The opinion
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DEVIN C. SEATS, R65374,
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Case No. 21-cv-1049-RJD
VIPIN SHAH, M.D., WEXFORD )
HEALTH SOURCES, INC., AND LORIE )
CUNNINGHAM, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Docs. 46 and 47).
Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 49). As explained further, Wexford’s motion is DENIED.
Defendants Cunningham and Shah filed Motions to Withdraw the Affirmative Defense of
Administrative Remedy Exhaustion (Docs. 44 and 45), which are GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff is an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and filed this suit
pursuant to 42 USC §1983, alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). Plaintiff alleges that he
has arthritis, nerve damage, bone spurs, and degenerative bone diseases related to multiple gunshot
wounds. When Plaintiff arrived at Lawrence in December 2019, Dr. Pittman (not a defendant)
prescribed him Tylenol-3, Flexeril, and a vitamin to treat his bone and nerve conditions. Six
months later, Dr. Shah replaced Dr. Pittman at Lawrence. Dr. Shah stopped Plaintiff’s Tylenol-3
prescription, allowed Plaintiff’s Flexeril prescription to expire, and discontinued Plaintiff’s
vitamins. Dr. Shah replaced Plaintiff’s medications with ibuprofen and acetaminophen.
Cunningham to help him renew his low bunk permit and see a different doctor who could prescribe
different medications, but she never did. Dr. Shah and nurses told Plaintiff that Wexford had
discontinued the use of Tylenol-3 and Flexeril at Lawrence to save money. Following the Court’s
threshold review conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, Plaintiff’s case proceeded on the
following claims:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr.
Shah for discontinuing Plaintiff’s pain prescriptions and
failing to replace them with medication that adequately
addressed his pain.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Wexford for instituting a cost-saving measure that caused
Dr. Shah to discontinue Plaintiff’s pain medications.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Lorie Cunningham for failing to refer Plaintiff to a different
doctor who could evaluate him for pain medications and a
low bunk permit.
(Doc. 18).
Defendants Cunningham and Shah raised the affirmative defense of administrative remedy
exhaustion, but now move to withdraw it. Wexford contends that though Plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies for his claims against Defendants Cunningham and Shah, he failed to fully
exhaust a grievance that identified Wexford’s cost saving measure that caused Dr. Shah to
discontinue Plaintiff’s pain medications.
Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). In considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light
most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Exhaustion Requirements
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative
remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each
step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). An inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections must first submit a written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident
or problem to his or her institutional counselor, unless certain discrete issues are being grieved.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance must contain the following:
…. factual details regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what
happened, when, where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who
is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not preclude an offender
from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the
offender must include as much descriptive information about the individual as
possible.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.870(b). If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the
grievance is considered by a Grievance Officer who must render a written recommendation to
the Chief Administrative Officer — usually the Warden — within 2 months of receipt, “when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id. §504.830(e). The Chief Administrative
An inmate may appeal the decision of the Chief Administrative Officer in writing within
30 days to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) for a final decision. Id. §_504.850(a);
see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2006). The ARB will submit a written
report of its findings and recommendations to the Director who shall review the same and make a
final determination within 6 months of receipt of the appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d)
and (e).
Inmates are required to follow all steps and instructions in the grievance process before
filing suit in order to “[allow prisons] to address complaints about the program [they administer]
before being subjected to suit, [reduce] litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily
resolved, and [improve] litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). However, an inmate is only required to exhaust the
administrative remedies that are available to him. Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1320 (7th
Cir. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Discussion
Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 11-20-070 at Lawrence on November 1, 2020 in which
he stated that Dr. Shah had discontinued his prescriptions for Tylenol #3 and Flexeril (Doc. 47-1,
p. 76). He explained that he needed those medications to control the pain from his prior gunshot
injuries (Id.). His counselor responded “prescriptions of all Tylenol #3 and Flexeril medication
at the facility ha[ve] been discontinued facility wide” (Id.). This grievance was denied by the
Chief Administrative Officer (Id.). Plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Review Board, who
also denied the appeal (Id. at p. 75). Plaintiff filed suit three months later (Doc. 1).
Defendant contends that Grievance #11-20-070 does “not identify Wexford by name, nor
did it reference a policy or procedure of Wexford.” To exhaust his administrative remedies,
Plaintiff is not required to specifically identify Wexford or point to a specific policy. 20 ILL.
notice to Wexford of a potential lawsuit. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). Rather, the grievance process allows prison
officials the opportunity to “address complaints about the program [they] administer.” Jones.
Plaintiff’s grievance #11-20-070 allowed officials at Lawrence the opportunity to address
his complaint that he was no longer receiving Tylenol #3 and Flexeril. His counselor noted that
all inmates’ prescriptions for Tylenol #3 and Flexeril had been discontinued at Lawrence.
Wexford was the medical provider at Lawrence. This information sufficiently placed prison
officials on notice of a facility-wide issue that Plaintiff now attributes to Wexford in his lawsuit.
Moreover, Plaintiff fully exhausted Grievance No. 11-20-070 prior to filing suit.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is DENIED. The Motions
to Withdraw the Affirmative Defense of Administrative Remedy Exhaustion by Defendants
Cunningham and Shah (Docs. 44 and 45) are GRANTED. This case will now proceed to discovery
on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 9, 2023
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge