutional violations under § 1983 . . . a government official is only liable for his or

her own misconduct.”). The same rule applies to those at the top of the pyramid who

oversee other individuals. “To recover damages against a prison official in a supervisory

role, a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat superior and must allege

that through their own conduct that they violated the constitution.” Id. As previously

stated, this means that the defendant must have had actual, personal knowledge of the

risk to the prisoner. See, e.g., Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2022)

(stating that “Stockton must demonstrate that Madden’s injury occurred at Clarke,

Schmidt, and Evan’s direction or with their knowledge and consent that the defendants

acted ‘either knowingly or with deliberate, and reckless indifference.’”) (quoting Backes

v. Vill. of Peoria Heights, Ill., 662 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff has not met this

standard regarding her allegations against Goins. Therefore, the grant of summary

judgment in favor of Goins is appropriate.

C. Defendants’ Qualified Immunity Defense

All Defendants claim they are protected by qualified immunity. Government

officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil

damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights. See

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). To determine whether qualified immunity

applies, the court must consider: (1) whether a constitutional violation has occurred on

the facts alleged; and (2) whether the right alleged to have been violated is clearly

established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).

The law is clearly established that prison officials have a duty to protect inmates

from abuse by other prisoners. See Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 484 (7th Cir. 2015).

In Balsewicz, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that Farmer forecloses the qualified immunity

defense in failure to protect cases. See Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 2020).

See also Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 734-736 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying qualified immunity

for a guard who failed to protect a detainee from sexual assault by his cellmate,

characterizing the right at issue as “the right to be free from deliberate indifference to

rape and assault” and finding that there “should be no debate” that it was a clearly

established right as of 1999).

Regarding the second prong, whether Defendants took adequate steps to protect

Plaintiff from sexual assault, that is a matter of factual dispute. Accordingly, granting

qualified immunity at this time would be improper at the summary judgment stage. See

Hampton, 2021 WL 2580267, at *14 (citing Mordi v. Zeigler, 770 F.3d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir.

2014)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court DENIES Defendant Walker’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 209). The Court also GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants DeWeese, Goins, and Kink

(Doc. 211). The Court GRANTS the Motion as to Defendant Goins. However, the Court

DENIES the Motion as to DeWeese and Kink. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to

enter judgment accordingly at the conclusion of the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2024. by

Hint 0. Date: 2024.03.29

16:37:37 -05'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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