Craft v. Robert Burns

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT CRAFT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

ROBERT BURNS (JACKSON CNTY. )

SHERIFF), )

DALE FOSTER (UNION CNTY. ) Case No. 22-cv-119-DWD

SHERIFF), )

SCOTT HARVEL (FORMER UNION )

CNTY. SHERIFF), )

LEE KERSTEN, )

KYLE SPRADLING, )

SHAREE LANGENSTEIN, )

TYLER TRIPP, )

KATIE MILEY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Sharee

Langenstein (Doc. 76) and Tyler Tripp (Doc. 80). The underlying lawsuit contains claims

about Plaintiff Robert Craft’s confinement at the Jackson County Jail, brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12001, et seq.. (Doc.

57). The parties participated in settlement efforts for the better part of a year in this case,

which delayed a ruling on the motions to dismiss, but recent settlement efforts in this

case have failed, and the parties now intend to recommence merits discovery. The

motions to dismiss are denied at this juncture for reasons explained herein.

BACKGROUND

Claims against Defendants Sharee Langenstein and Tyler Tripp were added to this

lawsuit via the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 57). Plaintiff alleges that Langenstein was an

assistant state’s attorney for Jackson County and Tripp was an assistant state’s attorney

for Union County. (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 9, 12). The underlying complaint concerns conditions

that Plaintiff encountered while detained at the Jackson County Jail, on behalf of Union

County (which does not have a jail facility). (Doc. 57 at ¶ 20). Plaintiff alleges that at the

hearing that led to his detention, the presiding judge instructed that the public defender

and Defendant Tripp should ensure that the Jackson County Jail (“the Jail”) would

provide Plaintiff with needed mental health services. (Doc. 57 at ¶ 18). Plaintiff further

alleges that Defendant Tripp was aware of his mental health needs, and that he argued

at the bond hearing that Plaintiff’s mental instability was a reason to keep him detained.

(Id. at ¶ 23). Given his representations to the state court, Plaintiff argues that Tripp had

an obligation to inform the sheriffs of Jackson and Union counties that Plaintiff needed

mental health care, and to ensure that care was received. (Id. at ¶ 23).

Despite assurances that Plaintiff could receive mental health services at the Jail, he

contends that he never received adequate mental health care and that his mental health

suffered. (Doc. 57 at ¶ 33). Without mental health care, Plaintiff alleges he was on suicide

watch at least three times. (Id. at ¶ 36). The only mental health services Plaintiff received

were brief medication management appointments, and emergency crisis counseling. (Id.

at ¶¶ 42-44). During these limited interactions, a counselor determined that Plaintiff

suffered from PTSD and needed additional care, so she contacted Defendant Sharee

Langenstein about the needed care in July of 2021. Despite the request for additional

services from the counselor, Plaintiff alleges Langenstein did nothing to secure additional

services. (Id. at 45). Langenstein was notified at least one more time in November of 2021

that services were still needed, but nothing was accomplished. (Id. at 47).

Plaintiff named Defendants Tripp and Langenstein in Count 1 of his amended

complaint, which alleges inadequate mental health treatment under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Doc. 57 at ¶¶ 60, 63).

DISCUSSION

The purpose of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure is to decide the adequacy of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chi.,

910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). The federal system of notice pleading requires only

that a plaintiff provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). However, the allegations must be “more than

labels and conclusions.” Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This requirement is satisfied if the

complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of

what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the

plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773,

776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

District courts are required by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to

review the facts and arguments in Rule 12(b)(6) motions “in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged and drawing all possible

inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

“The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to

decide the merits.” Gibson, 910 F.2d at 1520. A complaint “should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Sanders v. Melvin, 25

F.4th 475, 483 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When reviewing

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court is generally limited to the allegations within

the four corners of the complaint, along with any exhibits attached to the complaint and

any documents attached to the motion that are referenced in and central to plaintiff’s

claims. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

A pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care is violated if:

(1) there was an objectively serious medical need; (2) the defendant made a volitional act

with regard to the plaintiff's medical need; (3) that act was objectively unreasonable

under the circumstances in terms of treating or assessing the patient's serious medical

need; and (4) the defendant “acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly”

with respect to the risk of harm. Miranda v. Cty. Of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir.

2019).

Prosecutors have absolute immunity from suits for monetary damages under §

1983 for conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). A prosecutor is shielded by absolute

immunity when he acts “as an advocate for the State” but not when his acts are

investigative and unrelated to the preparation and initiation of judicial proceedings.

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Absolute immunity shields prosecutors

even if they act “maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis

of false testimony or evidence.” Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th

Cir.1986). A functional inquiry is used to determine the nature of a prosecutor’s actions.

Immunity covers more than just courtroom activity, and can also include things like

evaluating evidence before presenting it to a grand jury or at trial, or making an effort to

secure witnesses. Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 317 (7th Cir. 2016).

Additionally, prosecutors acting in investigative capacity may claim qualified

immunity, which covers conduct that does not violate clearly established constitutional

or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See e.g., Bianchi v.

McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2016). The qualified-immunity doctrine holds that

“government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their

discretionary functions when ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Buckley, 509

U.S. at 268 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “[T]wo central questions

must be addressed in the course of determining whether qualified immunity is available:

whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all, and whether

the right at issue was clearly established at the time and under the circumstances

presented.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). A court may

address either question first. See e.g., Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 915

(7th Cir. 2015). Courts should resolve immunity at the earliest possible time, but

dismissal on qualified immunity grounds may be inappropriate in many cases at the

12(b)(6) stage. Doe, 782 F.3d at 915-16.

The distinction between core functions of the prosecutorial duty and

administrative functions is nuanced for the purposes of absolute immunity. For example,

in Olson v. Champaign County, Ill., the Seventh Circuit found that a prosecutor had

absolute immunity for signing an information to initiate a suit, but he did not have

absolute immunity when he went a step further in the same document and attested to the

facts contained in the information in court because attesting to the facts is distinct under

Illinois law and is a role that can be performed by someone else like a police officer. 784

F.3d 1093, 1103 (7th Cir. 2015); see also, Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791, 809-11

(N.D. Ill. May 5, 2014) (finding that a prosecutor did not have absolute immunity for

failing to regularly report on a material witness’s detention status, because such reporting

was administrative in nature, not prosecutorial). By contrast, the Supreme Court held in

Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009), that even supervisory prosecutors who

allegedly failed to create an internal office system to share and manage jail informant

information, and who thus failed to disclose information about an informant to defense

counsel in a criminal case, were not acting administratively. They found that ultimately

the particular task at hand, compiling and sharing information about informants, was

intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, even if some aspects

of it could be viewed as generic and administrative.

Defendant Tripp argues that he had no general duty, and no authority under

Illinois law, to arrange for the provision of mental health care for Plaintiff at the Jail. (Doc.

81). He further contends he is eligible for absolute prosecutorial immunity because the

issues identified by Plaintiff took part at a hearing in a criminal matter. Alternatively, he

contends he is at least eligible for qualified immunity because it was not clearly

established under the law that a prosecutor would believe he had a constitutional

obligation to ensure mental health care for a jail detainee.

Plaintiff counters that Tripp is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity

because at the hearing he acknowledged Plaintiff’s mental health needs, and the judge

tasked Tripp and the public defender with ensuring Plaintiff received mental health care

while in the Jail. (Doc. 104). He argues that by tasking Tripp with ensuring Plaintiff’s

access to mental health care, the state court judge converted Tripp’s function to

administrative rather than prosecutorial. Plaintiff adds that Illinois law recognizes

voluntary undertaking liability, which was invoked when Tripp accepted a duty to

ensure mental health services. Finally, Plaintiff contends that he has established both that

a constitutional right was violated, and that the right was clearly established, so qualified

immunity does not apply. (Doc. 104 at 3).

While the Court appreciates the importance of determining the issues of absolute

and qualified immunity as early as possible in the litigation, here the disagreement relies

at least in part on the development of facts surrounding the contested issue. Specifically,

the parties are in direct contest about the implication of statements made on the record at

a state court detention hearing, but the best evidence the Court has to assess these

statements and their legal implication is Plaintiff’s approximate recitation of what

transpired at the hearing set forth in the amended complaint, as opposed to a transcript,

or any other kind of evidence. Plaintiff mentions statements about his mental health that

Tripp made when arguing to the judge about the appropriateness of detention as

opposed to bond. While statements about the appropriateness of detention are within

the heart of Tripp’s role as a prosecutor and would be entitled to absolute prosecutorial

immunity,1 Plaintiff also relies on either a directive from the judge to Tripp or a

conversation between Tripp, opposing counsel, and the presiding judge about ensuring

mental health services. It is hard to tell from the summarization in the amended

complaint and in the present motion briefing, if these interactions should be considered

central to the prosecutorial function, or if they gave rise to some unique administrative

or non-prosecutorial context. On the record available, the Court is unable to definitively

determine if Tripp acted in a prosecutorial or administrative capacity, so at this early

juncture it cannot grant him dismissal on the basis of absolute immunity.

Tripp argues that even if he is not entitled to absolute immunity, he is at least

entitled to qualified immunity. He argues that there is no general duty of rescue and that

1 See e.g., Neal v. U.S., 2014 WL 172545 at * 4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014) (arguments or evidence presented

during a bond or detention hearing is intimately associated with the judicial process and is protected by

absolute immunity); Wilson v. City of Chanute, 43 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D. Kan., Feb. 23, 1999) (county

prosecutor’s actions in securing a release on bond for a detainee hours after the initial appearance in court

on the case were prosecutorial in nature, even if she acted in part in response to queries from the police

department where he was detained and performed administrative functions to complete paperwork to

apply for the release on bond, because ultimately a release on bond is central to her prosecutorial function).

But see, Olson, 784 F.3d at 1103 (finding that some of a prosecutor’s in court actions at an initial appearance

were core to the prosecutorial function, but signing a portion of the charging document that contained

factual probable cause attestations was not core to the prosecutorial function because another party (such

as a detective or police officer) could serve that function).

under Illinois law sheriffs are tasked with maintaining jails and serving the needs of the

jail population. Both propositions are true, but they do not get around the more specific

rights that are the focus of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff relies upon the strong premise that

the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees access to needed medical and

mental health care. The care provided must be assessed only in terms of objective

reasonableness, rather than under the Eighth Amendment’s more lax subjective

reasonableness standard. This right is clearly established and has been emphasized

multiple times by the Seventh Circuit in recent years. See e.g., Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d

540, 550 (7th Cir. 2020) (pretrial detainees’ medical-care claims are governed by an

objective unreasonableness inquiry); Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018)

(pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all, so their medical care must be assessed under

an objective reasonableness standard, rather than the subjective standards used under

the Eighth Amendment). The context here is admittedly a bit unique because Plaintiff

seeks to hold a prosecutor (rather than a jail official) liable for his need for care while

detained, but the basic premise that a pretrial detainee is entitled to care is not debatable

or new. The Court finds that at this early juncture in the case, it is not appropriate to find

qualified immunity on Tripp’s behalf.

Defendant Langenstein is also a prosecutor, but she acknowledges that she had no

role in Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution and thus would not qualify for absolute immunity.

(Doc. 76). Langenstein argues that she had no legal obligation or authority to assist in

procuring mental health care at the jail, and thus she had no obligation under the

constitution to assist in this scenario. (Doc. 76). She also argues that even if Plaintiff

alleged a constitutional violation, any duty on her behalf was not clearly established at

the time of the underlying actions that give rise to this case. Plaintiff counters that

Langenstein is not entitled to immunity because his right to care was clearly established,

and his rights were clearly violated by the lack of care. (Doc. 82)2.

As with Defendant Tripp, the Court finds that Langenstein is not entitled to

qualified immunity at this juncture because a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate mental

health care was clearly established, and Plaintiff has plainly alleged that Langenstein was

notified of his need for care but entirely failed to act. While Langenstein’s ultimate level

of personal involvement, and her ability to take meaningful action will be important to

the overall analysis of this case, the Court will accept Plaintiff’s allegations at this early

juncture and read them broadly in his favor to suggest that the two notifications to

Langenstein about his need for care may have generated some obligation on her behalf.

Langenstein argues that she lacked authority or a responsibility to ensure adequate care

at the Jail, but it seems apparent that at least the medical contractor who contacted her

believed that she was a necessary or appropriate contact to receive assistance in

coordinating care. If Langenstein did not actually possess any appropriate authority to

act, it is not unreasonable to think that perhaps she should have redirected the

contractor’s queries to someone else rather than take no action at all. For now, the Court

will decline to find qualified immunity on Langenstein’s behalf.

2 In support of the response, Plaintiff submitted two visit notes from the counseling contractor that

allegedly contacted Defendant Langenstein about Plaintiff’s need for care. (Doc. 82-1). The court did not

weigh these notes in consideration of the motion to dismiss because such a ruling is generally limited to

the four corners of the complaint.

In sum, both Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 76, 80) will be denied. This ruling does

not foreclose later findings on absolute or qualified immunity, it is simply a

determination that at this early point in the litigation neither form of immunity is

sufficiently established to warrant a final dismissal of claims.

DISPOSITION

Defendants Tripp and Langenstein’s Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 76, 80) are

DENIED. The parties should proceed with merits discovery in accordance with the

earlier scheduling order. (Doc. 101).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2024

/s David W. Dugan

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge