Johnson v. Gomez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MAURICE S. JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-860-NJR

)

)

DEE DEE BROOKHART, JENNINGS, )

PUCKETT, OCHS, GIVINGS, TYE, )

PURDUE, SHERRY BENTON, )

ANTHONY WILLS, RYAN A. )

KILDUFF, and CHRISTINA ALLSUP, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Maurice S. Johnson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action

for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His Complaint

(Doc. 1) was dismissed for violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (Doc. 18)

because he sought to sue numerous individuals across three prisons for various

constitutional violations. In his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 19), Johnson alleges

individuals at Lawrence and Menard Correctional Centers violated his due process rights

while housed in unapproved protective custody status.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Amended Complaint

In his First Amended Complaint, Johnson makes the following allegations: While

he was housed at Lawrence Correctional Center in August 2021, Lawrence was

reclassified as a maximum security facility and its protective custody placement was

abolished (Doc. 19, p. 9). As a result, Johnson was held in restricted housing/segregation

and subjected to the use of handcuffs, waist chains, and leg irons anytime he was

removed from his cell (Id.). He also was denied access to religious services, the law

library, visitation with family, and outdoor recreation (Id.). Johnson describes the housing

units he was held in as condemned and unsanitary, lacking both heat and hot water (Id.).

Johnson blames Warden Brookhart, Assistant Warden Jennings, Lieutenants Givings,

Tye, Puckett, and Ochs, and Sergeant Purdue for the failure to maintain a protective

custody area of the prison and for subjecting him to the conditions in segregation.

Johnson alleges that he had a due process right to be free from handcuffs, waist chains,

and leg irons, and he was entitled to some sort of process before being subjected to the

restraints (Id. at pp. 9-10).

In addition to his due process claims, Johnson alleges that his conditions in

unapproved protective custody status amounted to cruel and unusual punishment

because he was not provided with hot water, heat, outdoor time, visitation, law library

services, educational or religious services, and access to commissary (Id. at p. 12). Johnson

further alleges that all defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances (Id. at p. 13).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court finds it

convenient to divide the pro se action into the following counts:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against

Brookhart, Jennings, Tye, Purdue, Puckett, and Ochs for

failing to maintain a protective custody unit and, instead,

placing Johnson in segregation.

Count 2: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against

Brookhart, Jennings, Givings, Tye, Puckett, Ochs, and

Purdue for subjecting Johnson to handcuffs, waist chains,

and leg irons.

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against

Brookhart, Jennings, Givings, Tye, Puckett, Ochs, and

Purdue for subjecting him to atypical and significant

hardships while in unapproved protective custody status at

Lawrence.

Count 4: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against

Brookhart, Jennings, Puckett, Ochs, and Purdue for denying

Johnson access to services while in unapproved protective

custody status at Lawrence.

Count 5: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim

against Brookhart, Jennings, Givings, Tye, Puckett, Ochs,

Purdue, and Anthony Wills for housing Johnson in

unapproved protective custody status where he lacked hot

water, heat, outdoor recreation, visitation, law library

services, educational services, religious services, and

commissary access.

Count 6: First Amendment claim against Brookhart, Jennings,

Givings, Tye, Puckett, Ochs, Purdue, and Wills for failing

to allow Johnson access to video/contact visits or religious

services.

Count 7: First Amendment retaliation claim against Brookhart,

Jennings, Givings, Puckett, Ochs, Purdue, Sherry Benton,

Ryan A. Kilduff, Anthony Wills, and Christina Allsup for

placing him in unapproved protective custody status

without access to services, transferring him to Menard, and

refusing to transfer him to a medium security prison in

retaliation for filing grievances.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly

pleading standard.1

Due Process Claims in Counts 1, 2, and 3

Simply put, Johnson again fails to state a due process claim. In essence, Johnson

argues that his due process rights were violated while he was in unapproved protective

custody status because Lawrence did not maintain a place for such individuals. As a

result, Johnson alleges that he was subjected to segregation and disciplinary-like

conditions with the use of handcuffs, waist chains, and leg irons, without due process.

But security classifications of inmates do not entitle an inmate to due process protections.

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). Nor do inmates have any liberty interest in

protective custody placement. See Kellas v. Lane, 923 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that

Illinois prison regulations governing protective custody “do not create a due process

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

claim of entitlement on the inmates’ behalf.”). And Johnson has not alleged how long he

was subjected to segregation-like conditions. See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir.

2005) (90 days in segregation with loss of contact visits, loss of telephone and commissary

privileges, and the inability to participate in programs did not implicate protected liberty

interests); see also Williams v. Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 156 (7th Cir. 2021) (only lengthy

period of segregation and harsh conditions will violate due process). In fact, his attached

grievance seems to suggest he was only housed in restrictive housing at Lawrence from

December 12, 2021, to January 13, 2022, approximately one month (Doc. 19, p. 19). Thus,

he fails to implicate a protected liberty interest.

As this is Johnson’s second attempt at amending these claims and he is unable to

state a due process claim, Counts 1, 2, and 3 are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Count 4

Johnson also fails to state an equal protection claim. He merely states in conclusory

fashion that his placement in segregation and lack of access to amenities and programs

violated his equal protection rights (Doc. 19, p. 11). To state an equal protection claim, a

plaintiff must allege that he or she is a member of a protected class and that state actors

treated members of the prisoner’s class less favorably than people not in the class but

who are similarly situated. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005). Johnson’s

Amended Complaint fails to allege such a claim. Specifically, he fails to allege that he was

a member of a protected class or that he was treated differently from other similarly

situated inmates. Thus, Count 4 is also DISMISSED with prejudice.

Count 5

Johnson also alleges that his conditions in segregation violated his Eighth

Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. He alleges that while in

unapproved protective custody status he lacked hot water and heat, and was limited in

his recreation time, visitation, library services, and educational/religious services. But

Johnson fails to allege that any of the defendants identified were aware of the conditions

he faced during his confinement. He does not allege that he spoke to any of them. Instead,

he only offers conclusory statements that they violated his rights. He also lists Anthony

Wills as a defendant for this claim, but Wills was the warden at Menard Correctional

Center at the time, and there are no allegations to suggest that he had any knowledge or

control over the conditions at Lawrence Correctional Center (Doc. 19, p. 4). Thus, Count

5 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Count 6

Similarly, Johnson’s First Amendment claim also fails because Johnson only offers

conclusory statements that he was denied access to religious services while in

unapproved protective custody status. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits a prison from

imposing a “substantial burden” on a “central religious belief or practice,” unless the

burden is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. Kaufman v. Pugh, 733

F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). But Johnson fails to allege that he faced a substantial burden

because he fails to allege what, if any, religious services he requested to attend and was

denied due to his status in restrictive housing. Nor does he indicate how long he was

denied access to religious services or how that denial placed a burden on his religious

practice. Thus, Count 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Count 7

Finally, Johnson’s retaliation claim in Count 7 also fails because he offers only

conclusory statements that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances

(Doc. 19, pp. 12-13). Although he alleges that he was subjected to a number of conditions

while at Lawrence and was transferred to Menard, a maximum security prison, he fails

to allege that his speech was at least a motivating factor for the actions taken against him.

See Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). He only offers conclusory statements

that he wrote grievances and was retaliated against by being housed in Lawrence’s

restrictive housing unit and later transferred to Menard. He has not alleged what

personal involvement, if any, each defendant had in the decisions regarding his

placement. Further, he alleges that grievance officials, including Administrative Review

Board members Benton and Kilduff, as well as his counselor Allsup, retaliated against

him, but mishandling or denying a grievance by those who did not participate in the

underlying conduct does not state a claim. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir.

2011). There are no allegations to suggest the grievance official’s roles in the alleged

retaliation. Thus, Count 7 is also DISMISSED without prejudice.

Accordingly, Johnson’s First Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal. Again,

this is Johnson’s second attempt to draft a viable complaint. As mentioned above, his

original Complaint was dismissed because he attempted to sue numerous individuals

across three institutions for various individual actions. In this First Amended Complaint,

he has narrowed down the individuals and institutions, but his amended pleading

contains mostly conclusory statements. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require

“simple, concise, and direct” allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A complaint must also

include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The purpose of these rules is to “give

defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds for supporting the

claims.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. Although Johnson appears to have attempted to provide simple

allegations, he does not provide enough factual description to provide defendants with

fair notice of the claims against them. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Johnson could

possibly pursue viable claims, particularly in Counts 5, 6, and 7 regarding his conditions

of confinement, inability to access religious services, and retaliation at Lawrence. Thus,

the Court will allow Johnson one final attempt to submit an amended pleading which

sets forth viable claims. If he chooses to do so, Johnson must comply with the instructions

and deadlines set forth below.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Johnson’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED

without prejudice. Johnson is GRANTED leave to file a “Second Amended Complaint”

on or before June 5, 2023. Should Johnson fail to file his Second Amended Complaint

within the allotted time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the

entire case shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order

and/or for failure to prosecute his claims. Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v.

Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994);

28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). The dismissal shall count as one of Johnson’s three allotted “strikes”

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An amended complaint supersedes and replaces all previous pleadings, rendering

them void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir.

2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to a Complaint. Thus, the Second

Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any previous pleading,

and Johnson must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the

Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint is subject to review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

It is strongly recommended that Johnson use the civil rights complaint form

designed for use in this District. He should label the form “Second Amended Complaint”

and use the case number for this action (Case No. 22-cv-860-NJR). Further, Johnson

should identify each defendant in the case caption and include sufficient allegations

against each defendant to describe what the defendant did or failed to do to violate his

constitutional rights, see DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (a

successful complaint generally alleges “the who, what, when, where, and how....”), and

as much as possible, include the relevant facts in chronological order, inserting each

defendant’s name where necessary to identify the actors and each defendant’s actions.

While Johnson may use “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” to refer to parties whose names are

unknown, he must still follow pleading standards and include a short, plain statement of

the case against that party. He must describe each Doe Defendant and his or her

involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct (for example, John Doe did X and

Jane Doe did Y). No service shall be ordered on any defendant until after the Court

completes its Section 1915A review of the Second Amended Complaint.

Johnson is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action

was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable,

regardless of whether he elects to file a Second Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Johnson is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this Order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

To facilitate Johnson’s compliance with this Order, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to mail Johnson a blank civil rights complaint form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 8, 2023

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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