Opinion

Brown v. Piper

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Apr 24, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”

How later courts described this case

  • an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARREN BROWN, #M50137, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-01321-SMY

)

CODY PIPER, )

JOSHUA CRAWFORD, )

KEVIN T. JOHNSON, and )

NATHAN ATTEBURY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Darren Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed the

instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivations of his constitutional rights at

Lawrence Correctional Center. Following preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

Complaint and First Amended Complaint were dismissed for failure to state a claim (Docs. 10,

16). Plaintiff was given a final opportunity to address the deficiencies in his Complaints by filing

a Second Amended Complaint (see Doc. 17), which is now before the Court for review.1

Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17):

Plaintiff was issued a disciplinary report following an investigation by Internal Affairs Officers

Cody Piper and Joshua Crawford. According to Piper and Crawford, confidential sources stated

Plaintiff was responsible for distributing synthetic marijuana in Lawrence Correctional Center.

1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for

relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Following a hearing before Adjustment Committee members Kevin Johnson and Nathan Attebury,

Plaintiff was found guilty and given three months of segregation and six months of contact visit

restriction. Plaintiff alleges that numerous violations of the Illinois Administrative Code related

to the disciplinary proceedings resulted in due process violations.

Based on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court designates the

following claim in this pro se action:2

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Piper, Crawford, Johnson,

and Attebury for due process violations in the disciplinary

proceedings against Plaintiff including issuing a false disciplinary

report, withholding evidence, relying on misleading evidence from

confidential sources, and finding Plaintiff guilty without sufficient

evidence

Discussion

To state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must

show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or

property” without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). When a

prisoner raises a due process claim related to disciplinary proceedings, the Court undertakes a two-

part analysis. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court first evaluates whether

the prisoner was deprived of a protected liberty interest. If so, the Court then evaluates whether

the process he was afforded was constitutionally deficient. Id. The Complaint and First Amended

Complaint were dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege facts suggesting he was deprived of a

protected interest.

A six-month contact visit restriction does not implicate a protected interest, Overton v.

2Any claim that is mentioned in the Second Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order is dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to

state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003), and an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding segregation is

limited. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009). In assessing whether

disciplinary segregation gives rise to a protected liberty interest, courts look to “the combined

import of the duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured.” Marion, 559

F.3d at 697 (emphasis in original).

Three months in segregation, standing alone, does not implicate a protected liberty interest.

Id. at 698. And once again, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts regarding the conditions of his

confinement in segregation. Without a showing that Plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty

interest, he fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.3

To the extent Plaintiff alleges violations of the Illinois Administrative Code, § 1983

“protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or ... departmental

regulations and police practices.” Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.2003). Further,

without commenting on the merits of any intended state law claims, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any such claims. See U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (court may decline

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction”).

Plaintiff has had three opportunities to plead a meritorious § 1983 claim and has failed to

do so. The Court twice advised Plaintiff why his allegations failed to state a due process claim

and gave him opportunities to address the deficiencies the Court identified. He has either declined

to provide additional information or can present no facts to support a meritorious claim. Under

the circumstances, he will not be granted another opportunity to amend.

3 Because Plaintiff has not pled a protected liberty interest, the Court does not need to consider whether the disciplinary

hearing was conducted in accordance with procedural due process requirements.

Disposition

The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure

to state a claim for relief.4

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this Court

within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to

appeal in forma pauperis must set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See FED.

R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate

filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter final judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 24, 2023

s/ Staci M. Yandle_____

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

4 This dismissal qualifies as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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