“Issuing false and unjustified disciplinary charges can amount to a violation of substantive due process if the charges were in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right.”
How later courts described this case
- “Issuing false and unjustified disciplinary charges can amount to a violation of substantive due process if the charges were in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right.”
- Section 1983 “protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or…departmental regulations.”
- two months not enough on its own
- “a claim against a prison official for knowingly making a false charge might best be analyzed under the principles of substantive, rather than procedural, due process”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DEVIN SEATS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 23-cv-1842-NJR
DARREN GALLOWAY, JERRY
JOHNSON JR., and LT. BRADFORD,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Devin Seats, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Shawnee
Correctional Center. Seats’s original Complaint, alleging Fourteenth Amendment due
process violations in a disciplinary hearing, was dismissed for failure to state a claim
(Docs. 1, 13). He was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint. In his First Amended
Complaint, Seats again alleges constitutional violations stemming from a disciplinary
ticket (Doc. 14).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Amended Complaint
In his First Amended Complaint, Seats makes the following allegations: On
December 22, 2022, Lieutenant Browning issued Seats a disciplinary report (Doc. 14, p. 3).
Seats alleges that he never received notice of the report prior to his hearing before the
Adjustment Committee (Id.). Jerry Johnson Jr. and Lieutenant Bradford were both
members of the Adjustment Committee, and Darren Galloway was the warden at
Shawnee (Id. at pp. 3-5). They proceeded with the disciplinary hearing, despite Seats not
having a copy of the disciplinary report (Id.). Seats also alleges that he was not present at
the hearing and lacked any description of the alleged violations (Id.). Seats alleges the
lack of notice violated both his procedural and substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at p. 3). Seats also alleges that the defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights, failed to protect him, and violated his Equal Protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment (Id.).
On January 4, 2023, Seats was found guilty of the charges and received three
months C grade, 28 days in segregation, a disciplinary transfer, and a six-month
restriction on his contact visits (Id. at p. 3). Galloway signed off on the disciplinary
hearing findings and punishment (Id.). Seats filed a grievance regarding the violation of
his due process rights. The Administrative Review Board deleted a portion of the charges
as unsubstantiated (Id.).
Discussion
Simply put, Seats again fails to state a viable claim regarding his disciplinary
report and hearing. The Court previously found that Seats adequately alleged that
Defendants Johnson and Bradford failed to provide him adequate notice of his hearing.
But as the Court previously noted in dismissing Seats’s original Complaint, an inmate’s
liberty interests are protected by the Due Process Clause only insofar as a deprivation of
the interest at issue would impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
In dismissing his original Complaint, the Court noted that the demotion in grade,
transfer, and limitations on his visitation rights did not invoke due process protections.
Antoine v. Uchtman, 275 F. App’x 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2008); Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372,
375 (7th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761-62, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1997). Seats also
received 28 days in segregation, but typically, short stays in segregation, on their own,
do not implicate a liberty interest. Thomas, 130 F.3d at 761-62 (two months not enough on
its own); Williams v. Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 157 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that 30 days is
not enough). Only if the conditions of confinement in segregation were particularly
egregious would the short stay in segregation implicate a liberty interest. Seats’s
Amended Complaint fails to offer any additional allegations regarding his conditions in
segregation (Doc. 14, p. 8). Instead, he states that he faced an atypical and significant
hardship because he was placed in restrictive custody and then found guilty of the
charges 14 days later (Id.). These allegations do not state a claim, however, because
placement in investigatory segregation does not implicate a liberty interest. Townsend v.
Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]nmates have no liberty interest in avoiding
transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative,
protective, or investigative purposes.”). Thus, Seats again fails to state a claim.
Seats also alleges that the defendants’ actions violated his substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But a potential substantive due process claim
also fails because Seats fails to allege that he suffered substantial consequences. To
implicate a substantive due process right, “the consequences [must be] sufficiently
severe.” See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2006); Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d
1395, 1402-03 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Issuing false and unjustified disciplinary charges can
amount to a violation of substantive due process if the charges were in retaliation for the
exercise of a constitutional right.”). Seats fails to offer any allegations which suggest his
segregation stay was sufficiently severe, nor has he alleged that the defendants
knowingly made false charges against him. See Langstrom, 463 F.3d at 625 (“a claim
against a prison official for knowingly making a false charge might best be analyzed
under the principles of substantive, rather than procedural, due process”).
In addition to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, Seats again states
in conclusory fashion that his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
were violated. He also alleges the defendants acted with deliberate indifference and failed
to protect him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also states that his rights were
violated because the defendants failed to follow IDOC Administrative Code and
procedures. Seats was previously informed that he would need to offer additional factual
allegations to indicate how the defendants violated his rights, but he has failed to do so.
His conclusory statements that the defendants’ actions violated his constitutional rights
still fail to state a claim. And the failure to follow administrative and internal procedures
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760
(7th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 “protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not
violations of state laws or…departmental regulations.”); Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472
F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, Seats again fails to state a claim.
This is Seats’s second attempt at stating a viable claim, and he has failed to do so.
The Court finds that further amendment would be futile. Thus, the First Amended
Complaint must be dismissed.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Seats’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED
with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The dismissal counts as one of Seats’s three
allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If Seats wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Seats does choose
to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133
F.3d at 467. He must list each of the issues he intends to appeal in the notice of appeal,
and a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must set forth the issues he plans to
present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be
nonmeritorious, Seats may also incur another “strike.” A proper and timely motion filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.
Feb. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28)
days after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 16, 2024 Tl
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NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge