Goings v. Baldwin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

FREDERICK GOINGS #M36022, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 19-CV-212-SMY

)

KENT E. BROOKMAN, et al, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Now pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Kent E. Brookman, Christopher Crabtree, Kevin Page, Michael M. Keys, Kimberly S. Butler,

Frank Eovaldi, Yvette Baker, Jason N. Hart, Kalin Bridges, Major Childers, Michael Monje1, and

Tracy Lee (Doc. 131), which Plaintiff Frederick Goings opposes (Docs. 141, 142). For the

following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part.

Factual Background

The following material facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted: During the relevant

period, Defendants were staff members of Menard Correctional Center and Goings was an inmate

at the facility (Goings Deposition, Doc. 132-1 at 9:7-18). Goings’ cellmate was Jeremy Matthews.

(Id. at 17:8-11). Matthews moved into Goings’ cell on or about February 10, 2016, but they both

had a lower bunk bed permit. (Id. at 18:1-14). Goings allowed Matthews to use the lower bunk

bed until one of them could transfer to a new cell. (Id. at 18:16-25). Over the subsequent two-

week period, Goings grew irritated with what he perceived as Matthews’ invasion of his privacy,

including looking around the shower area while Goings showered and positioning a mirror to

1 Monje’s last name is occasionally spelled as “Monte” in the briefing and related documents.

watch Goings while he slept. (Id. at 19:1-24). Goings complained to CO Crabtree that Matthews

had committed these acts, “threatened [his] safety and used threats of physical violence.” (Id. at

20:14-23). Matthews had challenged Goings to fights and Goings told CO Crabtree to “move me

or him in order to avoid any physical combative situation.” (Id. at 21:14-19.) Goings spoke with

CO Crabtree “at least five times.” (Id. at 24:25 to 25:2). He sent a request to Warden Butler,

stating Matthews had been acting strangely in the cell and was planning to attack him. (Id. at

40:20-24.) Goings spoke directly with Warden Butler about one of his requests. (Id. at 39:10-23).

On or about February 24, 2016, Goings was in his cell while Matthews went out into the

prison yard. (Id. at 23:9-13). When Matthews returned to the cell around 1:00 P.M., he told

Goings that “by choice or by force” he had until 3:00 P.M. to vacate the cell. (Id. at 23:11-16).

Goings told Matthews that only prison officials controlled the “flow of who leaves and who stays.”

(Id. at 23:16-20). Matthews then swung at Goings. (Id. at 24:10-11). He threw additional punches

that Goings blocked. Goings then punched Matthews. (Id. at 27:17-23).

Following the altercation, several Menard staff members prepared incident reports, all of

which described finding Matthews unresponsive and bloody in Goings’ cell (Docs. 132-2, 132-3,

132-4). Goings received a Disciplinary Report for a level 100 infraction, violent assault of any

person, which was issued by CO Bridges and signed by Major Page and Major Monje (Doc. 132-

5). The Disciplinary Report states in relevant part:

This disciplinary report is being issued as a result of an investigation that began on

2/24/16. On the above date at approximate time, staff reported a medical emergency

in North Upper cell house, cell 5-05. Responding staff reported offender GOINGS

was observed in the back of the cell while his cellmate, offender MATTHEWS

K71403, was incoherent, lying on the cell floor in a pool of blood. . . his

(MATTHEWS) face was swollen and bleeding, and was unable to respond to staff.

Offender MATTHEWS was rushed to local hospital by EMS personnel for

emergency care. Offender MATTHEWS suffered head/facial trauma with soft

tissue swelling, and facial lacerations requiring 25 stitches. Following the assault,

GOINGS refused to speak with investigators and requested a lawyer. Multiple

confidential sources stated they overheard GOINGS state, ‘Someone had better get

him out of here because I don’t want to have to kill him,’ referring to offender

MATTHEWS. Offender GOINGS was identified by identification card and

institutional graphics. End of Report.

(Doc. 132-5, pp. 1-2).

Goings received the Disciplinary Report (Doc. 132-1 at 44:1-4) and pled not guilty (Doc.

132-6, p. 1). On March 1, 2016, Goings attended a hearing on the Disciplinary Report. He made

objections and had an opportunity to speak, albeit with some interruptions. (Doc. 132-1 at 58:11-

25). Goings recalls that there were at least “17 correctional officers” at the hearing and he made

multiple objections to the number of people in the room, the people who kept questioning him,

and his inability to refresh his recollection with descriptions of the assault. (Id.) He was aware

that there were “neighbor witnesses [around the cell]” and requested their names and full

statements but was not provided with that information. (Id. at 37:8-13). The Adjustment

Committee, made up of Defendants Kent Brookman and Michael Keys, found Goings guilty.

(Doc. 132-6).

Goings filed a grievance dated March 18, 2016 regarding the ticket and the Adjustment

Committee hearing (Doc. 132-7). The grievance officer remanded the Disciplinary Report to

internal affairs to be rewritten and to the adjustment committee to be reheard because the original

report did not comport with Department Rule 504 (Doc. 132, ¶ 23).

The parties disagree on whether Goings attended the rehearing, but the rewritten ticket

indicates that, “[Goings] wants a victims [sic] statement of the fact the he himself assaulted this

acclaimed inmate” (Doc. 132-9, p. 1). On June 1, 2016, the Adjustment Committee found Goings

guilty on the rewritten ticket and recommended that he be disciplined with one year C grade, one

year segregation, restitution, and commissary restriction. (Id.) Defendant Kent Brookman was

the chairperson of the Adjustment Committee and Defendant Jason Hart was also present. (Id.)

The Chief Administrative Officer, Anthony Wills, signed off on the Adjustment Committee final

summary report and the report was served on Goings by Yvette Baker on June 10, 2016 (Doc. 132-

9, p. 2).

The findings in the Adjustment Committee summary were different from the original

hearing summary in that each confidential informant statement was specifically quoted (Doc. 132-

9). According to the summary report, Confidential Source number one overheard Goings state “get

help, get a C/O before I kill him, I don’t want to kill him.” (Id.) Confidential Source number two

overheard Goings state, “get some help to the cell; I don’t want the guy to die.” (Id.) Confidential

Source number three stated Goings called out to him after the fight because Matthews was dying

in the cell. (Id.)

Goings filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). He is proceeding

on the following claims:

Count One: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference/failure to protect claim against

Crabtree and Warden Butler for failure to take precautions to remove

Plaintiff or his cellmate prior to the incident on February 24, 2016;

Count Three: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Bridges, Page, Monte,

Childers, Eovladi, Lee, Brookman, Keys, Baker, and Hart, regarding the

disciplinary proceedings, including the rehearing, that resulted in Plaintiff

being found guilty of an IDOC offense and being confined to segregation

from February 24, 2016 until February 1, 2017;

Count Four: State law defamation claim against Bridges, Page, Monte, Childers, and

Eovaldi for false and misleading oral and written statements published in

the disciplinary reports, adjustment committee final summary report, and

that otherwise occurred during the disciplinary process;

Count Five: State law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Lee,

Brookman, Keys, Baker, Hart, Page, Monte, Butler, Bridges, Childers, and

Eovaldi for their conduct related to the disciplinary proceedings that

resulted in Plaintiff being found guilty of an IDOC offense and being

confined to segregation from February 24, 2016 until February 1, 2017 for

an offense that he did not commit.

(Doc. 48, p. 10).

Discussion

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact or if the non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient

showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha County,

391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).

Count 1: Failure to Protect

Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 831-33 (1994). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, a prisoner

must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his welfare, effectively

condoning the attack by allowing it to happen. Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640-641 (7th Cir.

1996). More specifically, the plaintiff must establish that “the defendant had actual knowledge of

an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm

can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.” Santiago v. Wells, 599 F.3d 749, 756

(7th Cir. 2010).

Here, Goings testified that he told CO Crabtree about Matthews’ threats, and asked to be

moved in order to avoid a physical confrontation. He also testified that he sent a request to Warden

Butler in which he indicated that Matthews was planning a “sneak attack” against him and asked

her whether she had received his request forms. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably

find that CO Crabtree and Warden Butler had knowledge of the impending fight and should have

acted to prevent it. As such, Goings’ testimony creates a material issue of fact precluding summary

judgment with respect to the failure to protect claim against CO Crabtree and Warden Butler.

Qualified Immunity

CO Crabtree and Warden Butler assert that even if an assault occurred, they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Governmental officials are protected from civil liability when performing

discretionary functions under the doctrine of qualified immunity so long as “their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267

F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours

“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 2010),

quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).

As previously noted, the record contains facts from which a jury could reasonably conclude

that CO Crabtree and Warden Butler violated Goings’ constitutional rights by failing to prevent

the physical confrontation between him and his cellmate, Matthews. At the time in question, the

unconstitutionality of the failure to protect in this context was clearly established and should have

been known to CO Crabtree and Warden Butler. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prison

officials have a duty to protect prisoners from assault). Thus, these defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity.

Count 3: Due Process for Disciplinary Ticket

Goings alleges a procedural due process claim with respect to the discipline imposed

following the fight between he and Matthews. To establish a procedural due process claim, a

plaintiff must show that (1) “he has a liberty or property interest that the state has interfered with;

and (2) the procedures he was afforded upon that deprivation were constitutionally deficient.”

Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007).

Goings was sentenced to one year in disciplinary segregation, which implicates a

protectable liberty interest triggering procedural due process safeguards. See Marion v. Columbia

Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). In the context of disciplinary proceedings,

due process requires that prisoners be afforded “(1) advance (at least 24 hours before hearing)

written notice of the claimed violation; (2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision

maker; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent

with institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on

and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th

Cir. 1992); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-572 (1974). The disciplinary decision

must be supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). Even

a meager amount of supporting evidence is sufficient to satisfy this inquiry. Scruggs v.

Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007).

Relatedly, in Illinois prisons, the Adjustment Committee determines whether an inmate is

guilty of a disciplinary offense “based upon all relevant information and evidence.” Ill. Admin.

Code, tit. 20 § 504.80(k). “The Committee must be reasonably satisfied there is some evidence

that the offender committed the offense for the individual to be found guilty.” Ill. Admin. Code,

tit. 20 § 504.80(k)(1).

While Goings concedes that he was given advance written notice of the violation, a chance

to speak during the disciplinary hearing, and received a written statement of the evidence relied

upon, he argues that the defendants violated due process by not following Department Rule 504,

interrupting him at his hearing, using hearsay evidence by not having the confidential witnesses

testify, and not allowing him to testify at the rehearing, these alleged violations of internal prison

rules cannot support his claim of a constitutional deprivation. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752,

760 (7th Cir. 2003) (the violation of department or local rules is not tantamount to constitutional

violations). Despite Goings’ displeasure with how the hearing that he attended was conducted,

there is no evidence from which a jury can conclude that the hearing violated his procedural due

process rights. Ryan v. Illinois Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir.

1999) (plaintiffs should demonstrate that hearings were “shams” in order to proceed with

procedural due process claims).

Moreover, the record demonstrates that the Adjustment Committee provided an adequate

statement of the evidence it relied on in finding Goings guilty and that it clears the “some evidence”

threshold. The evidence consisted of statements from multiple confidential informants, whose

names were withheld due to the safety and security concerns of the institution, but who testified

similarly that Goings stated that he was going to kill Matthews. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527,

535 (7th Cir. 1995). Goings asserts that he should have been able to confront and cross examine

these confidential informants, but there is no due process right to confront and cross-examine

witnesses in prison discipline hearings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321-322 (1976).

Defendants Bridges, Page, Monje, Childers, Eovladi, Lee, Brookman, Keys, Baker, and

Hart are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count 3.

Count 4: State Law Defamation

Goings alleges that Defendants defamed him by writing that an “assault” had occurred in

his disciplinary reports. Under Illinois law, defamation is the publication of a false statement that

“tends to harm a person’s reputation to the extent that it lowers that person in the eyes of the

community or deters others from associating with that person.” Lott v. Levitt, 556 F.3d 564, 568

(7th Cir. 2009), quoting Tuite v. Corbitt, 866 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Ill. 2006). To bring a successful

claim, a plaintiff must show that an unprivileged communication of a false statement caused him

harm. Id. A privileged communication is one which, except for the occasion on which or the

circumstances under which it is made, might be defamatory and actionable. Kuwik v. Starmark

Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ill. 1993).

A qualified privilege exists as a matter of law if the following elements are present: (1)

good faith by the defendant in making the statement; (2) an interest or duty to uphold; (3) a

statement limited in its scope to that purpose; (4) a proper occasion; and (5) publication in a proper

manner and to proper parties only. Id. To overcome the privilege, a plaintiff must prove that the

statements were not just untrue, but that “the defendant abused the privilege by intentionally

publishing false material or by displaying a ‘reckless disregard’ as to its truth or falsity.” Tamburo

v. Dworkin, 974 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

Here, Defendants’ descriptions of the assault were made for the legitimate penological

purpose of evaluating and imposing discipline, and there is no evidence that they were published

to any third parties beyond Menard Correctional Center. Thus, they were privileged and cannot

be the basis for a viable defamation claim. Summary judgment will be granted with respect to

Count 4.

Count 5: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Illinois, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements to state a cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress: “First, the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous.

Second, the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress or know that

there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress. Third, the

conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 269

(Ill. 2003), quoting McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86 (Ill. 1988). As detailed above,

Defendants’ actions were neither extreme nor outrageous; they are entitled to summary judgment

on Count 5 as well.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 132) is

GRANTED with respect to Counts 3, 4, 5; these counts are DISMISSED with prejudice. The

motion is DENIED with respect to Count 1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment

accordingly at the conclusion of this case. This case will be set for a status conference by separate

order.”

IT IS SO ORDERED. Aw i ele

DATED: March 23, 2023

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

2 The Court would ordinarily appoint standby counsel for Plaintiff for trial, but in the five years prior to his

incarceration, Goings was an Illinois attorney who operated a solo law practice. (Doc. 132-1 at 10:5-15). The Court

presumes Goings is sufficiently familiar with the relevant rules of procedure and evidence to represent himself at trial

without standby counsel.

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