noting that “an inmate who suffers only a risk of physical harm has no compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “an inmate who suffers only a risk of physical harm has no compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment.”
- indicating that a failure to protect claim requires more than “general allegations of fear or the need to be removed”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHAD CUTLER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-03127-GCS
)
ANTHONY WILLS, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Currently, before the Court is Plaintiff Chad Cutler’s motion to reconsider the
summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s Count 1. (Doc. 8). Specifically, Plaintiff moves the Court
to reconsider the Order dated October 16, 2023 (Doc. 11), dismissing without prejudice
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Wills for failing to protect him from attack
from other inmates. (Doc. 39). Wills opposes the motion. (Doc. 44). Based on the reasons
delineated below, the Court DENIES the motion.
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently
incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff claims that
he is suffering from untreated and undiagnosed episodes of paralysis that put him in
danger of attack and sexual assault by other inmates. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff alleges that he has low functioning autism and another condition that has
not been diagnosed or evaluated. (Doc. 1, p. 3). This second condition causes Plaintiff to
enter a paralytic state when under extreme stress or at other random moments. During
these episodes, Plaintiff experiences a loss of voluntary movement that lasts for minutes
or hours. Id. When Plaintiff is in such a state, he is utterly defenseless to violent or sexual
advances by other inmates. Id.
On July 10, 2023, Plaintiff began writing the medical department at Menard with
requests for urgent medical attention. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff states he has submitted over
fifty requests. All such requests have been ignored for over seventy days. Id.
Plaintiff has also submitted three PREA reports due to the high likelihood of being
raped or maimed by a cellmate during a paralytic episode. (Doc. 1, p. 4). In July, Plaintiff
wrote to his counselor twice seeking assistance with acquiring medical attention, and he
did not receive a response. Id. at p. 5. On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff appeared before the
Administrative Review Board and described his unsuccessful attempts to be treated and
that his condition places him in danger. Id. He also wrote emergency grievances on
August 20, 2023, and September 1, 2023. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff again appeared
before the Administrative Review Board and presented his issues with obtaining medical
treatment and not receiving recognition of his condition by staff, which makes him
vulnerable to an attack by another inmate. (Doc. 9). Despite notifying prison officials that
he is being denied medical treatment, his condition continues to go untreated and ignored
by medical staff, thus placing him in a dangerous situation. Id. at p. 2-4.
On October 16, 2023, the Court performed its preliminary screening Order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment
claim against Defendant Wills for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. (Doc.
11).
DISCUSSION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly contemplate
motions to reconsider. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has approved of district courts
construing motions pursuant to the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) or 60(b) if it appears that a party is requesting relief available under those Rules. See
United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992). A motion under Rule 59(e) must
be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment/order to be timely. This time
limit is unyielding.” Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 750 F. 3d 663, 666 (7th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted). The Court cannot extend the 28-day deadline imposed by Rule
59(e). Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2); Justice v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 682 F. 3d 662, 664-665
(7th Cir. 2012)). When a motion to reconsider is filed more than 28 days after the entry of
judgment/order, the Court is to treat the motion as filed under Rule 60(b). Id.
The deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) was November
14, 2023, 28 days after the entry of the Order on October 16, 2023. See FED. R. CIV. PROC.
59(e). Plaintiff filed the motion to reconsider on December 14, 2023. Thus, the Court must
treat the motion to reconsider as one filed pursuant to Rule 60(b).
Under Rule 60(b), a Court may vacate a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; fraud or misconduct of the opposing party; a judgment
that is void or discharged; newly discovered evidence; or “any other reason that justifies
relief.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 60(b)(1)-(6). Despite the catchall provision of allowing a court
to grant relief for “any other reason,” Rule 60(b) is still an “extraordinary remedy and is
granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620 F. 3d 747, 759 (7th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dickerson v. Board of Educ. of Ford Heights, Ill., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown a legal or factual mistake made by the Court , nor
has he demonstrated any other reason to justify relief. See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S.
528, 533-534 (2022). In dismissing Count 1 without prejudice, the Court correctly ruled
that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his safety and fears of attack are too generalized in
that he has not described his current cellmate as someone with a known propensity to
sexually assault or attack others and has not alleged any specific threats posed by any
inmate. See, e.g., Saunders v. Tourville, No. 03-3757, 97 Fed. Appx. 648, 649 (7th Cir. April
19, 2004) (noting that “an inmate who suffers only a risk of physical harm has no
compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment.”); Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633,
639 (7th Cir. 2008) (indicating that a failure to protect claim requires more than “general
allegations of fear or the need to be removed”). Plaintiff maintains that after the
preliminary injunction hearing the record now contains additional evidence to support
his failure to protect claim in that staff destroyed his written requests and grievances as
they refused to protect him when they were aware of his medical condition. Despite
Plaintiff’s assertions, the Court does not find that the record supports a claim for failure
to protect. In fact, Plaintiff testified during the preliminary injunction hearing that his
medical condition is not obvious to other inmates, as he tries to hide it; that he has never
been assaulted because of this medical condition; and that he has never been threatened
because of this medical condition. Thus, the Court remains convinced of the correctness
of its decision.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to reconsider
the summary dismissal of Plaintiff's Count 1. (Doc. 39).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Digitally signed by
DATED: January 3, 2024. - ~ Judge Sison
Aldint ©. dDaige re: 2024.01.03
15:31:25 -06'00'
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
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