Dorn v. Jefferys

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES DORN,

#N90855,

Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-02378-SPM

v.

ROB JEFFREYS,

MARK WILLIAMS,

LIEUTENANT WRANGLER,

LIEUTENANT CROUSE,

GARZA,

LINBOOM,

LITTLE,

SERGEANT MOORE,

LEDBETTER,

HAAS,

BENNETT,

GRAVEL,

SCHENKEL,

URASKI, and

BAYLOR,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff James Dorn, a transgender inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights that took place at Pinckneyville Correction

Center and Hill Correctional Center. The Amended Complaint is now before the Court for

preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a

complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief

must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro

se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,

821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that in the spring of 2022, she was housed in 5 House, B Wing at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). (Doc. 17, p. 51). In April 2022, an inmate

named Minor, who was also housed in the same wing as Plaintiff, assaulted another inmate who

identifies as transgender. (Id. at p. 8, 35). Lieutenant Wrangler witnessed the first incident and

allowed the inmates to continue fighting. Eventually, Wrangler told the inmates to “lock up.” (Id.

at p. 8). Plaintiff wrote to Wrangler about the incident and told Wrangler that she did not feel safe

around Minor, but she did not receive a response. (Id. at p. 52). On May 3, 2022, Minor spit on

another transgender inmate and tried to fight the inmate because the inmate refused to “be with

him.” Wrangler spoke to Minor, but again, no disciplinary action was taken against Minor, and

Minor remained housed in B Wing. (Id.).

On May 15, 2022, Minor spit on Plaintiff and told her that “she is a disgrace to Vice Lords.”

(Doc. 17, p. 36). Minor then “beat up” Plaintiff. (Id. at p. 36, 48, 52). On May 27, 2022, Plaintiff

was interviewed by Internal Affairs Officer Uraski about the incident. (Id. at p. 36). Uraski asked

Plaintiff if she feared for her life, and Plaintiff said yes. Uraski told Plaintiff that he was going to

place her under investigation until she will be transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center

(“Pontiac”) under protective custody. The transfer did not occur, and Plaintiff was transferred to

Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”). (Id.).

On or around June 2022, after her transfer, Plaintiff gave a letter to Officer Little requesting

to speak to Lieutenant Crouse of the Internal Affairs Unit at Hill. (Doc. 17, p. 36). In the letter,

Plaintiff explained that she had been a high-ranking member of the security threat group, the Vice

Lords. Once she “was found out to be homosexual,” a hit was placed on her life. Plaintiff wrote in

the letter that for the last three years she has felt like she has been running for her life. (Id.). Plaintiff

explained that prior to being transferred to Hill, she was spit on at Pinckneyville because she is

disliked by other members of the Vice Lords. (Id. at p. 38).

That same month, Plaintiff asked Officer Little about the status of her transfer to protective

custody at Pontiac. (Doc. 17, p. 37). Little told Plaintiff that she was transferred to Hill on a

disciplinary transfer and that Hill does not have protective custody. (Id. at p. 38). Little informed

Plaintiff about the PRISM program at Centralia Correctional Center for transgender inmates. Little

told Plaintiff that when he came back from his July 4th break, then he would talk to Plaintiff’s

counselor and Schenkel, a mental health staff member, about getting Plaintiff transferred to the

PRISM program. Little also told Plaintiff that in the meantime, he would transfer her to a building

where she would have no problems. (Id.).

In July, Plaintiff was threatened by an inmate named Tru. (Doc. 17, p. 39). Tru had stabbed

an inmate in the jaw and then told Plaintiff that she was next. Around August 25, 2022, Tru was

let out of restrictive housing and moved to the same wing as Plaintiff. One day when Plaintiff was

returning from lunch, Tru pointed his finger in Plaintiff’s face and said he was “going to kick [her]

ass.” Plaintiff’s cellmate told Bennett, the wing officer, about the incident. (Id. at p. 39-40). Later

that day, Plaintiff was informed that Tru had been “moved off the wing.” Plaintiff left her cell and

spoke to Bennett personally. (Id. at p. 40). Bennett told Plaintiff to write to the Internal Affairs

Unit. Plaintiff then asked to speak to a crisis team member. A mental health staff member was

called. Plaintiff also asked to speak to Little. Plaintiff told Little about the most recent threat, and

Little said he was “washing his hands of her.” (Id.).

Plaintiff spoke to Lieutenant Crouse around July 20, 2022, about her life being in danger

and her request to be transferred to Pontiac protective custody. (Doc. 17, p. 41). Crouse said he

would look into it, but Plaintiff never heard back from Crouse. (Id.).

On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff was moved to a new cell house. (Doc. 17, p. 41). At the

new cell house, Plaintiff asked to see Lieutenant Jones and showed Jones a paper signed by

Schenkel. The paper designated Plaintiff as transgender and stated that Plaintiff was supposed to

be housed in a one-person cell. (Id.). Jones called Schenkel about the paper. (Id. at p. 42). Schenkel

stated she had never seen the paper and in all her years at Hill, she has never granted a transgender

person and single cell. Schenkel told Jones that Plaintiff must have forged her signature. Schenkel

wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary report for falsifying her signature on the form. (Id.).

Plaintiff states that Schenkel was supposed to submit her name to the PRISM program back

in July 2022. Schenkel, however, waited to submit her name until Plaintiff had already refused

housing three times due to fear for her safety. (Doc. 17, p. 42-43). By this time, Plaintiff’s grade

status had been demoted to C-grade, and Plaintiff could not participate in the program due to her

C-grade status. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that Schenkel and Little advised her that if she feared for her

life, then she should refuse housing. (Id. at p. 23). For repeatedly refusing housing, however,

Plaintiff has been at C-grade status for over thirteen months. Furthermore, when she refuses

housing her TV, tablet, hot pot, and headphones are taken, until she goes before the Adjustment

Committee. She is also locked in a cell for most of the day and is only allowed to leave for a

shower. (Id.).

On January 24, 2023, Plaintiff refused housing again and was told she was moving to cell

OR 55. (Doc. 17, p. 43). Plaintiff told Gravel that OR 55 had plumbing problems, and Gravel told

Plaintiff it did not matter. After moving to the cell, the next day Gravel came and told Plaintiff that

her toilet was leaking into the cell below. A plumber and a lieutenant came to the cell. (Id. at p.

43). The lieutenant told Gravel to move Plaintiff to a different cell. (Id. at p. 44). After packing her

property, Plaintiff told Gravel that she was ready to move. Gravel stated that he did not care what

the lieutenant said, “this is his wing and he’s not going to move the Plaintiff nowhere[sic].” For a

week, the water was turned off in Plaintiff’s cell and she was unable to flush her toilet. (Id.).

SEVERANCE AND TRANSFER

Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of her constitutional rights that allegedly occurred

while she was incarcerated at two different correctional facilities. As a result, the Court must

determine whether the claims are properly joined or, if improperly joined, should be severed or

dismissed. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 prohibits a plaintiff from asserting unrelated claims

against different defendants or sets of defendants in the same lawsuit. Therefore, multiple

defendants may not be joined in a single action unless the plaintiff asserts at least one claim to

relief against each respondent that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of

transactions or occurrences and presents a question of law or fact common to all. See George, 507

F.3d at 607. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 grants district courts broad discretion when

deciding whether to sever claims or to dismiss improperly joined defendants. See Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011).

The alleged constitutional violations that occurred at Pinckneyville and Hill not only took

place at two different facilities, but they involve different defendants and arise from separate

transactions and occurrences. The only common defendants are IDOC Director Jeffreys and

Administrative Review Board Member Baylor who allegedly mishandled grievances written while

Plaintiff was incarcerated at both institutions. (See Doc. 17, p. 25-26). Their involvement in

Plaintiff’s claims that occurred at Pinckneyville and Hill is not enough to bring the allegations

under the same umbrella. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Pinckneyville is located

within this judicial district, while Hill is located within the Central District of Illinois. Accordingly,

consistent with George v. Smith and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21, the Court will

sever the claims that occurred at Hill against Jeffreys, Williams, Crouse, Garza, Linboom, Little,

Moore, Ledbetter, Haas, Bennett, Gravel, Schenkel, and Baylor into a separate action and transfer

the new action to the proper venue. The remaining claims, which occurred while Plaintiff was at

Pinckneyville against Wrangler, Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor shall be addressed in this case and

reviewed pursuant to Section 1915A.

DISCUSSION

Based on a review of the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff’s articulation of her

claims, the Court designates the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Wrangler,

Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor.

Count 2: Claim under 18 U.S.C. § 922 against Wrangler for failure to obey

state regulations.

Count 3: State law claims against Wrangler and Uraski.

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned in the First

Amended Complaint that occurred at Pinckneyville but not addressed in this Order is

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly1 pleading

standard.

Count 1

In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a failure to protect claim, the plaintiff must plead that

she was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the

defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” to that danger. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994); Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff also must allege that

1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

prison officials were aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat to her safety. Pope v.

Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, the defendant had to know that there was a

substantial risk that those who attacked plaintiff would do so, yet failed to take any action. See

Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant Wrangler for failure to protect.

Plaintiff alleges that Wrangler was the lieutenant of Plaintiff’s housing wing at Pinckneyville and

was aware that inmate Minor was assaulting inmates who identify as transgender. Wrangler,

however, allowed Minor to remain in the same housing unit as Plaintiff, resulting in Plaintiff being

spit on and “beaten up” by Minor. Count 1 will proceed against Wrangler for failing to protect

Plaintiff from attack by another inmate on May 15, 2022.

Count 1 will be dismissed as to Uraski for similar reasons stated in the original Merit

Review Order. (Doc. 15, p. 10). Plaintiff claims that Uraski failed to protect her by not placing her

to protective custody at Pontiac, and instead, Uraski transferred her to Hill. (Doc. 17, p. 28). This

is not sufficient to state a claim for failure to protect. The Eight Amendment is not violated when:

[A] prisoner is put in fear of assault by other inmates, or even when a prisoner is

actually assaulted. It is violated only when correctional officials know of a

substantial risk to the prisoner and, through intention or deliberate indifference to

the prisoner’s safety, fail to take reasonable steps to prevent injury.

See DeJesus v. Peters, 92 C 0387, 1997 WL 392000, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1997) (citations

omitted). There are no allegations that Uraski knew of a specific threat to Plaintiff’s safety at Hill

and transferred her there anyways. The First Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff told Uraski

that Minor spit on her because she is a disgrace to the Vice Lords and that she feared for her safety

at Pinckneyville. (Doc. 17, p. 9). A failure to protect claim requires more than “general allegations

of fear or the need to be removed.” Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F. 3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, failure to transfer Plaintiff to the facility of her choice does not violate the

constitution. (Doc. 15, p. 10). See i.e. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983)(Inmates

have no justifiable expectation to be incarcerated in any particular prison); Johnson v. Barry, 815

F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff had no protected expectation to either stay at his facility

or avoid transfer to a facility with more severe rules); Robertson v. Jeffreys, 2023 WL 2777933, at

*1 (C.D. Ill. April 4, 2023) (no constitutional right to transfer); Jackson v. Brookhart, 2021 WL

1146984, at *3 (S.D. Ill. March 25, 2021) (“there is no constitutional right for a prisoner to be

housed in a particular institution or placement.”). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

failure to protect and deliberate indifference claims against Uraski for not transferring Plaintiff to

Pontiac are dismissed.

The Court also dismisses the failure to protect claims against IDOC Director Jeffreys and

Administrative Review Board Member Baylor. Plaintiff asserts that Baylor refused to hear

Grievance #1414-05-22 dated May 17, 2022, concerning Wrangler’s conduct and the assault on

Plaintiff by Minor. In reviewing the grievance, Baylor wrongly stated that he had already

addressed the issue in responding to a different grievance on May 31, 2022. (Doc. 17, p. 25).

Plaintiff states that she is suing Jeffreys because he signed his name and concurred with Baylor’s

decision to deny her grievance. (Id. at p. 26).

These allegations do not state claim for an Eighth Amendment violation against either

Defendant. Grievance #1414-5-22 was written after Plaintiff was spit on and assaulted by Minor

and received by the Administrative Review Board in July 2022, after Plaintiff had already been

transferred to Hill. Thus, Jeffreys and Baylor cannot be held responsible for failing to protect

Plaintiff from Minor when they were not informed of the problem until months after the assault

occurred. Furthermore, generally, a prison official “who simply processed or reviewed inmate

grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.” Owens

v. Evans, 878 F. 3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Count 3 is dismissed as to Jeffreys and

Baylor.

Count 2

Count 2 brought under 18 U.S.C. § 922 for Wrangler’s failure to obey state law is dismissed

with prejudice. (See Doc. 17, p. 27). Section 922 is a criminal statute dealing with unlawful

possession and sales of firearms. The statute does not provide for a private cause of action. See

Price v. Indy Trading Post, No. 19-cv-001267-JMS-TAB, 2019 WL 2010197, at *4 (S.D. Ind.

May 7, 2019) (discussing that Section 922(d) does not create a federal civil cause of action).

Count 3

Plaintiff purports to bring state law claims against Wrangler for “official misconduct,

dereliction of duty, negligence, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress,”

but she offers only a conclusory statement which does not state a claim. Thus, these state law

claims are dismissed without prejudice as to Wrangler. (Doc. 17, p. 27-28).

Plaintiff brings similar state law claims against Uraski, which are also dismissed as

conclusory. Even if Plaintiff had stated a colorable state law claim against Uraski, however, the

Court would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims since she did not state

a viable federal claim against Uraski.

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claims against Jeffreys, Williams, Crouse, Garza,

Linboom, Little, Moore, Ledbetter, Haas, Bennett, Gravel, Schenkel, and Baylor for the events

that occurred at Hill Correctional Center are SEVERED into a new case. In the new case, the

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) and the Motion for

Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). Once the newly severed action is opened, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1404(a) and on the Court’s own motion, the Clerk of Court is

ORDERED to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Central District of

Illinois for such further proceedings as that court may deem appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 93(b).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claims remaining in this action are the claims

asserted against Wrangler, Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor for events that occurred at Pinckneyville

Correctional Center (designated as Counts 1, 2, and 3). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

terminate Williams, Crouse, Garza, Linboom, Little, Moore, Ledbetter, Haas, Bennett, Gravel, and

Schenkel as defendants in this action.

Merit Review Under Section 1915A

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall proceed against Wrangler and is

dismissed without prejudice as to Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor. COUNT 2 is DISMISSED with

prejudice. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Because there are no surviving claims

against Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them from

this action as defendants.

The Clerk of Court SHALL prepare for Wrangler the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a

Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of

Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the First Amended Complaint,

and this Memorandum and Order to the defendant’s place of employment. If the defendant fails to

sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the

date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the

defendant, and the Court will require the defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the

extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If the Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his

last known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above

or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the

Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant Wrangler is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

First Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant Wrangler should respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that she is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and each opposing party informed of any change in her address; the Court will not

independently investigate her whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 17, 2023

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will

enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.