Opinion

Brumit v. Granite City, Illinois

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Mar 11, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DEBORAH BRUMIT and ANDREW )

SIMPSON, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-1090-SMY

)

THE CITY OF GRANITE CITY, )

ILLINOIS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc.

161), which Defendant opposes (Doc. 163). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Background

Plaintiffs Deborah Brumit and Andrew Simpson filed a four-count Complaint against

Defendant Granite City alleging various constitutional violations related to Granite City’s

compulsory-eviction law (Doc. 1). On February 9, 2021, the Court entered an order dismissing

three of the four counts (Doc. 59). The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment

(Docs. 76-79, 125). On September 15, 2022, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Granite City and denied summary judgment for the Plaintiffs (Doc. 148). Plaintiffs appealed to

the Seventh Circuit (Doc. 153).

On June 16, 2023, the Seventh Circuit entered an Order finding Plaintiffs’ claims moot,

vacating this Court’s Judgment and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of

justiciable controversy (Doc. 162-1). Plaintiffs’ Petition for Rehearing was denied, and the

Seventh Circuit issued its Mandate on August 15, 2023 (Docs. 162-3, 162).

On the same day the Seventh Circuit’s Mandate issued, Plaintiffs filed with this Court a

Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint with this Court (Doc. 161). Plaintiffs assert that a request

for actual damages may yield a different result, and seek leave to add a prayer for compensatory

damages totaling $19.00 “or, in the absence of sufficient proof to support an award of

compensatory damages, nominal damages”. Granite City opposes the motion and requests that

this Court dismiss the matter as moot consistent with the Seventh Circuit mandate (Doc. 163).

Discussion

The mandate rule requires a lower court to adhere to the commands of a higher court on

remand. Carmody v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 893 F.3d 397, 407 (7th Cir. 2018).

“The mandate rule may give way ‘in light of subsequent factual discoveries or changes in the

law.’” Id. citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the

Seventh Circuit’s mandate is clear:

“This case therefore is moot. The district court’s judgment is vacated, and the case

is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. See

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).”

(Doc. 162-1 at p. 5).

Plaintiffs proffer no subsequent factual discoveries or changes in the law that would provide this

Court with any basis to not adhere to the specific commands of the Seventh Circuit’s mandate to

dismiss this case for lack of a justiciable controversy.

Even if this Court was to entertain Plaintiff’s request as outside the scope of the mandate

rule, their request runs afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Under that Rule, a party

seeking to amend a pleading after the scheduling order deadline has expired must show “good

cause.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16(b)(4). The “good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence

of the party seeking amendment.” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc.,

831 F.3d 815, 832 (7" Cir. 2016) citing Trustmark Insurance Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re

of America, 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7" Cir. 2005). “With a late motion for leave to amend, the

‘underlying concern is the prejudice to the defendant rather than simple passage of time.’” /d.

citing McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 687 (7" Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiffs’ request to amend comes over four years into litigation and only after the

Seventh Circuit determined the case was moot. Plaintiffs had adequate opportunities throughout

the pendency of litigation to seek leave to amend their complaint to include compensatory damages

but did not do so. As such, they have not shown “good cause” or exercised “diligence” in seeking

leave to amend their complaint after the scheduling order deadline had expired. See Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 16(b)(4).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 161) is

DENIED. In accordance with the Mandate of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Doc. 162), the

Clerk’s Judgment (Doc. 149) is VACATED and this case is DISMISSED for lack of a justiciable

controversy. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to keep this matter closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 11, 2024 Aol Cell

STACIM.YANDLE ————is—s—s

United States District Judge

Page 3 of 3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.