Mason v. Cecil

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MICKEY MASON,

#R04326,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 19-cv-01375-SPM

v.

HEATHER CECIL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Allen,

Brookhart, Burle, Cecil, Downen, Fitch, Goins, Jeffreys, Livingston, Loy, Piper, A. Pucket, N.

Pucket, Reid, Ulrich, Waltz, Weaver, and Young. (Doc. 100). Plaintiff has filed a response in

opposition. (Doc. 103). Now that this matter has been fully briefed, and for the reasons set forth

below, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mason, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently

incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging the deprivation of his constitutional rights that occurred at Lawrence Correctional Center

(“Lawrence”). (Doc. 10). In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the mailroom staff, internal affairs

staff, and the mailroom supervisor, Heather Cecil, have repeatedly opened his legal oriented mail

without him being present, delayed mail, and destroyed outgoing mail. (Doc. 10, pp. 17-18, 22;

Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 10-1, pp. 6, 19). Plaintiff also asserts that he has been subjected to various

forms of retaliation and harassment by staff members at Lawrence.

Following a preliminary review of the Complaint, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the

subsequent dismissal of the John Doe Defendants, Plaintiff is proceeding on the following four

claims:

Count 1: First Amendment access to courts claim against Cecil, Jeffreys,

Brookhart, Goins, Loy, Livingston, and Burle for the mishandling

Plaintiff’s legal mail.

Count 7: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment against

Reid, Brookhart, Jeffreys, Goins, Burle, Ulrich, Downen, and

Livingston for ongoing harassment against Plaintiff.

Count 13: First Amendment claim of retaliation against Brookhart, Goins,

Cecil, Reid, Nicholas Puckett, Weaver, Adam Puckett, Piper, Young,

Fitch, Allen, Ulrich, Loy, Livingston, Waltz, Downen, Burle, and

Jeffreys.

Count 15: First Amendment free speech claim against Cecil for repeatedly

mishandling Plaintiff’s incoming and outgoing mail.

(Docs. 14, 71).

Along with the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff asserted that he continued to be harassed, threatened,

and retaliated against by staff. He argued that he would suffer irreparable harm because mail

interference will hinder his legal proceedings, and he feared for his life. The Court denied the

request for a temporary restraining order and the request for a preliminary injunction to the extent

Plaintiff sought relief based on allegations of interference with legal mail and denial of access to

the courts. The Court, however, set a hearing on Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction

regarding his claims of ongoing harassment and retaliation. (Doc. 14, p. 20-21).

Following the hearing, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request preliminary injunction finding

that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits reading his claims against

all the defendants, except Defendant Reid. (Doc. 101). However, the motion was still denied as to

the First Amendment claim retaliation claim against Reid, as Plaintiff could not demonstrate that

he would suffer irreparable harm and that his traditional legal remedies were inadequate.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. “Summary

judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Anderson v. Donahoe, 699

F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Accord Archdiocese of Milwaukee

v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014). A genuine issue of material fact remains “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d

676, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2014).

In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Anderson, 699

F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has

explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in the light

reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable,

favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Cmty.

Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014).

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Access to Courts

The Court must first address the scope of Count 1, as the parties put forth arguments for

why certain mail that was allegedly opened by staff does or does not qualify as privileged mail

according to administrative regulations. (See Doc. 101, p. 6; Doc. 103, p. 5-6). Plaintiff also asserts

that due to the mishandling of his legal mail he was prevented from collecting evidence and legal

documents and obtaining a private investigator, which “could have lead [sic] to new evidence and

a petition filed with the court” in relation to his criminal case. (Doc. 103, p. 6, 12).

In the Merit Review Order, the Court specified that Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on

Count 1 against Heather Cecil only to the extent that he alleged that correspondence with his

attorneys were open and read on multiple occasions outside his presence. (Doc. 14, p. 12, 20).1

Count 1 is also proceeding against Jeffreys, Brookhart, Goins, Loy, Livingston, and Burle who

reviewed Plaintiff’s frequent grievances regarding the opening of his legal mail from his attorney

and failed to address the constitutional violation. (Id.). The Court ruled that Plaintiff had not

properly pled how the opening and mishandling of the other mail he characterized as “legal mail”

or “privileged” hindered his ability to pursue legal claims. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to

amend the Complaint to correct these deficiencies, and he missed the deadline. (Doc. 71, 84, 106).

Therefore, the issue before the Court is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence to

demonstrate a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to access

the courts was hindered by the opening of mail sent to him by an attorney.

As the Seventh Circuit has stated, “[i]nmates have a First Amendment right both to send

and receive mail, but that right does not preclude prison officials from examining mail to ensure

that it does not contain contraband.” Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F. 3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations omitted). Because of the potential for interference with the right to access the

1 In denying Plaintiff’s first request for a preliminary injunction concerning his claim for interference with his legal

mail and denial of access to the courts, the Court stated, “the Court is allowing Mason’s claim regarding the repeated

opening of mail from his attorneys to proceed past threshold…”. (Doc. 14, p. 20). Furthermore, in denying Plaintiff’s

second request for a preliminary injunction concerning his claims that he was being denied access to the courts, the

Court again iterated, “[t]he Court also dismissed Mason’s access to courts claim against Cecil, Jeffreys, Brookhart,

Goins, Loy, Livingston, and Burle (Count 1) for mishandling his mail because he had not sufficiently plead that he

alleged conduct ‘hindered his ability to pursue a legal claim or defense’… Mason’s First Amendment access to courts

claim was allowed, however, to proceed to the extent he alleged that correspondence with his attorneys were read on

multiple occasions outside his presence.” (Doc. 84, p. 13-14).

courts, an inmate’s legal mail “is entitled to greater protections.” Id. (citing Rowe v. Shake, 196

F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)). The term “legal mail” does not encompass everything an inmate

sends and receives related to a lawsuit or even every piece of mail deemed “legal” or “privileged”

pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Code.2 For the purpose of a constitutional violation, legal

mail refers to mail that is a “correspondence with an attorney.” Harrison v. Cty. of Cook. Ill., 364

F. App’x 250, 252 (7th Cir. 2010). When a “prison receives a letter for an inmate that is marked

with an attorney’s name and a warning that the letter is legal mail, officials potentially violate the

inmate’s rights if they open the letter outside of the inmate’s presence.” Kaufman v. McCaughtry,

419 F. 3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2005). Even when prison officials have improperly opened or

interfered with legal mail, however, a plaintiff must still demonstrate some hindrance to his ability

to prosecute a meritorious legal claim in order to maintain a claim for denial of access to the courts.

No constitutional claim is stated unless the element of prejudice is met. See Guajardo-Palma v.

Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 805-806 (7th Cir. 2010).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that on five separate occasions he received mail from his

attorney that had been opened outside his presence. He alleges that on July 2, 2019, he received a

letter marked “Confidential Legal Mail” from the Office of the State Appellate Defender that

appeared to be steamed opened and read by mailroom and internal affairs staff. (Doc. 8, p. 2; Doc.

10, p. 21). Later that month, Plaintiff then received “clearly marked legal mail from Attorney

Brenda G. Baum dated 7/26/2019 that was opened without being in my presences by mailroom

supervisor Heather Cecil, mailroom staff and/or Internal affairs staff.” (Doc. 10, p. 25). Another

letter from Attorney Baum that was clearly marked legal mail was delivered to Plaintiff on August

2 The law does not distinguish between privileged mail and non-privileged mail; privileged mail is a creation of Illinois

Department of Corrections regulation. See Jenkins v. Huntley, 235 Fed.Appx. 374, 376 (7th Cir. 2007). Prisoners have

no constitutional right to see that the Illinois Department of Corrections regulations are enforced.

2, 2019, and had been “steamed opened” and read without Plaintiff being present. (Id. at p. 27,

32). On October 6, 2019, Plaintiff received documents from Attorney Baum “that [were] in another

envelope that was opened, read, and intentionally delayed by mailroom supervisor Heather Cecil,

mailroom staff, and /or internal affairs staff.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 15-16; Doc. 7-3, p. 35-36). The

envelope was marked with a note written by staff “envelope missing/damaged by USPS.” (Id.).

Lastly, Plaintiff claims that on December 22, 2019, he received a letter marked legal mail from

Attorney Baum that “appeared to be steamed opened and read before he received it by mailroom

staff and/or internal affairs staff.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 27). Plaintiff testified that he knew the letters had

been steamed open and read prior to delivery because the envelopes were not sealed properly, and

they were “real sticky, meaning some heat been put to it.” (Doc. 101-2, p. 47, 57). He stated that

he did not know how staff was applying heat to the envelopes in order to open them, but he guessed

that “they probably got a machine.” (Id. at p. 57).

The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Count 1. Even

assuming that Plaintiff’s legal mail was opened prior to his receipt, “there is no evidence that such

actions hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim or defense.” Daniel v. Cook Cty., No. 12 C

9049, 2015 WL 5332346, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2015). See also Mason v. Gimber, No. 17-cv-

01025-GCS, 2020 WL 3268654, at * 9 (S.D. Ill. June 17, 2020) (“the establishment of a pattern

and practice, however, does not absolve a plaintiff from showing actual injury”). According to

court records, Attorney Brenda Baum was recruited to represent Plaintiff in Mason v. Spiller, No.

17-cv-00867-NJR, litigated in this district before Chief Judge Rosenstengel. In that case, the

parties notified the court that a settlement had been reached, and judgment was entered on June 4,

2020. (Spiller, at Doc. 123, 124, 136). Plaintiff testified that he was not aware that the opening of

his legal mail from Attorney Baum impacted the litigation, and neither were any claims dismissed

in that lawsuit due to the mishandling of mail by Cecil. (Doc. 101-2, p. 72, 81). As for the letter

from his appellate state defender received on July 2, 2019, Plaintiff testified that he could not

remember how the reading of this letter outside his presence affected his litigation. (Doc. 101-2,

p. 80, 81). As Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Defendants’ conduct in handling letters

from his attorneys disadvantaged and prejudiced the pursuit of any of his legal claims, summary

judgment is granted as to Count 1.

II. Count 7 Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In the Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Sergeant Reid harassed him by tearing off the

post-date sticker from his mail, shaking down his cell, issuing a false disciplinary ticket,

confiscating his property, and continually making sexual comments and gestures to him. He further

asserted that he brought Reid’s conduct to the attention of Brookhart, Jeffreys, Goins, Burle,

Ulrich, Downer, and Livingston, and they failed to act.

In the motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that none of the alleged conduct

on the part of Reid, taken separately or together, is sufficient to state a violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 101, p. 9). Plaintiff does

not dispute this assertion and concedes that his allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation. (Doc. 103, p. 7). Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of

Defendants as to Count 7.

III. Count 13 First Amendment Retaliation

In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he engaged in

activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such

activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to

impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted). A plaintiff may demonstrate retaliation by utilizing circumstantial evidence. See Kidwell

v. Eisenhauer, 679 F. 3d 957, 965-66 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that a plaintiff may show retaliation

by use of circumstantial evidence). Circumstantial evidence can “include suspicious timing,

ambiguous statements, behavior, or comments.” Manuel v. Nally, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir.

2020) (quoting Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 2009)). But

suspicious timing alone does not evidence retaliation. Manuel, 966 F.3d at 681.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show a nexus between any alleged retaliation and

the exercise of his right to free speech or that any such alleged retaliation had a deterrent effect.

(Doc. 101, p. 10). In response, Plaintiff asserts that he is not required to set out every single

instance in which Defendants retaliated against him and that he has alleged sufficient facts to put

each Defendant on notice “that they are parties to this action.” (Doc. 103, p. 7). He states that the

“ongoing misconduct of harassment and delays in receiving mail… could be considered retaliation

because of grievances [he] had filed against Defendant Cecil.” (Id. at p. 6). In his deposition,

Plaintiff pointed to the affidavits of other inmates detailing similar experiences to support his

retaliation claim. (Doc. 101-2, p. 125).

The Court finds that no reasonable juror could infer that Plaintiff’s protective speech was

the motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct.3 Plaintiff testified that he was retaliated against by

Defendants for sending a letter to Director Jeffreys regarding issues he was having with his mail

at Lawrence and for filing grievances. (Doc. 101-2, p. 120, 132). Regarding the letter to Director

Jeffreys, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the Defendants were even aware that he sent

3 Plaintiff asserts: (1) Defendant Cecil mishandled his mail; (2) Defendants Weaver, Adam Puckett, Piper, and Young

were members of the internal affairs unit and did not place him in protective custody; (3) Nicholas Puckett falsely

stated Plaintiff pled guilty to the disciplinary ticket; (4) Correctional Officers Fitch and Allen prevented Plaintiff from

freely communicating with his attorney; (5) Correctional Officer Reid harassed him by tearing off the post-date sticker

from his mail, shaking down his cell, issuing a false disciplinary ticket, confiscating his property, and continually

making sexual comments and gestures to him; and (6) Defendants Jeffreys, Brookhart, Goins, Loy, Livingston, Burle,

Downen, Ulrich, and Waltz denied various grievances about retaliation and harassment by staff.

this letter. He testified that no one ever mentioned the letter to him, but he knew Defendants were

aware that he notified Director Jeffreys that his mail was being mishandled because “the whole

facility is full of family and friends. They all stick up for each other.” (Id. at p. 124, 132-133).

According to his own assertions, however, Plaintiff believed his mail was being improperly opened

even before he sent the letter to Director Jeffreys. (See Doc. 10, p. 18, 21; Doc. 8, p. 2).

As for his grievances, Plaintiff has not identified any specific grievances that triggered the

alleged retaliation by each Defendant, and when asked, he could not describe any grievance that

led to Defendants’ conduct. (Doc. 101-2, p. 120; Doc. 103, p. 6). He testified that its “common

sense” that people do not like to be “told on that they are not doing their job.” (Id. at p. 134).

Furthermore, none of the affidavits written by other inmates speak to Plaintiff’s contention that

Defendants had a retaliatory motive towards him. (See Doc. 103, 14-24).

Other than his suspicions, Plaintiff does not point to anything in the record supporting his

claim for retaliation. See Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F. 3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2020) (“a suspicion is not

enough to get past a motion for summary judgment”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“Nor can an inference of knowledge or retaliation be drawn from the circumstances,” as presented

in this case. Healy v. City of Chi., 450 F. 3d 732, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2006). Because Plaintiff has

failed to show that Defendants were motivated by his First Amendment activity, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on this count.

IV. Count 15 Free Speech

The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners have protected First Amendment

interests in both sending and receiving mail. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)

(citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). A valid

First Amendment claim regarding interference in communications requires “a continuing pattern

or repeated occurrences” of denial or delay of mail delivery. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568,

572 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Allegations of sporadic and short-term delays in receiving mail are

insufficient to state a cause of action grounded upon the First Amendment.”) (citing Rowe v. Shake,

196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999); Sizemore v. Wiliford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1987)).

Plaintiff contends that the Complaint and exhibits show several situations in which Cecil

refused to send his mail or delayed his mail. (Doc. 103, p. 8). He points to a situation in which he

tried to mail a letter to the Illinois State Police. On August 18, 2019, he placed the letter to the

Illinois State Police in a sealed envelope and marked the letter privileged mail. (Doc. 10-1, p. 7,

9). Plaintiff asserts that Cecil refused to send the privileged mail, and the next day, the letter had

been returned to him opened and read, along with a form that stated, “Everything except

legal/privileged mail must be UNSEALED” and “must be to specific person/office.” (Doc. 10-1,

p. 7; Doc. 1-1, p. 37). Plaintiff was also prevented from mailing legal documents to a private

investigator. (Doc. 10-1, p. 10; Doc. 1-1, p. 44). He received a notice stating that “Everything

except legal/privileged mail must be UNSEALED” and “LCCP is not a law firm/attorney. It’s a

process server.” (Id.). When he tried to mail documents again to the private investigator, Cecil

refused to mail the legal documents, and he received a notice stating, “can’t use legal envelopes

for non-legal mail.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 50). Likewise, Plaintiff’s letter to NAACP Legal Defense was

returned to him with the instructions that the letter must be unsealed, and the letter must be

addressed to a specific attorney. (Doc. 1, p. 52). His letter to Mayor Lighfoot that he attempted to

mail on January 22, 2020, was also returned to him with the note that the envelope should be

unsealed, extra postage was required, and that letters to mayors are not legal or privileged. (Doc.

38, p. 12). Finally, Plaintiff never received pictures of his daughter sent by his family through the

website Freeprints.com. (Doc. 10-1, p. 12-14; Doc. 101-2, p. 135).

An affidavit from fellow inmate William Smith states that Smith witnessed the return of

the letter to the Illinois State Police to Plaintiff, as well as a letter to the NAACP and to Mayor

Lightfoot without being sent. (Doc. 103, p. 24). Smith also witnessed mail, pictures, and cards not

being mailed to Plaintiff’s family. (Id.).

Plaintiff also provides several situations in which he claims his mail was intentionally

delayed. In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that legal mail should take only 3 or 4 days for it to

be delivered to him because “legal mail is priority” and some of the letters he received from

attorneys were marked “one-day or two-day shipping.” (Doc. 101-2, p. 48, 49). However, he was

receiving mail seven or eight days from the postmark date indicated on the envelope. (Id. at p. 49).

Plaintiff asserts that it took: (1) 12 days to receive a letter from his state appellate defender

postdated June 21, 2019; (2) 3 days to receive a letter from Attorney Baum postdated July 30,

2019; (3) 5 days to receive letter from the Montroy Law Offices; and (4) 9 days to receive another

letter from Attorney Baum dated September 27, 2019. On October 29, 2019, he sent a letter to

another attorney, Arielle Williams, and he received the letter back months later in August 2020

with a sticker that states “return to sender, attempted, not known, unable to forward.” (Doc. 99, p.

32). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Cecil delayed a letter for Attorney Baum by 9 days. On December

1, 2019, he gave to a sergeant the letter addressed to Attorney Baum and the offender authorization

for payment form, and later when the form was returned to him, written on the back of the

authorization for payment form was the note “received December 10, 2019.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 26).

The Court will grant summary judgment as to Cecil, as Plaintiff has failed to provide

evidence from which a jury could infer that delays in receiving or sending mail are attributable to

her.4 Liability under Section 1983 is predicated on a defendant’s personal involvement in the

4 Defendant Heather Cecil is sued in her individual capacity. (Doc. 10, p.10, p. 2).

alleged constitutional violation. Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). To be personally responsible, an official “must know about the conduct and

facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006)) (citing Gentry v.

Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff testified that he believed it was Cecil who

was mishandling his mail because he was told by staff and the warden that she was the only one

in the mailroom. (Doc. 101-2, p. 144). But he also stated that he did not know if she was the only

individual working in the mailroom during the entire time frame alleged in the Complaint. (Id. at

p. 144). Plaintiff then testified that even if someone else mishandled his mail, Cecil, as supervisor,

is responsible for staff being properly trained and doing their job correctly. (Id. at p. 145-146).

Plaintiff’s testimony that he “believed” Cecil to be the one who mishandled his mail is

simply insufficient to find create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether she is personally

responsible and engaged in any specific action to repeatedly interfere with Plaintiff’s mail. Plaintiff

has not identified who informed him Cecil was the only person working in the mailroom, nor has

he pointed to evidence in the record to support this contention. See United States v. 5443 Suffield

Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir.2010) (“At summary judgment, unfortunately for

[the plaintiff], saying so doesn’t make it so; summary judgment may only be defeated by pointing

to admissible evidence in the summary judgment record that creates a genuine issue of material

fact”). Additionally, Plaintiff is mistaken that Cecil can be held liable solely because she held a

supervisory position, as the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to Section 1983

actions. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

The Court further notes that there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s contention that there

was in fact a pattern or practice of mishandling the mail. Many of the situations described by

Plaintiff appear to be a misunderstanding of mail procedures. Under the Illinois Administrative

Code, outgoing mail that is “clearly marked as privileged and addressed to a privileged party may

not be opened for inspection.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 525.130(c). All other outgoing mail, “shall

be unsealed when collected or placed in housing unit mailboxes. Sealed mail that is not privileged

will be opened and returned to the sender.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 525.130(e). The Illinois State

Police, private investigators, mayors, and organizations are not considered privileged parties under

the Illinois Administrative Code, nor did the letters meet the Code’s definition of “legal mail.” See

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 525.110(g)-(h). Thus, Plaintiff should have placed those letters in unsealed

envelopes if he wanted them promptly mailed.

Likewise, Plaintiff calculated the delivery times based on the postmark date printed on the

envelope, which indicates the “date the Postal Service accepted custody of a mailpiece,” not the

date that Lawrence received the mail. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Handbook PO-408 - Area

Mail Processing Guidelines, 1-1.3 Postmarks, https://about.usps.com/handbooks/po408/

ch1_003.htm (last visited March 18, 2023). In his response, he acknowledges that he does not have

any evidence that the United States Postal Service treats legal mail differently than non-legal mail.

(Doc. 103, p. 8). Thus, the record does not support the contention that a majority of the delays

Plaintiff experienced in receiving his mail was in fact attributed to staff at Lawrence and not the

United States Postal Service.

Because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that Cecil had a practice and pattern of

mishandling Plaintiff’s mail, summary judgment is granted as to Count 15.

V. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, but because the Court

grants summary judgment on the merits it need not address the qualified immunity arguments.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment filed

by Defendants Allen, Brookhart, Burle, Cecil, Downen, Fitch, Goins, Jeffreys, Livingston, Loy,

Piper, A. Pucket, N. Pucket, Reid, Ulrich, Waltz, Weaver, and Young. (Doc. 100).

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Mason and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2023

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge