Ortega v. Halliday

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ALDO ORTEGA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-36-NJR

TANYA FORD, JOSEPH BLAHA,

ENAITE AKPORE, JOSEPH PATE, and

ERNEST VANZANT,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Aldo Ortega, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who was placed on Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) on August 19,

2019, brought this case pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his

constitutional rights and Illinois law. Defendants Tanya Ford, Joseph Blaha, Enaite

Akpore, Joseph Pate, and Ernest Vanzant now move for summary judgment (Doc. 67).

Ortega, through counsel, filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 75).

Defendants filed a reply brief (Doc. 79).

BACKGROUND

In 2012, Ortega was convicted for “possession of child pornography, reproducing

and selling” (Doc. 67-1, p. 15). He received a four-year sentence, with the requirement to

serve 50% of the sentence, and MSR of three years to life (Id. at pp. 15-16). Ortega was

initially paroled in December 2013 (Id. at p. 17). He was subject to a number of conditions

on release, including having a parole site and abiding by all the rules, regulations, and

the law. He was to refrain from contact with the victims and to attend offender treatment

(Id. at p. 19). Prior to his release, he signed an MSR agreement agreeing to the conditions

(Id.).

Ortega’s original parole host site, his parents’ home, was denied because his father

got into an argument with the parole agent (Id.). Ortega obtained another host site at a

family member’s home and was released on December 16, 2013 (Id. at pp. 55-57). In April

2014, he resubmitted his parents’ residence for approval and was allowed to move to his

parents’ home at that time (Id. at pp. 57-59).

Ortega testified that after moving into his parents’ residence, there were constant

issues between his parole agent and his parents (Doc. 67-1, p. 60). His father complained

because he believed that Ortega would be able to have more freedom in movement to

assist his parents with chores and shopping (Id. at p. 61). Ortega witnessed several verbal

disagreements between the agents and his father (Id. at pp. 61-62). Ortega’s father

specifically argued with Blaha, Ortega’s parole agent, about Ortega’s ability to take his

father to the hospital and grocery shopping (Id. at p. 62). Ortega’s father also complained

that Ortega was not able to leave the house to look for a job (Id.).

On August 5, 2015, Blaha completed a parole violation report (Doc. 67-2). The

report indicated that a number of violations were found when Blaha and another agent

conducted a face-to-face visit with Ortega. They had visited Ortega in order to locate an

expired passport that Ortega indicated he had in his possession (Id. at p. 1). Ortega

testified that he needed a new passport in order to sign up for school and had previously

asked Blaha to be allowed to leave his house to obtain a new passport from Walgreens

(Doc. 67-1, pp. 68-70). He and Blaha had argued over the phone the day before the search

because Blaha believed Ortega wanted the passport in order to escape (Id. at pp. 70-71).

Ortega indicated he had an expired passport in his mother’s possession (Id. at p. 73; 67-2,

p. 1).

During the search, Blaha found a number of items in violation of Ortega’s MSR

agreement including DVDs, iPhones with internet access, alcohol, a PlayStation 3, and

access to Wi-Fi (Doc. 67-2, pp. 1-3). In the report, Blaha noted that Ortega’s parents were

aware that the host site could not have alcohol, computers, internet, or Wi-Fi (Id. at p. 3).

The agents also indicated their belief that Ortega sought a passport to flee the country (Id.

at p. 2). Blaha observed that there were safety concerns at the home, noting that Ortega’s

father was upset during the search and displayed a wood rod in a threatening manner

(Id. at p. 3). Ortega was taken into custody after the search. (Id. at p. 2). In the report, Blaha

recommended that Ortega’s parents’ home be declared off limits as a future host site

because the location was “not conducive to the rehabilitation of the offender and agent

safety.” (Id. at p. 3). The report noted several issues with the host site, going back to April

2014 (Id. at p. 2).

Ten days after being returned to custody, Ortega receive a parole violation report

(Doc. 67-1, p. 79). He had a parole violation hearing in September 2015 (Id. at pp. 79-80).

He was given at least two weeks’ notice of the hearing (Id. at p. 80). After some initial

questioning, a parole board member decided to continue the hearing to seek clarification

on how to proceed (Id. at pp. 80-81). Ortega agreed to the continuance, and his hearing

was rescheduled for March 15, 2016 (Id. at p. 83). He received notice 30 days prior to the

parole revocation hearing (Id.).

At the hearing, Ortega asked to be declared a violator, believing that if he was

labeled a violator he could serve two years and be discharged from his parole

requirements (Doc. 67-1, pp. 83-84). He told the parole board member that he did not

have a host site other than his parents’ house (Id. at 83-84). Ortega testified that he

believed if he served out his full period of confinement, four years, he would be

discharged from parole because another inmate told him that was how parole worked

(Id. at p. 87).

The parole board informed Ortega he could not be declared a violator because

Vanzant, the records office supervisor at Big Muddy Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”),

sent a letter indicating that field services were working to find Ortega a proper host site

for continuing MSR (Id. at p. 84). Ortega testified that he never had any contact with

Vanzant other than to request a copy of the letter, which was refused (Id. at p. 85). Ortega

recalled filing a grievance, and the Administrative Review Board denied his request for

a copy of the letter, as he was not allowed access to information in the master files at the

prison (Id. at p. 85).

After the hearing, on March 16, 2016, Ortega sent a request for his parents’ house

to be considered for his host site (Doc. 67-1, p. 89). His request was denied, and he was

told he would need to submit a different address for placement (Id.). He did not submit

a new address (Id. at p. 90). In October or November 2016, he had another hearing before

the parole board (Id. at pp. 91-92). By that time, Ortega had transferred to Robinson

Correctional Center. Ortega was not able to coordinate having his parents at the hearing

because he received only one weeks’ notice of the hearing (Id. at pp. 92-93). Although

given the opportunity to reschedule the hearing in order to allow for his parents’

attendance, he declined (Id. at p. 93). Ortega informed the parole board member that he

did not have a host site and, instead, he wanted to be declared a violator in order to finish

out his sentence and be discharged completely (Id. at pp. 93-94). The board member

declared him a violator and continued his release date until September 15, 2017 (Id. at

p. 94). The confinement period was backdated to August 15, 2015, the date of his initial

violation (Id.). Ortega was informed that he would still be subject to MSR because it

remained in effect until discharged (Id.). The MSR would not be discharged by the

completion of his sentence (Id. at p. 95).

After the hearing, Ortega resubmitted his parents’ address as a host site. He

believed that Tanya Ford sent him a request for a new host site, and he provided his

parents’ address (Id. at pp. 95-96). The request was again denied because the site had

unsafe conditions (Id. at p. 97). Ortega believed that Tanya Ford informed him of the

denial (Id.).

Ortega testified that he believed he became eligible for re-release on MSR on

August 15, 2017, because he had served the remaining two years of the confinement

period (Doc. 67-1, p. 98). He believed this because of what another inmate told him and

acknowledged that no one from IDOC ever informed him that he would be released (Id.

at p. 99). He again submitted his parents’ address as a host site; it was denied (Id. at

p. 100). After his release date passed, he received a notice of violations of his MSR (Id. at

p. 101). The violation report, dated August 7, 2017, indicated that Ortega lacked a suitable

host site for his release (Doc. 67-4).

At the hearing, in either October or November 2017, Ortega was declared a

violator but was informed he could be considered for release to MSR if he submitted a

suitable host site (Doc. 67-1, pp. 105-106). After the hearing, he sent request slips inquiring

as to why his parents’ address was not approved, and they referred him back to the initial

parole violation paperwork in which Blaha recommended against allowing Ortega’s

parents’ home as a host site (Id. at pp. 106-108). Ortega believed that Tanya Ford

responded to two of the four or five request slips he sent (Id. at pp. 107-109).

Ortega testified that he learned from other inmates that in order to obtain release

to a halfway house, the halfway house would have to contact the institution, and the

halfway houses did not contact the institution unless IDOC contacted them first (Id. at

p. 109-110). His understanding was that IDOC did not contact a halfway house unless the

halfway house contacted them (Id.). He never talked to anyone at IDOC or any staff at his

prison about the possibility of a halfway house (Id. at p. 110).

Ortega eventually paroled from IDOC custody on August 15, 2019 (Doc. 67-1,

p. 115). He had submitted a grievance requesting his parents’ address as a host site (Id. at

p. 116). Ortega believed he was released approximately five days after submitting the

grievance (Id.).

Ortega also filed a grievance regarding Tanya Ford (Id. at p. 112). Ortega believed

that Ford was a field services representative at Robinson Correctional Center (Id. at

pp. 121-122). He had two or three face-to-face encounters with her in 2017. He signed

paperwork in her presence about his parole, but he never talked with her about the denial

of his host site (Id. at p. 123). His last encounter with her was on his release date when he

signed paperwork in her presence (Id. at pp. 123-124). Ortega testified that Ford’s job was

to obtain addresses from the offender seeking parole and to place those addresses in the

computer so that the location could be investigated by agents (Id. at p. 125). Ortega

believed that she did not submit his parents’ address on two occasions because she

responded that the address would not be approved due to the initial parole violation

report (Id. at pp. 125-126). He acknowledged that Ford never had contact with Blaha, as

she based her responses solely on the 2015 parole violation paperwork (Id. at p. 127). On

August 13, 2019, Ford emailed Enaite Akpore asking if Ortega’s parents’ address could

be resubmitted for review (Doc. 67-5, p. 2). Akpore responded that another agent would

re-investigate the proposed host site (Id. at p. 1).

Enaite Akpore was a parole supervisor at the Oakley parole office (Id. at pp. 127-

128). Ortega met with her once in 2015 (Id.). He did not verbally communicate with her,

nor did he have any written communication with her (Id. at pp. 128-129). Akpore issued

the warrant for his arrest in 2017, despite Ortega being confined in IDOC custody at the

time of the warrant (Id. at p. 129).

Joseph Blaha was Ortega’s supervising agent during his 2014-2015 parole (Id. at

p. 130). His last interaction with Blaha was in August 2015 when he arrested Ortega for

parole violations (Id. at pp. 131-132). Ortega testified that other parole and prison officials

used Blaha’s parole violation report to deny Ortega’s host site, which kept him confined

in IDOC custody (Id. at p. 132).

Ortega only knew Joseph Pate by name (Id. at p. 133). Ortega testified that he never

met Pate in person, but he

believed that Pate was a supervising agent like Blaha. Ortega testified Pate made

statements in the 2017 parole violation report that he should not have made because they

were untrue, and Pate was only allowed to allege violations against individuals he

personally supervised (Id. at p. 134). Pate signed Ortega’s 2017 parole violation report on

August 4, 2017 (Doc. 67-4, p. 2).

Ortega also sent request slips to Ernest Vanzant (Doc. 67-1, p. 135). He never met

Vanzant face-to-face but sent a request slip when Vanzant was supervisor of records at

Big Muddy (Id. at pp. 135-136). He asked for a copy of the letter sent to the parole board

member (Id. at p. 136). Ortega believed that Vanzant should not have written a letter

directing the parole board member to refrain from finding Ortega guilty of the parole

violations in 2015 (Id.). Vanzant did not participate in any review or approval of Ortega’s

host site, and his job was to maintain records at Big Muddy (Id. at p. 137-138).

On January 9, 2020, Ortega filed his Complaint alleging various claims related to

Defendants’ refusal to approve his proposed MSR residential placement and for failing

to assist him in finding an alternative placement. After a review of the claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), he was allowed to proceed on the following eight counts:

Count 1: Ford, Blaha, Akpore, Pate, and Vanzant subjected Ortega to

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment by their actions or omissions that resulted in the

continuation of his IDOC confinement and denial of release

on MSR while he had an approved host site at his parents’

home, which subjected Ortega to four years of additional

incarceration.

Count 2: Ford, Blaha, Akpore, Pate, and Vanzant violated Ortega’s

right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment by their actions or omissions that resulted in the

rejection of his proposed MSR host site, denial of release on

MSR to his parents’ home, and/or failure to investigate

alternative MSR host sites.

Count 3: Ford, Blaha, Akpore, and Pate violated Ortega’s right to

procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by

their actions or omissions that resulted in the rejection of his

proposed MSR host site, denial of release on MSR to his

parents’ home, and/or failure to investigate alternative MSR

host sites.

Count 4: Akpore and Pate violated Ortega’s right to equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment by their actions or

omissions that resulted in the rejection of his proposed MSR

host site and denial of release on MSR to his parents’ home.

Count 5: Ford, Blaha, Pate, and Vanzant violated Ortega’s due process

and/or equal protection rights under the Illinois

Constitution, Article 1, sec. 2, and his right to remedy and

justice under Article 1, sec. 12, by their actions or omissions

that prevented his release on MSR to his parents’ home.

Count 6: Akpore and Pate violated the warrant clause of the Fourth

Amendment by issuing or requesting an MSR violation

warrant for Ortega on or about August 4, 2017, even though

Ortega was in custody at Robinson.

Count 7: Pate violated the warrant clause of the Illinois Constitution,

Article 1, sec. 6, by requesting issuance of a warrant for Ortega

on or about August 4, 2017, even though Ortega was in

custody at Robinson.

Count 8: Ford, Blaha, Akpore, Pate, and Vanzant’s actions or inactions

violated Illinois state laws including assault, false

imprisonment, and/or conspiracy.

(Doc. 17).

Defendants Ford, Blaha, Akpore, Pate, and Vanzant now move for summary

judgment, raising a number of grounds, including absolute immunity, the statute of

limitations, res judicata, and arguing that the claims are barred by the doctrine established

in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (Doc. 67). In the alternative, they argue that they

are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Ortega’s numerous claims.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014), citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of

material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord

Bunn v. Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, a district court views the facts in the

light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving

party. Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by

examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party,

giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the

evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014).

ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claims

Simply put, Ortega’s claims are barred by the holding in Heck v. Humphrey. In Heck,

the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [Section] 1983 plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a statute tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called in question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under [Section]

1983.” Id. Thus, “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a [Section] 1983 suit, the district

court must consider whether a judgment in [his] favor…would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.” Id. at 487. “The Heck bar accounts for the preclusive effect of state court

criminal judgments on civil litigation by lifting the bar only when the plaintiff has

achieved a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.” Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d

409, 419 (7th Cir. 2020). Heck has been extended to cover “state procedures that determine

the length of the sentence (as by granting or revoking good-time credits).” Wells v. Caudill,

967 F.3d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)).

In order to pursue a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first obtain a “favorable

termination” for the proceedings being challenged. In Savory, the Seventh Circuit

recognized that the “good faith but unsuccessful pursuit of collateral relief does not

relieve [a prisoner] of Heck’s favorable termination requirement.” Savory, 947 F.3d at 426.

The Seventh Circuit “established a bright line rule: A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim which implies

the invalidity of a conviction or sentence cannot proceed until Heck’s favorable

termination requirement is satisfied, regardless of the availability of collateral relief or

the diligence in pursuing that relief.” Whitfield v. Althoff, Case No. 13-cv-3192, 2020 WL

4275256, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 24, 2020).

As to whether Heck bars the claims in this case, Ortega argues that there are issues

of fact as to whether Heck applies. But even taking the facts in the light most favorable to

Ortega, Ortega testified that his claims related to the revocation of his supervised release.

He testified that his claims against Blaha focused on the 2015 parole violation report (Id.

at pp. 132-133). His claims against Pate and Akpore stemmed from the 2017 parole

violation report (Id. at p. 129, 134). He testified that Pate improperly made statements in

the report which resulted in his continued imprisonment and that Akpore improperly

issued an arrest warrant while he was still in prison (Id.). His claims against Vanzant

relate solely to the letter he wrote prior to the March 2016 parole hearing, which initially

kept him from being found in violation of his parole (Id. at p. 136). His claims against

Tanya Ford stem from her receipt on two occasions of his proposed parole sites (Id. at

p. 125). Defendants’ alleged actions and inactions resulted in Ortega being labeled a

violator of his MSR terms and his supervised release being revoked.

Ortega’s MSR is part of his sentence. United States v. Haymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369, 2379

(2019); United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 821 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Supervised release is part

of the overall sentence.”); Lee v. Findley, 835 N.E. 2d 985, 988 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2005)

(parole/mandatory supervised release is a continuation of custody and part of the

sentence); Stepney v. Johnson, No. 14 C 3548, 2016 WL 5720367, at * 5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2016)

(a sentence is discharged only when the inmate completes his MSR term; the inmate

remains in the legal custody of the IDOC while on MSR, regardless of whether they are

in IDOC’s physical custody). And a judgment in his favor on his current claims would

necessarily imply the invalidity of that sentence. He argues that because of Defendants’

actions and inactions, he was prevented from utilizing his parents’ address as a host site

and was labeled a violator for lacking a proper host site. This led to the wrongful

detainment beyond his scheduled release on MSR. Further, he alleges Akpore and Pate

improperly submitted a warrant for an alleged parole violation while Ortega was still

confined in IDOC, which also led to him being found in violation and being detained in

custody.

Ortega argues that he is not challenging the length or validity of his sentence but

is instead attacking the handling of the host site process, citing to Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F.

Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019). In Murphy, the plaintiffs challenged the host site

procedures themselves, seeking to change the process to determine their conditions of

confinement. Id. at 750. But here, Ortega attacks the actions of specific individuals,

arguing that their actions or inactions caused him to be labeled a violator and have his

supervised release revoked. A judgment in favor of Ortega would mean the revocation

of his supervised release in 2015 and 2017 was invalid and he, indeed, was wrongfully

detained. See Courtney v. Butler, Case No. 16-cv-1062-NJR, 2021 WL 3619862, at * 4 (S.D.

Ill. Aug. 16, 2021). Thus, his Section 1983 claims, including his claims in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4,

and 6, are barred by Heck. They are, accordingly, DISMISSED without prejudice. Johnson

v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2019).

B. Remaining State Law Claims

This leaves only Ortega’s state law claims in Counts 5, 7, and 8. Count 5 and 7

allege violations of the Illinois Constitution, and Count 8 alleges various state law

allegations including assault, false imprisonment, and conspiracy. Defendants failed to

include any arguments regarding these claims, and Ortega has not offered any allegations

or arguments as it relates to these claims. The basis for the Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction in this case is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants federal district courts original

jurisdiction over cases “arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This jurisdiction stems from Ortega’s Section 1983 claims. The

Court’s jurisdiction over Ortega’s state law claims lies in supplemental jurisdiction, as

codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which extends the subject matter jurisdiction of federal

district courts to all claims that form the same case or controversy as the federal claims.

See City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997).

There are several situations enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in which it is

appropriate for a court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. One of these

situations is when the district court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Normally, the federal court is expected to relinquish

jurisdiction of supplemental state-law claims when the federal claims are disposed of

prior to trial. Walker v. McArdle, 861 F. App’x 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2021) (It is “presume[d]

that a district court will relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims when

no federal claims remain in advance of trial.”); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578

F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Normally, when all federal claims are dismissed before

trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather

than resolving them on the merits.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Exceptions to this general rule exist “when (1) the statute of limitations has run on the

pendent claim, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state court; (2) substantial judicial

resources have already been committed, so that sending the case to another court will

cause a substantial duplication of effort; or (3) when it is absolutely clear how the pendent

claims can be decided.” Sharp Elecs., 578 F.3d at 514–15 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

None of the exceptions apply in this case. As Ortega points out in his response, the

statute of limitations did not accrue until his release from IDOC custody on August 15,

2019. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018). Further, both federal and

Illinois statutes allow for tolling in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); 735 ILCS 5/13–217

(giving plaintiffs one year or the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, to

refile a state law claim that was dismissed by a federal court for lack of jurisdiction). The

summary judgment motion in this case also focused solely on the federal claims, meaning

substantial judicial resources have not been expended as to the remaining state law

claims. Davis v. Cook Cnty., 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, the Court is not

prepared to say that the proper resolution of the remaining state law claims is absolutely

clear. Thus, the Court relinquishes jurisdiction of the remaining state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 because the claims are barred by Heck. Those

claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court further relinquishes jurisdiction

of the remaining state law claims (Counts 5, 7, and 8), and those claims are DISMISSED

without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and

close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 27, 2023 Tl

fllmnsg!

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge

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