Smith v. SMS Group Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DELANCEY SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-1303-DWD

)

SMS GROUP, INC., )

SMS GROUP GMBH, )

SMS GMBH, )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

)

SMS GROUP, INC., )

)

Third-Party Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

HEIDTMAN STEEL PRODUCTS, )

INC., )

)

Third-Party Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Now before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by

Defendants SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH (hereinafter referred to collectively as

“Defendants” or the “SMS GMBH Defendants”) (Doc. 56). Defendants seek to dismiss

the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).

Alternatively, they ask the Court to reconsider its prior rulings permitting substituted

service on Defendants. For the reasons detailed below, Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Background

As alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 29), on November 12, 2020,

Plaintiff Delancey Smith was operating and working with a coil slitter at a steel

processing and factory plant in Granite City, Illinois (Doc. 29, ¶ 10). Plaintiff describes

the coil slitter as “a Pro-Eco steel coil slitting line, described as GCS3 and identified as

S.O. 6690” (Doc. 29, ¶ 1). While operating the coil slitter, its “pusher plate” failed to return

to the proper position and Plaintiff became trapped between the coil slitter’s bearing arm

and the coil slitter (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 11-14). The bearing arm failed to retract, and the coil

slitter’s power failed, keeping Plaintiff trapped until a total machine reset was performed

and causing severe and extensive injuries to Plaintiff (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 15-16). Plaintiff alleges

multiple defects in the coil slitter’s design, manufacturing, and marketing and brings

strict liability and negligence counts against Defendants (Doc. 29).

Plaintiff maintains that the coil slitter involved in his accident was manufactured,

designed, and sold by the entity Pro-Eco Ltd. (“Pro-Eco”) (Doc. 29, ¶ 6(a)). Plaintiff alleges

that Pro-Eco dissolved as a business entity sometime after 2000 when it entered into a

purchase or merger agreement with the entity SMS Demag, Inc. (Doc. 29, ¶ 6(a)-(d)).

Thus, Plaintiff named three entities as Defendants whom he alleges “are the lawful

successors of Pro-Eco and assumed certain liabilities of Pro-Eco.” (Doc. 29, ¶ 6). These

entities include Defendants SMS Group, Inc., SMS Group GMBH, and SMS GMBH (Doc.

29). SMS Group, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

Pennsylvania (Doc. 29, ¶ 3). SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH are German

corporations with principal places of business located in Germany (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 4-5).

According to Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 Disclosure Statements, SMS GMBH is the

parent corporation of both SMS Group GMBH and SMS Group, Inc. (Docs. 17, 58, 59).

SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH dispute that they are successors to Pro-Eco

and further move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them for a lack of personal

jurisdiction. Defendant SMS Group, Inc. did not join in these motions, but also denies

that it is the lawful successor of Pro-Eco (See Doc. 17). In recent filings, Plaintiff and

Defendants appear to suggest that Pro-Eco assets were sold to another SMS entity, non-

party SMS Concast Canada, Inc., in or about 2013 (Doc. 70, ¶ 8; Doc. 57-1, p.2, ¶ 6). Thus,

the parties speculate that SMS Concast Canada, Inc. may be the proper successor to Pro-

Eco. Plaintiff has therefore sought leave to amend his complaint to add SMS Concast

Canada, Inc. as a defendant.

Legal Standard

When personal jurisdiction is challenged under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Matlin

v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2019); Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-

Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court may decide a motion to

dismiss based on submitted written materials, and without holding an evidentiary

hearing, so long as the Court resolves all factual disputes in Plaintiffs’ favor. Purdue

Research Foundation, 338 F.3d at 783; see also uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421,

423–24 (7th Cir. 2010); Leong v. SAP Am., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2012).

If the Court consults only the written materials, the plaintiff need only make a prima

facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Matlin, 921 F.3d 701; Purdue Research Foundation,

338 F.3d at 782 (citing Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Further, where, as here, Defendant has submitted evidence opposing the exercise

of personal jurisdiction, “the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit

affirmative evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.” Purdue Research Foundation,

338 F.3d at 783. The Court will accept as true any facts contained in Defendants’ affidavits

that remain unrefuted by Plaintiff. See GCIU-Emp. Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d

1018, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009); Joy v. Hay Grp., Inc., No. 02 C 4989, 2003 WL 22118930, at *2

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003) (“Once a fact is challenged by an affidavit from the defendant,

the plaintiff has an obligation to provide an additional affidavit supporting his or her

contention.”).

Discussion

“As a procedural matter, federal courts look to state law in determining the

bounds of their jurisdiction over a party.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir.

2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). Because the Illinois long-arm statute permits a

court to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, “the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements

merge.” Brook, 873 F.3d at 552 (citing Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir.

2010)). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a

court to render a judgment over nonresident defendants.” Brook, 873 F.3d at 552 (internal

citations omitted). Thus, personal jurisdiction is only proper if a defendant has sufficient

minimum contacts with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co.

v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). “While the

defendant's physical presence in the forum State is not required, there must be sufficient

minimum contacts such that he or she ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into

court there.’” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).

Personal jurisdiction can be established through general or specific jurisdiction.

General jurisdiction, or “all-purpose” jurisdiction, allows a court to hear any and all

claims against foreign corporations when their “affiliations with the State in which suit

is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render them essentially at home in the

forum State.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)). Determining whether a corporation is

“at home” in a particular state “calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their

entirety, nationwide and worldwide” because “[a] corporation that operates in many

places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 138, n. 20.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified only two places where a corporation is “at

home”: the state of the corporation's principal place of business and the state of its

incorporation. Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137.

“Specific” or “case-linked” jurisdiction requires an affiliation between the forum

and the underlying controversy—that is, an “activity or an occurrence that takes place in

the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. 915; Brook, 873 F.3d at 552 (“Specific jurisdiction requires a

defendant's contacts with the forum State to be directly related to the conduct pertaining

to the claims asserted.”). Specific jurisdiction arises where an out-of-state defendant has

“’purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results

from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Burger King Corp., 471

U.S. at 472–73 (internal citations omitted).

“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and

the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014) (quotation omitted). “The mere

fact that a defendant's conduct affects a plaintiff with connections to the forum State is

not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.” Id. at 290. Rather, the out-of-state defendant must

purposefully direct its activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation must “arise

out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum state.” Curry v.

Revolution Lab'ys, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 396 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burger King Corp., 471

U.S. at 475). The defendant's relationship with the plaintiff or a third party, standing

alone, is insufficient to create the necessary “minimum contacts.” See Walden, 571 U.S. at

286.

Plaintiff does not argue that general jurisdiction exists over the SMS GMBH

Defendants, thus the Court focuses its analysis on whether Defendants are subject to

specific personal jurisdiction in this Court. Defendants argue that they maintain separate

corporate identities from all the named parties in this matter, and have no connection to

the former Pro-Eco corporation (Doc. 57). They further argue that they have no

connection with Illinois, do not design, manufacture, engineer, construct, market, sell, or

install any coil slitter components or parts in Illinois or elsewhere, and have no other

connections to Illinois, Plaintiff, or the coil slitter at issue in this matter. In support of

their motion to dismiss, Defendants provided affidavits from Sabine Schmeinck (Doc. 57-

1, Doc. 73)1, who attested to the following on behalf of SMS GMBH and SMS Group

GMBH:

1. SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH are German corporations with

their headquarters, home offices, and principal places of business in Germany

(Doc. 57-1, ¶ 5; Doc. 73, ¶5).

2. SMS GMBH is a holding company and “does not design,

manufacture, engineer, construct, market, sell, or install any products,” including

coil slitter or coil slitter components or parts (Doc. 73, ¶ 6). It has not designed,

manufactured, sold, delivered, or issued warranties on any good or product in

Illinois or the United States, has not participated in the decision to sell or deliver

any good or product to Illinois or the United States, and has not supervised,

managed, or conducted a recall or replacement program of any kind in Illinois or

the United States (Doc. 73, ¶ 7(f)-(h)).

3. SMS GMBH “does not operate, conduct, engage in, carry on, or

transact business of any kind, including coil slitters, coil slitter components or

parts, in Illinois or in the United States of America” (Doc. 73, ¶¶ 7, 7(j), 9)). It

maintains no offices, places of business, post office boxes, telephone listings, real

1 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law omitted the affidavit of SMS GMBH (Doc. 57), and instead contained

duplicate copies of the SMS Group GMBH affidavit (See Doc. 57-1, 57-2). However, Defendants submitted

the corrected SMS GMBH Affidavit on April 26, 2023 (Doc. 73). No parties objected to Defendants

submission of the corrected attachment.

estate, bank accounts, or other interests in property in Illinois or the United States,

and has not incurred any obligation to pay or paid Illinois or United States federal

taxes (Doc. 73, ¶ 7(a)-(c)). It has no agents, distributors, sales representatives, or

employees in Illinois or the United States (Doc. 73, ¶ 7(d)-(e)). It has not engaged

in or participated in any advertising campaign, marketing campaign, or

promotion for coil slitters in Illinois or the United States (Doc. 73, ¶ 7(i)).

4. SMS GMBH does not conduct any activities in Illinois, does not have

a license to do business in Illinois, does not maintain a registered agent for service

of process in Illinois or the United States, and has not authorized anyone to act as

its agent for service of process in Illinois (Doc. 73, ¶ 8).

5. SMS Group GMBH is not a successor to Pro-Eco Ltd., and assumed

no liabilities of Pro-Eco Ltd. Instead, Pro-Eco Ltd. ceased business in 2013,

ultimately merging with SMS Concast Canada Inc., with its obligations to creditors

satisfied and remaining assets sold to SMS Concast Canada Inc. (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 6).

6. SMS Group GMBH is not a successor to SMS Group, Inc. and has not

assumed the liabilities of SMS Group, Inc. Instead, SMS Group, Inc. is a wholly

owned subsidiary of SMS Group GMBH (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 7).

7. SMS Group GMBH has “not engaged in the design, manufacturing,

engineering, construction, marketing, selling, installing, maintaining, and/or

supplying of any parts for, the Coil slitter identified in the Complaint, nor assumed

any liabilities of Pro-Eco for Pro-Eco products.” (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 8).

8. SMS Group GMBH does not sell, and has never sold, a coil slitter or

coil slitter components parts in Illinois (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 9).

9. SMS Group GMBH has never maintained offices, places of business,

post office boxes, or telephone listings in Illinois (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 10). It has never

owned real estate or other property interests, or held a bank account in Illinois

(Doc. 57-1, ¶ 11), and has not paid taxes or incurred an obligation to pay taxes in

Illinois (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 12).

10. SMS Group GMBH has no sales representatives or employees

working in Illinois, and have not recruited any employees from Illinois (Doc. 57-1,

¶¶ 13-14),

11. SMS Group GMBH has not (a) designed, manufactured, sold,

delivered, or issued warranties on any goods or products in Illinois, including coil

slitters or coil slitter lines, (b) supervised, managed or conducted a recall or

replacement program in Illinois, (c) engaged or participated in any advertising,

marketing, or promotion campaign for coil slitters or coil slitter parts in Illinois, or

(d) served the Illinois market for coil slitters or coil slitter lines (Doc. 57-1, ¶¶ 15-

18)

12. SMS Group GMBH does not have any manufacturing plants in the

United States or Illinois for coil slitters or other products, and do not have any

distributors in the United States or Illinois for coil slitters or coil slitter lines (Doc.

57-1, ¶ 19); and

13. SMS Group GMBH does not have a license to do business in Illinois,

does not maintain a registered agent in Illinois, and is not considered at home in

Illinois (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 20).

Ms. Schmeinck also attested to the separate corporate identities of SMS GMBH and

SMS Group GMBH, and the other entities identified in Plaintiff’s complaint, including

Pro-Eco, Ltd., SMS Group, Inc., SMS Demag Inc., and SMS Siemag Inc. (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 21;

Doc. 73, ¶¶ 10-11). Specifically, she stated that SMS GMBH “is and always has been a

separate corporation from companies whose stock ownership it holds … and has not

conducted business in Illinois or anywhere else through these companies” (Doc. 73, ¶ 10).

She further stated that SMS GMBH and SMS Group GMBH are separate corporations,

maintain separate daily operations, conduct separate board meetings, keep separate

books and accounts, file separate taxes, and do not share common departments or

business (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 21(a)-(f); Doc. 73, ¶11). Finally, she stated that SMS GMBH has not

established any daily management policies for these other entities, and no SMS GMBH

employee has day-to-day managerial responsibility over the other entities named in the

complaint (Doc. 73, ¶ 11(a), (e)).

Defendants contend that, at best, Plaintiff’s claims, and the specific Pro-Eco coil

splitter at issue in this matter, may involve another SMS entity, specifically the Canadian

based SMS Concast Canada Inc. (See Doc. 57-1, ¶ 6). However, Defendants argue that

this entity is legally distinct from them, and that Plaintiff has not established that the

jurisdictional contacts of SMS Concast Canada, Inc. or Defendant SMS Group, Inc. should

be imputed to them merely because of their status as parent companies or some other

related entity. (Doc. 57, p. 6). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit maintains a “general rule” that

“jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary corporation are not imputed to the parent.” Abelesz

v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 658 (7th Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff cannot establish personal jurisdiction over them.

In response, Plaintiff contends that the allegations in his complaint are sufficient

to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Specifically,

Plaintiff points to his allegations in Paragraphs 6, 8, and 17 of his Amended Complaint

where he avers that “one or more Defendants are the lawful successors of Pro-Eco and

assumed certain liabilities of Pro-Eco”) (Doc. 29). Plaintiff argues that these allegations

are sufficient to impose successor liability on Defendants as successors to the dissolved

Pro-Eco, Ltd. or as a parent entity of Defendant SMS Group, Inc. (Doc. 65) (citing Auto

Driveaway Franchise Sys., LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, No. 18 CV 4971, 2019 WL

3302223, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2019) (finding personal jurisdiction on a successor

liability theory where the successor provided similar services, shared some of the same

personnel, and the successor purchased some of the predecessor’s assets)).

However, Plaintiff does not explicitly address Defendants’ arguments concerning

Defendants’ specific and distinct legal identities. Instead, the allegations in the Complaint

refer to the SMS GMBH Defendants collectively with the third Defendant in this matter,

Defendant SMS Group, Inc, and with no distinction between the three different entities

(See Doc. 29, ¶ 6) (referring to “one or more” of the Defendants, defined as SMS GMBH,

SMS Group GMBH, and SMS Group, Inc.). This is problematic because the jurisdiction

over a parent corporation does not automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly

owned subsidiary. See Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984); Purdue Research

Foundation, 338 F.3d at 785 (finding no successor liability where, rather than refer to the

defendant entity as a “mere continuation”, it was “far more accurate” to regard them as

having “purchased particular assets.”). 2

The Court is also entitled to accept as true any unchallenged facts contained

Defendants’ affidavits. See GCIU-Employer Retirement Fund, 565 F.3d at 1020; Joy, 2003 WL

22118930, at *2 (“Once a fact is challenged by an affidavit from the defendant, the plaintiff

has an obligation to provide an additional affidavit supporting his or her contention.”).

Although Plaintiff submitted six documents allegedly connecting the former Pro-Eco,

Ltd. coil splitter to Defendants (Docs. 65-1, 65-2, 65-3, 65-4, 65-5, 65-6)., these documents

do not reference SMS Group GMBH or SMS GMBH specifically. Plaintiff’s documents

consist of screenshots of internet webpages and purchase documents for the coil splitter

at issue in this matter. However, without a reference to SMS Group GMBH or SMS

GMBH specifically, the documents are generally consistent with Defendants’ arguments

that a different SMS entity is the proper party here.

Indeed, two of the internet pages cited by Plaintiff suggest a connection with the

United States based SMS Group, Inc. (Doc. 65-1; Doc. 65-4) (citing to sms-group.us and

2 Separately, Plaintiff also makes these allegations on “information and belief.” Typically, jurisdictional

allegations made “upon information and belief” are not sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,

Am.'s Best Inns, Inc. v. Best Inns of Abilene, L.P., 980 F.2d 1072, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992) (Jurisdictional allegations

made “upon information and belief” are not sufficient to support federal diversity jurisdiction); Page v.

Wright, 116 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1940) (expressing doubt that allegations of party's citizenship for

diversity purposes made only on information and belief can suffice to establish jurisdiction). However, the

Court need not reach that issue here because Plaintiff’s additional evidence does not establish personal

jurisdiction.

sms-group.com/en-us/company/our-heritage)3 or SMS Concast Canada (Doc. 65-3)

(citing to sms-concast.ch/about-us/locations). Further, the coil-splitter documents refer

only to SMS DEMAG Group, which is an SMS entity Defendants have affirmatively

disclaimed any managerial or other interest in apart from SMS GMBH’s stock ownership

(Doc. 57-1, ¶ 21; Doc. 73, ¶¶ 10-11). Finally, the relevant corporate addresses on the

purchase orders refer to addresses in the United States and Canada (Doc. 65-5), and gives

no indication of a connection to Defendants’ Germany based entities.

In sum, the documents Plaintiff submitted in response to Defendants’ Motion do

not establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction here such to overcome the

undisputed facts contained in Defendants’ affidavits. As outlined above, Defendants

provided affidavits from Defendants attesting that Defendants are not successors to Pro-

Eco, and that they maintain separate and distinct corporate identities from the other SMS

entities (Doc. 57-1; Doc. 73). Defendants’ affidavits also stated that the proper successor

entity to Pro-Eco is SMS Concast Canada, Inc. (Doc. 57-1, ¶ 6). Plaintiff does not refute

this testimony. Instead, Plaintiff has sought leave to file a second amended complaint to

add SMS Concast Canada, Inc. as a party based on Defendants’ representations that it is

the proper successor entity here (Doc. 70).

In all, Plaintiff’s documents are not inconsistent with Defendants’ arguments that

they are the incorrect SMS entity. Nor do the documents supply sufficient contacts for

the Court to impute jurisdictional contacts onto Defendants as alleged parent companies

3 The exact web addresses identified in these exhibits were partially obscured and illegible.

to the correct SMS entity or successor of Pro-Eco. As mentioned above, the Seventh

Circuit applies “the ‘general rule’ that ‘the jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary

corporation are not imputed to the parent.’” Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 658 (quoting Purdue

Research Foundation, 338 F.3d at 788); see also Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v.

Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 943 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We join other courts in

finding that stock ownership in or affiliation with a corporation, without more, is not a

sufficient minimum contact.”).

Instead, “[d]ue process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum

State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or

attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.”

Walden, 571 U.S. at 286 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475); see also IDS Life Ins.

Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Parents of wholly owned

subsidiaries necessarily control, direct, and supervise the subsidiaries to some extent, but

unless there is a basis for piercing the corporate veil and thus attributing the subsidiaries’

torts to the parent, the parent is not liable for those torts.”). Here, there is simply no

indication that SMS Group GMBH or SMS GMBH have or maintain sufficient contacts

with Illinois for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. Nor has Plaintiff

offered a sufficient basis for piercing the separate corporate identities in this case to

impute jurisdictional contacts of some other SMS entity to Defendants.

Because the litigation does not arise from contacts that Defendants themselves

created with Illinois or actions purposefully directed at residents of Illinois, the Court

FINDS that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of specific personal

jurisdiction with regard to both SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH. For these reasons,

the Court concludes that it has no personal jurisdiction over Defendants SMS Group

GMBH and SMS GMBH. As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants must be

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

Plaintiff moves to file a Second Amended Complaint and to add non-party, SMS

Concast Canada, Inc. as a party based on Defendants’ representations that it is the proper

successor entity to Pro-Eco Ltd. (Doc. 70). No party has filed an objection to this Motion,

and the time for doing so has now passed. See SDIL-LR 7.1. Further, the Court is mindful

that leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a); Pugh v. Trib. Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to Amend (Doc. 70) will be granted. Further, as the pending Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by Defendant SMS Group, Inc. (Doc. 69) is directed at Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint, this Motion (Doc. 69) will be denied, as moot.

Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, Defendants SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH’s

Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 56)

is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH

are DISMSISED for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

terminate SMS Group GMBH and SMS GMBH from the docket sheet.

Further, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 70)

is GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to file his Second Amended Complaint by June 23,

2023. Further, as the pending Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant SMS

Group, Inc. (Doc. 69) is directed at Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, this Motion (Doc.

69) is DENIED as moot, and without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2023

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

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