Koen v. Southern Seven Health Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBBIE M. KOEN, JORDAN HOLDER, )

RHONDA SUMNLERS, KANEESA )

MALLORY, and ROMELLO ORR, )

)

Plaintiffs,1 )

) Case No. 23-cv-2657- DWD

vs. )

)

SOUTHERN SEVEN HEALTH )

DEPARTMENT and RHONDA RAY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and

Supporting Memorandum of Law (“Motion”) (Doc. 86). Plaintiffs filed a Response in

Opposition to the Motion (Doc. 90) and Defendants filed a Reply in Support of the Motion

(Doc. 92). As explained below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs initiated this case on August 1, 2023, when they filed a Complaint for

Damages for Racial Discrimination and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 1).

That same day, Plaintiffs also filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Entry of a Temporary

Restraining Order Without Notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) (Doc. 3),

which requested a temporary restraining order or, in the alternative, a preliminary

1Defendants note Plaintiff Holder is identified in the caption of the Amended Complaint, but he is

not mentioned anywhere in the body of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 86, pg. 6 n. 2). Defendants suggest

Plaintiff Holder was included in the caption of the Amended Complaint by mistake. (Doc. 86, pg. 6 n. 2).

injunction. The Court denied the aforementioned Ex Parte Motion in part and deferred it

in part on August 3, 2023. (Doc. 25). More specifically, the Court denied the request for a

temporary restraining order without notice, but deferred ruling on the request for a

preliminary injunction. (Doc. 25). The Court indicated to the parties that it would

schedule a hearing on the requested preliminary injunction at the earliest possible date.

(Doc. 25). The hearing on that request is now scheduled for November 20, 2023. (Doc. 87).

Over the course of a month, Plaintiffs attempted to serve each Defendant in

advance of a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. At a Status Conference

held on September 5, 2023, however, Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the Complaint to

dismiss unnecessary parties. (Doc. 74). That request was granted. (Doc. 74).

On September 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Damages for

Racial Discrimination and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Amended Complaint”)

(Doc. 84), dismissing one Plaintiff and all but one Individual Defendant. Plaintiff Koen,

an African American, is an employee of Defendant Southern Seven Health Department

(“Southern Seven”) who has been the site supervisor of the Head Start Facility in Cairo,

Illinois, since 1996. (Doc. 84, pgs. 2-3). Plaintiff Sumnlers, who is not an African American,

and Plaintiffs Mallory and Orr, who are African Americans, have children enrolled at the

Cairo Head Start Facility. (Doc. 84, pg. 2). Defendant Southern Seven is allegedly a body

politic, incorporated under Illinois law and governed by a board of directors, serving

seven counties in Southern Illinois. (Doc. 84, pg. 2). Defendant Ray, as the Executive

Director of Defendant Southern Seven, is one of Plaintiff Koen’s supervisors. (Doc. 84, pg.

3). She reports to Defendant Southern Seven’s Board of Directors. (Doc. 84, pg. 3).

Collectively, Plaintiffs allege “Defendants herein decided to close the Cairo Head

Start facility for reasons motivated by race as opposed to the implementation of objective

criteria.” (Doc. 84, pg. 1). According to Plaintiffs, Cairo, Illinois, “is predominately

African-American in its racial make up.” (Doc. 84, pg. 3). Further, as to Plaintiff Koen,

Plaintiffs allege she “received regular raises and bonuses,” and was considered “a

valuable employee,” before 2018. (Doc. 84, pg. 3). Around that time, however, Defendant

Ray allegedly joined Head Start. (Doc. 84, pg. 3). She and two other individual employees

allegedly made Plaintiff Koen’s “life…substantially more difficult.” (Doc. 84, pg. 3).2

Specifically, Defendant Southern Seven’s treatment of the Cairo Head Start

Facility, generally, and Plaintiff Koen, specifically, changed in the following ways:

(1) Plaintiff Koen “was met with a caustic response” when, in late 2019 or early 2020, she

asked the Head Start administrator about a directive regarding the number of enrolled

students, “plainly indicating that she was not welcome to ask questions” despite being

urged to ask questions about the program in the past; (2) “a campaign of harassment”

began against Plaintiff Koen, in July 2020, after learning that a staff member contracted

COVID-19 and she, but not Defendant Ray or the Head Start administrator, wanted to

inform other employees of that reported illness; (3) Plaintiff discovered the maintenance

department was “ignoring work orders,” including a work order to replace the windows

in the classrooms at the Cairo Head Start Facility, that were delivered to the Head Start

administrator; (4) the Cairo Head Start Facility was “consistently” short staffed when

2The two other individual employees are identified as the Head Start administrator, Jennifer Parks,

and the human resource administrator, Emily Boyd. Neither Ms. Parks nor Ms. Boyd are named as

Defendants in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 84, pg. 3).

employees called in sick because the Head Start administrator “routinely” decided not to

send temporary replacements to fill in; (5) after Plaintiff Koen learned, on May 1, 2023,

that Defendant Southern Seven planned to close the Cairo Head Start Facility, the Head

Start administrator, in a conversation with Plaintiff Koen, the human resource

administrator, and a parent, informed the parent that “she and other administrators were

unable to speak with Koen and other Cairo staff because Koen had filed grievances and

had complained about the closing of the” Cairo Head Start Facility; (6) Plaintiff Koen filed

an internal grievance against Defendant Ray on July 26, 2023, after Defendant Ray, “in an

aggressive manner and in an attempt to harass and intimidate” Plaintiff Koen, “put her

finger near Koen’s face and falsely charged her with calling Senators, Representatives,

and other stakeholders” to come and view the Cairo Head Start Facility; and (7) Plaintiff

Koen was given notice that she was laid off, effective August 4, 2023. (Doc. 84, pgs. 3-5).

Plaintiffs allege Defendant Southern Seven, which operates nine other Head Start

facilities in southern Illinois where “[t]he children enrolled…are predominantly white in

racial background,” gave no consideration to closing any of the nine other Head Start

facilities. (Doc. 84, pg. 3, 5). Also, “substantial repairs have been and are being done at”

the Egyptian, Metropolis, Mounds, and Vienna Head Start Facilities. (Doc 84, pg. 5).

Despite budgeted funds for the Cairo Head Start Facility, however, “money is not being

spent for repairs in Cairo.” (Doc 84, pg. 5). Based on the above allegations, “Plaintiffs

allege…[the Cairo Head Start Facility] would still be operating if [it] were located in a

city that was predominately white, where the children enrolled are predominantly white,

and where the Site Supervisor was also white.” (Doc. 84, pg. 5).

Relatedly, Plaintiffs allege discrimination “against Plaintiff Koen because she is a

confident, articulate, and strong woman of African-American descent.” (Doc. 84, pg. 5).

That discrimination is also allegedly related to “the advocacy she took in relation to her

questioning [of] Defendants’ decision to close…[the Cairo Head Start Facility] by

reaching out to elected officials to come and inspect” the Facility. (Doc. 84, pg. 5). In

Plaintiffs’ view, “Southern Seven employees and officials were resentful of the fact that

Plaintiff Koen stood up for the rights of persons of African American descent with regard

to…[the] treatment of” the Cairo Head Start Facility. (Doc. 84, pg. 6). Plaintiffs brought

their claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (Count I) and 1983 (Count II). (Doc. 84, pgs. 6-8).

Defendants filed the Motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on

September 28, 2023. Plaintiffs’ Response was filed on October 26, 2023, and Defendants’

Reply was filed on November 9, 2023. Therefore, the Motion is fully briefed and ripe for

a ruling. The parties’ specific arguments as to the Motion are incorporated below.

II. Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the complaint due to a failure to state a claim for

which relief may be granted. See Firestone Fin. Corp., 796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)). To survive

the motion, which tests the sufficiency of the complaint but not the merits of the case, a

plaintiff must allege enough facts to state a facially plausible claim for relief. See Kloss v.

Acuant, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch

& Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012)); Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 921-22 (7th Cir.

2022) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility

means enough facts are pled to draw reasonable inferences as to liability. See Fosnight, 41

F.4th at 922 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Taha v. Int’l

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020) (“When a complaint’s

facts ‘do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged—but has not “shown”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” ’ ”).

Thus, a complaint need not allege “detailed factual allegations,” but it must state

enough facts to lift the claim above the speculative level. See Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 876

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals” of the elements, supported by

mere conclusions, do not suffice, and “a complaint must plead ‘more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’ ” See Trivedi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

609 F. Supp. 3d 628, 631 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); Taha, 947 F.3d at

469. Likewise, a complaint does not suffice if it “ ‘tenders “naked assertions” devoid of

“further factual enhancement.” ’ ” See Taha, 947 F.3d at 469 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

The Court accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all inferences for Plaintiffs, but,

again, it may reject “sheer speculation, bald assertions, and unsupported conclusory

statements.” See Trivedi, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d

1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)); accord Kloss, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 874-75; Taha, 947 F.3d at 469.

Notably, in Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, which involved discrimination in the

employment context under Title VII, the Seventh Circuit found the plaintiff failed to

allege enough facts to plausibly infer discrimination based on her protected

characteristics. See 23 F.4th 774, 776-77 (7th Cir. 2022). In that case, “[a]t a high level of

generality,” the plaintiff alleged a discharge due to her age, race, and national origin.

See id. at 776. The Seventh Circuit found “Rule 8 requires more,” as the plaintiff

“include[d] no factual allegations directly or indirectly connecting the termination with

her national origin, age, or race.” See id. The complaint invoked a policy that allegedly

resulted in the plaintiff’s firing, but it stated “nothing allowing…[the Seventh Circuit] to

see a link between any aspect of that policy and her contention that the agency discharged

her because she [wa]s Polish, white, or over 50.” See id. at 777. Therefore, it was not

enough for the complaint to observe that federal law bars adverse employment actions

on those grounds, as there had to be facts rendering the allegation of a wrongful discharge

plausible. See id. at 776 (citing Doe v. Columbia College Chicago, 933 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir.

2019), which noted “[a] plaintiff cannot rely on…generalized allegations alone…but must

combine them with facts particular to his case to survive a motion to dismiss”).

With these pleading requirements in mind, the Court turns to the Motion.

A. Count I—42 U.S.C. § 1981

As to Count I, Defendants argue § 1981 “does not allow a right of recovery from

state actors based on alleged constitutional violations.” (Doc. 86, pg. 2). The prohibition

allegedly applies to both governmental entities, such as Defendant Southern Seven, and

individuals acting under the State’s authority, such as Defendant Ray. (Doc. 86, pg. 2). As

such, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ only remedy lies under § 1983. (Doc. 86, pg. 2).

In Response, Plaintiffs “reluctantly agree” that the Motion should be granted as to

Count I. (Doc. 90, pgs. 1-2). In doing so, Plaintiffs cite the same binding authority, relied

upon by Defendants, from the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit. (Doc. 90, pgs. 1-2).

Upon review of those authorities, the Court FINDS it must dismiss Count I.

Section 1983 “remains the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state

actors,” like Defendants Southern Seven and Ray in this case. See Campbell v. Forest

Preserve Dist. of Cook County, Ill., 752 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating this rule and

discussing how Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989), which held that

§ 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for state-actor violations of the

rights guaranteed by § 1981, remains good law after the Civil Rights Act of 1991);

accord Barnes v. Bd of Trustees of University of Illinois, 946 F.3d 384, 389 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2020)).

As such, the Motion is GRANTED as to Count I, which is DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. Count II—42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983, in part, states: “Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State…subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (concluding “[l]ocal governing bodies,” like Defendant

Southern Seven, allegedly a body politic, “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief where…the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers”). The Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment bars racial discrimination by state and local officials, so persons

subjected to such discrimination may seek relief under § 1983. See Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d

478, 487 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Majeske v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local Lodge No. 7, 94 F.3d

307, 311 (7th Cir. 1996); Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 624 (7th Cir. 1986)).

A prima facie claim of this nature requires Plaintiffs to show (1) they are members

of a protected class, (2) they are similarly situated to members of an unprotected class,

(3) they were treated differently than members of the unprotected class, and

(4) Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent. See McPhaul v. Bd of Comm’rs of Madison

Co., 226 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d

965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 370 (7th Cir. 2000); Jackson v. City

of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1999)); accord Moore v. Freeport Comm. Unit

School Dist. No. 145, 570 F. Supp. 3d 601, 611 (N.D. Ill. 2021); McDorman v. Smith, 437 F.

Supp. 2d 768, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2006). For Monell liability, Plaintiffs must show a constitutional

violation caused by Defendant Southern Seven, allegedly a body politic that “may be held

liable for its own violations of the federal Constitution and laws,” such as through an

express policy, a widespread practice or custom, or a final policymaker. See Moore, 570 F.

Supp. 3d 601, 611 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120

(1992); Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019)); First Midwest Bank Guardian

of Estate of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021). And, as Defendants

note with respect to the individual liability of Defendant Ray, officials in § 1983 lawsuits

may only be held accountable for their own misconduct. See Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753,

767-68 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 497-98 (7th Cir. 2022));

accord Taylor, 999 F.3d at 493. In other words, the officials must be personally involved in

the constitutional violation and have the specific intent to commit the discrimination.

See Taylor, 999 F.3d at 493; see also Thomas v. Chmell, 569 F. Supp. 3d 732, 737 (N.D. Ill.

2021) (“Individual liability requires personal involvement in the constitutional violation

and ‘depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions.”).

Now, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim “falls short in several respects.”

(Doc. 86, pg. 5). First, Defendants note what Plaintiffs appear to concede—Plaintiff

Sumnlers is not a member of a protected class. (Doc. 86, pg. 5). The Amended Complaint

“makes abundantly clear[] [that] the ‘protected class’ of people…are African-Americans,

which the lawsuit claims were illegally treated differently from whites,” so Defendants

argue Plaintiff Sumnlers claim “fails in the most basic sense.” (Doc. 86, pgs. 5-6).

Second, even though the Amended Complaint adequately alleges that Plaintiffs

Koen, Mallory, and Orr are within the protected class at issue, Defendants argue those

Plaintiffs have not alleged treatment that is any different than the treatment of

individuals outside the protected class. (Doc. 86, pg. 6). Defendants note “the two forms

of alleged discriminatory conduct” in the Amended Complaint, including: as to all

Plaintiffs, the closing of the Cairo Head Start Facility; and as to Plaintiff Koen, the “racist

mistreatment and personal animus” of Defendants. (Doc. 86, pg. 6).

However, Defendants argue it can only be assumed, absent allegations to the

contrary, that the closure of the Cairo Head Start Facility affected African American and

non-African American individuals. (Doc. 86, pg. 7). Defendants suggest Plaintiffs

“essentially concede[]” this point by arguing Plaintiff Sumnlers, who is not African

American, “was equally impacted by the closure of the facility.” (Doc. 86, pg. 7). To

further illustrate their point, Defendants state this is not a case where “[Plaintiffs] Mallory

and Orr’s children…[were] denied admittance to the Head Start program[,] while white

children were not, or…[where Plaintiffs] Mallory or Orr, as African-Americans, were

denied the opportunity to have their children attend one of the other Head Start

facilities…after the Cairo location closed, while white parents were not.” (Doc. 86, pg. 7).

Defendants stress that Plaintiffs Mallory and Orr merely have children who cannot attend

a Head Start program at a desired location due to the facility’s closure. (Doc. 86, pg. 7).

Further, Defendants note there is no allegation that African American employees

of the Cairo Head Start Facility, like Plaintiff Koen, were treated any differently than

white employees. (Doc. 86, pg. 8). Instead, Defendants maintain, “[o]nce it was decided

to close the facility, all [employees] were in the same boat.” (Doc. 86, pg. 8). Also,

Defendants submit that Paragraph 34 of the Amended Complaint, which details the

treatment of Plaintiff Koen by Defendants, “does not even hint of a race-based animus.”

(Doc. 86, pg. 8). In Defendants’ view, Plaintiff Koen’s allegations of mistreatment reflect

disagreements over employment-related matters and her disapproval of the “tone of

voice” used by certain administrators during those conflicts. (Doc. 86, pg. 8).

Third, Defendants argue Defendant Ray must be dismissed because the allegations

do not suggest she personally engaged in misconduct that violated Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights. (Doc. 86, pgs. 9-10). Again, as to Paragraph 34 of the Amended

Complaint, which details the treatment of Plaintiff Koen, Defendants argue Plaintiffs do

not allege Defendant Ray said or did anything to display a race-based animus, “much

less a violation of Koen’s constitutional rights.” (Doc. 86, pg. 10). Likewise, Defendants

argue Plaintiffs make no mention of Defendant Ray’s role in the closure of the Cairo Head

Start Facility. (Doc. 86, pg. 10). Defendants emphasize that Defendant Southern Seven is

governed by a board of directors and, according to Plaintiffs’ own allegations, Defendant

Ray reports to and carries out the wishes of that board of directors. (Doc. 86, pg. 10).

In their Response, Plaintiffs state “a head start facility is arguably not a school,

[but] the same rules [that apply to schools] should apply to the Cairo Head Start Facility.”

(Doc. 90, pg. 3). That is, Plaintiffs argue the Cairo Head Start Facility, like schools, should

not be closed for reasons related to race. (Doc. 90, pg. 3).

In doing so, Plaintiffs note Defendants do not dispute this proposition but instead

argue the Amended Complaint is inadequately pled under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 90, pgs.

3-4). Plaintiffs emphasize, though, the Cairo Head Start Facility allegedly closed while

nine other facilities in “predominantly white communities” did not close. (Doc. 90, pg. 4).

Further, maintenance and repairs were allegedly made at the other facilities but not at

the Cairo Head Start Facility. (Doc. 90, pg. 4). Likewise, substitute personnel were

allegedly sent to the other facilities, but not to the Cairo Head Start facility, when workers

were sick. (Doc. 90, pg. 4). Plaintiffs “concluded from the above facts that they were

discriminated against because of their race,” such that the Amended Complaint suffices

under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 90, pg. 4). Whether Defendant Southern Seven intended to

discriminate, Plaintiffs continue, “is a question for another day.” (Doc. 90, pg. 4).

Further, with respect to Plaintiff Sumnlers, Plaintiffs argue she does not have to be

African-American in order to be entitled to relief. (Doc. 90, pgs. 4-5). Plaintiffs analogize

this situation to the situation where a white lessor has had standing to assert the right of

a black lessee to be free of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. (Doc. 90, pg. 5);

see Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)). Plaintiffs also note, in the

context of § 1981, “[c]losely-related claims…accord standing to non-minority plaintiffs

like Sumnler[s].” (Doc. 90, pg. 5). Therefore, Plaintiffs argue Plaintiff Sumnlers should be

permitted to remain in the case, as she “is not some disinterested person who has only an

intellectual stake in the suit.” (Doc. 90, pg. 6). Rather, Plaintiff Sumnlers and her children,

like the other Plaintiffs and their children, is suffering a direct injury because of the

alleged race-based decision to close the Cairo Head Start Facility. (Doc. 90, pg. 6).

Here, under the liberal notice-pleading standard contemplated by Rule 8, the

Court finds Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated the prima facie case necessary for

Count II, such that it can survive the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6). At base, Plaintiffs allege

Defendant Southern Seven’s decision to close the Cairo Head Start Facility, which

purportedly serves children in a “predominantly African-American” community, for

race-based reasons. (Doc. 84, pgs. 1-3, 5). The Court agrees, at this early stage, Plaintiffs’

baseline allegation is factually enhanced by the allegations that Defendants did not

consider closing any of the nine Head Start facilities in “predominantly white”

communities, ignored work orders and required maintenance at the Cairo Head Start

Facility despite budgeted funds for that purpose and the “substantial repairs” underway

at other facilities, and “routinely” declined to temporarily staff the Cairo Head Start

Facility when employees were sick. (Doc. 84, pgs. 3-5). In light of these factual allegations,

the Court can draw reasonable inferences as to Defendant Southern Seven’s liability.

The Court is of the same opinion as to Defendant Ray, despite Defendants’

argument that she is only liable for her own misconduct. As an initial matter, it would be

inappropriate for the Court to assess liability at this stage. Also, as with Defendant

Southern Seven, the Court finds the baseline allegation of racial discrimination against

Plaintiff Koen is factually enhanced by the allegations that she “received regular raises

and bonuses,” and was considered “a valuable employee,” before 2018, when Defendant

Ray allegedly joined Head Start and made Plaintiff Koen’s “life…substantially more

difficult.” (Doc. 84, pg. 3). To be sure, at times, certain of Plaintiffs’ allegations are

conclusory in nature. In sum, though, the Court finds reasonable inferences as to

Defendant Ray’s liability may be drawn from the properly alleged facts. (Doc. 84, pgs. 3-

5). After all, Plaintiff Koen’s life was allegedly made “substantially more difficult” due

her race as well as her advocacy against closing the Cairo Head Start Facility, which,

again, purportedly serves a “predominantly African-American” community. (Doc. 84,

pgs. 5-6).

The Court stresses, on this procedural posture, it is not concerned with the

evidence or merits of the case. The time will come when Plaintiffs must prove their case

and rebut Defendants’ legal arguments. For now, though, Plaintiffs were merely required

to allege enough facts to state a facially plausible claim for relief. As discussed above, the

Court finds they have done so and, notably, this is not a case where the claim is doomed

to fail due to “a high level of generality” and the total absence of factual enhancements.

See Kaminski, 23 F.4th 776-77; see also Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater

Chicago, 927 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding, in the context of a § 1983 claim for

racial discrimination by a public employer against a public employee, the district court

erred by “demanding too much specificity” in the complaint, where “[a] plaintiff alleging

race discrimination need not allege each evidentiary element of a legal theory to survive

a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6) and instead “need only allege…[the defendant]

fired him because of his race). Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to Count II.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Count I of the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. By virtue of this

ruling, the hearing on Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction will proceed as

scheduled on November 20, 2023.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2023

s/ David W. Dugan

_________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge