The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BOBBY JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 18-cv-2212-RJD
)
LUCAS MAUE, TERRANCE JACKSON, )
GARRETT GRIFFIN, CHASE CARON, )
JOHN TOURVILLE, and ANTHONY )
JONES, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Bobby Johnson, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional
rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff alleges
several prison officials used excessive force against him and/or failed to protect him, resulting in
extensive injuries.
Plaintiff’s complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and he is proceeding on
the following claims (see Docs. 9, 26):
Count One: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Maue, Jackson,
Griffin, Coron, Tourville, and Jones for physically assaulting
Plaintiff on June 26, 2017.
Count Three: Intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in violation of
Illinois state law against Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Coron, Tourville,
and Jones.
Count Four: Assault and battery claim in violation of Illinois state law against
Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Coron, Tourville, and Jones.
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The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Caron,
Tourville, and Jones (Doc. 78) is now before the Court. Plaintiff filed a timely response (Doc.83),
and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 87). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Factual Background
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (Deposition
of Bobby Johnson, Doc. 79-1 at 4). On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff was inside the gym when his
recreation time was cut short due to a staff assault that occurred elsewhere in the facility (id. at 6).
Plaintiff and the other inmates who were in the gym were made to exit and subjected to “shake
downs” (id. at 7).
Plaintiff testified that he was “shaken down” by an unknown officer, and then was ordered
by Defendant Maue, a correctional officer, to undergo another shakedown (Doc. 79-1 at 7).
Plaintiff testified that he complied and allowed Maue to search him again (id). Maue allegedly
then used a racial slur and Plaintiff advised Maue he was going to submit a grievance against him
for using the racial slur1 (id.). Plaintiff testified that Maue then grabbed Plaintiff’s arm, and
Plaintiff responded by striking Maue with his fist2 (id. at 8). Maue and Plaintiff then struggled,
and Maue wrestled Plaintiff to the ground (id.). Maue restrained Plaintiff’s hands behind his back
with handcuffs and then struck Plaintiff in the back of his head (id.). This altercation took
approximately one minute (Doc. 79-5 at 20). According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, after
he was on the ground and struck by Maue, other officers responded and Plaintiff was hit with
1 Plaintiff’s verified complaint includes a somewhat different version of events leading up to Defendant Maue’s
alleged use of a racial slur (see Doc. 1 at 7-8). The Court declines to set forth those events in detail as they are not
central to the culmination of events that allegedly occurred on June 16, 2017.
2 As noted by Defendants, Plaintiff did not mention that he struck Maue in his complaint.
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foreign objects (Doc. 79-1 at 9). Pepper spray was deployed during this altercation, which
impaired Plaintiff’s vision (id. at 10). Plaintiff does not know who hit him when he was on the
ground (id. at 9). This altercation took place around 11:00 a.m. (Doc. 79-5 at 13). Defendant
Maue knew Plaintiff had some injuries after this altercation (Doc. 79-5 at 21).
After his altercation with Maue, Plaintiff was escorted to the North 2 segregation unit by
two officers, who held Plaintiff by both arms (Doc. 79-1 at 9). The walk from the gym to North
2 takes approximately one to two minutes (Doc. 79-5 at 23). During this walk, these officers
“rammed” Plaintiff’s face and head into the gates and corners of the doors (Doc. 79-1 at 9).
During his deposition, Plaintiff identified these officers as Defendants Jackson and Caron (id.).
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff only identified Defendant Jackson and indicated the other
officer was a “John Doe”3 (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff was placed in a cell in North 2, uncuffed
through the chuckhole, and he washed mace off his face (Doc. 79-1 at 10). After a brief time,
Plaintiff was handcuffed again and moved to an interview room in North 2 (Doc. 79-1 at 10, 12;
Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff testified that Jackson and Caron escorted him from the cell to the interview
room by pulling him up the stairs (Doc. 79-1 at 11). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged he was
escorted to the interview room by Defendant Officer Griffin, Sgt. Jones, Lt. Tourville, Officer John
Doe, and Lt. John Doe (Doc. 1 at 9).
Plaintiff testified that while he was in the interview room, Defendants Jackson and Caron
held Plaintiff’s arms while the other officers, including Defendant Lt. Tourville, Griffin, and two
unknown officers punched Plaintiff in the face (Doc. 79-1 at 11-12). Plaintiff also testified that
Jones was in the interview room, but he did not specifically testify that Jones engaged in punching
3 Defendants John Does 1 and 2 were dismissed from this action on December 17, 2019 due to Plaintiff’s failure move
to amend the complaint to identify the defendants or otherwise inform the Court of their identities (see Doc. 26).
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or otherwise assaulting Plaintiff (id. at 16). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Griffin
and an unknown officer held Plaintiff’s arms while he was repeatedly punched in the face by Lt.
John Doe, Sgt. Jones, and Lt. Tourville (Doc. 1 at 9-10).
Plaintiff was subsequently interviewed by Internal Affairs and was then taken to the
healthcare unit around 12:45 p.m. to receive treatment for his injuries (Doc. 79-1 at 13; Doc. 83-4
at 61). Plaintiff testified he blacked out at some point while in the interview and regained
consciousness in the healthcare unit (Doc. 79-1 at 13). Plaintiff was transported to an outside
hospital at 4:35 p.m. (Doc. 83-4 at 72-73). Plaintiff suffered injuries to his eyes and nose, as well
as bruising and lacerations to his face (79-1 at 12). Plaintiff testified that he underwent surgery
to address his injuries and remained in the Menard infirmary until August 1, 2017 (id. at 17).
Defendant Lt. Tourville testified that after Maue’s altercation with Plaintiff, he escorted
Maue to the healthcare unit and both Tourville and Maue were seen in the healthcare unit (Doc.
83-5 at 53). Tourville testified that he then went to the shift commander’s office and typed up his
reports, and then left to seek outside medical attention for his injuries at the direction of the shift
supervisor (id.).
Defendant Maue testified that after the altercation with Plaintiff he was seen in the
healthcare unit around 11:15 a.m., and he was instructed to go to an outside hospital (Doc. 79-5 at
22). Maue testified he was taken to the healthcare unit by an unknown lieutenant and that the
unknown lieutenant did not stay at the healthcare unit (id. at 24). Plaintiff was charged in Randolph
County Circuit Court with Aggravated Battery, a class 3 felony, for striking Lucas Maue in the
face with a closed fist (see Doc. 79-2). Plaintiff pleaded guilty to this charge and was sentenced
to two years in the IDOC (see id.).
According to Menard’s Roster Management record, Chase Caron was not present at
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Menard on June 16, 2017 because it was his scheduled day off (see Doc. 79-6 at 12). Menard’s
Roster Management record is less clear regarding Defendant Anthony Jones. “Anthony B. Jones”
appears on the Segregation Unit roster for June 16, 2017, but the name is crossed out and
substituted with another name (see id. at 24). It is also documented that “A. Jones” was absent
and listed as “Sick” (see id. at 32). However, “Jones, Anthony B.” is also listed on the Daily
Roster with an “x” below “TAC” (see id. at 28). There is no notation on this page that Jones was
not present on June 16, 2017. Plaintiff asserts this document indicates “Jones, Anthony B.” was
present. The Court is not clear as to the meaning of this document, and Defendants do not address
the same. At his deposition, Defendant Jones indicated that he does not recall if he was called in
on June 16, 2017 as part of the “tac team” (Doc. 83-2 at 36). Jones testified, however, that if his
name was crossed off of the roster and replaced with another name, then he was not there (Doc.
83-2 at 32).
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
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248). In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Discussion
Count One – Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Maue, Jackson,
Griffin, Coron, Tourville, and Jones
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837
(7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). “In cases involving the
claimed use of excessive force, ‘the core judicial inquiry’ is ‘whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm’.”
Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 837 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Prison officials who fail to take
reasonable steps to intervene and prevent the use of excessive force may be liable under the Eighth
Amendment. Wilburn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Young v. Hardin, 37
F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Defendants Tourville, Griffin, Jackson, Caron, and Jones
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no evidence to support his claim that Tourville, Griffin,
Jackson, Caron, and Jones were involved in the assault that allegedly occurred on June 16, 2017.
Liability under § 1983 is predicated on a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violation. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). To be personally responsible, an official “must know about the conduct and facilitate
it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir.
2009) (quoting Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Gentry v. Duckworth,
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65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Defendant Caron asserts June 16, 2017 was a scheduled day off of work for him and, as
such, he was not at Menard on that date and could not have participated in the incidents at issue.
In his response brief, Plaintiff does not dispute the records Caron relies on establishing that he was
not at Menard on June 16, 2017. Further, although the Menard roster conflicts with Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony, courts have indicated that “even on summary judgment the district court
should not credit testimony that is inherently incredible,” Simms v. Reiner, 419 F.Supp. 468, 475
(N.D. Ill. 1976), or “irrefutably contradicted by documentary evidence,” Stewart v. RCA Corp.,
790 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1986). The Court has no reason to question the validity of the records
before it. Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable jury could find that Defendant Caron was at
Menard or participated in the incidents occurring on June 16, 2017 alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Defendant Caron is entitled to summary judgment on Count One.
Defendant Jones also asserts he was not at Menard on June 16, 2017, and relies on
Menard’s roster records for support. The records relied on by Jones, however, are not as clear as
the records that support Caron’s personal liability argument. As asserted by Plaintiff, of the three
pages wherein Defendant Jones’ name appears on Menard’s roster for June 16, 2017, one of the
three appears to reflect that Jones was or may have been present at Menard on that date (see Doc.
79-6 at 28). Although the record is not entirely clear, it is Defendant Jones’ burden to establish
that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Because the records relied on by Jones lack clarity, the Court cannot grant summary judgment in
his favor on Jones’ argument that he lacked personal involvement in any alleged constitutional
violation.
Defendant Tourville argues the records do not support a finding that Tourville participated
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in the alleged assault that occurred in the North 2 interview room on June 16, 2017. In support of
this argument, Tourville argues that he was seen in the healthcare unit as a result of injuries
sustained in an altercation with another inmate, and he then proceeded to an outside medical
facility to receive treatment. This timeline does not “irrefutably contradict” Plaintiff’s testimony.
As argued by Plaintiff, Tourville’s assertion that he was not present in the interview room in North
2 with Plaintiff is a disputed material fact. Indeed, Tourville has not presented any evidence
documenting the time at which he was no longer at Menard. The incident at issue occurred around
11:00 a.m. and possibly continued until Plaintiff was seen in the healthcare unit at 12:45 p.m.
Defendant Tourville authored an Incident Report concerning the June 16, 2017 events at 12:40
p.m. on the same date (see Doc. 79-3). As such, it appears Defendant Tourville was at Menard
until at least 12:40 p.m. on June 16, 2017. Thus, the records relied on by Tourville do not establish
that he was not present in the interview room with Plaintiff in North 2 at the time alleged by
Plaintiff. Defendant Tourville is not entitled to summary judgment on Count One on this basis.
Relatedly, Defendants Tourville, Griffin, Jackson, Caron, and Jones argue there is no
evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims that they used excessive force or assaulted Plaintiff on June
16, 2017. In support of this argument, Defendants cite to Plaintiff’s changing narratives of the
events included in his verified complaint and deposition testimony. The Court notes there are
certainly differences in these two narratives that may go to Plaintiff’s credibility. However, the
Court is not to weigh credibility at this juncture. In any event, the Court finds the nature of the
differences between the verified complaint allegations and deposition testimony is not dispositive
for purposes of summary judgment.
With regard to Defendant Jackson, both Plaintiff’s complaint and deposition testimony
place Jackson as one of the two officers that escorted Plaintiff from the gym to the North 2
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building. Plaintiff contends that during this time Jackson rammed him into gates and doors.
Plaintiff was restrained at this time. This is sufficient at this stage in the proceedings for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant Jackson was involved in the events of June 16, 2017.
Plaintiff also consistently identified Defendants Tourville, Jones, and Griffin in his verified
complaint and deposition testimony as present in the North 2 interview room and involved in either
punching Plaintiff (Tourville) or, at the very least, holding Plaintiff’s arms (Griffin) or doing
nothing while others punched Plaintiff (Jones). Again, this is sufficient at this stage in the
proceedings for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants Tourville, Jones, and Griffin were
involved in the events of June 16, 2017.
For these reasons, Defendants Tourville, Griffin, Jackson, and Jones are not entitled to
summary judgment on Count One.
Defendant Maue
Defendant Maue asserts that Plaintiff is barred from seeking damages in this lawsuit
pursuant to the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-88. In other words, under Heck, an inmate may not
challenge a finding previously established in a criminal or disciplinary proceeding that was
essential to the decision in that proceeding.
Maue contends that Heck bars Plaintiff’s claims against him because Plaintiff pleaded
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guilty to a felony charge of aggravated battery on the factual basis that Plaintiff struck Maue in the
face with a closed fist. Defendant Maue contends the timing of Plaintiff’s interaction that resulted
in Plaintiff’s criminal conviction and Maue’s alleged use of excessive force are such that Heck
applies and bars Plaintiff’s claims. Maue further asserts that his use of force was part of an
ongoing situation caused by Plaintiff’s assault, and that the actions at issue were in response to
that assault and resulted from Maue’s actions employed to gain control of the situation.
Plaintiff asserts that Heck is not applicable and that his plea of guilty to battery and Maue’s
violation of his constitutional rights are not mutually exclusive. Plaintiff relies on McCoy v.
Mennerich, No. 3:18-cv-1297-NJR, 2021 WL 2223783, at *3 (S.D. Ill. June 2, 2021), to support
his proposition. In McCoy, the court considered a circumstance wherein the inmate-plaintiff
struck an officer and was subsequently restrained. Id. at *1. Similar to the facts here, the inmate-
plaintiff pled guilty to aggravated battery. Id. On summary judgment, the defendant-officers
argued the plaintiff’s claims were barred by Heck. The court, however, disagreed. The court
found that the plaintiff freely admitted to striking an officer and that he was subsequently
restrained. Id. at *3. The court found that “[t]he fact that officers were justified in restraining
[the plaintiff] does not mean that any level of force would have been justified … [and found that]
[i]f officers exceeded the level of force justified by the situation, then [the plaintiff] would still
have a claim, and presenting evidence in support of that claim would not be a challenge to his
aggravated assault conviction.” Id.
The circumstances in McCoy are substantially similar to those here. Plaintiff does not
dispute that he struck Maue and was subsequently restrained. Like McCoy, the question presented
in Plaintiff’s claims is whether the force employed by Maue subsequent to Plaintiff’s battery of
Maue was excessive. The Court has reviewed the transcript of Plaintiff’s guilty plea (see Doc.
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79-2) and finds that allowing Plaintiff to proceed against Defendant Maue on his § 1983 claim
does not imply the invalidity of his conviction as it does not provide for any defense of Plaintiff’s
actions. Plaintiff’s claim does nothing to invalidate his admission that he struck Maue.
Defendant Maue is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of Heck.
Defendant Maue also asserts that his use of force against Plaintiff was justified under the
circumstances on June 16, 2017. More specifically, Defendant Maue contends that after Plaintiff
struck him in the face, he returned strikes in an effort to gain compliance and control of the
situation. As such, Defendant Maue contends his efforts were within constitutional bounds and
he had a need to apply force because of the situation.
Defendant Maue is correct that whenever prison officials are accused of using excessive
physical force, a court must determine whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary or
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. In order to make this
determination, a court must examine a variety of factors, including: the need for an application of
force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; the threat reasonably
perceived by the responsible officers; the efforts made to temper the severity of the force
employed; and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 7 (1992). In this instance, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the force employed by
Defendant Maue was applied in good faith and not for purposes of causing harm. Although it is
clear Plaintiff struck Maue and Maue certainly needed to apply some degree of force to restrain
Plaintiff and control the situation, the Court cannot say that Maue’s alleged striking of Plaintiff in
the back of the head after he was restrained with handcuffs was an appropriate use of force. This
is a question for the jury.
For these reasons, Defendant Maue is not entitled to summary judgment on Count One.
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Qualified Immunity
Generally, government officials are protected from civil liability when performing
discretionary functions under the doctrine of qualified immunity so long as “their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v. Litscher,
267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, in order to evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, the
Court engages in a two-part inquiry. The first question is whether the defendants’ conduct
violated a constitutional right. Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The
second question is whether that particular constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time
of the alleged violation. Id. The two questions may be considered in either order. Volkman,
736 F.3d at 1090 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-42).
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff cannot establish
they violated his constitutional rights and, if they were to be held liable on the facts alleged, it
would constitute a heightened standard for what constitutes a constitutional violation.
The Court need not consider the question of qualified immunity as to Defendant Caron
because the Court has already found Caron was not personally liable for the actions at issue in this
lawsuit. With regard to Defendants Tourville, Maue, Jackson, Jones, and Griffin, the Court finds
they are not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of the
alleged incidents that applying force in a manner inconsistent with maintaining or restoring
discipline implicates an inmate’s constitutional rights, and Plaintiff has submitted some evidence
establishing the same.
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Counts Three and Four – State law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
assault and battery against Defendants Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Coron, Tourville, and Jones
Defendants argue that because Plaintiff cannot succeed on his Eighth Amendment claims,
he cannot succeed on his state law claims. Insofar as Plaintiff shall proceed at this stage on his
Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Tourville, and Jones, he
shall be able to proceed on his state law claims (Counts Three and Four) against these Defendants.
The Court need not consider these claims any further as Defendants have not set forth any
additional argument for summary judgment on these claims.
Insofar as there is irrefutable documentary evidence in the record that Caron was not
present at Menard on June 16, 2017 that requires summary judgment in his favor on Count One,
Caron is entitled to summary judgment on Counts Three and Four.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Maue,
Jackson, Griffin, Caron, Tourville, and Jones (Doc. 78) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Chase Caron and against
Plaintiff at the close of this case.
Plaintiff shall proceed on the following claims:
Count One: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Maue, Jackson,
Griffin, Tourville, and Jones for physically assaulting Plaintiff on
June 26, 2017.
Count Three: Intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in violation of
Illinois state law against Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Tourville, and
Jones.
Count Four: Assault and battery claim in violation of Illinois state law against
Maue, Jackson, Griffin, Tourville, and Jones.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 7, 2023
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
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