French v. Wills

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MARCELLUS A. FRENCH, SR., )

M21081, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 23-cv-2948-DWD

ANTHONY WILLS, )

MAJOR ROWLAND, )

JOSHUA A. SCHOENBECK, )

ANTHONY B. JONES, )

C/O GARCIA, )

SARA McCLURE, )

MARGARET MADOLE, )

LATOYA HUGHES, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Marcellus A. French, Sr., an inmate of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC) currently detained at Menard Correctional Center (Menard), brings

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 12). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated

during two separate disciplinary proceedings, the conditions of confinement in

segregation were improper, he has been denied medical care, and his grievances have

been mishandled. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s initial complaint for failure to state a

claim, and Plaintiff has now filed a timely Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) that is before

the Court for initial review. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter

out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that

is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must

be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se

complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d

816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is similar in many regards to the original, and it

still focuses on two disciplinary proceedings, his conditions of confinement while in

segregation, his requests for medical care, and the processing of his related grievances.

The first disciplinary incident at issue began on November 8, 2022, when Plaintiff was

removed from yard and was charged with a dangerous disturbance and disobeying a

direct order. (Doc. 12 at 4-5). Plaintiff alleges he intended to call two witnesses to the

associated disciplinary hearing, but he was neither allowed to call the witnesses nor to

adequately present his side of the story. (Id. at 5-7). Defendants Schoenbeck and Jones

presided over the hearing. Plaintiff argues that by denying him a witness, his due process

rights were implicated. (Id. at 7). He further contends that this disciplinary proceeding

did not follow the prison’s internal administrative code, and Defendant Anthony Wills

condoned the violation of his rights by declining emergency status for a related

grievance.

As a result of the November disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff received 28 days in

segregation, 1 month of c-grade demotion, and an increase in his aggression level from a

moderate to a high. (Doc. 12 at 10). Plaintiff contends that as a result of his increased

aggression level, when he was released from segregation he was moved to the “East

House” to be housed amongst other high aggression inmates. Plaintiff argues that the

East House is the “bad inmate” unit and that residents receive fewer privileges than

others in general population status.

Plaintiff argues that from December 6, 2022, through April 29, 2023, he lived in the

East House where he had less amenities, such as reduced yard time (five hours instead

of ten), reduced showers and sanitation practices, and no Islamic prayer services. (Doc.

12 at 11-12). He argues that the amenities afforded in East House fall below the standards

set forth for offender conditions of confinement in the IDOC Administrative Directives.

Plaintiff attempted to grieve the conditions of his confinement, but he faults Defendants

Wills, Margaret Madole and Latoya Hughes for “incompetently” denying his grievances.

(Doc. 12 at 12-13). Plaintiff further argues that because the conditions fell below those

set forth by administrative directives, then they should automatically be deemed an

atypical and significant hardship. (Doc. 12 at 14-15).

Plaintiff’s second disciplinary incident began on April 29, 2023, when he received

a disciplinary report concerning items that were located in his shared cell during a

February 9, 2023, shakedown. He alleges that Defendants Schoenbeck and Jones again

presided over the associated disciplinary hearing, which he contends did not comply

with due process requirements. Notably, he argues that per the Administrative Code,

the disciplinary report was served too long after the underlying conduct, and the

underlying charges were not properly substantiated by the terms of the applicable rules.

Based on the identified flaws with his disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff argues that the

proceedings violated his due process rights. Plaintiff also argues that he was excessively

sentenced for the infractions, though he does not state what he believes his sentence

should have been. (Doc. 12 at 24-25). Ultimately, Plaintiff states that he was in

segregation from April 29, 2023, through September 8, 2023, for this second disciplinary

incident. (Doc. 12 at 32). As with the first disciplinary incident, Plaintiff grieved this

disciplinary outcome to Defendant Wills, and he faults Wills and grievance officer Sarah

McClure for deeming the grievance a non-emergency and not granting him any relief.

(Doc. 12 at 25-26).

In addition to his arguments about the actual disciplinary proceedings, Plaintiff

contends that another offender charged with the same offense had his disciplinary

conviction expunged because the disciplinary proceedings did not establish who

“possessed” the drugs or contraband in question. (Doc. 12 at 29-31). Plaintiff argues that

his proceedings had the same defect, so his charges also should have been expunged.

Plaintiff further contends that his disciplinary conviction implicates a liberty

interest because he continues to seek a reduction of his underlying criminal sentence

based on the premise that he was convicted of a crime as a juvenile, and prison

disciplinary infractions are a leading factor in the consideration of a reduced sentence.

Plaintiff admits, as the Court pointed out in the review of his initial complaint, that the

Illinois state courts have now rejected his postconviction pleadings on this issue, but he

contends he has a federal habeas matter on the same topic that is currently stayed. (Doc.

12 at 26-29).

Plaintiff goes on to argue that the conditions in segregation from April 29, 2023, to

September 8, 2023, were atypical and significant, and he also argues that they violated

the Eighth Amendment. He repeats the argument that because the conditions did not

satisfy internal prison directives about conditions, then they should automatically be

deemed atypical and significant, and considered cruel and unusual. (Doc. 12 at 32-34).

He argues that among other things, on June 8, 2023, the gallery was flooded with feces,

urine, and waste, and he was not provided with any sanitation products to clean his cell.

He managed to clean the inside of his cell to the best of his ability with products he

already possessed, but filth outside the cell and on his cell bars was not cleaned for

another eight days. (Doc. 12 at 34-45).

Throughout his stay in segregation, he claims he was deprived of showers for

weeks at a time. (Doc. 12 at 35). He also states that “he has went a week without one

shower,” which is far less than the three per week that should be afforded under

institutional directives.

Plaintiff also lived next to and around seriously mentally ill (“SMI”) offenders who

screamed, banged on the walls, threw feces and urine, and engaged in quarrels with

officers that prompted the frequent discharge of chemical agents. (Doc. 12 at 36). These

disturbances caused him to lose sleep and peace of mind.

During his stay in segregation, he received a total of just 5.5 hours of outdoor

recreation. Plaintiff claims the cells are so small that he was entirely unable to exercise in

his room. He has preexisting injuries that require him to stay active to maintain full use

of his limbs, but without any outdoor or indoor recreation, he was unable to keep up on

necessary exercises. (Doc. 12 at 37-38). Plaintiff has also been exposed to second-hand

smoke and has grieved that issue to no avail. (Doc. 12 at 38-39). Additionally, he claims

the meals in segregation do not meet basic caloric needs, and as a result, he has lost

significant weight. Plaintiff alleges that he sought medical care or treatment for issues

associated with the lack of exercise, the secondhand smoke, and the weight loss, but he

has not been seen. He adds that he also sought medical attention after he had to clean

human waste from his cell without proper protection. (Doc. 12 at 41). Plaintiff faults

Defendants Garcia and Rowland for his lack of medical care because they were in charge

of his cellhouse or of restrictive housing during his stay in segregation. (Doc. 12 at 40-

41).

Plaintiff argues that although some of the conditions he experienced might not be

enough standing alone to violate the constitution, the conditions taken together are

sufficient to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim. He argues that Anthony Wills should

be faulted for the conditions because he should have created or led a committee on

restrictive housing, but the committee did not correct flaws with the housing conditions.

(Doc. 12 at 42-43).

Finally, Plaintiff has designated a fourth claim against Defendant Wills for

retaliation. (Doc. 12 at 43). Specifically, he claims that he grieved issues related to his

discipline and housing and he submitted his grievances as emergencies to ensure they

went directly to Wills for review, but Wills deemed them non-emergencies. Among the

items grieved and dismissed, Plaintiff claims that during his segregation ordeal he was

prevented from taking an exam for educational programming. Plaintiff tried to grieve

issues related to his education and the exam, but Wills deemed the grievance a non-

emergency. While in segregation, Plaintiff was recorded as a no-show for his exam. (Doc.

12 at 47). During this same time, Defendant Garcia told Plaintiff that his “superiors”

instructed him not to let Plaintiff attend the exam. Based on this series of events, he

argues it is clear that Wills knew his rights were being violated and willfully turned a

blind eye. (Doc. 12 at 48).

Plaintiff attributes these “adverse actions” to a course of retaliation that is being

enacted because he filed the present lawsuit. (Doc. 12 at 50). He claims that prior to the

incidents described in the complaint, he had not been in trouble for over five years, but

since he started grieving the issues described in this complaint, and then filed this

lawsuit, things have drastically changed for him at the prison. (Doc. 12 at 50-52).

In the closing paragraph, Plaintiff adds that his First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights have been violated because his right to observe his religion has been restricted.

(Doc. 12 at 53).

Along with the 53-page complaint, Plaintiff submitted approximately 270-pages

of exhibits that he referenced extensively throughout his complaint. The exhibits include

grievances, affidavits, prison administrative documents, disciplinary documents, and

more.

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court designates the

following counts:

Claim 1: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendants Schoenbeck and Jones concerning November

2022 disciplinary ticket;

Claim 2: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendants Schoenbeck and Jones concerning April 2023

disciplinary ticket;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

concerning segregation placement;

Claim 4: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Wills.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissals

As the Court found in relation to Plaintiff’s original complaint, he has failed to

state a claim against the defendants associated with the processing of his grievances,

because mere participation in the grievance process, without participation in the

underlying harm, is insufficient to state a claim. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th

Cir. 2011) (prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment, and

the alleged mishandling of grievances by persons who did not otherwise cause or

participate in the underlying conduct states no claim). Plaintiff names Defendants

Anthony Wills, Sarah McClure, Margaret Madole, and Latoya Hughes for their roles in

processing his grievances, but any such claim is insufficient and is dismissed for failure

to state a claim.

Plaintiff also relies heavily again on the alleged violations that he has identified of

various Administrative Directives, but as the Court previously stated, violations of prison

policies or state laws do not give rise to a constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346

F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 protects inmates from constitutional violations,

not violations of state laws, or prison regulations or policies). While violations of policies

on things such as the conditions of confinement in restrictive housing may be evidence

in support of a conditions of confinement claim, violations of the internal policies

themselves do not automatically equate to constitutional violations. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s arguments that the violations of the policies themselves should be deemed

atypical or cruel and unusual are unavailing.

Plaintiff mentions his ability to observe his religion in passing throughout the

complaint and in the last paragraphs, but he has provided insufficient information to

maintain a First Amendment claim related to his religion because the allegations are

vague and are not associated with any individual defendants.

Plaintiff also argues that he was unable to secure needed medical care while in

segregation. Specifically, he claims he sought care for: being forced to clean human waste

without proper protective equipment, for being forced to deal with hunger pains, and for

being denied exercise, which exacerbated his pre-existing injuries. (Doc. 12 at 41).

Plaintiff attributes the lack of medical attention to Defendant Garcia who oversaw his

gallery five days a week, and Major Rowland who was in charge of safety and security

on the restrictive housing committee. To establish a denial or delay of medical care

deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must identify an objectively serious medical

condition and an individual’s subjective disregard of the risk to the inmate’s safety or

health. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). A medical condition must be so

obvious that even a lay person would recognize the need for medical attention. Greeno v.

Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to hold Garcia or Rowland liable for his

alleged medical care issues because his allegations are vague and do not specify when or

how these two specifically prevented him from accessing care in relation to each of his

alleged medical needs. Plaintiff also does not describe his alleged medical needs with a

level of detail that suggests a serious condition even a layperson would recognize as

needing treatment, nor does he clearly describe physical injuries that resulted from the

lack of treatment or the delay in treatment. On the whole, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

his need for medical care to too vague to proceed, and they will be dismissed as

insufficient.

DISCUSSION

Claims 1 and 2

Plaintiff’s factual and legal assertions concerning his due process rights and his

two disciplinary incidents are much the same from the original complaint to the amended

complaint. As the Court previously stated, to establish a due process claim related to

disciplinary proceedings, an inmate must demonstrate: (1) the deprivation of a liberty

interest; and (2) the procedures he was afforded were constitutionally deficient. Lisle v.

Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 720 (7th Cir. 2019). Before the Court considers if Plaintiff was

afforded adequate procedures at a disciplinary hearing, it will first consider if a liberty

interest was even implicated by the punishment imposed. Six months in segregation and

six months’ loss or restriction of privileges—do not, without more, implicate a protected

liberty interest. See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (six-month

disciplinary segregation alone); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2005)

(temporary loss of contact visitation and restricted commissary); Whitford v. Boglino, 63

F.3d 527, 533 n.7 (7th Cir. 1995) (six-month disciplinary segregation and demotion to C

grade). A plaintiff may also argue that the combination of disciplinary measures

deprived him of a protected liberty interest. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th

Cir. 2015).

Plaintiff’s first term of disciplinary segregation was just 28 days. He does not

identify any conditions during this first term that were unusually harsh. As such,

Plaintiff’s complaint still fails to invoke a liberty interest. Plaintiff argues that after his

first stint in segregation he was released to the East House where conditions were

considerably worse than other general population cellhouses, but even if the Court added

this entire stay in the East House to consideration of his first disciplinary incident, that

would still only amount to five months of consequences for the first disciplinary

infraction, and would not be enough to automatically invoke a liberty interest. The

conditions he describes in East House included less recreation time and shower time than

he was accustomed to accessing in other general population housing, but these

limitations do not persuade the Court that even construing the placement as some form

of extended punishment, the housing caused an atypical hardship.

To the extent that Plaintiff argues after his first term of disciplinary segregation,

he was further punished by release to the East House due to an increased aggression

level, he cannot maintain a Due Process claim related to his aggression level because

inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in their prison classifications. See e.g.,

Waldron v. Gaetz, 2011 WL 2518782 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2011) (finding that an inmate did not

have a protected liberty interest where his aggression level was increased after a

disciplinary infraction).

Plaintiff’s second term of disciplinary segregation lasted from April 29, 2023, to

September 8, 2023, which is a total of 132 days, or four months and ten days. By duration

alone, this stay in segregation does not invoke a liberty interest. See e.g., Lisle v. Welborn,

933 F.3d 705, 721 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that four months in segregation for the discovery

of contraband was not so atypical and significantly harsh that it immediately created a

liberty interest). However, unlike the first stay in segregation, Plaintiff described several

conditions he faced during the second stay that he argues made it atypical. The

conditions include: lack of access to indoor or outdoor recreation time, lack of access to

frequent showers, inadequate dietary offerings, exposure to urine and feces thrown and

spread about the gallery by other offenders, and exposure to frequent noise and

disturbances created by other mentally ill offenders. Plaintiff specifies that the exposure

to human waste was most problematic for about eight days around June 8, 2023, at which

time he was unable to clean up waste and filth on the outside of his cell. He also specifies

that access to showers was irregular, although he indicates at most there was a one-week

stint where he went without a shower.

As to the lack of recreation time and the disturbances from fellow inmates, he

claims that these particular conditions were nearly constant, with just 5.5 hours of

recreation in 132 days, and constant noise and disturbances of varying severity. In

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2013), the Seventh Circuit found that

six months with only one day a week to shower and access recreation activities did not

constitute an atypical hardship, because Plaintiff was allowed to exit his cell at least

sometimes. By contrast, in Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2015), the Seventh

Circuit suggested that a much shorter term than six months can be atypical if it involves

extreme conditions such as only one hour of exercise per day in a small indoor room. The

conditions that Plaintiff has described about exercise are even more restrictive than what

was described in Kervin.

Plaintiff alleges that over the course of four months, he was only allowed out of

his cell for a total of 5.5 hours of recreation, and he adds that his cell was too small for

him to conduct any meaningful exercise inside. However, unlike Kervin, and many other

recent procedural due process cases, Plaintiff has not suggested that he was deprived of

all human contact or sensory stimuli. In fact, to the contrary, Plaintiff’s grievance about

the access to out of cell recreation during this segregation stay indicated that he was

afforded out-of-cell time to visit with family and loved ones and to attend

medical/mental health appointments. (Doc. 12-2 at 57-58) (“On 04.29.23 I was placed in

segregation, today being 05.16.23 I have not been allowed out of my cell except for

visitation from my family and loved ones and a health care check up[.]”). Plaintiff also

mentioned in relation to cleaning his cell that he had cell bars, which suggests he was not

deprived of all human contact or sensory stimuli because he was not in a closed door cell.

(Doc. 12 at 35) (mentioning Plaintiff’s cell bars). In light of this information, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has not established that his stay in segregation amounted to an atypical

and significant hardship. Though Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is insufficient,

this does not foreclose an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim related to

the same circumstances.

Plaintiff also re-asserts the arguments he made earlier about his disciplinary

sanctions potentially translating to a longer sentence. The Court previously rejected this

line of argumentation on the premise that Plaintiff claimed he was still a candidate for a

sentence reduction in state court, but that publicly available state court documents

showed that he had been denied the relief he sought. Plaintiff adds now that he is still

potentially eligible for a sentence reduction because he has a federal habeas case on the

subject that is currently stayed. Whatever the merit may be to this assertion, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s bald assertion he may lose out on a shortened sentence because of

his disciplinary proceedings is speculative and is not a plausible basis to infer a liberty

interest for the purpose of his present due process claim. See e.g., Moon v. Galipeau, 2023

WL 6584173 at * 2 (N.D. Ind. 2023) (if an inmate did not actually lose any good time credit,

then a liberty interest is not invoked); Peacher v. Reagle, 2023 WL 9119690 (S.D. Ind. Dec.

19, 2023) (discussing claims about the prospective loss of good time credit). Additionally,

if Plaintiff did ultimately lose good time credit, he would need to first challenge that issue

in a habeas proceeding. Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (federal habeas

corpus is the exclusive avenue for federal relief of constitutional violations if the

violations result in the loss of good-time credit or a reduction in the rate of earning good-

time credit).

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead plausible due process

claims in relation to Claims 1 and 2 against Defendants Schoenbeck and Jones because he

has not demonstrated that either of his relatively short stays in segregation rose to the

level of atypical and harsh conditions sufficient to create a liberty interest.

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to fault any of the other defendants for his

disciplinary proceedings, he cannot do so because at most he has alleged they have erred

in handling related grievances, but as explained earlier, the handling of grievances alone

does not give rise to a claim.

Claim 3

To establish a conditions of confinement claim, an inmate must establish (1) a

deprivation that is, from an objective standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) where prison officials

are deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th

Cir. 2016), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 824 (1994). Conditions may be

considered collectively when analyzing a conditions of confinement claim, and the

duration of the allegedly harmful conditions is relevant to the existence of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that his conditions included virtually no out-of-cell exercise for

132 days, reduced meal portions1, reduced showers (as few as one per week)2, lack of

access to sanitation supplies3, exposure to secondhand smoke4, exposure to constant

noise and disruptions from mentally ill inmates, and exposure to human waste after other

inmates caused a disturbance. Many of these conditions standing alone are not sufficient

to give rise to an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, but they must also

be considered collectively. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). Most

concerning is the lack of access to any form of indoor or outdoor recreation, which

Plaintiff alleges harmed his health because he needs to stay active to avoid losing mobility

in his upper extremities as a result of an old wound.

Plaintiff appended numerous grievances and other documents to his complaint.

One grievance discusses the lack of recreation time, and the physical implications for

Plaintiff with his existing injuries. Defendant Wills deemed the grievance a non-

emergency, and he later signed off on the denial of the grievance in September of 2023.

As the Seventh Circuit noted in Gray v. Hardy, an inmate’s grievance signed by a warden

may be sufficient evidence to maintain a plausible deliberate indifference claim against a

warden concerning the conditions of confinement. 826 F.3d at 1008 (“Gray’s grievance

1 Hruby v. Hodge, 2013 WL 2403272 (S.D. Ill. 2013) (finding that an inmate failed to state a claim about

reduced portions because he did not suggest he was ever completely deprived of food, nor that he faced

an objectively serious risk of harm from the reduced portions).

2 Myrick v. Anglin, 496 Fed. App’x 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have noted that limiting inmates to weekly

showers does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”)

3 Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have recognized Eighth Amendment violations

where prisoners are deprived of cleaning supplies…only in extreme circumstances.”).

4 Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2007) (a prison is not required to provide a smoke-free

environment unless smoke exposure specifically exacerbates an inmate’s medical condition).

demonstrates the prison and the warden’s knowledge of the conditions about which he

is complaining. The response he received was signed by Warden Hardy. The grievance

and response are thus sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on deliberate

indifference.”). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has noted that “the lack of exercise can

rise to a constitutional violation where movement is denied and muscles are allowed to

atrophy and the health of the individual is threatened.” Smith v. Dart, 803 f.3d 304, 313

(7th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). On the information presented, Plaintiff has a

plausible claim against Defendant Wills concerning the lack of recreation time during his

132-day stay in segregation.

In addition to the access to recreation, Plaintiff alleges he had inadequate food in

segregation, as well as occasional filth, exposure to secondhand smoke, and exposure to

general pandemonium caused by other inmates. As explained above, though these

conditions alone are likely insufficient to state a conditions of confinement claim, they are

also considered in aggregate. However, unlike the lack of access to recreation, Plaintiff

has not tendered documents or factual allegations that plausibly tie these particular

issues to discrete defendants.5 The Court previously noted that Plaintiff could not

proceed on conditions of confinement claims that were not associated with the personal

5 At most, Plaintiff suggests he filed a few grievances about additional conditions such as exposure to

smoke, cell placement, or medical needs, but it does not appear he included copies of these grievances, and

instead just included a receipt. (Doc. 12-3 at 53) (grievance receipt). From this limited excerpt, the Court

cannot adequately determine the contours of any such claim, and it cannot determine which named

defendants might be personally responsible for these deprivations. Plaintiff also included various

affidavits, some of which go to his conditions claims, but which do not provide any further information

about who was personally responsible for these issues. (Doc. 12-3 at 64) (Plaintiff’s affidavit about weight

loss).

actions of any of the named defendants, and this remains true. Because Plaintiff has not

associated most of his conditions of confinement claims with any of the named

defendants, the remainder of the allegations are insufficient to state a claim and will be

again dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Claim 4

Plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary proceedings he has faced in recent months,

and the grievance rulings he has received, are all a result of ongoing retaliation from

Defendant Wills. He alleges that Defendant Wills repeatedly denied emergency status

for his grievances about the disciplinary proceedings and conditions of confinement, and

that Wills also interfered with his ability to complete a final exam for an educational

program while he was in segregation. A prison official may not retaliate against an

inmate because he filed grievances under the First Amendment. Manuel v. Nalley, 966

F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). To show retaliation, an inmate must identify protected

speech, a deprivation that occurred to deter the speech, and that the speech or protected

activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to take retaliatory action.

Circumstantial evidence of a motivating factor or causal link may include suspicious

timing or ambiguous statements, behavior, or comments, but suspicious timing alone is

rarely enough to make out a retaliation claim. Id. at 680-81.

Plaintiff’s theory of retaliation is based purely on speculation. He alleges for the

five years prior to the events mentioned in his complaint he did not get in any trouble,

was pursuing a prison education program, and was of good character, but after the

multiple incidents of discipline and grievances he has now experienced a variety of

adverse actions. He alleges that “clearly” the adverse things he has experienced are

retaliation, but he does not have any support for this notion aside from the temporal

relationship between the recent events. At most, he alleges that Defendant Garcia told

him he could not attend an education related exam because his superiors told him not to

allow it, but the Court does not find that this one allegation makes Plaintiff’s overarching

theory of retaliation plausible.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead a

sufficient claim against Defendants Rowland, Schoenbeck, Jones, Garcia, McClure,

Madole, or Hughes. One of the major flaws with Plaintiff’s original complaint and with

his amended complaint is that many of his factual allegations have no tie to the individual

actors. To recover damages under § 1983, an inmate must establish that a defendant was

personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right. See e.g., Whitfield v.

Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023). An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983

action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation. Colbert

v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017). The mere responsibility to oversee

some aspect of the prison is generally insufficient to give rise to § 1983 liability. “Liability

under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their own acts

but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that subordinates carry out their

tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). By extension, a §

1983 plaintiff may not “insist that one employee do another's job.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555

F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). “Bureaucracies divide tasks.” Id. The “view that everyone

who knows about a prisoner's problem must pay damages ... can't be right.” Id.

Here, although Plaintiff makes a wide variety of allegations about his experiences

at the prison over the last two years, very few of his factual allegations tie to the direct

actions of the named defendants. As such, many of the named defendants are now

subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged their personal involvement

in the facts asserted.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 3 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives

against Defendant Anthony Wills in his personal capacity. By contrast, Claims 1-2 and

Claim 4 are dismissed for failure to state a claim. All allegations against Defendants

Major Rowland, Joshua A. Schoenbeck, Anthony B. Jones, C/O Garcia, Sara McClure,

Margaret Madole, and Latoya Hughes have also been dismissed as insufficient and the

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendants Rowland, Schoenbeck, Jones,

Garcia, McClure, Madole, and Hughes.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendant Anthony Wills: (1)

Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form

6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy

of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’

place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the

Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the

forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on

Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,

to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this

action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 10, 14) are GRANTED by the issuance of this

Order. Plaintiff’s Motion to Show Cause (Doc. 13) is DENIED as MOOT because the

Court did not treat his amended complaint as untimely.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2024

DDavid W. Dugan

/s

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.