Cannon v. City of Anna, Illinois

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROGER CANNON and

MISTI CANNON, individually and as

Next Friend of R.C., a minor,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 3:22-CV-981-NJR

THE CITY OF ANNA, ILLINOIS,

ANNA POLICE DEPARTMENT,

ANNA-JONESBORO COMMUNITY HIGH

SCHOOL DISTRICT #81,

BRETT DETERING, ROB WRIGHT,

SCOTT FINDERS, CODY HAND,

CALEB CLOVER, TIM SMITH,

BRENTLEY SIMS, and

RODGER GOINES,1

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs Misti Cannon, individually and as Next Friend of R.C., and Roger Cannon bring

this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights.

(Doc. 59). Defendants each move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for failure to state a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. 64, 65, 69). Certain Defendants also

move to strike a portion of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f). (Doc. 67). For the

reasons set forth below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are reflected in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. 59), and the

Court accepts them as true when considering Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

1 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to correct the spelling of Rodger Goines’s name on the docket.

Roger and Misti Cannon have been married for 12 years and are residents of Union

County, Illinois. (Doc. 59 at ¶¶ 2-3). Roger Cannon’s minor son, R.C., is biracial; his biological

mother is African American, and Roger Cannon is Caucasian. (Id. at ¶ 2). Misti Cannon, R.C.’s

custodial stepmother, is also Caucasian. (Id. at ¶ 20).

R.C. attends Anna-Jonesboro Community High School (“the High School”), which is part

of the Anna-Jonesboro Community High School District #81 (“the District”) and located in the

City of Anna, Illinois. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5). R.C.’s girlfriend is M.P. (Id. at ¶ 16). R.C.’s ex-girlfriend,

H.L., is now dating B.L., who is biracial like R.C. (Id.). M.P. and H.L. are Caucasian.

Around March 2021, B.L. began to harass R.C. by calling him the n-word. (Id. at ¶ 21). R.C.

complained to several teachers at the High School about the harassment, but none took any

action. (Id. at ¶ 22). R.C. then complained to Principal Brett Detering and Vice Principal Scott

Finders, who referred the matter to Superintendent Rob Wright. (Id. at ¶ 23). Principal Detering

held a meeting with R.C. on May 4, 2021, and implied it was not racial harassment for B.L. to call

R.C. the n-word because they were both biracial. (Id. at ¶ 24). R.C. recorded the conversation on

his cell phone, during which Detering said the following:

[F]irst of all, I don’t like, there’s no place for the n-word to be used period. And

that goes for, in my opinion, even people that are of color, I don’t think should use

it because I think it sends the wrong message. You know what I’m saying? That

it’s OK for that word to be used at all, and it’s not, you know? And, I know there

was a thing that at one point about well, did a person say it with an “ER” ending

or an “A” ending? I don’t, to me, it doesn’t matter. You know what I’m saying? It

still, it still the same thing, and I don’t think anybody should use that word

regardless, you know? And I know that sometimes there are people that will use

that, you know, I’ve seen, African American people use that word talking with

each other and I just wish that that was a word that we were just able to just cross

out from our vocabularies because it’s hard to distinguish when one person uses

a certain word, is it meant as a, how is it meant? You know what I’m saying? And,

obviously, with you and, and B.L., both of you being of mixed race, you know,

there’s not a racial thing to it, you know what I’m saying, as much it is, just this,

it’s just a word that just can’t be used.”

(Id.)

After the meeting, Wright and Finders called R.C. to the office, took him to a small room,

and locked the door. (Id. at ¶ 25). Wright and Finders stood over R.C. and threatened him by

stating that they were going to call the police, have R.C. arrested, and taken to jail. (Id. at ¶ 26).

R.C., who was in tears and extremely frightened, asked for permission to call his parents. (Id. at

¶ 27). Wright and Finders denied R.C. permission to contact his parents and took R.C.’s cell

phone. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). They tried to delete the recording of the conversation between R.C. and

Detering, but R.C. refused to give them the passcode to his phone. (Id. at ¶ 29). They then kept

R.C.’s cell phone and instructed R.C. to leave the office. (Id. at ¶ 30). The phone was not returned

to him until the end of the day. (Id.).

Wright later called Roger Cannon and said he planned to suspend R.C. for recording his

conversation with Detering. (Id. at ¶ 31). Roger said R.C. recorded the conversation because he

was afraid. (Id.). Subsequently, in a meeting at the High School, Wright advised Roger that he

was suspending R.C. for recording the conversation. (Id. at ¶ 32). Roger objected, but Wright said

he did not care if R.C. had been afraid. Further, if R.C. used the recording in any way against

Detering, there would be consequences. (Id.). When Roger further protested the suspension,

Wright said that R.C. had no rights while in school, that he was going to be suspended, and there

wasn’t a “damn thing” Roger could do about it. (Id. at ¶ 33). Roger objected but did not threaten

to hit Wright or any other school official. (Id.).

The next day, Roger asked that R.C.’s threatened suspension be put on the agenda of the

school board meeting. (Id. at ¶ 34). However, Roger was not permitted to speak at the meeting.

(Id. at ¶ 35). On May 17, 2021, the Board of Education sent Roger a Notice of Bar letter, barring

him from entering the High School grounds and from attending any High School events, home

or away, without prior written permission of Superintendent Wright, for a period of one year.

(Id. at ¶ 38; Doc. 59-3).

The Notice of Bar states that Roger used vulgar and obscene language during his phone

call with Wright.2 (Doc. 59-3). Roger then abruptly stated he was coming to the District’s office.

(Id.). Once there, Roger entered Wright’s office and engaged in violent, aggressive, and

threatening behavior. (Id.). He was belligerent, uncooperative, and abusive toward staff, and he

told Wright that “by the time [he] was done, Mr. Wright and Mr. Detering would be fired and all

hell and fire would reign down on the District.” (Id.). Roger refused to leave after multiple

requests, so he had to be escorted from the premises by a police officer. (Id.). He then argued with

the officer and refused to leave until he was threatened with arrest. (Id.). The officer had to call

for back up, as Roger remained in the parking lot for another 15 to 20 minutes, arguing with the

officers. (Id.). As a result of Roger’s actions, District staff feared for their safety and the safety of

students at school. (Id.). Finally, the Notice states that the Police Department had been given all

information regarding the events, and that if Roger enters High School property or a school-

sponsored event, the District would immediately contact law enforcement to remove him, and

criminal trespass charges would be filed. (Id.). Roger asserts these allegations are not true and

that the Notice of Bar was issued in retaliation for his complaints about the harassment R.C.

endured. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 39-40).

Roger then filed a complaint with the United States Department of Education, Office of

Civil Rights (“OCR”) on June 22, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 36).

On September 24, 2021, the night of the homecoming football game, a physical fight

erupted between H.L. (R.C.’s ex-girlfriend) and M.P. (R.C.’s current girlfriend). (Doc. 59 at ¶ 41).

H.L shoved M.P., and M.P. struck H.L in the face with her fist. (Id.). R.C. was about 100 feet away

from the girls at the time of the fight and was walking back to his truck. (Id.). R.C. attempted to

2 On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court can consider the complaint, as well as documents attached to the

complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to

proper judicial notice. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012).

leave the parking lot in his truck with M.P. in the passenger seat, but H.L.’s mother stood in front

of the truck to prevent R.C. from leaving. (Id. at ¶ 42).

Tim Smith, an off-duty officer with the Anna Police Department, and Rodger Goines, an

off-duty Illinois State Trooper, were attending the homecoming game and had consumed

alcoholic beverages. (Id. at ¶ 43). They were not in uniform, and R.C. did not know they were

police officers. (Id.). Officer Smith and Trooper Goines ordered R.C. to get out of his truck without

announcing they were officers. (Id.). R.C. refused, so they yelled to “get your black ass out of the

truck.” (Id. at ¶ 44). Officer Smith then grabbed R.C. by the back of his neck while Trooper Goines

grabbed his lower body. (Id. at ¶ 43). The officers yanked R.C. from the truck and threw him on

the ground, holding him there until other officers arrived. (Id. at ¶ 43). Anna Police Department

Officer Caleb Clover arrived and searched and handcuffed R.C. (Id.). R.C. remained handcuffed

and detained for nearly two hours, but he was not charged with a crime. (Id. at ¶ 45).

While R.C. was being accosted by Officer Smith and Trooper Goines, M.P. used R.C.’s cell

phone to call Roger and Misti Cannon. (Id. at ¶ 46). Roger could hear R.C. yelling as he was being

thrown to the ground by Officer Smith and Trooper Goines. (Id.). Roger and Misti drove to the

High School, where they were arrested. Misti was arrested and detained for more than an hour

by Trooper Goines, Officers Smith and Clover, and Anna Police Department Officer Cody Hand.

(Id. at ¶ 49). Roger was arrested by Officers Hand and Clover, who handcuffed him with his hands

behind his back, causing an acromioclavicular separation (“AC joint separation”) in his right

shoulder. (Id. at ¶ 50). Prior to being handcuffed, Roger advised Officers Hand and Clover that

he could not put his hands behind his back because of a previous surgery on his shoulder. (Id. at

¶ 51). Nevertheless, the officers forced Roger’s hands behind his back, causing the AC joint

separation. (Id.). Roger later obtained medical treatment for his AC separation and was required

to keep his arm in a sling for an extended period of time. (Id. at ¶ 52).

While Roger was being arrested, three officers from other jurisdictions all advised Officers

Hand and Clover that they could not arrest Roger for appearing on public property at a public

event without an order signed by a judge, stating that Officers Hand and Clover were violating

Roger and Misti’s rights to be on public property. (Id. at ¶ 54).

As a result of the incident, Roger Cannon was charged with criminal trespass to real

property, a Class B misdemeanor, for entering the High School grounds in violation of the Notice

of Bar. (Id. at ¶ 53).

On December 15, 2021, the OCR issued its report related to Roger’s complaint with the

Department of Education. (Id. at ¶ 36). The report outlines the Department of Education’s

“concerns that the District failed to appropriately investigate Student A’s report that Student B

used a racial slur towards Student A…and did not determine if there had been other incidences

of alleged racial harassment to Student A.” (Doc. 59-1). The OCR further stated “they had

concerns that the District has not provided training to staff and administrators on the District’s

nondiscrimination and harassment policies and procedures, has not trained administrators on

conducting racial discrimination and harassment investigations…and failed to keep sufficient

records for OCR to assess the District’s compliance. (Id.; Doc. 59 at ¶ 77). The OCR and the District

then entered into a Resolution Agreement, in which the District agreed to, among other things,

ensure students at the High School are not subjected to harassment on the basis of race, properly

investigate incidents of racial harassment, and provide staff and student training on the District’s

policies and procedures regarding racial discrimination and harassment. (Doc. 59-2).

On May 9, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Anna,

Illinois, the Anna Police Department, Anna-Jonesboro Community High School District #81,

Principal Brett Detering, Superintendent Rob Wright, Vice Principal Scott Finders, Officer Cody

Hand, Officer Caleb Clover, Officer Tim Smith, Officer Brentley Sims, and Trooper Rodger

Goines. (Doc. 1). They subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on July 12, 2022. (Doc. 59).

Roger and Misti, individually and as Next Friend of R.C., seek damages for their loss of freedom

of movement, extreme mental and emotional distress and anguish, and humiliation. They also

seek attorneys’ fees and an award of punitive damages against each individual Defendant.

The Amended Complaint asserts a total of 16 counts alleging Defendants deprived

Plaintiffs of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the first 14 counts, Plaintiffs assert

Defendants either acted in concert or pursuant to a conspiracy. In Counts 1 through 4, Plaintiffs

allege Wright, Detering, Finders, Smith, and Goines discriminated and retaliated against R.C. in

violation of R.C.’s Equal Protection rights. In Counts 5 through 8, Plaintiffs allege Hand, Clover,

Smith, Sims, and Goines violated R.C. and Misti Cannon’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights when they falsely arrested Plaintiffs. In Counts 9 and 10, Plaintiffs allege Wright, Detering,

Finders, Hand, and Clover violated Roger Cannon’s Due Process rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments, and in Counts 11 and 12, they allege these Defendants violated Roger’s

free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Counts 13 and 14, Plaintiffs

claim Hand and Clover used excessive force in violation Roger Cannon’s Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Finally, in Counts 15 and 16, Plaintiffs allege a violation of their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights against the City of Anna, Illinois, the Anna Police Department,

and the Anna-Jonesboro Community High School District #81.

Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against them for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. 64, 65, 69). The District, Detering, Wright, and

Finders (the “School Defendants”) also move to strike paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint.

(Doc. 67).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Strike

The Court first addresses the School Defendants’ Motion to Strike paragraph 24 of the

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 67). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “the court

may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). “Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed

with disfavor because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often

sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.” Riemer v. Chase Bank, N.A., 275 F.R.D. 492, 494

(N.D. Ill. 2011) (quotation omitted). Further, a motion to strike is not a tool for deciding disputed

issues of law or fact, especially where no discovery has been taken and the legal basis for the

motion to strike depends on facts yet to be uncovered. See id.

In this case, paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint contains the transcript of the

recorded conversation between R.C. and Principal Detering. The School Defendants argue that

recording a conversation without consent by the other party amounts to eavesdropping under

the Illinois Criminal Code, 720 ILCS § 5/14-2. Because R.C. did not have permission to record the

conversation, and thus it was recorded in violation of the Illinois Criminal Code, the transcript

contained in paragraph 24 should be stricken.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not cited any case law supporting their

motion to strike. But even the cases relied on by Plaintiffs are inapplicable or no longer good law.

Plaintiffs assert that there can be no invasion of an “expectation of privacy” when a party to a

conversation makes a recording of that conversation. Thus, it was not illegal for R.C. to record his

conversation with Detering because Detering had no expectation of privacy. Plaintiffs cite to

Thomas v. Pearl, 793 F.Supp. 838, 842 (C.D. Ill. 1992), aff’d, 998 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1993); People v.

Rodriguez, 680 N.E.2d 757, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); and People v. Harrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 958-

59 (Ill. 1994). These cases, in turn, rely on People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ill. 1986), which

has been superseded by statute. Thus, neither party cites to useful case law interpreting Illinois’s

eavesdropping law.

Under current Illinois law, a party to a private conversation must have consent of all other

parties before recording the conversation. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(2). The failure to obtain consent

before recording the conversation constitutes eavesdropping. Id.; People v. Leannah, 2022 IL App

(2d) 200672-U, ¶ 28, 2022 WL 1469345, *3 (citing 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(2)). Prior to 2014, the law

prohibited a person from knowingly and intentionally recording any conversation between two

or more people without the consent of all parties to the conversation. Leannah, 22 WL 1469345, *3.

In 2014, the statute was amended to apply to communications only in which one or more parties

is “reasonably justified in expecting the conversation to be private.” Id.

Here, even if the Court assumes Detering was reasonably justified in expecting his

conversation with R.C. to be private, there are a multitude of exemptions to Illinois’s

eavesdropping law. See 720 ILCS 5/14-3. At this stage, it is unknown whether any of those

exemptions will apply. Moreover, Defendants have cited no cases indicating that the recording,

allegedly taken in violation of Illinois law, is inadmissible as evidence in a civil case pending in

federal court. For these reasons, the School Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 67) is denied.

II. Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests whether the

complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637

(7th Cir. 2012). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff only needs to allege enough facts

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed factual allegations, but must provide “more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts as true all well-

pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Burke

v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). Taken together, the factual

allegations contained within a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted).

A. Trooper Rodger Goines

Trooper Goines moves to dismiss the claims against him in Counts 1 through 8 of the

Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts

establishing he was acting under color of state law.

A law enforcement officer can be held individually liable under § 1983 if the officer

deprives the plaintiff of a Constitutional right while acting “under color of state law.” DiDonato

v. Panatera, 24 F.4th 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 2022); Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2010). An

action is taken under the color of state law when it involves “a misuse of power, possessed by

virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority

of state law.” Id.; Barnes v. City of Centralia, Illinois, 943 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2019)). “To plead

that a defendant acted under color of state law, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that a defendant’s

invocation of state authority in one way or another facilitated or enabled the alleged misconduct.”

DiDonato, 24 F.4th at 1161.

“There is no set formula in determining whether a police officer has acted under the color

of state law.” Doe v. City of Chicago, No. 19 C 7375, 2020 WL 1675639, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2020)

(citing Harnishfeger v. United States, 943 F.3d 1105, 1119 (7th Cir. 2019)). Instead, a court must look

to the nature of the specific acts performed. Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir.

2001); see also Pickrel v. City of Springfield, Ill., 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Deciding whether

a police officer acted under color of state law should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts

the police officer performed, rather than on merely whether he was actively assigned at the

moment to the performance of police duties.”). Several factors considered by courts include

whether the officer pretends to act under color of state law, whether his pretense of acting in the

performance of his duties influenced others’ behavior, and the harm inflicted on the plaintiff

related to the police officer’s status. Jones-Huff v. Hill, 208 F.Supp.3d 912, 919–20 (N.D. Ill. 2016).

In this case, Plaintiffs allege Trooper Goines was off duty, not in uniform, and attending

the homecoming football game on September 24, 2021. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 43). As R.C. attempted to

leave the parking lot after the altercation between H.L. and M.P., Officer Smith and Trooper

Goines ordered R.C. to vacate the pick-up truck. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-43). Trooper Goines did not

announce himself as a police officer. (Id. at ¶ 43). When R.C. refused to get out of the truck,

Trooper Goines said “get your black ass out of the truck,” grabbed R.C.’s lower body, yanked

him out of the truck, and threw him on the ground. (Id.). Trooper Goines then picked R.C. up and

held him until other officers arrived. (Id.). Trooper Goines also kept the keys to the truck until

R.C. was released. (Id. at ¶ 44). When Roger and Misti Cannon arrived at the scene, Misti Cannon

was arrested and detained for more than an hour by Trooper Goines along with Officers Hand,

Clover, and Smith. (Id. at ¶ 49).

Trooper Goines does not deny these allegations or argue that they are insufficient to

establish he was acting under color of state law. Instead, he relies on an affidavit he prepared and

attached to his motion to dismiss. Under Rule 12(b)(6), however, the Court cannot consider

documents outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment

under Rule 56. Neither party has requested that the Court convert the motion to dismiss to a

motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs have not filed any evidence to rebut Goines’s

affidavit. Thus, the Court will not convert the motion to one for summary judgment and will not

consider Trooper Goines’s affidavit.

Construing Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in

their favor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Trooper Goines was acting

under color of state law. Trooper Goines demanded that R.C. get out of his vehicle, physically

pulled R.C. out of the truck, held him until other officers arrived, kept his truck keys, and arrested

and detained Misti when she arrived on school grounds. This alleged display of police power is

enough, at this stage, for Plaintiffs to state a claim that Trooper Goines was acting under color of

state law.

B. Concerted Action Claims

All Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13 because there is no

independent civil rights cause of action for acting “in concert.” While the state of Illinois

recognizes the tort of concerted activity, here, Plaintiffs bring only federal constitutional claims

under § 1983. And under § 1983, a claim for civil conspiracy is the proper avenue for alleging

concerted action.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of concerted action is often used to

determine whether private parties can be held jointly liable with public officials in a § 1983 action.

They further assert that while a conspiracy requires a preconceived plan agreed upon by the

conspirators to accomplish a common goal, concerted action only requires willful participation

in a joint activity. Plaintiffs reason that if a private party can act in concert with a state actor, but

not pursuant to a conspiracy, then two state actors can also be found liable for acting in concert,

but not pursuant to a conspiracy.

“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors, and private individuals in collaboration

with state officials, from using a ‘badge of authority’ to deprive individuals of rights guaranteed

by the Constitution.” Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998). For a private individual to

act under color of law, there must be “evidence of a concerted effort between a state actor and that

individual.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fries, 146 F.3d at 457).

The Seventh Circuit refers to this as “the ‘conspiracy theory’ of § 1983 liability.” Id. A civil

conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act,

or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir.

2015) (quoting Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also Sroga v. Weiglen,

No. 08C1789, 2008 WL 4831693, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2008) (“The charge of conspiracy in a civil

action is merely the string whereby the plaintiff seeks to tie together those who, acting in concert,

may be held responsible for any overt act or acts.”) (emphasis added and citation omitted).

In other words, concerted action is an element of a conspiracy claim—not a standalone

action. And because Plaintiffs have alleged the exact same facts in their conspiracy claims, their

“in concert” claims are redundant. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and

13 because there is no independent cause of action for acting “in concert” under federal law.

C. Count 2: Conspiracy to Discriminate in Violation of R.C.’s Equal Protection Rights

In Count 2, Plaintiffs allege Superintendent Wright, Principal Detering, Vice Principal

Finders, Officer Smith, and Trooper Goines conspired to discriminate against R.C. on the basis of

his race in violation of his Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 59).

Each Defendant moves to dismiss Count 2 for failure to state a conspiracy claim. Defendants

argue that, while Plaintiffs invoke the term “conspiracy” numerous times, their factual allegations

of a conspiracy are lacking. Specifically, Wright, Detering, and Finders assert there are no facts

connecting their alleged acts in March and May 2021 with the alleged unconstitutional

detainment of R.C. by Officer Smith and Trooper Goines on September 24, 2021. Trooper Goines

also argues that the Amended Complaint contains no allegations that he reached an

understanding with state officials to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Officer Smith

likewise argues there are no allegations of an agreement between any of the parties to take

punitive action against R.C.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged a culture of racial discrimination in the

City of Anna, its Police Department, the High School, and among the individual Defendants.

Furthermore, all Defendants acted pursuant to a preconceived plan to (1) enforce the

unconstitutional ban prohibiting Roger Cannon from entering all District property; (2) arrest or

detain Roger and Misti if they appeared on High School grounds; and (3) arrest or detain R.C.

any time someone complained about R.C. because he is biracial and because he had dated two

Caucasian girls. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 58).

As discussed above, a civil conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons acting in

concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means.” Beaman, 776

F.3d at 510. To support conspiracy liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendants

reached an agreement to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) a member of the

conspiracy took an overt act to deprive him of those rights. Fulton v. Bartik, 547 F. Supp. 3d 799,

817 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (citing Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2018)). To survive a motion

to dismiss, a plaintiff must set forth specific facts alleging the parties involved, the time period,

and the general purpose of the conspiracy. Id. (citing Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.

2006)).

In Geinosky v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit explained that, under Twombly, a plaintiff

need only allege a plausible account of a conspiracy. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 749

(7th Cir. 2012). While the plaintiff in that case made only conclusory allegations of conspiracy, he

also alleged a pattern of harassment by several officers over a period of months. Id. Applying its

“judicial experience and common sense,” the court found that “[i]f several members of the same

police unit allegedly acted in the same inexplicable way against a plaintiff on many different

occasions, we will not dismiss a complaint for failure to recite language explicitly linking these

factual details to their obvious suggestion of collusion.” Id. The Geinosky court also distinguished

the facts alleged in that case from those alleged in Redd v. Nolan, where the plaintiff pleaded facts

indicating only one defendant interfered with her employment relationship, leading to her

termination. Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff tried to bring a second

defendant into the mix by claiming that he conspired with the first defendant to intentionally

interfere with her employment. Id. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s conspiracy

claim, noting that the complaint contained “not a whiff of a conspiratorial agreement or any

improper complicity” to support the conclusory allegation. Id.

The Court finds this case more akin to Redd than Geinosky. Plaintiffs have alleged two

incidents separated by a span of six months. In March 2021, Wright, Detering, and Finders were

involved with R.C.’s complaints of racial harassment and allegedly took no action to address the

harassment. Months later, on September 24, 2021, City of Anna Police Officer Smith and Illinois

State Trooper Roger Goines pulled R.C. out of his truck to stop him from leaving the scene of a

fight on school grounds. While Plaintiffs allege Defendants were acting pursuant to a

“preconceived plan,” there are no factual allegations to support Plaintiffs’ claim that these

Defendants reached any agreement to discriminate against R.C. in violation of his Equal

Protection rights. A blanket claim that there is a culture of racial discrimination in the Police

Department, the High School, and among the individual Defendants is insufficient to support a

conspiracy claim. Accordingly, Count 2 will be dismissed.

D. Count 4: Conspiracy to Retaliate in Violation of R.C.’s Equal Protection Rights

In Count 4, Plaintiffs allege Wright, Detering, Finders, Officer Smith, and Trooper Goines

conspired to retaliate against R.C. on the basis of his race in violation of his Equal Protection

rights. (Doc. 59). Wright, Detering, and Finders move to dismiss this claim because the Seventh

Circuit does not recognize claims of retaliation brought under the Equal Protection Clause.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that, even if this claim cannot properly be raised under the

Equal Protection Clause, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint also establish a claim of

retaliation under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs point to their allegation that, after R.C.

complained about B.L.’s racial harassment, Wright, Detering, and Finders failed to take any action

to remedy the situation, “after which Officer Smith and Trooper Goines pulled R.C. from his pick-

up truck on September 24, 2021, and slammed him to the ground, while yelling “get your black

ass out of the truck.”

The Court agrees that “the right to be free from retaliation may be vindicated under the

First Amendment or Title VII, but not the equal protection clause.” Robertson v. Dep’t of Health

Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 374 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Boyd v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th

Cir. 2004)). But even assuming Plaintiffs meant to bring a cause of action under the First

Amendment, they still have failed to state a claim.

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he engaged

in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter

First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a

motivating factor in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” McGreal v. Vill. of

Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir.

2015)). A deprivation is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to

engage in protected activity.” FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 585 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted). “The retaliatory action itself need not amount to an independent constitutional

violation.” Patton v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 120CV00699TWPMJD, 2022 WL 3716522, at

*17 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 29, 2022) (citing Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005)). “[T]he law

merely requires some negative consequence (deprivation) with a chilling effect on First

Amendment activity.” Id.

With regard to Wright, Detering, and Finders, Plaintiffs allege that R.C. engaged in

protected activity—complaining to the School Defendants about B.L. calling him the n-word—

but they have not alleged R.C. suffered any deprivation that would deter First Amendment

activity in the future. While Plaintiffs claim these Defendants did nothing in response to R.C.’s

complaints of harassment, there are no allegations that R.C. suffered a negative consequence for

reporting the harassment that would chill future First Amendment activity. With regard to

Officer Smith and Trooper Goines, Plaintiffs have not alleged that R.C. was engaged in any

protected activity the night of September 24, 2021, or that the officers involved that evening knew

about R.C.’s prior complaints of harassment to Wright, Detering, and Finders.

To the extent Plaintiffs are trying to claim that Officer Smith and Trooper Goines pulled

R.C. out of the truck and detained him as part of a preconceived plan to retaliate against R.C. for

his protected speech to Wright, Detering, and Finders, again, there are no facts to support a

conspiracy existed between these Defendants. Plaintiffs have alleged that R.C.’s girlfriend was

involved in a physical fight, and that R.C. and M.P. got in R.C.’s truck in an attempt to leave the

parking lot. Officer Smith and Trooper Goines, who happened to be attending the homecoming

football game, then pulled R.C. out of the truck and detained him. It would be unreasonable to

infer that the officers—one local and one Illinois state trooper—removed R.C. from the truck as

part of an agreement to retaliate against R.C. for his complaints of racial harassment to school

administrators six months earlier. Rather, the reasonable inference from the facts alleged is that

Officer Smith and Trooper Goines were attempting to prevent R.C. and M.P. from leaving the

school grounds after M.P. had just punched another girl in the face. Plaintiffs’ claim in Count 4

for conspiracy to retaliate in violation of the First Amendment fails.

E. Count 6: Conspiracy to Falsely Arrest in Violation of R.C.’s Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment Rights

In Count 6, Plaintiffs allege Anna Police Officers Hand, Clover, Smith, and Sims and

Trooper Goines, acting pursuant to a conspiracy, falsely arrested and detained R.C. without

probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 59).

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs have not asserted any facts regarding Defendant Brentley

Sims’s personal involvement in the incidents alleged in the Amended Complaint. Absent any

facts alleging Sims’s personal involvement in depriving R.C. of his constitutional rights, there is

no basis for retaining him in this lawsuit. See Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 893 F.3d

397, 401 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Individual liability pursuant to § 1983 requires personal involvement in

the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Accordingly, Defendant Sims will be dismissed without

prejudice.

As to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiffs have alleged no facts indicating the Anna Police

Officers and Trooper Goines entered an agreement to deprive R.C. of his constitutional rights by

falsely arresting him. See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (a bare allegation of

conspiracy or the mere suspicion that persons adverse to the plaintiff joined a conspiracy is not

enough to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); but see Gardunio v. Town of

Cicero, 674 F. Supp. 2d 976, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (plaintiff stated a claim for conspiracy to falsely

arrest when plaintiff alleged defendants agreed to unlawfully arrest him, manufactured evidence

against him, withheld existence of exculpatory evidence, and did so at the direction of another

defendant). Instead, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint indicate Officer Smith and

Trooper Goines were at the football game and detained R.C. to prevent R.C. and M.P from leaving

the parking lot in light of the physical fight that had just occurred between H.L. and M.P. Plaintiffs

allege no facts whatsoever indicating Officer Hand was even involved in R.C.’s arrest. Without

any plausible allegations of a conspiracy among Defendants, this claim must be dismissed.

F. Count 8: Conspiracy to Falsely Arrest in Violation of Misti Cannon’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment Rights

In Count 8, Plaintiffs allege Officers Hand, Clover, and Smith and Trooper Goines falsely

arrested Misti Cannon pursuant to a conspiracy. The Amended Complaint alleges that these

Defendants arrested and detained Misti for more than one hour, but she was not charged with a

crime. (Doc. 59). Plaintiffs claim Misti did nothing other than enter onto the High School parking

lot before she was detained, and that three other officers on the scene advised Defendants they

did not have the right to arrest Misti because she was on public property at a public event. (Id.).

Plaintiffs claim the officers acted pursuant to a preconceived plan to arrest or detain Misti any

time she appeared on the school grounds. (Id.).

Once again, Plaintiffs allege no facts to indicate these Defendants reached an agreement

to deprive Misti of her constitutional rights. Plaintiffs’ vague allegation that Defendants’ agreed

to arrest Misti if she came on school property, when these Defendants worked for two different

law enforcement agencies and arrived at the scene at different times, is not enough to plausibly

claim that Defendants acted pursuant to a conspiracy.

G. Count 10: Conspiracy to Violate Roger Cannon’s Due Process Rights

Count 10 of the Amended Complaint alleges Defendants Wright, Detering, Finders, Hand,

and Clover, acting pursuant to a conspiracy, violated Roger Cannon’s procedural and substantive

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment3 when they banned him from the High

School grounds and then arrested him for violating the ban. (Doc. 59).

Wright, Detering, and Finders contend that Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim in

Count 10 should be dismissed because there are other, more specific constitutional rights that are

potential sources of protection. They argue it is well-settled that “[w]here a particular

3 The Amended Complaint references the First Amendment, which Plaintiffs note was a “scrivener’s error.”

Thus, the Court considers the due process claim as if raised under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive

due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273

(1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Because the governmental interference

alleged by Plaintiffs implicates Roger Cannon’s right to free speech, the claim is better raised

under the First Amendment—as it is in Count 12. They also argue Plaintiffs have not plausibly

alleged a conspiracy between Detering, Wright, Finders, Officer Hand, and Officer Clover to

violate his constitutional rights. In response, Plaintiffs argue that the Notice banning Roger from

school grounds was issued without notice to Roger and without providing him with an

opportunity to be heard. Thus, his due process rights were violated.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed, but for a

different reason. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. When a plaintiff asserts a due process claim,

the court must first determine whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or

property interest. Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch. Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2012); New

Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1479 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Board

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Before a party may assert a due process argument—

procedural or substantive—it must establish that it has a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to the

right being asserted.”)). In the absence of a protected life, liberty, or property interest, a plaintiff

cannot establish a due process claim.

The Seventh Circuit has held that “members of the public do not have a constitutional

right to access school property.” Id. In Hannemann, a school district banned a former student from

school property without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 750. The ban explained that

entry onto school grounds would be considered a trespass. Id. But the former student continued

to use the school’s weight room and drove onto school grounds to pick up friends, and he was

given a citation for trespassing. Id. The individual then filed suit challenging the ban on First

Amendment, equal protection, and due process grounds. Id.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

defendants, holding that the plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in accessing school

property. Id. at 755-56 (citing Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655–56 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming the

dismissal of a parent’s claim regarding his ban from school property and stating that “[s]chool

officials have the authority to control students and school personnel on school property, and also

have the authority and responsibility for assuring that parents and third parties conduct

themselves appropriately while on school property”); Henley v. Octorara Area Sch. Dist., 701

F.Supp. 545, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“The right to come onto the school property was not such a right

as to require any sort of a due process hearing before making the classification that excluded [the

non-student].”). Because the plaintiff failed to establish that the ban deprived him of a protected

liberty interest, his procedural due process claim failed. Id. See also J.S. v. Machnester Cmty. Sch.

Corp., No. 3:19-CV-421 DRL-MGG, 2019 WL 7283285, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2019) (because

plaintiff had no right to be on school property, he could not maintain a procedural or substantive

due process claim against the defendants); Mejia v. Holt Public Schools, 2002 WL 1492205

(W.D. Mich. 2002) (“A school may ban a person, including a parent, from going to school property

. . . without any fundamental right to go onto or access school property.”).

Here, as a non-student, Roger had no constitutional right to access school grounds. Thus,

even if Roger had alleged a conspiracy among these Defendants, without a protected property or

liberty interest, his procedural and substantive due process claims must be dismissed.

H. Count 12: Conspiracy to Violate Roger Cannon’s Free Speech Rights Under the First

and Fourteenth Amendments

Count 12 alleges Defendants Wright, Detering, Finders, Hand, and Clover conspired to

violate Roger Cannon’s free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments when

Roger was barred from public events at the High School, without reasonable grounds, and when

Roger was then arrested for allegedly violating the ban notice. (Doc. 59).

In their motion to dismiss, Officers Hand and Clover assert that the Amended Complaint

affirms that Roger was banned from school grounds, meaning they had probable cause to arrest

Roger for trespassing when he appeared on school property. Defendants Wright, Detering, and

Finders argue Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a conspiracy to violate Roger’s

constitutional rights. In response, Plaintiffs contend Roger had a First Amendment right to be

present on school grounds during public events such as the homecoming football game, a right

that Defendants violated.

The First Amendment “does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned

or controlled by the government.” United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns.,

453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981). “The Supreme Court has established that the limits, if any, the

government can place on the expression of protected speech depends on the nature of the forum

the speaker seeks to employ.” Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of Michigan City Area Sch.,

978 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass’n

v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)). There are three types of fora: (1) the

traditional public forum; (2) the public forum created by government designation; and (3) the

nonpublic forum. Id. “Public schools are of the second type; they become public fora only if school

authorities have by policy or by practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the

general public or by some segment of the public such as student organizations.” Id. (cleaned up

and quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988)). If a school is not made

a public forum, “the public is not invited in, period.” Id.

“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited

discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988). As the Supreme Court has explained,

“public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public

forums that . . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between

citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiffs claim the football field and parking lot were open to the public

generally at the time Roger was arrested and direct the Court to Johnson v. Perry, 859 F.3d 156, 175

(2d Cir. 2017). There, the Second Circuit held that a school creates a public forum when it invites

the attendance of the public for sporting events. Id. Plaintiffs then conclusively argue that Roger’s

First Amendment free speech rights were violated when Roger was banned from school property

and arrested when he entered the parking lot to pick up R.C.

A mere ban on attending sporting events at a public school is not enough to state a claim

for a First Amendment violation. The court in Johnson went on to explain that a school may

regulate access to its property when it is being used as a limited public forum “only if its

restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.” Id.; see also Kugler v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of

Chicago, No. 16 C 8305, 2017 WL 3581176, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2017) (quoting Rosenberger v.

Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The State may not exclude speech where

its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, nor may it

discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.”).

None of the parties addressed this issue. In fact, none of the parties truly address Plaintiffs’

First Amendment claims with any intricate analysis. Assuming Plaintiffs’ facts are true, however,

a jury could find that the statements in the Notice of Bar are false, Roger Cannon did not threaten

school officials at all, and the Notice was issued in retaliation for Roger’s complaints about R.C.

being harassed. In that event, the school’s restriction on Roger’s attendance at sporting events

held after school hours would not be reasonable or viewpoint-neutral. For those reasons, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claim in Count 12 against Wright, Detering, and Finders survives their

motion to dismiss. Count 12 will be dismissed against Hand and Clover, however, because there

are no plausible allegations that these officers conspired with Wright, Detering, and Finders to

violate Roger’s First Amendment free speech rights by banning him from school property

without reasonable grounds.

I. Count 14: Conspiracy to Use Excessive Force in Violation of Roger Cannon’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment Rights

Plaintiffs next claim that Officers Hand and Clover used excessive force in arresting Roger

Cannon by placing his hands behind his back and handcuffing him, causing an acromioclavicular

separation in his right shoulder. (Doc. 59). Plaintiffs assert Roger advised Defendants that he

could not put his hands behind his back due to a previous shoulder surgery. (Id.). Plaintiffs

further claim Officers Hand and Clover acted pursuant to a conspiracy. (Id.).

Officers Hand and Clover move to dismiss Count 14 because, while Plaintiffs allege Roger

Cannon told officers about his shoulder surgery, there are no allegations that Roger actively

complained of pain or suffering. Thus, his complaint of being placed in handcuffs behind his

back, as is common practice for an arrest, does not meet the definition of excessive force as a

matter of law.

Defendants rely on Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2017), in which the Seventh

Circuit discussed the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard in the context of qualified

immunity. There, a driver who had allegedly shot at another vehicle in a road rage incident was

pulled over and handcuffed as part of a “high-risk traffic stop.” Id. at 895-96. According to the

officer, the driver did not complain of any pain, but the driver maintained that he told the officer

he could not stretch his arm behind his back due to a recent surgery. Id. at 896. He also claimed

to have told another officer he was in pain. Id. The driver ultimately was released and later had

multiple shoulder surgeries. Id.

In gauging the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, the court noted that it must evaluate

the totality of the circumstances and perform a “careful balancing of the nature and quality of the

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 898 (citations omitted). “The nature and extent of the force

that may be used depends upon the circumstances surrounding an arrest, including ‘the severity

of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id.

(quoting Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009)). An officers’ actions are viewed in

“the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight,” recognizing officers often need to make split-second judgments. Id. (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).

Specifically with regard to the use of handcuffs, “[a] person has the right to be free from

an officer’s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that

person presents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.” Id. (quoting Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d

737, 742 (7th Cir. 2014)). Focusing on the information the officer had at the time of the incident,

particularly that the driver was suspected of discharging a firearm on a highway and the

individual did not explicitly state he was in pain or suffering from the handcuffs, the Howell court

found that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 900 (the information provided

about the suspect driver’s recent shoulder surgery “clearly did not outweigh the very concrete

information about the crime and the circumstances under which it was allegedly committed”).

Relying solely on Howell, Defendants assert that Roger’s claim regarding his shoulder is

insufficient to state a claim for excessive force. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs allege Roger came

onto school property to pick up his son. When he arrived, he was arrested for misdemeanor

trespassing; he was not armed and did not otherwise pose a safety threat to the officers, and he

did not attempt to resist arrest or flee. Despite informing the officers that he could not put his

hands behind his back due to a previous shoulder surgery, the officers handcuffed him behind

his back anyway, causing an acromioclavicular separation that required further medical

treatment. Based on the information the officers had available to them at that time, the Court finds

that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a violation of Roger Cannon’s constitutional rights.

J. Counts 15 and 16: Monell Claims Against the City of Anna, the Anna Police

Department, and the District for Violating Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment Rights

In Count 15, Plaintiffs claim that, as a direct result of the policies established by the City

of Anna and the Anna Police Department, as well as their failure to hire and train police officers

to perform their duties in a non-discriminatory manner, Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated. Likewise, in Count 16, Plaintiffs allege that their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated a result of the District’s deficient hiring and training

practices, as well as its deliberate indifference to its duty to treat all students equally.

Because the Court has found that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for any underlying

constitutional violations related to race or discrimination, Plaintiffs’ Monell claims also must be

dismissed. See Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 962 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If the plaintiff fails to

prove a violation of his constitutional rights in his claim against the individual defendants, there

will be no viable Monell claim based on the same allegations.”). Here, the only claims that have

survived Defendants’ motions to dismiss are Roger Cannon’s claim regarding his First

Amendment free speech rights in Count 12 and his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim in

Count 14. Neither of these claims involve Defendants’ failure to provide adequate race training,

given that Roger is Caucasian. Accordingly, Counts 15 and 16 will also be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Roger Goines (Doc. 64) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Goines is DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by Anna-Jonesboro Community High School District #81,

Brett Detering, Scott Finders, and Rob Wright (Doc. 65) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. The Motion to Strike filed by these Defendants (Doc. 67) is DENIED. Defendant Anna-

Jonesboro Community High School District #81 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by the City of Anna, Illinois, the Anna Police Department,

Caleb Clover, Cody Hand, Brentley Sims, and Tim Smith (Doc. 69) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Defendants Brentley Sims, Tim Smith, the City of Anna, Illinois, and the Anna

Police Department are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Plaintiffs shall proceed on their claims in Count 12 (Conspiracy to Violate Roger Cannon’s

Free Speech Rights Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Wright,

Detering, and Finders) and Count 14 (Conspiracy to Use Excessive Force in Violation of Roger

Cannon’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights against Defendants Hand and Clover) only.

A scheduling conference will be set by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 3, 2023 Tl

nef flionsi!

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |

Chief U.S. District Judge

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