Champ v. Simmon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BYRON CHAMP, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:19-CV-345-MAB

)

CHERYL SIMMONS, )

CARRI MORRIS, SHIRLEY FORCUM, )

RHIANA DRAPER, )

NAGESWARARAO VALLABHANENI, )

and WAYNE WOMAC, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is currently before the Court on the motions for summary judgment

filed by Defendants Nageswararao Vallabhaneni (Doc. 140; see also Doc. 141) and

Defendants Cheryl Simmons, Carri Morris, Shirley Forcum, Rhiana Draper, and Wayne

Womac (Doc. 142). For the reasons explained below, both motions are granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Bryon Champ filed four separate and distinct pro se lawsuits alleging

violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for events arising out of his

involuntary confinement as a pretrial detainee at Chester Mental Health Center from

April 5, 2018 through August 29, 2018. See SDIL Case Nos. 18-cv-1986 (Doc. 18); 19-cv-26

(Doc. 14); 19-cv-263 (Doc. 17); and 19-cv-345 (Doc. 22).

This case and case 18-cv-1986 are somewhat similar. In 18-cv-1986, Plaintiff alleged

that Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni, Carri Morris, and Shirley Forcum interfered with

his constitutional right to access the Courts (see Doc. 143, pp. 8, 9). See also SDIL Case No.

18-cv-1986, Docs. 187, 154, 18. And in the instant case, Plaintiff is proceeding on a First

Amendment claim against Dr. Vallabhaneni, Morris, Forcum, Cheryl Simmons, Rhiana

Draper, and Wayne Womac for retaliating against him by interfering in his lawsuits and

legal work (Doc. 22). While the claims may sound similar, Plaintiff was very clear that

there is no overlap between his claims in this case and in 18-cv-1986 (Doc. 143, pp. 8, 9,

n.1, 17, n.2).

In case 18-cv-1986, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants prevented him from

pursuing two lawsuits that he had pending at the time he arrived at Chester, which both

pertained to excessive lockdowns at the Winnebago County Jail, by failing to have him

transported for a court hearing in Winnebago County and denying him access to legal

materials and the law library (Doc. 143, pp. 8, 9, n.1, 17, n.2). See also SDIL Case No. 18-

cv-1986, Docs. 187, 154, 18. While in this case, Plaintiff alleges that, in retaliation for filing

grievances and lawsuits, Defendants failed to properly safeguard, transfer, and/or return

his personal property boxes containing his legal documents and legal research by causing

them to either be lost or sent to an improper address following his transfer from Chester,

which in turn interfered with his ability to conduct legal work on his existing cases

and/or to file new cases (Doc. 143, pp. 9–10, para. 2, 3; see also id. at p. 9 n.1; Doc. 142, pp.

2, 9–10). In other words, this case is solely about Plaintiff’s legal boxes going missing

when he was transferred out of Chester.1

Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment in February 2023 (Docs.

140, 142). Plaintiff’s recruited counsel filed a response in opposition on his behalf (Doc.

143). None of the Defendants filed a reply.

In this Order, the Court addresses only the facts and arguments as they pertain to

Plaintiff’s legal boxes going missing when he was transferred out of Chester. The Court

does not address, for example, anything related to a failure to coordinate court dates in

his excessive lockdown cases, interference with his legal mail, the inadequacy of the law

library at Chester, or denial of access to legal forms and/or his legal materials on a day-

to-day basis, which were all topics discussed by Defendants in their motions for summary

judgment (see Doc. 141, Doc. 142).

FACTS

In 2018, Plaintiff was incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee at the Winnebago County

Jail awaiting trial on charges of felony aggravated domestic violence (Doc. 143, p. 7).2

During the course of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings, Plaintiff was involuntarily

committed to Chester on April 5, 2018, after he was found unfit to stand trial based on

1 The Court greatly appreciates the efforts of Plaintiff’s counsel to make clear the nature and scope of

Plaintiff’s claims in this case.

2 The Court’s citations to Doc. 143, which is Plaintiff’s response brief in opposition to the motions for

summary judgment, denote that a particular fact is undisputed. It is either a fact that Plaintiff admitted, or

a fact that Plaintiff asserted and Defendants did not deny.

his refusal to cooperate with his public defender (Doc. 143, pp. 1, 7). Plaintiff remained at

Chester until August 29, 2018 (Doc. 143, p. 13; see also Doc. 143-3 (discharge report)).

During Plaintiff’s involuntary commitment to Chester, Dr. Vallabhaneni was

employed as a staff psychiatrist (Doc. 143, p. 8). Shirley Forcum was the Unit Director of

the unit where Plaintiff was housed (Doc. 143, p. 3). Carri Morris was a social worker

assigned to work with Plaintiff (Doc. 143, p. 3).3 Rhiana Draper was a social worker who

began working with Plaintiff approximately a week before he was discharged (Doc. 143,

p. 6). Cheryl Simmons was the office coordinator for Plaintiff’s unit, and Wayne Womac

worked as a forensic coordinator at Chester (Doc. 143, pp. 4, 5).

When a patient arrives at Chester, their property, including paperwork, is

inventoried and sent to the property department, where it is kept with the exception of

items that the patient is allowed to keep in their room (Doc. 143, pp. 2, 4, 10, 12). When a

patient is discharged from Chester, the counselor/social worker fills out a form titled

“Authorization to Forward Patient Possessions” using information provided by the

patient (Doc. 142-6, pp. 12–13 (Draper depo); see also Doc. 142-3, pp. 66, 67 (Morris depo);

Doc. 142-4, p. 16 (Simmons depo)). The patient signs the form and then turns the form in

to the property department (see Doc. 142-6, pp. 13–14 (Draper depo); see also Doc. 142-3,

pp. 66, 67 (Morris depo); Doc. 142-4, pp. 14, 16 (Simmons depo)). The property

department verifies all of the patient’s belongings are in the box and then sends it to

“whatever address [the patient] signed for” (Doc. 142-6, pp. 13–14 (Draper depo)). Carri

3 Plaintiff referred to her as his therapist.

Morris likewise testified that the counselor’s involvement is limited to filling out the form

and turning it in (Doc. 142-3, p. 68). The counselor is not actually responsible for sending

the property anywhere (Id.).

Plaintiff’s property was inventoried when he arrived, and included four legal

boxes (Doc. 143, p. 10; see also Docs. 143-1, 143-2 (inventories); Doc. 142-3, p. 61, 77–78

(Morris depo)). Plaintiff testified that his property included correspondence from the

courts and legal research, his Social Security card, and his state ID card, amongst other

things (Doc. 143, pp. 10–11; see also Doc. 142-1, pp. 51, 111–12 (Plaintiff depo)).

During his time at Chester, Plaintiff submitted a number of grievances (Doc. 143,

p. 8; see also Doc. 142-1, p. 20-23 (Plaintiff depo)). Additionally, at the time of his admission

to Chester, Plaintiff had two ongoing lawsuits against Winnebago County officials for

excessive lockdowns while he was housed at Winnebago County Jail.

On August 8, 2018, Carri Morris filled out the top portion of an “Authorization to

Forward Patient Possessions” form (Doc. 143, pp. 3, 11; see also Doc. 143-4). The form

stated:

Upon my discharge, please send my personal possessions (i.e., clothing,

property and money) to the following address:

Willie Brown / Eugene Batten John Hazlewood

Rockford Rescue Mission

C/O Bryon Champ (Property)

715 W. State St., Rockford, IL 61102

(Doc. 143-4; see Doc. 142-3, pp. 66–67 (Morris depo)). The form was signed by Plaintiff

and witnessed by Morris (Doc. 143-4).

Defendant Morris testified that she filled out the form with information provided

to her by Plaintiff in preparation for his discharge from Chester and that Plaintiff wanted

his property sent to the Rockford Rescue Mission, which is a homeless shelter, when he

was discharged from Chester (Doc. 143, p. 12; see also Doc. 142-3, pp. 66, 67 (Morris depo)).

Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that he did not sign anything (Doc. 141-3, p. 42 (“No,

I ain’t sign no release. . . . Why would I sign a release form that had my stuff sent to a

shelter and I’m not there?”)). He further stated that his legal boxes were sent off to the

“place where I was paroling to,” meaning the Rockford Rescue Mission (Id. at p. 111). But

he “never went home,” rather he went to trial, was convicted, and sentenced to prison

time in the Illinois Department of Corrections (Id.). He therefore claims that he “never

gave . . . permission to send my box anywhere. If I had went home, that’s when she’s

supposed to send it to me.” (Id.). According to him, his property “was supposed to stay

at Chester until I told them to send it somewhere else, but I never told them to send my

legal box nowhere else, so my stuff is still supposed to be there right now as we speak. I

didn’t give nobody permission to send nothing nowhere” (Id. at pp. 40, 70).

Defendant Morris also testified that she left Plaintiff’s unit prior to his actual

discharge date and that Rhiana Draper took over for her (Doc. 143, p. 12; see also Doc. 142-

3, p. 69 (Morris depo)). Plaintiff testified that on the day Morris told him she was leaving

and would no longer be his therapist, he heard Morris tell Draper that he “needed [his]

legal work” (Doc. 142-1, pp. 38–39, 55–56 (Plaintiff depo); see also Doc. 143, pp. 2, 12).

Plaintiff said that when he looked up, he saw Morris wink at Draper and “I never got my

legal work from them that day” (Doc. 142-1, pp. 37–38 (Plaintiff depo); see also id. at pp.

55–56; Doc. 143, pp. 2, 12). It is undisputed that another individual was present for

Morris’s statement and wink. Defendants assert that it was Cheryl Simmons (Doc. 142, p.

3), which Plaintiff admitted (Doc. 143, p. 2). But then Plaintiff subsequently asserted it

was Shirley Forcum (Doc. 143, p. 12), which Defendants did not deny. At various times

during his deposition, Plaintiff gave three different names. He first testified that Morris

was talking to his “new therapist,” who was Rhiana Draper, and “Shirley,” meaning

Shirley Forcum, the unit director (Doc. 142-1, pp. 38–39). Next, he testified that Morris

was talking to “Rhiana” and “Cheryl,” meaning Cheryl Simmons, the office coordinator

(Doc. 142-1, pp. 55–56). And later, he testified that Morris was talking to Rhiana and

“Shirley Simmons,” which is a transposition of Shirley Forcum and Cheryl Simmons’

names (Doc. 142-1, p. 112).

Rhiana Draper confirmed that she took over Carri Morris’s caseload on or about

August 22, 2018, which was seven days before Plaintiff’s discharge on August 29th (Doc.

143, p. 12; see also Doc. 142-6, pp. 10–11 (Draper depo)). Defendant Draper testified that

she believed Plaintiff had been found fit to stand trial and was being discharged to the

Illinois Department of Corrections (which is incorrect; he was discharged back to

Winnebago County Jail) (Doc. 143, p. 13; see also Doc. 142-6, p. 10-13 (Draper depo)).

Draper testified that when she took over for Morris, all of Plaintiff’s discharge paperwork

was already complete, so her job was essentially finished (Doc. 142-6, pp. 13, 15). She

further explained, “really it’s just maintenance at that point, making sure that he’s ready

to go, making sure all the paperwork is filled out, if he has any questions, [etc.]” (Id. at p.

15). Draper testified that she did not recall ever seeing the Authorization Form indicating

that Plaintiff’s property to be sent to the Rockford Rescue Mission prior to her deposition

(Id. at pp. 12–13). She further testified that she did not make any changes to the

Authorization Form and did not have any conversations with Plaintiff about changing

the location of where his property was to be sent because he said “he didn’t need

anything” and “did not want to meet with [her]” (Doc. 143, p. 13; see also Doc. 142-6, pp.

14–15 (Draper depo)). Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that before he was discharged,

Draper told him that they would send him his legal boxes (Doc. 143, p. 13; see also Doc.

142-1, p. 40 (Plaintiff depo)).

There is a handwritten notation at the bottom of the Authorization Form, which

states: “11-1-19 ALL your property was sent to the address of your choice. See Above.

Any further questions about property should be addressed to the above person/facility.”

(Doc. 143, p. 13; see also Doc. 143-4 (form)). Shirley Forcum testified that the handwriting

is hers and that “the facility” would have sent Plaintiff’s property to that address (Doc.

143, p. 13; see also Doc. 142-2, p. 16 (Forcum depo)). Shirley Forcum further testified that

she received a letter from Plaintiff saying he never received his property and that she

investigated that claim by checking with the Property Department (Doc. 143, p. 14; see

also Doc. 142-2, pp. 16–17 (Forcum depo)). Defendant Forcum stated that the Property

Department “had a record of sending it and not receiving it back.” (Doc. 143, p. 14; see

also Doc. 142-2, p. 17 (Forcum depo)).

Counsel for Plaintiff subsequently requested the Property Department’s

documentation reflecting that transfer of property (Doc. 142, p. 14; see also Doc. 143-5

(emails regarding documentation)). On January 20, 2023, counsel for Defendants

provided another copy of the typed Personal Property Inventory and with a piece of

paper that had “Bryon Champ, c/o Rockford Rescue Mission, 715 West State Street,

Rockford, IL 61102” typed on it (Doc. 143-8). Plaintiff does not indicate whether any

explanation was provided as to how these documents served to show Plaintiff’s property

was sent out (see Doc. 143), and the documents themselves do not include anything that

indicates if and when Plaintiff’s property was sent out (see Doc. 143-8). The Court notes,

however, a different copy of the typed Personal Property Inventory contains handwritten

notes that say “Discharged 8/29/18[,] rec’d address 8/29/18[,] Mailed out 9/4/18” (Doc.

143-1, p. 2).

Plaintiff testified he never received his legal box (Doc. 142, p. 3). Plaintiff’s counsel

issued a subpoena to the Rockford Rescue Mission and was told the Mission did not have

any personal property of Bryon Champ from Chester Mental Health Center (Doc. 143,

pp. 15–16; see also Doc. 143-7 (email chain)).

As a staff psychiatrist, Dr. Vallabhaneni’s duties included evaluating, diagnosing,

and treating psychiatric patients that were admitted to Chester, and making final

discharge recommendations for those patients (Doc. 143, p. 8; see also Doc. 141-2, pp. 13–

14 (Vallabhaneni depo)). Dr. Vallabhaneni testified that he had no involvement

whatsoever with Plaintiff’s legal box (Doc. 143, p. 9; see also Doc. 141-2, pp. 85–88). He

never saw it, never talked to Plaintiff or anyone else about it, and was not involved in

forwarding it when Plaintiff left Chester (Doc. 141-2, pp. 85–88). Plaintiff testified,

however, that he believed Dr. Vallabhaneni was involved in retaliating against him for

filing lawsuits because he had influence and control over Plaintiff’s therapists, so if Dr.

Vallabhaneni told Morris and Draper not to help Plaintiff access or perform legal work,

they would follow that directive (Doc. 143, p. 15; see also Doc. 142-1, pp. 94–99).

As office coordinator for Unit A, Cheryl Simmons testified that she processed

patients’ incoming mail once it was brought to the unit (Doc. 142-4, pp. 7, 16–17). For

example, if a patient received a package of clothing, she would fill out the proper form

and send it down to the clothing department; if a patient received property that they

could not have on the unit, she would send it to the property department (Id.). Simmons

testified that she did not inventory patients’ personal property when they arrived (Id. at

pp. 8, 10, 11–12). And she did not forward patients’ personal property when they left

Chester; that was the job of the patient’s therapist and the property department (Id. at pp.

pp. 13–14, 15–16). Simmons testified that she did not recall ever seeing Plaintiff’s property

box, she never communicated with him or anyone else about his property box, and she

was not in charge of forwarding it once he was discharged (Id. at pp. pp. 14–15, 17).

Plaintiff, however, testified he believed Defendant Simmons coordinated with his

therapist to send his clothing and legal boxes away because “her job” was “my legal box,

my clothes, the mail” and “the trust fund balance” (Doc. 143, p. 5; see also Doc. 142-1, pp.

61–62, 70, 102–03 (Plaintiff depo)).

As a forensic coordinator at Chester, Wayne Womac arranged the admission and

discharge of individuals, oversaw the submission of court reports to a patient’s admitting

court, and oversaw communication with the admitting courts (Doc. 143, p. 5; see also Doc.

142-5, p. 9 (Womac depo)). Plaintiff admits that Defendant Womac had nothing to do

with his legal box (Doc. 143, p. 6; see also Doc. 142-1, p. 65 (Plaintiff depo)).

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party “shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008). “Only if the court can

say, on that sympathetic reading of the record, that no finder of fact could reasonably rule

in the unsuccessful movant's favor may the court properly enter summary judgment

against that movant.” Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat'l Ret. Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 603 (7th

Cir. 2015).

The gist of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in this case is that his legal boxes were sent

to a place where he was not going to be residing and have never been returned to him.

To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, he must show: (1) he engaged in

activity protected by the Constitution; (2) Defendants took action against him that was

sufficiently adverse to deter a person of “ordinary firmness” from engaging in the

protected activity in the future; and (3) his protected activity was a motivating factor in

Defendants’ decision to subject him to the adverse treatment. Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d

606, 610 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015).

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had pending lawsuits when he arrived at

Chester and that he filed a number of grievances while he was there. That suffices to show

he engaged in protected activity. See Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2016)

(detainee’s grievances are protected by the First Amendment). Additionally, a reasonable

jury could find that being deprived of all of one’s personal property is treatment

sufficiently adverse that it is likely to dissuade a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising further First Amendment activity. See Morris v. Scott, 840 Fed. Appx. 14, 15 (7th

Cir. 2021) (holding a targeted search and the confiscation of property was a deprivation

sufficient to support a retaliation claim); Gully v. Hundley, No. 3:17-CV-211-NJR-MAB,

2019 WL 4727698, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2019) (implying that inmate who received false

disciplinary tickets and had items stolen from his cell suffered a deprivation sufficient to

support a retaliation claim); Taylor v. Hunziker, No. 16-CV-3309, 2018 WL 4326804, at *1

(C.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2018) (“[A] rational juror could find that destroying an inmate's

property is a sufficiently adverse action to deter an ordinary prisoner from filing

grievances.”); Birdo v. Gomez, No. 13-CV-6864, 2016 WL 4011227, at *18 (N.D. Ill. July 27,

2016) (finding that inmate suffered a sufficient deprivation to support a retaliation claim

when officials threw his personal items in the trash and ordered him to be transferred to

a different facility).

However, there is no evidence that some of the Defendants were personally

involved in the purported retaliatory conduct of mishandling Plaintiff’s legal boxes by

sending them to an improper address or causing them to be lost. “Individual liability

pursuant to § 1983 ‘requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Carmody v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 893 F.3d 397, 401 (7th

Cir. 2018). Plaintiff admitted that Defendant Wayne Womac had nothing to do with his

legal box. Womac is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

The evidence shows that Dr. Vallabhaneni was also not involved in the retaliatory

conduct at issue. Dr. Vallabhaneni testified unequivocally that he had no involvement

whatsoever with Plaintiff’s legal boxes and played no part in forwarding them when

Plaintiff left Chester. Plaintiff nevertheless seems to believe that Dr. Vallabhaneni was

involved in some capacity based on Dr. Vallabhaneni’s position as the staff psychiatrist

(see Doc. 143, pp. 14–15, 18). This amounts to nothing more than speculation that Dr.

Vallabhaneni had some influence over how Plaintiff’s legal boxes were handled, and

speculation cannot defeat summary judgment. Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch.Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d

835, 841 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Speculation is no substitute for evidence at the summary

judgment stage.”); Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is well-

settled that speculation may not be used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact.”) (citation

omitted). See also Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 493–94 (7th Cir. 2021) (“There is no such

thing as respondeat superior liability for government officials under § 1983. The supervisor

is therefore liable only if she was personally involved in . . . a subordinate's constitutional

violation[, which] requires supervisors to “know about the conduct and facilitate it,

approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.”). Dr.

Vallabhaneni is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s evidence is also insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that Cheryl

Simmons was involved in the purported retaliatory conduct. Cheryl Simmons

unequivocally testified that, as the office coordinator, her job did not include forwarding

a patient’s personal property when they left Chester and that she had nothing to do with

forwarding Plaintiff’s property when he was discharged. Plaintiff suggests that Simmons

was involved based on his belief that her job entailed handling property and the mail,

and his assertion that Carri Morris told Simmons that he would need his property (Doc.

143, pp. 4–5, 14, 18 (citing to Doc. 142-1, pp. 38–40, 55–56)). Again, Plaintiff’s unsupported

speculation as to what Simmons’ job entailed is not enough to create an issue of fact and

survive summary judgment. Neither is his testimony that Simmons was on the receiving

end of Carri Morris’s wink given Plaintiff’s contradictory testimony as to whether

Simmons was actually present. Furthermore, even if the Court assumes Simmons was

present for the wink, the most a jury could infer is that Morris was signifying Simmons

should withhold Plaintiff’s legal boxes from him on that particular day (see 142-1, pp. 37–

38, 55–56 (Plaintiff depo)). No reasonable jury would conclude that the wink was Morris’s

way of signifying that Simmons should play along with Morris’s retaliatory scheme to

have Plaintiff’s property sent to the Rockford Rescue Mission or to ensure that it was lost

in order to retaliate against him for filing lawsuits and/or grievances. That conclusion is

simply too tenuous and unsupported, particularly given that there is no evidence

Simmons knew anything about where Plaintiff’s property was being sent or had anything

to do with sending it there. Simmons is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

The same goes for Shirley Forcum. It is undisputed that Forcum did not fill out the

Authorization Form to send Plaintiff’s property to the homeless shelter. And Plaintiff did

not put forth any evidence that Forcum otherwise saw, reviewed, approved, or handled

the Form in any fashion after it was filled out by Morris. Rather, Plaintiff’s only evidence

seems to be his own subjective belief that Forcum played some role in forwarding his

property based on her position as unit director, and his assertion that Carri Morris told

Forcum that he would need his property (Doc. 143, pp. 12, 14, 18 (citing to Doc. 142-1, pp.

38–40, 55–56)). As with Dr. Vallabhaneni and Cheryl Simmons, Plaintiff’s speculation as

to what Forcum’s job entailed is not enough to establish an issue of fact. And neither is

his changing story as to whether Forcum was on the receiving end of Carri Morris’s wink,

for the same reasons as explained above with respect to Simmons. Furthermore, to the

extent that Shirley Forcum’s handwriting appears on the bottom of the Authorization

Form, that only serves to show that she investigated where Plaintiff’s property was sent

after-the-fact. It does not in any way show that she had a role in designating where

Plaintiff’s property was sent or otherwise knew before it was sent out. Shirley Forcum is

therefore entitled to summary judgment.

That leaves Carri Morris and Rhiana Draper. It is undisputed that Carri Morris

filled out the authorization form to have Plaintiff’s property sent to the Rockford Rescue

Mission. She testified that she did so because that is the location Plaintiff gave her.

(Rhiana Draper corroborated that therapists fill out the authorization form based on the

information the patient gives them.) And, perhaps most crucially, Plaintiff signed the

authorization form, affirming that he wanted his property to go to the Rockford Rescue

Mission. At his deposition, Plaintiff did not deny that he provided Morris the information

for the Rockford Rescue Mission. In fact, he seemed to admit that he told Morris to have

his property sent there. But he apparently thought it would not be sent there until he

“went home” and was paroled to the Rockford Rescue Mission and that it would

otherwise be held at Chester indefinitely until he asked for it to be sent. Plaintiff did not,

however, put forth any evidence that leaving his stuff at Chester was actually an option

(see Doc. 143).4 The evidence in this case only suggests that Carri Morris was following

the facility’s standard procedure and therefore no reasonable jury could infer her actions

were motivated by a desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing grievances and/or

lawsuits.

As for Rhiana Draper, the Court does not see any basis for holding her liable. She

was Plaintiff’s therapist for the last week of his time at Chester. She testified that by the

time she arrived, all of Plaintiff’s discharge paperwork was completed. She further

testified that she did not make any changes to the authorization form or have any

conversations with Plaintiff about changes because he did not want to meet with her.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he opted not to meet with Draper. Nor does he assert that

he asked any questions about where his property was being sent or when it would be

sent, or that he made any requests to change the location. He cites only to his testimony

that Carri Morris told Draper that he would need his property and then winked, and that

Draper told him before he left that they would send him his legal box (Doc. 143, pp. 14,

18). But neither of those things changes the fact that Draper did not fill out the

authorization form or had any inclination that changes needed to be made to it. In fact,

there is no evidence that, at the time of Plaintiff’s discharge, Draper was even aware of

where his property was going to be sent (see Doc. 146-2, pp. 12–13 (Draper’s deposition

testimony that she did not recall ever seeing the authorization form)). Furthermore, there

is no evidence that she was aware of his lawsuits about excessive lockdowns (which had

4 The Court has no reason to believe Chester has agreed to act as a storage unit and to be responsible for

and safeguard the belongings of patients who have been discharged from the facility.

both been dismissed by the time she took over as Plaintiff’s therapist) or any grievances

that he had filed; again, she was only his therapist for about a week before he was

discharged. Consequently, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find

that Defendant Rhiana Draper participated in having his property sent to the Rockford

Rescue Mission in retaliation for him filing lawsuits and/or grievances.

In sum, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because there is simply

no evidence that any Defendant was involved in the transfer of his personal property or,

to the extent that they were involved, that their actions were motivated by retaliatory

animus.

CONCLUSION

The motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Nageswararao

Vallabhaneni (Doc. 140) and Defendants Cheryl Simmons, Carri Morris, Shirley Forcum,

Rhiana Draper, and Wayne Womac (Doc. 142) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims against

these Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor and to close this case on the Court’s docket.

The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to place Document 143-2 UNDER SEAL

because it contains personal identifying information for Plaintiff. See SDIL-LR 5.1(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 29, 2023

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge