Opinion

McCarty v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Sep 29, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

“[T]he ALJ must consider the combined effect of all impairments, ‘even those that would not be considered severe in isolation.’ “

How later courts described this case

  • “[T]he ALJ must consider the combined effect of all impairments, ‘even those that would not be considered severe in isolation.’ “
  • “An error is harmless only if we are convinced that the ALJ would reach the same result on remand.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SARAH M.,1 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-1852-DWD

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final agency decision

of Defendant, which denied Plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits

(DIBs). For the reasons explained below, the Court AFFIRMS the final agency decision.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff was born on September 17, 1979. She protectively applied for DIBs on

April 15, 2015. Plaintiff initially alleged a disability onset date of November 1, 2012, but

that date was later amended to June 30, 2013. Plaintiff’s date of last insured was December

31, 2017. The alleged disability was related to cervical radiculopathy, scoliosis, migraines,

fibromyalgia, bone degeneration, nerve damage, sphincter dysfunction, chronic fatigue

syndrome, anxiety, asthma, and severe memory loss. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 24). The claim was

denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff sought a hearing, which was held in

October 2017 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). In July 2018, Plaintiff received

1Plaintiff’s full name will not be used due to privacy concerns.

an Unfavorable Decision. The Appeals Council denied review, so Plaintiff appealed to

this Court. Before the Court could resolve the appeal, however, the parties agreed to a

remand of the case to the agency. A second hearing was held on October 1, 2020. On

November 25, 2020, Plaintiff received another Unfavorable Decision. Plaintiff filed

written exceptions to that Unfavorable Decision, which were rejected by the Appeals

Council in June 2022. Plaintiff has now exhausted her administrative remedies.

Accordingly, the most recent Unfavorable Decision is final and ripe for judicial review.

II. General Legal Standards

To qualify for DIBs, a claimant must be disabled. To assess a disability, the ALJ

employs a “five-step sequential evaluation process.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1), (2), (4).

The ALJ asks whether: (1) the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity; (2) the

claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets

certain duration requirements or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets

the duration requirements; (3) the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals an

impairment listed in the regulations and satisfies the duration requirements; (4) in view

of the RFC and past relevant work, she can perform past relevant work; and (5) in view

of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, she can adjust to other work.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)-(g); Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).

If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity under step 1, does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments as described at step 2, can perform past

relevant work under step 4, or can adjust to other work under step 5, then the claimant is

not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i),(ii), (iv), (v). If the claimant has an

impairment that meets the requirements of step 3 or is incapable of adjusting to other

work under step 5, then she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (v). The claimant

has the burden of proof at steps 1 to 4. See Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 514, 516 (7th Cir.

2022). At step 5, however, the burden shifts to Defendant to show that the claimant can

adjust to other work existing in “a significant number of jobs…in the national economy.”

See Young, 362 F.3d at 1000; accord Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2020).

Impairments and related symptoms may cause physical and mental limitations

that affect the ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Steps 4 and 5 assess the most

a claimant can do at work despite those limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1);

accord SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2; Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872-73 n. 7 (7th Cir.

2000). As such, a residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which the ALJ completes after step

3 but before steps 4 and 5, assesses the ability to perform sustained physical and mental

activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis, i.e., for eight hours a day

and five days a week or an equivalent schedule. See Tenhove v. Colvin, 97 F. Supp. 2d 557,

568 (E.D. Wisc. 2013); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2; accord Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118,

1121 (7th Cir. 2014). An RFC must be based on the relevant medical and other evidence

contained in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2-3, 5.

In the RFC, the ALJ must identify the claimant’s functional limitations and assess

his work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis. See Tenhove, 97 F. Supp. 2d at

569; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *1, 3; accord Lechner v. Barnhart, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1015,

1036 (E.D. Wisc. 2004). The ALJ considers all impairments, including those that are

nonsevere, and the claimant’s ability to meet physical, mental, sensory, and other

requirements of work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2), (4); see also Alesia v. Astrue, 789 F.

Supp. 2d 921, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[T]he ALJ must consider the combined effect of all

impairments, ‘even those that would not be considered severe in isolation.’ “). “An

impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit

[the] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). And,

importantly, while a claimant’s statements of pain or other symptoms are considered,

they alone are not conclusive evidence of a disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

As to physical abilities, the ALJ assesses the nature and extent of physical

limitations, then determines the RFC for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). A limited ability to perform physical demands, such as sitting,

standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, reaching, handling, stooping, or

crouching may reduce the ability to do “other work” at step 5. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b);

see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *5-6. After identifying a claimant’s functional

limitations and assessing his work abilities on a function-by-function basis, the RFC may

be expressed by exertional category, such as “sedentary.”2 See Tenhove, 97 F. Supp. 2d at

569; accord Lechner, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 1036; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *3. To do a full

range of work in an exertional category, the claimant must be able to perform

substantially all of the functions at that level. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *5-6.

Further, in the RFC, the ALJ must address medical source opinions. See SSR 96-8p,

2Sedentary work involves “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or

carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). A sedentary job involves

sitting but often has walking and standing that is necessary to related duties. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally, and the other sedentary criteria are

satisfied. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

1996 WL 374184, *7. If the RFC assessment conflicts with a medical source opinion, then

the ALJ must explain why the opinion was not adopted. See id.; accord Smith v. Colvin, 9

F. Supp. 3d 875, 887 (E.D. Wisc. 2014). Medical opinions are considered with the following

factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) the relationship with the claimant;

(4) specialization; and (5) other factors supporting or contradicting the opinion, including

evidence showing familiarity with other evidence in the claim or an understanding of

disability policies and evidentiary requirements. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). The most

important factors to the persuasiveness of a medical opinion, however, are supportability

and consistency. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2).3 The ALJ may, but is not required to,

explain how the other factors were considered. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)-(5).

III. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ noted, on remand, the Appeals Council directed it to consider medical

source opinion evidence and the claimant’s maximum RFC, to acquire evidence from a

vocational expert, and to offer Plaintiff the opportunity for a new hearing. (Doc. 14-9, pg.

16). Further, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff was required to establish a disability

between the amended onset date of disability, June 30, 2013, and the date of last insured,

December 31, 2017. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 17). For the reasons discussed below, the ALJ found

Plaintiff was not under a disability between those dates. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 17).

3The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a

medical source are to support his or her medical opinions, the more persuasive the medical opinions will

be. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). The more consistent medical opinions are with the evidence from other

medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinions will be.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

At step 1, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

during the relevant period. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 19). At step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered

from severe impairments through the date of last insured, including left trochanteric

bursitis, mild scoliosis, facet arthropathy, asthma, migraines, fibromyalgia, obesity,

depression, anxiety, somatic symptom disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (Doc.

14-9, pg. 19). Those impairments were severe, as they limited Plaintiff’s ability to perform

basic work activities. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 19). Certain other conditions were found to be

nonsevere, as there was no persuasive evidence suggesting they caused more than

minimal limitations in the ability to perform basic work activities. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 19). Still,

the ALJ considered the effect that those nonsevere impairments had on Plaintiff’s ability

to function. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 20). At step 3, the ALJ found she did not have an impairment

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of impairments

listed in the regulations through the date of last insured. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 20).

Before proceeding to step 4, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC, finding as follows:

[T]hrough the date [of] last insured, the claimant had the…[RFC] to

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except that she

cannot climb[] ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and can only occasionally climb

ramps and stairs. The claimant cannot engage in tasks requiring balancing

on slippery or unexpectedly uneven surfaces or moving walkways. She

can engage in no more than frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching and

crawling and can perform no overhead reaching, pushing, or pulling

bilaterally. The claimant can perform tasks requiring no more than

frequent handling and fingering, and she must work in an environment

where the noise level would be no more than 3-moderate. She cannot

work at unprotected heights, around moving mechanical parts or other

such hazards, and she can have no concentrated exposure to extreme heat,

cold, humidity, wetness, dust, fumes[,] or other pulmonary irritants. The

claimant is limited to performing simple, routine tasks and can perform

work with production expectations, but the work must not be at a fast

pace such as an assembly line. She cannot engage in work that requires

tandem tasks, where other work functions would be dependent on her

completion of a task. She is limited to work that requires only occasional

changes in the work setting and she can have no more than occasional

interaction with the public.

(Doc. 14-9, pg. 23).

In assessing the above RFC, the ALJ noted that, “[a]t the hearing…the claimant

testified that she has an 8-year history of dominant right upper extremity nerve damage

resulting in things flying out of her hand.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 24). Further, Plaintiff “claimed

her hand jerks and she has difficulty writing her name, getting dressed, brushing her hair,

holding a coffee cup, and carrying a water bottle.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 24). However, while

Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably cause her alleged

symptoms, the ALJ found her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence

and the other evidence of record. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 24). More specifically, Plaintiff’s

allegations of severe symptoms and limitations were inconsistent with the conservative

treatment, objective diagnostic testing results, and observations of the treating medical

sources. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 24). Likewise, there was no evidence of significant worsening

symptoms since the date of last insured. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25).

In support of these findings, the ALJ engaged in a thorough discussion of the

medical evidence. The ALJ stated the physical examinations throughout the relevant

period were found to be “essentially unremarkable as related to the claimant’s neck and

back impairment.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Treatment notes referenced complaints of chronic

pain, but the ALJ found the objective imaging revealed only mild scoliosis. (Doc. 14-9, pg.

25). Further, radiographs showed early degenerative disc disease, some degenerative

arthritis of the sacroiliac joints, and facet arthropathy, but there was no canal stenosis or

foraminal stenosis. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Plaintiff reported muscle spasms around the

amended alleged onset date of disability, June 30, 2013, but she was also “staying active”

at that time. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). As a result, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s normal to mild

examination findings were inconsistent with her extreme complaints. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25).

The ALJ noted, during a neurological examination on April 7, 2015, Plaintiff

reported chronic neck pain caused by automobile accidents. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Plaintiff

also reported, inter alia, episodic reduced function of the right arm and shaking hands.

(Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). However, the ALJ believed it was significant that the neurologist

found a CT of the neck was normal, as that finding was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claim

of cervical radiculopathy. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Further, the neurologist’s examination

found no skeletal abnormalities, no joint deformity, no tenderness or swelling, normal

strength throughout, normal motor tone with no spasticity or rigidity, no muscle atrophy,

and normal sensation with no cervical radiculopathy. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25).

In a consultative examination on August 26, 2015, Plaintiff complained of, inter

alia, cervical radiculopathy attributable to an automobile accident. Plaintiff indicated to

Dr. Austin Montgomery that she had neck pain, arm issues, and uncontrollable tremors.

(Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). However, although Plaintiff had one or two tender spots in the back

and the right shoulder, with right upper extremity atrophy, “the overall examination was

otherwise normal.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). The ALJ noted Dr. Montgomery observed some

limitation in the right shoulder range of motion and cervical range of motion, but

otherwise observed a normal range of motion in the lumbar spine. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). The

ALJ also stated: “when noted, the remainder of the record documents…normal

musculoskeletal range of motion. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Therefore, despite Plaintiff’s

testimony of significant limitations from neck and back pain, the ALJ found the

“treatment notes regularly show essentially normal musculoskeletal examinations with

no significant tenderness or swelling.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 26). Likewise, the ALJ found the

treatment notes indicated “generally normal physical examinations with a normal gait

and station.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 26). Also, as to the alleged uncontrollable tremors, the ALJ

noted “the record first indicated the tremor was psychogenic…[and] claims of any such

tremor were not featured later in the record.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27).

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treatment notes referenced fibromyalgia without

evidence of specific trigger points. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s

examination by a rheumatologist on July 6, 2016. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). At that time, Plaintiff

complained of chronic pain and fatigue, including pain in her hands and right shoulder.

(Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). Plaintiff also reported the worst pain was in her cervical spine. (Doc.

14-9, pg. 27). The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s physical examination by the rheumatologist

showed no acute distress and no edema in the extremities. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). Also, a

musculoskeletal examination revealed no synovitis in a standard 28 joint count. (Doc. 14-

9, pgs. 26-27). There was some tenderness to palpation of the PIP joints, but the

rheumatologist noted no myofascial trigger points present on examination. (Doc. 14-9,

pg. 27). The ALJ stated that was inconsistent with a diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (Doc. 14-

9, pg. 27). Radiographs of the right hand were normal. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27).

Further, the ALJ noted objective imaging of, inter alia, facet arthropathy. (Doc. 14-

9, pg. 27). Plaintiff’s testimony of severely limited ability to lift, walk, and perform other

activities, such as manipulative activities, was found to be extreme when compared to

that objective imaging, which the ALJ found showed only mild abnormalities. (Doc. 14-

9, pg. 27). The ALJ stated clinical signs were also limited and, despite references to back,

neck, and joint pain, there was not an indication of inflammatory signs, significant or

persistent range of motion problems, persistent or frequently recurring muscle spasms,

nerve root impingement, or motor, sensory, or reflex loss. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). Plaintiff

received only conservative medication management, without any specific or ongoing

indications of side effects, and achieved general pain relief. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27).

Although the ALJ found the record evinced adequate control of symptoms related

to Plaintiff’s physical conditions through conservative treatment modalities, such as

longitudinally decreased dosages of narcotic pain medication, the ALJ accommodated

Plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms to the extent that they caused functional limitations. (Doc.

14-9, pg. 27). This was done in light of Plaintiff’s testimony. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). The ALJ

limited Plaintiff to work performed at the sedentary exertional level with additional

postural and environmental restrictions. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27). The ALJ stated its RFC

assessment “more than accommodate[d]” Plaintiff’s allegations in consideration of her

physical condition, as “the totality of the medical records[,] including observations of

treating and examining sources[] and the claimant’s own statements[,] fail[ed] to provide

convincing objective evidence to support” greater limitations. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 27).

Next, the ALJ discussed the medical opinion evidence. The ALJ noted the March

20, 2015, statement of Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Gregory Climaco. (Doc. 14-

9, pg. 28). Dr. Climaco opined that Plaintiff could not stand or walk up to 2 hours per day,

sit six hours or more per day, occasionally lift 10 pounds, or work 40 hours a week due

to anxiety, fibromyalgia, and migraines. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 28). The ALJ gave this opinion

little weight because, despite Plaintiff’s longitudinal history with Dr. Climaco, the severe

limitations were inconsistent with the objective imaging and mild clinical signs discussed

above. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 28). According to the ALJ, Dr. Climaco regularly noted that Plaintiff

had normal examinations without debilitating symptoms that resulted in an inability to

work. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 28). Further, Dr. Climaco “provide[d] very little in the way of actual

functional limitations…instead provid[ing] a conclusory statement.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 28).

As to the consultative examination of Dr. Montgomery, which was conducted on

August 26, 2015, the ALJ noted Plaintiff claimed her shoulder swelled, fingers locked,

and she was unable to use one hand. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). The ALJ gave Dr. Montgomery’s

opinion partial weight. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). The ALJ noted that Dr. Montgomery

conducted testing that was supportive of the objective findings and the shoulder and

hand limitations assessed in the RFC. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). He noted shoulder range of

motion deficits and reduced grip strength, but the ALJ found other records showed

normal right shoulder range of motion and normal right and left hands without

significant abnormalities shown on imaging. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). Dr. Montgomery’s

observations were normal other than Plaintiff’s alleged distress from tremors, right hand

dexterity, and numbness in the “right 5th finger and 4th - ulnar nerve.” (Doc. 14-9, pg.

29). Also, Dr. Montgomery’s clinical impressions were based on Plaintiff’s statements,

and the note Plaintiff could not contain fasciculations or tremors was inconsistent with

the treating neurologist’s opinion. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). The ALJ noted Dr. Montgomery’s

findings of 11 tender points, mild range of motion deficits in the shoulder, 2/5 right upper

extremity strength, and 3/5 upper right grip strength. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). The ALJ stated,

“[o]verall, while the generally normal physical examination supports a finding of the

claimant’s ability to engage in each of these activities, Dr. Montgomery’s opinion is vague

and does not provide limitations on a function-by-function basis.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29).

The ALJ also discussed the initial assessment of the non-examining state medical

consultant, Dr. Kenneth R. Smith, M.D., from September 2015, and the reconsideration

assessment of the non-examining state medical consultant, Dr. James L. Greco, M.D.,

from May 2016. (Doc. 14-9, pgs. 29-30). The ALJ noted Dr. Smith “assigned less than the

full range of the light exertional level,” while Dr. Greco “assigned less than the full range

of the sedentary exertional level.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 30). The ALJ noted that Dr. Greco

limited Plaintiff to frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling,

crouching, and crawling, as well as occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.

(Doc. 14-9, pg. 30). Further, Plaintiff was to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold,

extreme heat, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. (Doc. 14-9, pg.

30). Drs. Smith and Greco’s opinions were given partial weight by the ALJ, as they were

generally consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. (Doc. 14-9,

pg. 30). However, the ALJ found the record did not support additional manipulative and

environmental accommodations. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 30). The ALJ emphasized, though, “I

have accommodated the claimant’s subjective complaints to the greatest extent possible

consistent with the objective evidence of record.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 30).

The ALJ noted its consideration of the response to interrogatories of Dr. Olivia M.

Bajor, D.O., from January 29, 2018. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). The ALJ gave that opinion partial

weight. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). The ALJ noted that Dr. Bajor assessed Plaintiff as capable of

sedentary work, as Plaintiff could stand and walk for 1 hour each and could sit for 8 hours

in an 8-hour workday. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). Further, Plaintiff could lift and carry 10 lbs

frequently and do the same with 20 pounds occasionally. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). Dr. Bajor

“specifically noted” reports in the medical record were inconsistent. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31).

For example, “[c]linical consultative exam [of Dr. Montgomery] in Exhibit 10F reported

diminished strength and dexterity in the right hand and shoulder, but subsequent exams

(Exhibits 13F-14F) do not report similar findings.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). Further, Plaintiff’s

primary care provider examinations were consistently normal to mild. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31).

The ALJ noted that Dr. Bajor limited Plaintiff to mostly occasional postural maneuvers,

consistent with Plaintiff’s complaints. Overall, the ALJ stated, “Dr. Bajor…explained her

opinion with reference to specific medical signs and findings, and her opinions [we]re

generally consistent with the evidence as a whole.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31).

In sum, based on the objective medical evidence and Plaintiff’s course of

treatment, clinical signs, medications, level of daily activity, and work history, the ALJ

found Plaintiff retained the above-described RFC. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 32). Plaintiff’s subjective

reports, including the limitations on her ability to perform activities of daily living, found

minimal support in the objective medical evidence of record. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 32). While

Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments, the ALJ noted conservative treatment

provided symptom relief and stabilization. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 32). Further, the clinical

findings were generally mild throughout the period at issue, as providers documented

normal examinations without significant changes to or worsening of symptoms. (Doc. 14-

9, pg. 32). When considered in totality, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements of limitations

supported the exertional and non-exertional accommodations outlined in the RFC, which

appropriately accommodated her subjective restrictions. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 32).

At step 4, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work, which

included work as a dental assistant. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 33). The ALJ noted Plaintiff had a high

school education and one year of college education. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 33). Further, the

transferability of jobs skills was not material to the determination of disability, as a

finding of not disabled would be appropriate regardless of whether Plaintiff had

transferable job skills. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 33). At step 5, the ALJ indicated, if Plaintiff had the

RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work, a finding of “not disabled” would be

directed. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 34). However, Plaintiff’s ability to perform all or substantially all

of the requirements of sedentary work was impeded by additional limitations. (Doc. 14-

9, pg. 34). Therefore, to determine the extent to which those limitations eroded the

unskilled sedentary occupational base through the date of last insured, the ALJ relied on

the testimony of a vocational expert. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 34). The vocational expert testified

that, given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, she would have been

able to perform “sedentary, unskilled, SVP 2 occupations.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 34).

Accordingly, at step 5, the ALJ found there were jobs existing in significant numbers in

the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed through the date of last

insured. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 33). For these reasons, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled

between June 30, 2013, and December 31, 2017. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 34).

IV. Analysis4

The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is “extremely limited” and “very

deferential.” See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008)). Findings of fact, supported by

substantial evidence, are conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); accord Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869.

The Court will reverse the ALJ’s decision only if the findings of fact were not supported

by substantial evidence or the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. See Clifford, 227 F.3d

at 869; accord Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020). “Substantial evidence means

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’ ” See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971)); accord Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773. If reasonable minds could differ about the

alleged disability and the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, then the

Court will affirm the ALJ. See Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773 (quoting Elder, 529 F.3d at 413).

The Court reviews the entire record, but does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts,

decide credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at

869; accord Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). However, an

ALJ must build a logical bridge between the evidence and the conclusions.

4The Court reviewed the entire evidentiary record. The portions of the evidentiary record that are relevant

to Plaintiff’s present arguments and the Court’s resolution of the case are incorporated into the analysis below.

See Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773 (quoting Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021)).

1. Opinion of Dr. Bajor

On January 23, 2018, the SSA requested the professional opinion of Dr. Bajor in

relation to Plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 631). Dr. Bajor was provided exhibits that were

selected for inclusion in the record, as well as interrogatories that were to be completed

based on that evidence and her professional knowledge. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 631).

Dr. Bajor opined that Plaintiff could frequently lift up to 10 lbs and occasionally

lift 11 to 20 lbs. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 632). Plaintiff could frequently carry up to 10 lbs and

occasionally carry 11 to 20 lbs. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 632). When asked to identify the particular

medical or clinical findings that supported these assessments, Dr. Bajor noted Plaintiff’s

diagnosis of facet arthropathy in the cervical spine at Exhibit 12F. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 632).

Further, Dr. Bajor opined that, at a given time, Plaintiff could sit for 6 hours, stand

for 1 hour, and walk for 30 minutes. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 633). In an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff

could sit for 8 hours, stand for 1 hour, and walk for 1 hour. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 632). When

asked to identify the particular medical or clinical findings that supported these

assessments, Dr. Bajor noted “exam…by orthopedic surgeon, claimant has only slight

limp without assistive device and may continue regular activity.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 633).

As to the right hand, Dr. Bajor opined that Plaintiff could continuously feel and

push/pull, frequently reach (all but overhead), and occasionally reach (overhead),

handle, and finger. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 634). When asked to identify the particular medical or

clinical findings that supported these assessments, Dr. Bajor noted the “[r]eports in

medical record are inconsistent. Clinical exam in 10F reports diminished strength and

dexterity in Rt. Hand, shoulder, but subsequent exams (13F, 1/14/17) do not report

similar findings.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 634).

Dr. Bajor answer “yes” when asked whether there was sufficient objective medical

and other evidence to allow her to form opinions about the nature and severity of the

impairments during the relevant timeframe. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 639). Dr. Bajor identified the

following impairments, among others, established by the evidence and supported with a

citation: chronic neck pain and facet arthropathy (12F); tremors, possibly psychogenic in

etiology (7F); and arthritis/arthralgia (13F). (Doc. 14-7, pg. 639).

Now, with her first argument, Plaintiff states the ALJ did not “specifically

acknowledge” Dr. Bajor’s opinion that Plaintiff could only occasionally handle and finger

with the dominant right upper extremity. (Doc. 18, pg. 8). Further, the ALJ allegedly

“incorrectly cited the handwritten notes [of Dr. Bajor] below th[at] limitation.” (Doc. 18,

pg. 8). As such, Plaintiff argues the ALJ “objectively misstated” Dr. Bajor’s opinion and

suggested she “discount[ed] her own opinion by the handwritten notes.” (Doc. 18, pgs.

8-9). Plaintiff argues it cannot be assumed Dr. Bajor meant anything other than Plaintiff

could occasionally handle and finger with the right upper extremity. (Doc. 18, pg. 9).

Defendant responds that the ALJ noted Dr. Bajor, in her opinion on Plaintiff’s

ability to use her hands, cited Exhibit 10F to show diminished strength and dexterity in

Plaintiff’s right hand and shoulder. (Doc. 24, pg. 7). The ALJ also noted, incorrectly, that

Dr. Bajor cited Exhibits 13F and 14F to show contrary findings. However, according to

Defendant, a review of Dr. Bajor’s opinion shows that she did rely upon Exhibit 13F,

which included a report of an examination from January 4, 2017. (Doc. 24, pg. 7). The

examination allegedly showed no diminished strength or dexterity in Plaintiff’s right

hand and shoulder. (Doc. 24, pg. 7). The fact the ALJ miscited to Exhibits, in Defendant’s

view, does not undermine its decision to give Dr. Bajor’s opinion partial weight, as the

ALJ reasonably compared Dr. Bajor’s opinion to primary care provider examinations that

consistently showed Plaintiff’s normal to mild use of the hands. (Doc. 24, pg. 7).

Defendant also argues the ALJ did not find Dr. Bajor discounted her own opinion

through handwritten notes. (Doc. 24, pg. 7). Defendant argues the ALJ accurately quoted

Dr. Bajor’s handwritten comments. (Doc. 24, pg. 7). However, based on the whole record,

including the treatment notes and objective test results, Defendant argues the ALJ

declined to adopt the opinion that Plaintiff could only occasionally handle and finger

with the right hand. (Doc. 24, pg. 8). Therefore, Defendant indicates the Court should not

reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. (Doc. 24, pg. 7).

Here, it is undisputed that the ALJ considered Dr. Bajor’s opinion, which was

requested by the SSA. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). Plaintiff does not make a contrary argument;

instead, she suggests the ALJ did not “specifically acknowledge” a particular aspect of

Dr. Bajor’s opinion, namely, that Plaintiff could only occasionally handle and finger with

the right hand. (Docs. 14-9, pg. 31; 18, pg. 8). The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument is overly

technical and flawed for the reasons discussed below.

The ALJ discussed the handwritten notes that “identif[ied] the particular medical

or clinical findings…[that] supported…[Dr. Bajor’s] assessment of any limitations and

why the findings support[ed] the assessment.” (Docs. 14-7, pg. 634; 14-9, pg. 31). It is

obvious to the Court that Dr. Bajor’s handwritten notes, as well as the ALJ’s discussion

of those handwritten notes, contemplated Plaintiff’s ability to occasionally handle or

finger with the right extremity. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 634; 14-9, pg. 31). Immediately below the

area where Dr. Bajor found, inter alia, Plaintiff could occasionally finger and feel with the

right hand, she stated: “Reports in medical record are inconsistent. Clinical exam in 10F

reports diminished strength and dexterity in Rt. Hand, shoulder, but subsequent exams

(13F, 1/14/17) do not report similar findings.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 634). The ALJ referenced

those handwritten notes, then added its belief that “primary care provider examinations

are consistently normal to mild.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). The ALJ also noted, generally, Dr.

Bajor “limited the claimant to mostly occasional postural maneuvers, consistent with the

claimant’s complaints,” and Dr. Bajor explained her opinion with reference to specific

medical signs and findings. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). Dr. Bajor’s opinions were “generally

consistent with the evidence as a whole.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). For these reasons, the Court

finds Plaintiff is incorrect that the ALJ failed to consider, i.e., failed to “specifically

acknowledge,” Dr. Bajor’s opinion on Plaintiff’s right hand. (Docs. 14-9, pg. 31; 18, pg. 8).

Further, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s decision to find, contrary to Dr.

Bajor’s opinion, that Plaintiff could “perform tasks requiring no more than frequent

handling and fingering.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 23) (Emphasis added.). As noted above, Dr. Bajor

and the ALJ both acknowledged the inconsistency of the evidence with respect to the

strength and dexterity of the right hand and shoulder. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 634; 14-9, pg. 31).

Ultimately, the ALJ expressly stated that it was granting Dr. Bajor’s opinion “partial

weight.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). The ALJ added that “provider examinations [we]re

consistently normal to mild.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31). In doing so, the Court finds the ALJ did

not misstate Dr. Bajor’s opinion, as argued by Plaintiff, but described its consideration of

that opinion in light of the medical and other evidence of record. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 31).

Similarly, the ALJ did not commit error by indicating Dr. Bajor, in her opinion,

cited to both Exhibits 13F and 14F rather than to only Exhibit 13F. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 634; 14-

9, pg. 31). The bottom line is that Dr. Bajor cited to Exhibit 13F, which details a date of

visit of January 4, 2017, for the proposition that subsequent examinations, i.e.,

examinations after that of Dr. Montgomery on August 26, 2015, did not indicate Plaintiff

suffered from diminished strength and dexterity in the right hand and shoulder. (Doc.

14-7, pgs. 348-59, 420-32, 634). Exhibit 13F, which documents no such diminished strength

or dexterity but includes normal x-rays of the right shoulder and hand from July 6, 2016,

reasonably stands for that proposition. (Doc. 14-7, pgs. 420-32). Therefore, it is irrelevant

that the ALJ included an extra citation to Exhibit 14F, presumably by mistake.

Notably, the ALJ’s decision to limit Plaintiff to frequent handling and fingering is

supported by the provider examinations of record, as the ALJ noted. For example, in

February and March 2016, Plaintiff had no musculoskeletal symptoms and, on

examination, there was “normal movement of extremities.” (Doc. 14-7, pgs. 223, 225, 227,

230, 277, 279). On examination in April 2016, Plaintiff was observed to have normal

musculoskeletal symptoms and “[n]o skeletal abnormalities or deformities.” (Doc. 14-7,

pgs. 265, 273). Likewise, as to Plaintiff’s joints, there was “no deformity or dislocation, no

tenderness or swelling, normal…[range of motion], no pain.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 265). In

February 2017, despite some cervical tenderness and decreased range of motion, Plaintiff

had 5/5 strength in the right upper extremities and was intact to gross touch to bilateral

upper extremities. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 379). From April to October 2017, despite “arthralgias

and joint pain” on one occasion, Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal symptoms and examinations

were normal. (Doc. 14-7, pgs. 565, 568, 570, 574-75, 578-79, 585, 588, 590, 593, 596, 599, 603,

606, 615). Therefore, the ALJ’s findings here were supported by substantial evidence.

2. Opinion of Dr. Montgomery

Plaintiff presented to Dr. Montgomery on August 26, 2015. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 348).

Based on the medical information available for review, Dr. Montgomery noted, inter alia,

Plaintiff had cervical radiculopathy and a transient paralysis of a limb. (Doc. 14-7, pg.

348). He also identified a prior diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 349).

Dr. Montgomery noted Plaintiff’s chief complaints were, among other things,

cervical radiculopathy, bone degeneration, and nerve damage in the neck, upper back,

and right arm. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 348). Dr. Montgomery also noted Plaintiff’s history of

present complaints. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 348). Plaintiff was in separate severe motor vehicle

accidents in 2007 and 2013. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 348). Since that time, she had neck pain and

arm issues. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 348). Plaintiff described uncontrollable tremors on the right

side of her body, degeneration in the bones around her shoulder and upper arm and neck

on the right, right arm and upper back pain, and “she obviously ha[d] nerve damage in

the neck involving different nerves, even in her right hand.” (Doc. 14-7, pgs. 348-49).

Some limitations pointed to ulnar nerve dysfunction and other limitations pointed to

radial nerve dysfunction. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 349). Plaintiff’s tremors caused distress and were

“a big problem,” as Dr. Montgomery noted “she had constant tremors in her right arm

and right leg as well as other uncontrollable movements” during the interview. (Doc. 14-

7, pgs. 349-50). Plaintiff’s “right shoulder swells and her fingers lock on the right side.”

(Doc. 14-7, pg. 349). Plaintiff’s fingers and hands also got feverish. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 349).

On examination, Plaintiff’s neck was supple, but she could not turn to the right

very well. (Doc. 14-7, pgs. 350-51). Plaintiff had tender spots in the back, especially over

the scapulae and the entire right shoulder area. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 351). Plaintiff’s right upper

arm was hypertrophied compared to the left upper arm, and “it apparently [wa]s due to

the constant tremors and contraction of the[] muscles…[that] she is not able to control.”

(Doc. 14-7, pg. 351). Further, Plaintiff’s right hand was not very dexterous. (Doc. 14-7, pg.

351). Plaintiff had numbness in the 5th finger and the medial half of the 4th finger,

implying some involvement of the ulnar nerve. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 351). However, Plaintiff’s

numbness in the thumb also suggested radial involvement. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 351).

In terms of a clinical impression, Dr. Montgomery noted Plaintiff had been in two

severe motor vehicle accidents, one with a concussion and the other “with multiple

injuries involving the central nervous system.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 351). The latter accident

resulted in constant tremors, fasciculations, and jerking spastic motions that were painful

and, according to Plaintiff’s doctors, were probably causing degeneration of the bone

around the right shoulder. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 351). Plaintiff could not “contain the constant

fasciculations and tremors in her body.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 348).

With respect to her second argument, Plaintiff notes Dr. Montgomery observed

that the dominant right upper extremity, when compared to the left upper extremity, was

hypertrophied. (Doc. 18, pg. 9). Plaintiff argues this observation, as well as the fact that

Dr. Montgomery observed numbness in the thumb, was “completely absent from the

ALJ’s discussion.” (Doc. 18, pg. 9). Further, Plaintiff argues the imaging relied upon by

the ALJ for the proposition that Plaintiff had a normal right extremity would not have

shown the ulnar and radial nerve issues noted by Dr. Montgomery. (Doc. 18, pgs. 9-10).

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ found Dr. Montgomery’s findings

supported the limitations assessed because “other records show[ed] normal right

shoulder range of motion and normal right and left hands without any significant

abnormalities seen on imaging.” (Doc. 24, pgs. 8-9). Therefore, rather than ignoring Dr.

Montgomery’s findings as to the right shoulder and hand limitations, “[t]he ALJ

reasonably weighed Dr. Montgomery’s findings against other record evidence and

explained her reasons for giving his opinion partial weight.” (Doc. 24, pg. 9).

Here, the Court disagrees the ALJ failed to observe Plaintiff’s “right upper arm

[wa]s hypertrophied compared to the left,” as found by Dr. Montgomery. (Docs. 14-7, pg.

351; 18, pg. 9). The ALJ stated, “[w]hile the claimant had one or two tender spots in the

back and especially over the scapulae and the right shoulder, with right upper extremity

atrophy [sic]…the overall examination was otherwise normal. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 351; 14-9,

pg. 25) (Emphasis added.). The ALJ also noted Plaintiff complained to Dr. Montgomery

of “arm issues…and uncontrollable tremors,” the latter of which were found by Dr.

Montgomery to be the cause of the hypertrophy. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 351; 14-9, pg. 25). Aside

from these specific statements, though, the ALJ also noted that Dr. Montgomery observed

some limitation in the right shoulder and cervical ranges of motion, but no abnormal

range of motion relating to the lumbar spine. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Further, the ALJ noted

Dr. Montgomery found 11 tender points, including two in the right shoulder and one in

the right arm, and 2/5 right upper extremity strength. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 354; 14-9, pg. 29).

Similarly, it is not clear to the Court that the ALJ “ignored the statement [of Dr.

Montgomery] about numbness in the thumb.” (Doc. 18, pg. 9). The ALJ noted Dr.

Montgomery found Plaintiff’s “right hand was not very dexterous, numbness right 5th

finger and 4th—ulnar nerve.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). Dr. Montgomery attributed the

numbness in the thumb to the radial nerve, and the ALJ did not note that finding.

However, the ALJ did note Dr. Montgomery, in the neurological section of his opinion,

which discussed all right-hand numbness, found “[p]inprick and vibratory sensation

were intact” on examination. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 351; 14-9, pg. 25). Likewise, the ALJ noted

Dr. Montgomery’s finding that Plaintiff had a right-hand grip strength of 3/5. (Docs. 14-

7, pg. 356; 14-9, pg. 29). It must be remembered, in light of these arguments, “an ALJ ‘need

not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.’ ”

See Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015). Regardless, though, the ALJ

recognized Dr. Montgomery “conducted testing supportive of some of the objective

findings and supportive of shoulder and hand limitations in the” RFC. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29).

Further, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred by noting, in a

discussion of Dr. Montgomery’s opinion, “other records show[] normal right shoulder

range of motion and normal right and left hands without any significant abnormalities

seen on imaging.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). Plaintiff suggests the ALJ’s statement was improper

because the impairment related to her right extremity stems from nerve, rather than bone,

damage. However, the imaging was referenced after the ALJ noted Dr. Montgomery’s

testing was supportive of the shoulder and hand limitations in the RFC. (Doc. 14-9, pg.

29). Further, the imaging was referenced in the context of Dr. Montgomery’s noted

“shoulder range of motion deficits and reduced grip strength,” which seems to render

the imaging relevant. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 29). Therefore, in a case where Plaintiff is alleging

impairments related to the right extremity, the Court finds it entirely unsurprising that

the ALJ would note the way in which that imaging assisted in determining the

functionality of the right extremity, even if Plaintiff alleges nerve damage. For these

reasons, the Court finds the ALJ did not err when considering Dr. Montgomery’s opinion.

3. The Treating Source Statement Regarding Plaintiff’s Right Hand

On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff was assessed by her primary care physician, Dr.

Climaco. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 176). He diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic pain and cervical

radiculopathy. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 176). Dr. Climaco marked the box “no” when asked

whether Plaintiff, in an 8-hour workday and 40-hour workweek, could stand and/or

walk up to 2 hours, sit for 6 or more hours, occasionally lift and/or carry up to 10 lbs, or

frequently lift and/or carry up to a few lbs. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 176). Dr. Climaco described

the objective and clinical findings that supported his opinions by stating, inter alia,

Plaintiff had pain and muscle spasms with prolonged sitting or standing, difficulty

turning her head to the right, and numbness in the right hand. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 176).

Now, as to her third argument, Plaintiff admits the ALJ discussed the above

medical source opinion of her primary care physician, Dr. Climaco, which was accorded

little weight, but states the ALJ “omit[ted] any reference to Dr. Climaco’s statement about

the Plaintiff’s right upper extremity” and right-hand numbness. (Doc. 18, pg. 10). Plaintiff

states this would usually be unimportant; however, here, “errors and omissions in the

analysis of the…right hand function are a theme in the ALJ decision.” (Doc. 18, pg. 10).

In response, Defendant points out that Plaintiff is not challenging the decision to

give Dr. Climaco’s opinion little weight. (Doc. 24, pg. 9). Defendant further notes the

ALJ’s decision is replete with references to subjective reports of nerve damage and

medical records documenting, inter alia, right hand numbness. (Doc. 24, pg. 9).

Here, the ALJ gave the entire 1-page opinion of Dr. Climaco “little weight”

because, although he was Plaintiff’s primary care doctor, Dr. Climaco provided a

“conclusory statement” with “very little in the way of actual functional limitations.” (Doc.

14-9, pg. 28). Indeed, the 1-page opinion provides two “check box” questions with little

room for meaningful comments. Therefore, even if the Court were to find error and

remand the case for consideration of the comment identified by Plaintiff, the ALJ would

likely find Dr. Climaco’s entire “conclusory statement” is still entitled to “little weight.”

See Lambert v. Berryhill, 896 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2018) (“An error is harmless only if we

are convinced that the ALJ would reach the same result on remand.”). And, regardless of

the claimed omission to consider that statement, the ALJ found Dr. Climaco “regularly

note[d] normal examinations,” including as to the musculoskeletal system, “without

anything supportive of such debilitating symptoms resulting in an inability to work

(Exhibit 1F).” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 28). Plaintiff’s alleged severe limitations were inconsistent

with the objective evidence. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 28). Indeed, the Court made similar findings

as to Plaintiff’s right hand and shoulder with respect to Dr. Bajor. As such, the Court finds

the ALJ did not ignore or otherwise error in its consideration of Dr. Climaco’s opinion.

4. The Failure to Mention Physical Therapy Records

On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff presented for physical therapy. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 185). The

primary and rehabilitative diagnosis was, inter alia, fibromyalgia and generalized

weakness. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 185). Plaintiff presented with decreased range of motion,

decreased strength, and increased pain that was scaled at 7/10 during resting and 10/10

during activity. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 185). Plaintiff reported “extreme neck pain and [an]

inability to turn head to…[the right, right upper extremity] weakness, tremors, and

occasional ‘locking.’ ” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 185). The physical therapist observed a guarded

right upper extremity and hypertonicity throughout “B UT and paraspinals.” (Doc. 14-7,

pg. 185). Plaintiff had gross limitations into all planes with the right upper extremity, and

the pain and weakness reportedly limited her range of motion. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 185).

Plaintiff argues the above-noted physical therapy notes describe hypertonicity in

the right upper extremity. (Doc. 18, pg. 11). Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to discuss that

evidence, which “describe[es] abnormality with neurologic origin that pertains to the

right dominant upper extremity.” (Doc. 18, pg. 11). Plaintiff notes, again, such an

omission, by itself, would be unimportant. (Doc. 18, pg. 11). In this case, though, “errors

and omissions in the analysis of the…right upper extremity function are a theme in the

ALJ decision.” (Doc. 18, pg. 11). In response, Defendant argues the ALJ was not required

to summarize or discuss every piece of evidence in the record. (Doc. 24, pgs. 9-10).

Defendant stresses, even though that is the case, the ALJ did not ignore the line of

evidence related to Plaintiff’s right arm and hand problems. (Doc. 24, pg. 10).

Here, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s failure to discuss an isolated observation

of a physical therapist that was made on a single date of service in April 2015. As noted

above, however, “an ALJ ‘need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece

of testimony and evidence.’ ” See Curvin, 778 F.3d at 651. This is especially true where, as

here, the ALJ did not otherwise ignore the evidence related to Plaintiff’s right upper

extremity. Indeed, the ALJ’s decision thoroughly discusses the issues related to Plaintiff’s

right upper extremity, including, inter alia, Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and written

statements relating to nerve damage, Plaintiff’s statements in the neurological

examination in April 2015, Plaintiff’s statements and Dr. Montgomery’s comprehensive

observations in August 2015, Plaintiff’s complaints of right shoulder pain and

examination in July 2016, and the findings of Dr. Bajor in January 2018. (Docs. 14-7, 631;

14-9, pgs. 24-25, 29). Dr. Bajor indicated the evidence was inconsistent as to the

diminished strength and dexterity in the right hand and shoulder. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 634).

However, the ALJ indicated its RFC and other findings were based on the entire record

of objective medical and other evidence. (Doc. 149, pgs. 12, 15, 23-25). And, as noted above

with respect to Dr. Bajor’s opinion, the findings related to Plaintiff’s right hand and

shoulder are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s

argument that the ALJ erred by failing to mention the above-discussed treatment record.

5. The Impermissible Playing of Doctor

On April 7, 2015, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Roula Al-Dahhak, M.D., of St. Louis

University. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 161). At that time, Dr. Al-Dahhak noted a prior CT of the neck

was “NL.” (Doc. 14-7, pg. 165). Plaintiff noted neck pain, joint pain, and tremors in the

past 90 days. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 167). On examination, Dr. Al-Dahhak noted Plaintiff’s neck

was symmetric and she had no skeletal abnormalities or deformities, scoliosis or

kyphosis, or contractures. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 167). Further, in terms of her joints, Plaintiff had

normal range of motion and no deformities or dislocations, tenderness or swelling,

edema in the lower extremities, or pain. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 167). Plaintiff also had normal

muscle tone with no spasticity or rigidity, normal muscle bulk with no atrophy or

hypertrophy, no contractures, 5/5 muscle strength in all categories, and 2/2 muscle

stretch reflexes in three categories. (Doc. 14-7, pg. 168).

Plaintiff argues, even if there was a normal CT of the neck from an unknown time,

the ALJ “improperly played doctor when she stated ‘a normal cervical spine CT is

inconsistent with her claim of cervical radiculopathy.’ ” (Doc. 18, pg. 12). Plaintiff notes

her pain from cervical radiculopathy was treated with a steroid injection at a time when

she was already taking methadone, lyrica, and oxycodone. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 396; 18, pg.

12). The doctor added baclofen and noted an MRI showing cervical indentation of the

thecal sac and facet arthropathy. (Docs. 14-7, pg. 396; 18, pgs. 12-13). Plaintiff states the

ALJ did not discuss this evidence, and “[t]he individual assessments of cervical

radiculopathy…are too numerous to cite.” (Doc. 18, pg. 13).

In response, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s characterization of the CT is incomplete.

(Doc. 24, pg. 10). In particular, Defendant notes a neurologist reviewed a CT scan of

Plaintiff’s neck and noted the results were normal. (Doc. 24, pg. 10). Further, on

examination, the neurologist observed that Plaintiff had normal muscle tone and

strength, sensation, and range of motion in the hands and feet. (Doc. 24, pg. 10).

Here, the ALJ noted, on April 7, 2015, Plaintiff complained of chronic neck pain.

(Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). The ALJ also correctly noted the neurologist’s observation that a CT

scan of the neck was normal. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). It is true the ALJ indicated “[a] normal

cervical spine CT is inconsistent with her claim of cervical radiculopathy,” but that was

not the end of the analysis. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). After making this statement, the ALJ noted

the neurologist’s examination indicated: “no skeletal abnormalities, no joint deformity,

no tenderness or swelling, normal speech and mentation…5/5 strength throughout,

normal motor tone with no spasticity or rigidity, no muscle atrophy, and normal

sensation with no cervical radiculopathy.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). It does not appear the ALJ’s

findings as to Plaintiff’s cervical radiculopathy were based solely, or even primarily, on

the CT of the neck. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). The neurologist’s examination clearly informed

the ALJ’s immediate analysis. (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). And, more broadly, the ALJ indicated

“[p]hysical examinations throughout the relevant period were essentially unremarkable

as related to the claimant’s neck…impairment.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). The ALJ further

stated, “[d]espite the claimant’s testimony of such significant neck…pain and limitation,

treatment notes regularly show essentially normal musculoskeletal examinations with no

significant joint tenderness or swelling.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 26). Also, “Dr. Montgomery

observed some limitation in…cervical range of motion…[but] the remainder of the record

documents…normal musculoskeletal range of motion.” (Doc. 14-9, pg. 25). Similar

findings have been noted by the Court above. As such, the ALJ did not improperly play

doctor, did not ignore evidence, and its findings were supported by substantial evidence.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the final agency decision. The Clerk of the

Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2023.

s/ David W. Dugan

__________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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