Jenkins v. McHaney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SCOTT JENKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-2128-DWD

)

MICHAEL MCHANEY, KIMBERLY )

KOESTER, JOHN J. FLOOD, STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, KATHY EMERICK, SHERRI )

GADD, FAYETTE COUNTY COURT, )

DAVE CATES, CATES LAW FIRM, )

JOSEPH BLEYERS, BLEYERS LAW )

FIRM, FIRST VANDALIA CORP., )

WILLIAM ERNEST CHAPPEL )

ESTATE, CITY OF VANDALIA IL, )

JACK JOHNSTON, JOHNSTON LAW )

FIRM, and DOUGLAS JARMAN, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Scott Jenkins’ “Motion not to

Close or Reopen Case, Motion to Reconsider fee waiver, in the Alternative, Motion for

Time to Raise Funds to Pay Fees” (“Motion to Reconsider”) (Doc. 21). For the reasons set

forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Scott Jenkins filed this pro se action against multiple defendants alleging

he was tricked into deeding his multimillion-dollar entertainment facility known as

“Twisters” to the First Vandalia Corporation. On May 9, 2023, the Court denied Jenkins’

Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). Jenkins’ IFP motion was denied

because the Court found that he was not indigent and because his Complaint did not

survive screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). As to the latter, the Court

declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jenkins’ claims in accordance with the Anti-

Injunction Act, the Younger abstention doctrine, and/or general principles of federalism

and comity. Judgment, dismissing the action without prejudice, was entered on May 10,

2023. On June 12, 2023 (33 days after entry of judgment) the Clerk of Court received and

filed Jenkins’ Motion to Reconsider.

II. RELEVANT AUTHORITY

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly contemplate motions

to reconsider. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has approved of district courts

construing motions pursuant to the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) if it appears that a party is requesting relief available under those

Rules. United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992). “[W]hether a motion filed

within [28] days of the entry of judgment should be analyzed

under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the motion, not on the timing

or label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008). A motion

to reconsider filed more than 28 days after entry of the challenged order “automatically

becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.” Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994).

Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment in order to correct manifest

errors of law or fact or to address newly discovered evidence. Obriecht, 517 F.3d at 494.

“A ‘manifest error’ is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is

the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling

precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations

omitted).

Rule 60(b) sets forth a more exacting standard than Rule 59(e), although it permits

relief from a judgment for a number of reasons, including mistake or “any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Relief under Rule

60(b) is an extraordinary remedy and is only granted in exceptional

circumstances. McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000).

“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected

arguments.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th

Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the

judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). Jenkins’ Motion was filed outside of the 28-day deadline

and therefore, it cannot be considered under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff contends that, because

he is a pro se litigant and does not receive electronic notification of filings, his motion is

timely. (Doc. 21, p. 3) (“[T]his Motion is within the 28-day time frame and I suffer approx.

a 1 week delay due to mail service since I am not electronically notified.”). This, however,

is not consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The general rule in federal

court is that the date on which the clerk receives the pleading, not the date on which the

pleading was mailed, is the date on which the pleading is filed.” Purchase v. Colvin, No.

15-CV-1075-JPG-CJP, 2016 WL 6963301, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2016) (citing Raymond v.

Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2006)). While pro se prisoners are entitled to a

“mailbox rule” that renders their documents filed “at the moment the prisoner places it

in the prison mail system,” that rule “does not extend to pro se litigants like plaintiff, who

are not incarcerated.” Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2015); Purchase, 2016 WL

6963301, at *2. Thus, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under

Rule 60.

In his Motion to Reconsider, Jenkins claims he has additional information that will

demonstrate this Court wrongly concluded that he is not indigent. Specifically, Jenkins

contends that the Court was clearly unaware that he has been granted pauper status in

other litigation he has filed in the Southern District of Illinois and in the Seventh Circuit.

Mr. Jenkins suggests that the Court’s “mistake” warrants reconsideration. The Court

disagrees. Whether Mr. Jenkins has been found indigent in other proceedings is not

relevant. The Court based its decision on the financial information Jenkins provided in

the instant case:

Plaintiff avers that he is unemployed and that he receives a total of $999.00

a month from Social Security (Doc. 6). He further indicates that he has a

total of $1,000.00 in a savings account and that he owns a ’99 Buick Lesabre.

Id. Jenkins states that he has no monthly bills, no mortgage, no dependents,

and does not list any other debts or financial obligations. The Court finds

that Plaintiff is not indigent and will deny Plaintiff's motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis.

(Doc. 19). Plaintiff does not claim that the above information is incorrect. Accordingly,

the Court finds no mistake in its finding as to Plaintiff’s alleged indigence.

Alternatively, Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him additional time to pay the

requisite filing fee. The Court will deny this request as futile. The Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety and closed the case in accordance with the Anti-

Injunction Act, the Younger abstention doctrine, and/or general principles of federalism

and comity. Paying the filing fee would not alter this result.

In his Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff also states that he will be filing “within a few

days” an additional motion detailing why the Court’s “jurisdictional ruling,” dismissing

his Complaint was wrongly decided. No additional pleadings have been filed, and the

Court finds no basis for reconsidering its ruling on the merits.

Finally, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Reconsider under seal, stating that it contains

confidential information regarding his financial status. Plaintiff claims that (1) his

financial situation should be kept confidential to avoid harming his settlement strategy

and (2) courts afford litigants privacy regarding financial matters. The Court is not aware

of any authority supporting Plaintiff’s contention and the Court finds no information in

the pleading that warrants sealing under Seventh Circuit authority. See Baxter Intern., Inc.

v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (in civil litigation, only trade secrets,

information covered by a recognized privilege, and information required by statute to be

maintained in confidence, shall be maintained under seal). Accordingly, the Court

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to unseal the Motion to Reconsider.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff Scott Jenkins’ “Motion not to Close or Reopen Case, Motion to Reconsider

fee waiver, in the Alternative, Motion for Time to Raise Funds to Pay Fees” (Doc. 21) is

DENIED. Further, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to unseal the Motion (Doc. 21).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2023

/s David W. Dugan

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge