Golden v. Cox

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ERIC GOLDEN, #B-05324 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 19-cv-855-RJD

)

IAN COX, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ian Cox, Marcus Myers, Sr., and

Charles Heck violated his First Amendment rights at Pinckneyville Correctional Center by

disciplining him for security threat group activity when he was actually communicating with an

individual regarding his religion (Doc. 14). This matter comes before the Court on Motions in

Limine Filed by Plaintiff (Docs. 82-87), to which Defendants filed a Response (Doc. 95).

Defendants also filed Motions in Limine (Doc. 88), to which Plaintiff filed Responses (Doc. 92,

93, and 94).

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Docs. 82-87)

1. Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s criminal convictions (Doc. 82)

Plaintiff asks the Court to bar any references to his prior criminal convictions and the 40-

year sentence he is currently serving. In a civil case, evidence of a witness’s criminal conviction

must be admitted for the purpose of attacking the witness’s character for truthfulness if the

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conviction was punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year. Fed. R. Evid.

609(a)(1)(a). However, the Court may exclude evidence of the conviction if “its probative value

is substantially outweighed by a danger of…unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

At the time of the events in question, Plaintiff was serving a 40-year sentence on a murder-

for-hire conviction. Plaintiff argues that he will be unfairly prejudiced if the jury knows the nature

of his crime, and the Court is inclined to agree. Of course, the jury will know that Plaintiff was

incarcerated at Pinckneyville. In §1983 cases involving conditions of confinement, the

undersigned typically allows the jury to hear that the plaintiff was convicted of a felony for which

he was incarcerated at the time of the events in question, but does not allow the jury to hear about

the particular crime (unless the crime is particularly probative of the plaintiff’s truthfulness, and

he is testifying). Defendants object to Plaintiff’s motion in limine, but provide no justification for

the undersigned to deviate from typical practice. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1 is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. For purposes of impeachment, Defendants may

introduce evidence that Plaintiff was convicted of a felony for which he was incarcerated at the

time of the events in question, but may not introduce evidence of the specific crime or the length

of Plaintiff’s sentence.

2. Shackles and prison uniform (Doc. 83)

Plaintiff asks that the Court allow him to wear plain clothes (not his prison uniform) and

be restraint-free during trial. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2 is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. The Court will allow Plaintiff to wear plain clothes and will also attempt to

prevent the jury from seeing any restraints on Plaintiff; if possible, the Court will not ask Plaintiff

to move from the plaintiff’s table in the presence of the jury. The Court will otherwise defer to

the Illinois Department of Corrections, the U.S. Marshals Service, and courtroom security officers

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regarding necessary restraints.

3. Qualified immunity (Doc. 84)

In their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39), Defendants argued that they were

entitled to qualified immunity, which “protects government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 785 (7th

Cir. 2020). Their Motion for Summary Judgment was denied (Doc. 56). Now, under the guise

of a Motion in Limine, Plaintiff requests that the Court find Defendants’ qualified immunity

defense is “moot and should be dismissed.” From a procedural standpoint, Plaintiff’s request is

more similar to a dispositive motion than a motion in limine, which “is a pretrial request that

certain inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial.” Empire Bucket, Inc. v.

Contractors Cargo Co., 739 F.3d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

1109 (9th ed. 2009).

Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s request to “dismiss” Defendants’ qualified

immunity defense, the substance of Plaintiff’s motion is not well-founded. Plaintiff argues that

“the only remaining issues at trial are fact questions for the jury to address.” The issue of qualified

immunity can be raised at any time and is resolved by the judge. Henry, 969 F.3d at 786-87

(internal citations and quotations omitted); Smith v. Finkley, 10 F. 4th 725, 750 (7th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiff then asks the Court to bar “any evidence, testimony, or argument at trial relating

to qualified immunity because the issue is for the Court.” The Court does not anticipate defense

counsel would argue to the jury that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity any more

than defense counsel would argue to the jury that a directed verdict should be entered. Plaintiff’s

Motion in Limine No. 3 is DENIED.

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4. References to Plaintiff’s Incarcerated Status (Doc. 85)

Plaintiff asks that Defendants and their attorneys refrain from referring to Plaintiff as a

“prisoner” or “inmate” or “felon” or “convict” at trial. Plaintiff also asks that Defendants and

their attorneys refrain from referencing the security levels of Statesville, Pinckneyville, Western

Illinois, and Danville Correctional Centers. Defendants have no objection to this motion, as

long as Plaintiff does not “open the door” regarding these topics. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

No. 4 is GRANTED. The parties are reminded that rulings in limine may be revisited at trial.

Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 41-

42 (1984)).

5. Plaintiff’s other lawsuits (Doc. 86)

Defendants have no objection to this Motion, which asks that Defendants and their counsel

refrain from mentioning Plaintiff’s other lawsuits. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 5 is

GRANTED.

6. Dismissed claims (Doc. 87)

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint contained a 14th Amendment claim against

Defendants, and he also alleged that Defendants were liable in their official capacities. Those

claims were previously dismissed by the Court. Plaintiff asks that Defendants refrain from

mentioning those claims at trial, and Defendants have no objection. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

No. 6 is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motions in Limine (Doc. 88)

1. Illinois Administrative Code and IDOC Administrative and Institutional

Directives

Defendants ask the Court to bar evidence of the Illinois Administrative Code and IDOC

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Administrative and Institutional Directives. Plaintiff objects. At the final pretrial conference,

Plaintiff’s counsel explained that Plaintiff seeks to admit certain IDOC regulations and directives

in order to “set forth what [Defendants] were supposed to do in evaluating whether or not [an

inmate] has a protected religious interest.” The directives and regulations are not admissible for

that purpose; a defendant’s violation of department regulations or even state law “is completely

immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the federal Constitution has been

established” in a §1983 claim. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th 2006); see

also Williams v. Shah, 927 F.3d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 2019) (“section 1983 protects plaintiffs from

constitutional violations, not violation of state law or departmental regulations” (quoting

Thompson)).

However, Defendants have also listed certain directives in the parties’ proposed exhibit

list, explaining that they “may” need to introduce them into evidence. On a motion in limine, it

is the movant’s burden to establish that the evidence in question is not “admissible for any

purpose.” Mason v. City of Chicago, 631 F. Supp.2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Because

Defendants contemplate the IDOC regulations and directives may be relevant at trial, the Court

will not bar them in limine. If one of the parties attempts to admit them into evidence at trial, the

Court will consider their relevancy in context of other evidence presented. Defendants’ Motion

in Limine No. 1 is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ alleged violation of Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment Rights

Defendants ask that the Court prohibit Plaintiff from presenting evidence regarding

Defendants’ alleged violations of Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment rights (a claim that was pled in

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and later dismissed), or any constitutional right other than

the First Amendment. Plaintiff has no objection. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 is

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GRANTED.

3. Indemnification of Defendants

Defendants move to bar evidence or reference to the State of Illinois potentially

indemnifying Defendants in this matter. Plaintiff has no objection. Defendants’ Motion in

Limine No. 3 is GRANTED.

4. Other lawsuits involving Defendants

Defendants request that no evidence be presented regarding other lawsuits against

Defendants. Plaintiff does not object. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4 is GRANTED.

5. Previous misconduct by Defendants

Defendants ask the Court to exclude all evidence of complaints, reports, or inquiries made

regarding allegations of misconduct by Defendants. Plaintiff objects to this motion, but has no

such evidence at this time. Plaintiff’s counsel explained at the final pretrial conference that they

intend to ask Defendants about whether they have ever been named in a lawsuit involving similar

allegations. Such questioning would violate the order on Motion in Limine No. 4.

In any event, the record before the Court currently reflects no previous misconduct by

Defendants. To the extent prior misconduct by Defendants occurred or allegedly occurred (other

than in a lawsuit involving Defendants) and is brought up at trial, the Court is currently unable to

evaluate whether such evidence is admissible for any purpose and therefore Defendants’ Motion

in Limine No. 5 is DENIED.

6. Golden rule appeal

Defendants request that the Court bar Plaintiff from asking the jury to put themselves in

Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff has no objection. Defendants’ Motion in Limine #6 is GRANTED.

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7. Plaintiff’s grievances

Defendants ask that none of Plaintiff’s grievances be admitted because they are hearsay.

Plaintiff contends that his grievances are admissible for two purposes. First, Plaintiff argues that

the grievances show he was sincere about his religious beliefs, because immediately after he was

disciplined he submitted grievances regarding the disciplinary report and hearing. Plaintiff may

testify that he submitted grievances after he received the disciplinary ticket, but the Court will not

admit the actual grievances to bolster Plaintiff’s testimony.

Plaintiff submitted two grievances regarding his religion prior to the events at issue in this

case. He argues those grievances should be admitted to show that Defendants were aware of his

religious affiliation. The Court cannot evaluate that argument because no evidence in the record

reflects that Defendants were aware of the grievances. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 7 is

TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT and will be reevaluated in context of other evidence admitted

at trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 10, 2023

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

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