Johnson v. Thompson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

IVAN JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3: 18-CV-1476-MAB

)

SCOTT THOMPSON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This case is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by

Defendant James Groves, Larue Love, Christopher Thompson, and Chad Wall (Doc. 80),

all of whom are or were employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Plaintiff,

Ivan Johnson, filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 86). The Defendants did not file a

reply brief. For the reasons outlined below, the Defendants’ motion is denied in part and

moot in part.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 8, 2018 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint was

screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to filter out non-meritorious claims and he was

permitted to proceed on the following claims against the following individuals:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against John Doe #1

Sergeant, Wall, and Love, for failing to protect Plaintiff from attack by his cellmate,

despite their knowledge of the cellmate’s aggressive behavior, mental illness, and

history of violence;

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Thompson in

his official capacity, for maintaining cell assignment policies that place inmates in

danger of physical harm.

(Doc. 6). Plaintiff’s claim in Count 2 was permitted to proceed against Thompson (who

was the Warden at that time) in his official capacity because Warden Thompson would

have been the appropriate official to carry out any injunctive relief ordered by the Court

(See Doc. 6).

The John Doe Sergeant in Count 1 was later identified as James Groves (Doc. 20).

The case proceeded through discovery (exhaustion was never an issue) and after the close

of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment (Doc. 80). Plaintiff responded in

opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and also filed a motion to

dismiss certain claims that, with the benefit of discovery, presumably lacked any

evidentiary support (See Doc. 85). Specifically, Plaintiff moved to dismiss Count 2 against

Warden Thompson and what Plaintiff described as Count 3, a preliminary injunction

(Doc. 85).

The Court granted the motion pursuant to its inherent authority (Doc. 87). With

the benefit of hindsight, and a careful evaluation of the record, the Court discovered that

the 1915A Screening Order did not categorize Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary

injunction as a standalone count (See Doc. 6.). While its true that Plaintiff’s pro se

complaint advanced a count for preliminary injunction, the Screening Order noted that

Plaintiff did not actually file a motion seeking such relief and thus took no action on the

request (See Doc. 6, p. 3). The Court offers this aside simply to clarify the record. Suffice

to say, Plaintiff dismissed Count 2, which was an official capacity claim against the

Warden. There was never a Count 3 to dismiss. And thus the only claim at issue now is

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Scott Groves, Chad Wall,

and Larue Love.1

Factual Background

Plaintiff, Ivan Johnson, is an inmate, currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional

Center. This case concerns an altercation, or according to Plaintiff – an attack – while

Plaintiff was housed at Pinkneyville Correctional Center with an inmate named Semaj

Dunn. Plaintiff says he warned the Defendants that his cellmate (Mr. Dunn) was

exhibiting abnormal behavior, that he did not feel comfortable in his cell with him, that

the situation was urgent, and that he needed to be moved to a different cell. The attack

on Plaintiff by Mr. Dunn resulted in six or seven stitches to Plaintiff’s lip and ultimately

this lawsuit.

A. The Parties

The incident occurred on March 31, 2018 (Doc. 86-1, p. 5). Plaintiff was in

segregation at that time, which was located in cellblock 5A at Pinkneyville (Doc. 86-1, p.

5). James Groves was a sergeant at Pinkneyville at that time (Doc. 86-2, p. 2). There is only

one sergeant on duty per shift in the segregation unit, and he was the one working the

day shift (Doc. 86-2). Chad Wall was working as a lieutenant in the segregation unit at

Pinkneyville that day as well (Doc. 86-3, pp. 4-5). A lieutenant has supervisory authority

1 Because of Plaintiff’s decision to dismiss Count 2, this renders a substantial portion of the arguments in

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment moot. Specifically, Sections 3 and 4 of Defendants’ Argument

are no longer applicable in light of this dismissal and the Court will not address them (See Doc. 81, pp. 9-

14).

over the correctional officers and the sergeant in the chain of command (Doc. 86-3, p. 5).

Larue Love worked as the Assistant Warden of Operations at Pinkneyville on the day in

question and in this role, reported directly to the Warden (Doc. 86-4, p. 5; 82-3, p. 2). As

the Assistant Warden, Love was responsible for the safety and security of the facility for

both staff and offenders, and was responsible for security of the departments, dietary,

and maintenance (Doc. 82-3, p. 3).

B. The incident and events leading up to it

Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn first became cellmates on March 27, 2018 (Doc. 86-1, p. 8).

They lived together in cellblock 5A (cell 54), which was the segregation unit at

Pinkneyville (Doc. 86-1, pp. 7-8, 26-27). When the two first started living with one

another, they got along okay as Plaintiff describes it, but he soon saw that Mr. Dunn had

some “disturbed behaviors.” (Doc. 86-1, p. 9). For example, within a day or two of living

together, Plaintiff witnessed Mr. Dunn either attempt to or pretend as if he was about to

commit suicide (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). Plaintiff saw Mr. Dunn rip some bed sheets, tie them

together to make a noose, slip the noose around his neck and stand in the front of his cell

waiting for a correctional officer to see him (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). According to Plaintiff, Mr.

Dunn told him this was all “part of his plan” and to just leave him alone (Doc. 86-1, p.

10). Ultimately a correctional officer saw Mr. Dunn and he was taken out of the cell and

placed on suicide watch (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). He returned back to the cell in a day or two

(Doc. 86-1, p. 11).

During their time together, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Dunn also acted unusual in

a variety of other ways. (Doc. 86-1, p. 12). For example, he beat on the door, he talked to

himself, he paced in the cell, was on psychiatric medicine, and he did not sleep (Doc. 86-

1, p. 12). Plaintiff also testified about an unusual practice that Mr. Dunn would engage in

where he, in essence, stood or hovered right over Plaintiff when he would be lying in bed

on the bottom bunk (Doc. 86-1, p. 22).

On March 31st, Plaintiff told Sergeant Groves he was having issues with Mr. Dunn

and gave him a kite to give to Lieutenant Wall (Doc. 86-1, pp. 16-17). When asked about

the specifics of the conversation, Plaintiff said he told Groves the kite was “urgent”

because it involved he and his cellmate and the two were not getting along in the cell

(Doc. 86-1, p. 18). Mr. Dunn was in the cell at this time as well (Doc. 86-1, p. 18). Groves,

for his part, has no recollection of this conversation with Plaintiff on March 31st, 2018

(Doc. 86-2, p.16). Groves does not dispute this conversation could have occurred; he

simply does not recall it (Doc. 86-2, p. 16).2

Plaintiff also voiced his concerns to a mental health professional (“MHP”) visiting

the cell the morning of March 31st. Plaintiff told MHP Smith he was having real

disturbing and life disturbing problems with Mr. Dunn (Doc. 86-1, p. 20). He recounted

to Mr. Smith some of the specific concerns he had about Mr. Dunn including his bizarre

behavior (i.e., he wasn’t sleeping, talking to himself) (Doc. 86-1, p. 20). Although Plaintiff

did not say specifically, it appears his intent with this conversation was to get word about

the urgent nature of his problem with Mr. Dunn to Lieutenant Wall and the Warden or

Assistant Warden (Doc. 86-1, p. 20).

2 Although Groves testified that he has nothing to do with inmate placement because that is handled by

the lieutenant, he also acknowledged that if he believed an inmate was endangered or threatened by his

cellmate, then he would be required to remove the inmate from that situation (Doc. 86-2, pp. 9, 16).

Later in the day around 11:30 or 12, Plaintiff spoke to Lieutenant Wall (Doc. 86-1,

p. 21). He hollered for Lieutenant Wall from his cell, asking to speak with him and told

him it was “urgent” because it concerned he and his cellmate (Doc. 86-1, p. 21). This

conversation occurred during yard time and Mr. Dunn was out of the cell at yard (Doc.

86-1, p. 22). Plaintiff says he told Wall (once he came over to his cell) that he and Mr.

Dunn are not getting along and that he did not feel comfortable being in a cell with him

(Doc. 86-1, p. 22). He also told Wall some of the specifics that were making him feel

uncomfortable (Doc. 86-1, p. 22).3 Plaintiff indicated he was trying to stress the urgency

of the situation and that it was a hostile environment and was not going to end well for

him (Doc. 86-1, p. 22). As Plaintiff tells it, Wall said that what Plaintiff was reporting was

not enough for him to move Plaintiff out of the cell with Mr. Dunn (Doc. 86-1, p. 23).4

At around 1:00 or 1:30, Plaintiff then spoke with Assistant Warden Love (Doc. 86-

1, p. 26). According to Plaintiff, he saw Love on the wing from his cell and asked to speak

with him (Doc. 86-1, p. 26.). He told Love who he was and that he was having “real life

disturbing problems” with his cellmate (Doc. 86-1, p. 27). Plaintiff provided details to

Love to try and explain why this was a very real problem and why Plaintiff needed to be

moved out of his cell as soon as possible (Doc. 86-1, p. 27). He also told Love specifics

3 According to Plaintiff, he told Wall that Mr. Dunn was “SMI” (serious mental illness). Plaintiff says Mr.

Dunn told him he was SMI (which Defendants never disputed). Plaintiff also told Wall that Dunn beat on

the door; talks to himself; and that he hovers over Plaintiff’s head all during the day and night and that this

was making Plaintiff uncomfortable (Doc. 86-1, pp. 22, 35).

4 Wall, for his part, does not recall the incident on March 31, 2018 and does not recall receiving any

complaints from Plaintiff beforehand (Doc. 86-2, p. 25). However, Wall does not dispute that he would

have been responsible for determining whether Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn should be cellmates on that day

(Doc. 86-3, p. 13).

about Mr. Dunn’s disturbing behavior. He noted that Mr. Dunn was SMI, that he was

beating on the door, hovering over Plaintiff while he was lying in bed, not sleeping, and

that he felt like his “life was in danger” and needed to be moved urgently (Doc. 86-1, p.

27). According to Plaintiff, Love said he will see what he can do (Doc. 86-1, p. 27). When

Love was asked about this interaction, he testified that he has no memory of anyone

complaining to him on March 31st, 2018 (Doc. 82-3, p. 5).

Sometime after evening chow (which is around 4:00 p.m.), Mr. Dunn attacked

Plaintiff in the cell (Doc. 86-1, p. 28). Plaintiff was attempting to move past Mr. Dunn in

the cell to put his chow tray by the door and Mr. Dunn shoved him or shoulder bumped

him and then punched him in the face (Doc. 86-1, p. 28). Plaintiff says that after the punch,

he grabbed Mr. Dunn to try and calm him down, and does not recall striking him back

(Doc. 86-1, p. 28). After he released Mr. Dunn from what he described as a bear hug, Mr.

Dunn starting kicking the door and yelling (Doc. 86-1, p. 28). A lieutenant came to the

cell and separated the two (Doc. 86-1, p. 30). Plaintiff ultimately received six or seven

stitches in his upper lip as a result of the attack from Mr. Dunn. He described the punch

as a “nice little punch” on him. He also received medication for his pain such as ibuprofen

(Doc. 86-1, p. 31).5 Ultimately, both Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn received tickets for fighting.6

5 The Offender Disciplinary Report, which was completed by Correctional Officer Bennett, tells a different

story. According to the Report, Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn both stated they “exchanged closed fist punches

around 3:15 p.m. inside the cell.” (Doc. 82-4). According to Mr. Dunn, the altercation occurred because

Plaintiff was trying to “control the cell” and according to Plaintiff, he was not sure why they fought, but

Mr. Dunn was “messed up in the head” and things got heated. The Report notes that both Plaintiff and Mr.

Dunn sustained injuries consistent with a fight having occurred (Doc. 82-4). However, it does not elaborate

any further on this, explain what injuries Mr. Dunn incurred, if any, or why it was consistent with a fight

having occurred.

6 Plaintiff’s brief cites to Exhibit E (Disciplinary Card of Mr. Dunn); Exhibit F (Disciplinary Card of Mr.

Johnson); and Exhibit G (e-mail from C/O Bennett) (See Doc. 86). However, Plaintiff did not attach any of

In short, Plaintiff indicated he told Groves, Wall, and Love that he was

uncomfortable with his cellmate; that his cellmate was exhibiting disturbing behavior;

that the situation in the cell was a real problem; that he needed to be moved as soon as

possible; and that Mr. Dunn doesn’t sleep (Doc. 86-1, p. 36-37). And Plaintiff specifically

told Love that he believed his life was in danger (Doc. 86-1, p. 37) and he told Wall and

Groves the situation with his cellmate was urgent and he needed to be moved (Doc. 86-

1, pp. 21-23, 36-37). For the Defendants’ part, none of them can recall these conversations

and the Offender Disciplinary Report, which is fairly perfunctory, seems to suggest it was

a two person fight rather than an unprovoked attack by Mr. Dunn (Doc. 82-4).

Discussion

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party “shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the

evidence presented, and they are material only if their resolution might change the suit’s

outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir.

2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary

judgment, the court’s role is not to determine the truth of the matter, and the court may

not “choose between competing inferences or balance the relative weight of conflicting

these exhibits to his brief or indicate where they might be located on the docket. Therefore the Court was

unable to review or rely on them. In any event, it appears from Plaintiff’s summary of these exhibits they

would only further demonstrate that there are a multitude of factual disputes surrounding the attack on

Plaintiff by Mr. Dunn. And for the purpose of summary judgment, the construes the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff.

evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hansen v. Fincantieri

Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley

& Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, “it must view all the evidence in the

record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes

in favor of the non-moving party.” Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836.

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’

obligates prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . .

inmates.’” Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). In particular, prison officials are required “to protect prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. In order to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on a failure to protect, an inmate must

show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk” to their

health or safety. Sinn, 911 F.3d at 419 (quoting Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th

Cir. 2015)). Like all deliberate indifference claims, there is both an objective and subjective

component. Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480. First, the prisoner must show that the harm to which

they were exposed was objectively serious. Id. Second, the prisoner must show that the

prison official knew of and disregarded the excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety.

Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020). This requires “actual, and not merely

constructive, knowledge” of the risk of harm, meaning the official “must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480 (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837). In deciding whether the prison official was aware of the risk, “the

circumstances as a whole must be considered.” LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 843 (7th

Cir. 2020).

A. Actual Knowledge

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff

cannot demonstrate Defendants had “actual knowledge” of an impending harm to

Plaintiff from his cellmate. However, before addressing this argument, the Court notes

that Defendants make no mention of or reference to the objective prong of Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim. Defendants’ silence on this subject leads the Court to

conclude that they have conceded the harm and injuries Plaintiff suffered (i.e. six or seven

stitches) was objectively serious. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (“a

beating suffered at the hands of a fellow detainee, such as that alleged by [plaintiff],

clearly constitutes serious harm”).

Defendants’ argument regarding their lack of actual knowledge is somewhat

cursory in nature and it is also a nonstarter because it minimizes Plaintiff’s testimony and

fails to fully account for and credit his story and construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to him (See Doc. 81, p.8).7 As outlined above, Plaintiff first told Sergeant Groves

that he and Mr. Dunn were not getting along, the matter was urgent, and that he needed

to be moved as soon as possible (Doc. 86-1, pp. 16-17, 36-37). He also gave Groves a kite

(a written message) to give to Lieutenant Wall about the urgent problem he was having

with Mr. Dunn (Doc. 86-1, pp. 16-17). Plaintiff voiced very specific concerns to Wall that

7 Defendants’ brief dedicates a paragraph to discussing Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2004) (See

Doc. 81, p. 7). But its unclear to the Court why Defendants discuss this case and what application, if any, it

has to the case at hand. The connection to this case is simply never made.

he and his cellmate were not getting along, he needed to be moved and that it was a

hostile environment, unlikely to end well for him (Doc. 86-1, pp. 21-23, 36-37). And

finally, Plaintiff spoke to Warden Love and raised concrete concerns about his safety and

specifically told Love he feared that his life was in danger. (Doc. 86-1, pp. 26-27, 36-37).

All three of these individuals (even Groves) acknowledged that if there was a credible

concern about an inmate’s safety from his cellmate, each Defendant had the power and

authority to move Plaintiff out of the situation.

“[A] complaint that identifies a specific, credible, and imminent risk of serious

harm and identifies the prospective assailant typically will support an inference that the

official to whom the complaint was communicated had actual knowledge of the risk.”

Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 2015); Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir.

1996) (in failure to protect cases, a prisoner normally can establish actual knowledge of

impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat

to his safety). Here, while Plaintiff’s conversations may have differed with each of the

three Defendants, he testified that he told each one of them he was having real life

disturbing problems with his cellmate, that his cellmate was exhibiting strange behavior,

that the situation was urgent, and in one instance, that he feared for his life. Defendants

have not made any suggestion that Plaintiff was not credible or that he was a known

fabricator. Crediting Plaintiff’s story as true (which the Court must for the purpose of

summary judgment), he very clearly conveyed the imminence and urgency of the

situation to each Defendant. And he identified the prospective assailant to each

Defendant. Although Plaintiff did not specifically say he feared Mr. Dunn was going to

punch him in his face, the details, according to Plaintiff, are specific enough to give the

Defendants actual knowledge of an imminent threat of a physical attack on Plaintiff by

Mr. Dunn.

None of the Defendants recall their conversation with Plaintiff on that day in

question, which is not surprising given the lapse in time (Docs. 82-3, p. 5; 86-2, p. 16; 86-

3, p. 25). The Offender Disciplinary Report seems to suggest that officials at Pinkneyville

determined the incident to be a mutual altercation between Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn, but

there is no real explanation as to why this determination was made (Doc. 82-4). In any

event, these factual disputes cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. See

Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836 (the Court must view all the evidence in the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes in favor of the

non-moving party).

In sum, a reasonable juror, crediting Plaintiff’s testimony, could conclude that each

of the Defendants had actual knowledge of a specific and imminent threat to Plaintiff’s

safety, posed by his cellmate. Summary judgment on the basis of actual knowledge (or

lack thereof) is simply not appropriate. See Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 643 (7th Cir.1996)

(prisoner advised sergeant, inter alia, that cellmate was intimidating him, acting

strangely, had threatened that “something crucial was going to happen” if one of them

was not moved, and was now “deadlocked” in cell, which restricted ingress to and egress

from cell).

B. Heck v. Humphrey and its application, if any, to Plaintiff’s claim

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a

state prisoner cannot proceed on claims for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based

on an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence unless the prisoner demonstrates

that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. Heck applies

both to a prisoner’s original conviction and sentence and to parole revocations. Easterling

v. Siarnicki, 435 Fed. App’x. 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81–82 (2005)).

Defendants point this Court to a case they say is similar and persuasive - Chencinski

v. Reeder, 2013 WL 2383637, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 30, 2013). This case involved a First

Amendment retaliation claim and a Due Process claim, both of which were dismissed by

the district court on the basis of Heck. In Chencinski, the plaintiff alleged that he received

a false disciplinary ticket as a means of retaliation for filing grievances. Id. at * 1. He also

claimed he was denied due process at his adjustment committee hearing because he was

not afforded an impartial investigation, an opportunity to put on a defense, and that the

adjustment committee relied on confidential informants without an inquiry into their

reliability. Id.

The plaintiff was found guilty at the adjustment committee hearing and the district

court ultimately concluded that Plaintiff’s claim was Heck barred because “[a] finding

that the disciplinary ticket was issued falsely or that the hearing denied Plaintiff due

process, would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the hearing's result.” Id.

at *4. The Court fails to see how Chencinski has any application to the instant case.

Plaintiff’s claim is an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference for failing to

protect Plaintiff from an attack by his cellmate, which is markedly different than the

claims at issue in Chencinski (First Amendment Retaliation and Due Process).

Moreover, Plaintiff seeks money damages from the Defendants for their alleged

failure to protect him from an attack by his cellmate (See Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 6). Plaintiff

does not seek to expunge the disciplinary ticket he received nor is he challenging the

disciplinary process in general. In fact, nothing about this case challenges the validity of

the ticket he received, the disciplinary process that ensued, or the discipline he ultimately

received. Plaintiff seeks money damages as a result of the injuries he sustained because

of the alleged constitutional violations. Neither Heck nor Chencinski have any application

to the instant case. Accordingly, summary judgment on this basis is not warranted.8

C. Qualified Immunity

In light of the Court’s conclusion that Defendants are not entitled to summary

judgment on Count 1, the Court must consider their argument that they are protected by

qualified immunity.

“Generally, qualified immunity protects government agents from liability when

their actions do not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.’” Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d

8 As noted supra (n. 1), Plaintiff has dismissed Count 2 against Warden Thompson, which concerned

injunctive relief. As a result, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments concerning this claim and

will thus move to Defendants’ final argument, which is qualified immunity.

906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2010)). “It protects

‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Burritt v.

Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). In determining whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court

must ask two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Vega,

show that Defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Hernandez, 634 F.3d at

914 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001)).

The Court has already determined that Plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence to

establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. Thus, the only remaining issue is

whether that right was clearly established. The Court concludes that it was at the time of

the incident. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court made clear that prison officials have

a duty under the Eighth Amendment to take reasonable steps to insure the safety of

inmates, which includes harm perpetrated on one inmate to another. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

And the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expounded on Farmer in Pope v. Shafer in 1996,

clearly outlining both the objective and subjective standard for an Eighth Amendment

failure to protect case. 86 F.3d at 92.

Consequently, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendants for failing to protect him from an attack by his cellmate.

Conclusion

The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 80) is DENIED in part and rendered

MOOT in part. It is DENIED with respect to Count 1, which is Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Sergeant Groves, Lieutenant Wall, and

Warden Love. It is MOOT with respect to Count 2 against Warden Thompson because

Plaintiff opted to dismiss Count 2 in response to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, thus rendering Defendants’ request for summary judgment on Count 2 moot.

The Court will set this case for a status conference by separate notice to discuss the

referral of this case for mediation or a settlement conference and to discuss trial

scheduling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 9, 2023

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge