Randall v. Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KIMOTHY RANDALL, )

K60950, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 23-cv-2502-DWD

ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CORR., )

DR. MEYERS, )

B. BLUM, )

CHRISTINE BROWN, )

LACEY, )

JANE DOE (NURSE), )

LATOYA HUGHES, )

DAVID MITCHELL, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Kimothy Randall, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Pinckneyville), brings

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff alleges that he has not received adequate

medical supplies for his multiple chronic medical issues, he has sustained injuries

because the facility does not have adequate accommodations for him, and he has been

retaliated against for filing a grievance on his access to an accessible shower.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

On July 23, 2021, Plaintiff was transferred from Lawrence Correctional Center to

Pinckneyville. (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff is paralyzed from the waist down, he has an astomy

(open wound), he uses a colostomy bag and catheters, and he needs a wheelchair to get

around. His ailments require a variety of supplies such as, a large band aid for his

astomy, catheters, and colostomy bags. Upon arrival to Pinckneyville, he saw Dr. Meyers

about his medical conditions and his need for supplies.

On July 25, 2021, Plaintiff requested an ADA compliant shower chair with wheels,

safety locks, and other features. He was presented with a chair that lacked many of the

features he desired, but he was faced with the choice of either taking the chair or passing

on showers. He was told to raise problems about the shower chair with Defendant

Brown, the healthcare unit administrator. Plaintiff opted to shower, but when attempting

to maneuver the chair under the showerhead he fell. A half-hour later he was seen by a

nurse who gave him Tylenol. He submitted a request for additional care on July 26, 2021.

(Doc. 1 at 9).

On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Meyers, and he described his injuries,

which included nerve pinching and pain in his neck, shoulder, and upper-back. Dr.

Meyers neither physically examined Plaintiff, nor did he provide any other treatment,

which prolonged Plaintiff’s pain. At the appointment, Plaintiff also informed Dr. Meyers

that he had not been receiving adequate medical supplies, which led to a urinary tract

infection, and leakage of blood, puss, mucus, and fecal matter from his astomy. Dr.

Meyers assured him he would follow up on his medical supply needs.

On August 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance because he still lacked adequate

supplies. From July 23 to August 14, 2021, he was seen once by Meyers and twice by

Defendant Blum. Both promised medical supplies but did not deliver on their promises.

At one point, Blum told him it was Defendant Brown’s responsibility to order his

supplies. (Doc. 1 at 10). Plaintiff was also deprived of his supplies for two additional

separate weeks in November of 2021. He alleges he suffered serious injuries from the

lack of supplies.

On December 4, 2021, Plaintiff was housed in a cell that was allegedly for four

ADA inmates, although he claims the cell was not actually adequate for this purpose.

The cell was crowded. Property boxes were strewn about the floor because there was

inadequate space to store the boxes and to navigate around the cell with wheelchairs.

Plaintiff was unable to adequately maneuver or lock his wheelchair in this environment,

and he fell while trying to retrieve items from his property box. He was taken to the

healthcare unit where two Jane Doe nurses examined his leg and foot and said it was just

bruised. They said he would be called for an x-ray on Monday of the following week.

(Doc. 1 at 11).

Plaintiff inquired about his x-ray on December 6, but Defendant Lacey informed

him that no x-ray tech was at work that day. Later that day, Plaintiff asked a non-party

nurse about his x-ray during medication rounds. She determined there was no report of

his fall and examined his leg and foot. She believed it was broken, so the next day she

called him to the healthcare unit. On December 7, 2021, Dr. Meyers “looked at his leg

and foot (without physically examining it), which was visibly swollen,” and he stated an

x-ray would be needed.

On December 9 and 10, Plaintiff got no x-ray. On December 11, 2021, he

complained to another non-party nurse about his situation, and she again called him to

the healthcare unit because he had swelling all the way up his leg. Non-party nurse Kelly

examined his leg and phoned Dr. Meyers. Dr. Meyers advised to give an ice pack and

ibuprofen, which was the same treatment from December 4, 2021. Finally on December

13, 2021, Plaintiff had an x-ray which revealed a compound fracture. He was sent to an

orthopedic doctor who said it was too late to perform surgery, so he gave an orthopedic

foot brace, and cautioned Plaintiff about the need to watch out for sores on his foot.

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Meyers’ delay of his care resulted in permanent deformation of

his right ankle. (Doc. 1 at 13).

Throughout December of 2021, Plaintiff submitted sick call slips for various

aliments such as bleeding from his rectum, intense knee pain, and sores on his foot. He

was put in to see Dr. Meyers. On December 28, 2021, he saw Dr. Meyers, but Dr. Meyers

did not examine any of his injuries and simply said he had hemorrhoids.

On March 1, 2022, Plaintiff wrote a grievance because Defendant Lacey had

repeatedly interfered with his right to access the prison shower facilities. He alleges that

as a result, Lacey retaliated by preventing him from showering on March 14 or 15, 2022.

He further alleges that the Warden of Pinckneyville has changed the shower schedule so

that ADA showers are late in the day, and they are for a short period of time. With these

changes, he alleges the showers are inadequate because they are filthy, and there is not

enough time for all ADA inmates to shower. Due to the filth, he got a UTI, and due to

the shortened time, he missed showers on two dates in June of 2022. (Doc. 1 at 15-16).

At the end of Plaintiff’s first full complaint, he then appended a second complete

complaint that appears to be freestanding but touches on the same factual content. He

adds David Mitchell, the Warden of Pinckneyville, as a Defendant in this complaint.

(Doc. 1 at 24). He also added Latoya Hughes, the acting director of IDOC. Plaintiff

alleges that prior to his transfer to Pinckneyville, he had leg braces, a walker, and physical

therapy, which all helped him to be mobile for short periods without his wheelchair. His

leg braces and walker were transmitted to Pinckneyville, but they were kept under lock

and key in the healthcare unit. (Doc. 1 at 27).

On October 18, 2021, a physical therapist recommended tweaks to his leg braces,

and Dr. Meyers approved. On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff was sent to a specialist for

repairs to the braces, but staff did not actually bring the braces from Defendant Brown’s

office. His braces were finally repaired around March 23, 2022. Despite the repairs, he

was denied use of the braces until October 17, 2023. He alleges that due to delays and his

intervening leg injury, his braces did not fit. He was sent back for repairs in March of

2023, but staff failed to bring his braces to the appointment. (Doc. 1 at 29).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brown and Meyers have failed to coordinate the

repair or use of his braces, and the lack of this has decreased his mobility. He alleges the

denial has deprived him of programs and services, so IDOC is also responsible under the

ADA/RA. (Doc. 1 at 31).

He alleges that he had repeat problems with his access to medical supplies in July

of 2022, and that outside advocates had to complain on his behalf in December of 2022

and February of 2023. (Doc. 1 at 33). Defendant Mitchell has been notified of the problem

by advocates. He provides a list of many times when he was denied supplies from July

of 2021 to February of 2023. (Doc. 1 at 34-35). He attributes access to supply issues to

Meyers, Brown, and Mitchell.

He alleges he has suffered multiple UTIs and other bowel problems, and that

treatment has been seriously delayed or denied. He attributes these problems to Mitchell,

Meyers, and Brown, for their participation and their receipt of related grievances and

correspondence. (Doc. 1 at 37-38). As a result of the shower chair problems, he fell at

least twice, and he made repeated requests for help. He submitted a request directly to

Defendant Brown in October of 2022, and she said a chair had been ordered but did not

provide one. Outside advocates also contacted Defendant Mitchell about the chair and

shower access. A chair was not provided until January of 2023. (Doc. 1 at 39). Plaintiff

also repeats all his allegation about the fall that fractured his ankle, and he alleges Meyers,

Brown and Mitchell either denied or delayed adequate care for this injury. (Doc. 1 at 40-

46).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following

claims:

Count 1: ADA/RA Claim against the Illinois Department of

Corrections/Latoya Hughes for failing to provide Plaintiff

with a safe shower chair, a clean shower facility, or adequate

time to shower;

Count 2: ADA/RA claim against IDOC/Latoya Hughes for failing to

provide a cell that is properly equipped for Plaintiff;

Count 3: ADA/RA claim against IDOC/Latoya Hughes for failing to

provide Plaintiff with the braces/walker and physical

therapy that he needs to maintain partial mobility;

Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Dr. Meyers, Nurse Blum, Christine Brown, and

David Mitchell concerning Plaintiff’s access to his needed

medical supplies for his chronic conditions (astomy,

colostomy bag, catheters, and bandages);

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Dr. Meyers for failing to properly assess and

treat Plaintiff’s ankle injury;

Count 6: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Lacey

for refusing Plaintiff showers after he filed a grievance

about Lacey.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissal

Plaintiff named a single Jane Doe nurse in his complaint, and he described this

individual as a nurse employed by Wexford. (Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff further alleged, “in

all her actions described in this complaint, Jane Doe was acting under the color of state

law.” (Id.). Although the naming of a Doe defendant can be acceptable, Plaintiff goes on

his compliant to describe seeing two Jane Does the day he fell from his wheelchair in

December of 2021. (Doc. 1 at 11). Given the explicit listing of one Jane Doe, and then the

discussion of two, the Court cannot properly set forth steps to identify the Doe(s). The

Court also notes that other nurses were discussed throughout the allegations without

any name at all, Jane Doe or otherwise. Given the ambiguities, the Jane Doe defendant

will be dismissed without prejudice.

Analysis

Claims 1-3

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,

by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits

of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination

by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Alongside the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act also

provides protections for inmates, and the two statutes are materially identical. A.H. by

Holzmuller v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2018). Failure to make

reasonable accommodations to ensure participation in the public entity's programs or

services by a person with a disability qualifies as “discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A); Wisc. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir.

2006). In the prison context, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discrimination

under the ADA by showing: (1) he is a qualified person; (2) with a disability; (3) the

Department of Corrections denied him access to a program or activity because of his

disability or otherwise subjected him to discrimination; and (4) the denial or

discrimination was by reason of his disability. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667,

672 (7th Cir. 2012). Access to showers, meals, and toilet facilities is considered a “program

or activity” within the meaning of the ADA. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (noting that inmate

access to showers and meals is a program or activity).

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his access to shower facilities are sufficient at this

juncture to proceed under the ADA and the RA. He may also proceed on his allegations

about the accessibility of his cell because he alleges that it is cluttered with items which

make it impossible for him to properly and safely use his wheelchair. Defendants Hughes

(in her official capacity) and the IDOC are proper defendants for the ADA/RA claims, so

they will both be served.

By contrast, his allegations about physical therapy or his leg braces do not sound

under the ADA or RA because these statues are not violated by a prison’s mere failure to

provide an inmate with medical care. A claim for inadequate medical treatment is not

actionable under the ADA. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff

alleges that he is not getting needed physical therapy, and that it prevents him from

improving strength or ambulating around with braces and a walker, but he does not

allege that it actually prevents him from participating in programs or services of the

prison, or that he has been denied these items because he is disabled. As such, Plaintiff

may proceed on Claims 1 and 2 under the ADA and RA, but not on Claim 3.

Claim 4

Plaintiff alleges that for multiple weeks at a time from July 2021 through March of

2023, he was not provided with adequate medical supplies to deal with his chronic

conditions. He has described the personal involvement of Dr. Meyers, Blum, and Brown

by alleging he made requests directly to them and/or was told they were responsible for

placing orders. As to Warden Mitchell, he alleges outside advocates contacted the prison

and informed Mitchell of his needs, and he also submitted grievances on the topic. He

described ill-effects of not having supplies such as UTIs, and foul drainage from his

astomy. These allegations are sufficient at this juncture against all defendants.

Claim 5

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Meyers, Brown and Mitchell failed to ensure

adequate care after he fractured his ankle in December of 2021. He directly describes Dr.

Meyers role in delaying or denying his care, and he alleges he submitted written request

to Brown describing his need for care just days after the injury. The allegations are

sufficient to proceed against Defendants Meyers and Brown for their direct involvement.

By contrast, Plaintiff’s allegations against Mitchell with relation to this particular

injury are overly conclusory. Plaintiff does not describe how Mitchell became aware of

this issue, or what Mitchell did in response to the situation. As the supervisor of the

prison, Mitchell is not automatically liable, so Claim 5 is insufficient as to Mitchell.

Claim 6

Plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2022, he submitted a grievance about Defendant

Lacey interfering with his access to ADA shower time, and on March 14 and 15 Lacey

retaliated by preventing him from showering. This is a classic claim of retaliation, and it

is sufficient as pled. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the types of

claims that can be joined together against defendants in a single lawsuit to those that arise

“out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A); Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1103-04 (7th Cir. 2022) (discussing the

Rule 20(a)(2)(A) factors). On its own, the court may “drop a party,” or “sever any claim

against a party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 21.

Claim 6 about retaliation for filing a grievance is largely unrelated to the other

claims in this case, and the Court finds that it is an appropriate exercise of discretion to

sever this claim. Dorsey, 55 F.4th at 1107 (when faced with misjoined claims, a court has

several options, including striking the complaint, directing the litigant to correct the

joinder problems, or dismissing defendants or severing claims if it will not cause a statute

of limitations problem for refiling the claim). Even though there is overlap between this

access to showers claim and the ADA access to showers claim in that both concern shower

time, the claims are not likely to turn on many of the same facts. Plaintiff’s claim against

Lacey is relatively freestanding, and the resolution of this claim would likely be

significantly delayed by inclusion in this case with other complex medical claims that will

require voluminous evidence. Accordingly, the Court will direct that this claim be

severed into a new case, and Plaintiff will have the opportunity to decide if he would like

to pay a filing fee to maintain that case separately.

Motion for Counsel

Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED at this time

without prejudice. There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil

cases. Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010). In determining whether to

recruit counsel, the Court considers two factors—Plaintiff’s efforts to get counsel, and his

ability to manage the litigation on his own. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir.

2007). Plaintiff’s motion demonstrates that he has corresponded with attorneys about his

case, but this showing is not dispositive. (Doc. 3 at 3-5). It appears that Plaintiff is

competent to litigate the case himself at this stage. See Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696

(7th Cir. 2013); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s complaint

was a bit long, but it was easy to understand. Further, at this early stage of the litigation,

it is difficult to accurately evaluate the need for the assistance of counsel. See Kadamovas

v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants respond to the

complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel...cannot be gauged.”). No one has

been served in this case, and a discovery schedule has not been entered. Although the

motion is denied at this juncture, Plaintiff may renew his request for counsel if necessary,

as the case progresses.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 2 of the Complaint (Doc. 1)

survive initial screening as described above against the Illinois Department of

Corrections/Latoya Hughes; Claim 4 survives as to Defendants Dr. Meyers, Blum,

Christine Brown, and David Mitchell, and Claim 5 survives as to Dr. Meyers and Brown.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ADD David Mitchell to this docket sheet as he was

listed in the Complaint as a proper defendant in the case caption at page 24, and to ADD

Latoya Hughes as she was properly named on page 23. The Clerk is DIRECTED to

SERVE Defendants IDOC, Latoya Hughes, Dr. Meyers, N.P. Blum, Christine Brown, and

David Mitchell.

For the reasons stated above, Claim 6 against Defendant Lacey is severed into a

new case. In the new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:

• This Memorandum and Order;

• The Complaint (Doc. 1);

• The motions to proceed IFP (Doc. 2) and for counsel (Doc. 3);

In the new case, Plaintiff shall have the option to proceed on Claim 6 or to dismiss

the case without prejudice and before he is required to pay a fee.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendants Lacey and Jane

Doe nurse from the docket sheet in this case, and Claim 6 is dismissed from this case.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants the Illinois

Department of Corrections, Latoya Hughes, Dr. Meyers, N.P. Blum, Christine Brown, and

David Mitchell: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to

mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to

Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign

and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from

the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service

on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,

to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case

because it will involve the exchange of medical records.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2023

/s David W. Dugan

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.