Seats v. Galloway

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DEVIN SEATS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-1842-NJR

DARREN GALLOWAY, JERRY

JOHNSON, JR., and LT. BRADFORD,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Devin Seats, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Shawnee

Correctional Center. In the Complaint, Seats alleges Defendants violated his due process

rights in a disciplinary hearing. He asserts claims against them under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

In his Complaint, Seats makes the following allegations: On December 22, 2022,

Lieutenant Browning wrote a disciplinary report about Seats, charging him with assault,

dangerous disturbances, and disobeying a direct order (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 16). Seats alleges

that he never received notice of the disciplinary charges or the hearing (Id. at pp. 8-10).

He was not even aware of the specific charges against him because he never received a

copy of the ticket (Id. at p. 10). He further alleges that he was not present during the

disciplinary hearing on January 4, 2023, and the hearing took place despite Seats having

a grievance pending regarding the disciplinary proceedings (Id. at p. 9). He alleges that

adjustment committee members Jerry Johnson and Lieutenant Bradford violated his due

process rights by failing to provide him with notice of the hearing or allowing him to

attend the hearing (Id. at pp. 9-10). He further alleges that Warden Darren Galloway

received a grievance about the due process violations but signed off on the adjustment

committee’s report, despite knowledge of the violations (Id. at p. 8). Seats was found

guilty of the charges and received three months C grade, 28 days segregation, disciplinary

transfer, and six months contact visit restriction (Id. at p. 16).

Discussion

Simply put, the Complaint fails to state a claim. Seats alleges that Defendants

violated his due process rights when they failed to provide him with notice of the

disciplinary hearing and did not allow him to attend the proceedings. “The Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to deprivations of life, liberty, and

property.” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). When an inmate raises a

procedural due process claim, the Court undertakes a two-part analysis. Id. The Court

first evaluates whether the prisoner was deprived of a protected liberty interest, and then

second, evaluates whether the process he was afforded was constitutionally deficient. Id.

(citing Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Seats alleges Defendants violated his due process rights when they disciplined

him without giving him notice of the hearing or allowing him to attend. Due process

safeguards that are associated with prison disciplinary hearings include: (1) advance

written notice of the charges; (2) the opportunity to appear before an impartial hearing

body to contest the charges; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence as a defense (if prison safety allows and subject to the discretion

of correctional officers); and (4) a written statement summarizing the reasons for the

discipline imposed. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974). In addition, the

decision of the adjustment committee must be supported by “some evidence.” Scruggs v.

Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007). Seats adequately alleges that he lacked advance

written notice of the charges and an opportunity to appear at the hearing.

But even if an inmate’s due process rights are violated, as Seats alleges here, he

still may not have a Fourteenth Amendment claim. An inmate’s liberty interests are

protected by the Due Process Clause only insofar as a deprivation of the interest at issue

would impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Seats alleges

that he received three months C grade, a disciplinary transfer, contact visit restrictions,

and 28 days in segregation (Doc. 1, p. 16). But demotion in grade, transfer to another

prison, or limitation on visitations do not invoke due process protections. Antoine v.

Uchtman, 275 F. App’x 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2008) (a month of segregation, loss of commissary

privileges, and loss of employment does not implicate a liberty interest); Hoskins v. Lenear,

395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005) (demotion in status and transfer fail to raise due process

concerns); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761-62, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1997) (temporary stay in

segregation and demotion to C-grade not atypical or significant).

Seats also alleges that he received 28 days in segregation, but typically, short stays

in segregation do not implicate a liberty interest. Thomas, 130 F.3d at 761-62. In assessing

whether disciplinary segregation amounts to a constitutional violation, a court must

examine the length of a prisoner’s confinement in segregation in combination with the

conditions he endured there. Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2015);

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013). Relatively short stints in

segregation do not, on their own, amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest. Thomas,

130 F.3d at 761 (70 days not enough on its own). The Seventh Circuit has noted that a

segregation stint of only 30 days is not enough to invoke due process protections.

See Williams v. Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 157 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Marion v. Columbia Corr.

Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 nn. 2-3 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases on the length and

duration of segregation that invokes a liberty interest)). Here, it is unlikely that his

28 days in segregation would implicate a liberty interest, but Seats fails to offer any

factual allegations to indicate the conditions he faced while in segregation. Such

conditions may implicate a liberty interest if particularly egregious, but the allegations in

the Complaint do not suggest the type of duration and conditions required to state a due

process claim. Thus, Seats fails to state a due process claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Seats also alleges that his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment were violated, and Defendants acted with deliberate indifference and failed

to protect him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. But Seats fails to offer any factual

allegations to support such claims and only states in conclusory fashion that his rights

were violated. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (To establish an equal

protection claim, a plaintiff must show that he is part of a protected class, is similarly

situated to members of unprotected class, and was treated differently.); Santiago v. Wells,

599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (To state a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must allege

that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to that risk.). His conclusory statements are not enough to state any viable

claim. He further alleges his rights were violated because Defendants failed to follow

requirements set forth in IDOC’s Administrative Code and adjustment committee

hearing procedures, but such violations do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 “protects

plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or…departmental

regulations”). Seats simply fails to state any viable claim in relation to his disciplinary

ticket. Thus, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. To the extent that Seats

may be able to a raise a constitutional claim with respect to his disciplinary proceedings,

the Court will allow Seats an opportunity to amend his Complaint.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for

failure to state a claim.

Seats is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before

September 13, 2023. Should Seats fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the

allotted time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall

be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to

prosecute his claims. Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051

(7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The

dismissal shall count as one of Seats’s three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering

the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638

n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments. Thus, the First

Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous pleading,

and Seats must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First

Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is subject to review pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Seats is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action

was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable,

regardless of whether Seats elects to file a First Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Seats is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this Order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 16, 2023

wep AM oanttegl

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge