Gaines, Jr. v. Jackson County Sheriff's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CLEOPHAS GAINES, Jr., #B85683, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-01112-JPG

)

JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

OFFICE, LARANA HILL, )

KYLE SPRADLING, )

and GARY RUSHING, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Cleophas Gaines, Jr., an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) and currently incarcerated in Dixon Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations that occurred during his

detention at Jackson County Jail. He originally filed the Complaint in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the case was transferred to this District. Gaines,

Jr., v. Jackson County Sheriff’s Office, et al., Case No. 22-cv-50164 (N.D. Ill. 2022). In his

Complaint, Plaintiff brings miscellaneous claims against Jackson County officials for

mistreatment he endured during his detention there in 2020. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-8). He seeks money

damages and “injunctive relief for prospective injuries.”1 (Id. at 8).

1 Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as it pertains to Jackson County Jail is MOOT. Plaintiff is no

longer housed at the Jail, and he describes no plans to return there. He has since transferred into IDOC

custody and been housed at Chester Mental Health Facility and Dixon Correctional Center. He should

bring any request for injunctive relief as it pertains to his current facility in a separate action altogether, if

he deems the relief necessary.

The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires this Court to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from an immune

defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The factual allegations of the pro se

complaint are liberally construed at this stage. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d

816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

According to the allegations, Plaintiff endured multiple violations of his constitutional

rights at Jackson County Jail, including the denial of treatment for mental health issues, the

unwarranted use of force by staff, and a failure to protect him from harm inflicted by other inmates.

(Doc. 1, pp. 1-8).

On September 5, 2020, Plaintiff ripped a hole in his mattress while suffering from untreated

mental health issues. Defendants were aware of his mental health problems and his treatment with

psychotropic medications. Rather than calling on mental health professionals to neutralize the

situation or simply deducting the cost of the mattress from his account, Deputies Hill and Rushing

used excessive force against him. Deputy Hill verbally threatened him, and Deputy Rushing shot

him with a taser gun, leaving the prongs in his hand and stomach for an impermissibly long time.

Plaintiff sustained wounds that caused significant pain and required medical treatment. (Id.).

A short time later, Lieutenant Spradling broke Plaintiff’s finger. Plaintiff claims that this

was done in retaliation for the events described above and because he shook his food tray in the

chuckhole door. (Id.).

In retaliation for all of the above-described events, Defendants intentionally placed

Plaintiff in harm’s way. At the time, Plaintiff was subject to a “stay away” order because he was

labeled a “snitch” for testifying against Jawan Jackson for the murder of Plaintiff’s brother in 2018.

After he was labeled a “snitch,” Plaintiff became the target of other inmates at the Jail. The

sheriff’s deputies were aware of this label and the related stay away order. Plaintiff also reminded

them about the order at booking. (Id.).

Following his “altercations” with Hill, Rushing, and Spradling, Plaintiff was transferred to

P block. While there, another inmate attacked him and broke his nose for being a snitch.

Defendants then moved Plaintiff into a more dangerous situation, by transferring him into Cell 339

with Jawan Jackson’s brother. Even after Plaintiff reminded Defendants of the stay away orders

and pleaded for a transfer into a safer cell, the defendants forced him to remain in Cell 339. (Id.).

The “separate but related” traumas he endured at Jackson County Jail caused mental health

problems that resulted in his transfer to Chester Mental Health Facility, where he endured more

abuse. He now suffers from heightened states of emotional distress, post-traumatic stress disorder,

depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and suicidal ideations. (Id.).

Preliminary Dismissal

Jackson County Sheriff’s Office shall be dismissed with prejudice. This defendant is not

a “person” or a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698 (7th

Cir. 2009) (citing Chan v. Wodnick, 123 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1997); West v. Waymire, 114

F.3d 646, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1997)). Although Plaintiff likely intended to name the municipality

instead, the Complaint articulates no claim upon which relief may be granted against Jackson

County. Id. In order to obtain relief against a municipality, Plaintiff must allege that the

constitutional deprivations resulted from an official policy, custom, or practice of the county.

Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 69-91 (1978); see also Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009). The allegations suggest no such thing, so the Jackson

County Sheriff’s Office shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Discussion

The Court finds it appropriate to designate the following six (6) counts in the pro se

Complaint:

Count 1: Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants for denying

Plaintiff adequate mental health treatment at Jackson County Jail on or

around September 5, 2020;

Count 2: Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Hill for verbally

threatening Plaintiff for tearing a hole in his mattress on or around

September 5, 2020;

Count 3: Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Rushing for

using excessive force against Plaintiff by shooting him with a taser gun and

leaving the prongs embedded in his hand and stomach on or around

September 5, 2020;

Count 4: Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Spradling for

using excessive force against Plaintiff by breaking his finger;

Count 5: Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants for failing to

protect Plaintiff from an excessive risk of harm to his health or safety when

they transferred him to P block, where an inmate broke his nose, and to Cell

339, where Jawan Jackson’s brother was also housed; and

Count 6: First Amendment claim against Defendants for retaliating against Plaintiff

on or around September 5, 2020.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should

be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.2

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).

Counts 1 through 5

Counts 1 through 5 are governed by different legal standards that depend on Plaintiff’s

status as a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner when his claims arose. If he was a pretrial

detainee, Plaintiff’s claims are controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,

which prohibits all forms of punishment of detainees. See Kingsley v. Henderson, 576 U.S. 389

(2015) (articulating applicable standard for pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim); Miranda v.

County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) (articulating applicable standard for pretrial

detainee’s claim of inadequate medical care). To state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,

a pretrial detainee must set forth facts suggesting that each defendant “acted purposefully,

knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly” in response to conditions posing an excessive risk to his

health or safety and that the defendant’s actions were “objectively reasonable” based on “the

totality of the facts and circumstances faced by the individual.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352-54;

McCann v. Ogle Cty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). If he was a convicted prisoner,

these claims are controlled by the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment of prisoners. The Eighth Amendment requires a showing of a sufficiently serious

deprivation (an objective standard) and deliberate indifference by the defendant (a subjective

standard). See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To state a claim under either amendment, Plaintiff must set forth

allegations showing each defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional deprivation. West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

Application of either standard to these claims yields the same result: Count 1 survives

screening against Defendants Hill, Rushing, and Spradling for denying Plaintiff adequate mental

health treatment at the Jail on or around September 5, 2020; Count 3 survives screening against

Defendant Rushing for using unauthorized force against Plaintiff by shooting him with a taser gun

and leaving the prongs embedded in his hand and stomach on or around September 5, 2020;

Count 4 survives review against Defendant Spradling for breaking Plaintiff’s finger on or around

the same date; and Count 5 survives screening against Defendants Hill, Rushing, and Spradling

for failing to protect Plaintiff from an excessive and known risk of harm when they transferred

him to P block, where an inmate broke his nose, and to Cell 339, where he was housed with Jawan

Jackson’s brother, on or around September 5, 2020. Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 survive screening against

those defendants named in connection with each claim above.

However, Count 2 lacks sufficient detail to support a claim against Defendant Hill,

regardless of the standard. According to the allegations, this defendant made unspecified verbal

threats on September 5, 2020. Although she did so just before Defendant Rushing shot Plaintiff

with a taser gun, her actual involvement in this use of force is not altogether clear. Plaintiff has

not developed this claim factually. He has not indicated what Hill actually said or did. The

allegations suggest a possible, but not plausible, claim against Hill, and this is not enough to

survive screening. Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed without prejudice against Hill.

Count 6

Count 6 shall be dismissed because the allegations support no claim of retaliation under

the First Amendment. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff “must demonstrate

that (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; and (2) his conduct was a substantial factor or

motivating factor in the defendant’s challenged actions.” Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654

(7th Cir.2002). In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any protected

conduct; he maintains that it was his misconduct (e.g., tearing a hole in the mattress and shaking

his food tray in the chuckhole door) that motivated the retaliation against him. Tearing apart a

mattress and shaking a food tray are not activities protected by the First Amendment. Given this,

Count 6 shall be dismissed against all defendants without prejudice.

Pending Motion

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Representation (Doc. 4) is DENIED without prejudice.

When the Court is presented with a request for counsel by an indigent litigant, it must first consider

whether the plaintiff has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own, and, if so,

whether the difficulty of the case, both factually and legally, exceeds his capacity as a layperson

to present it. Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d

647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Plaintiff has shown some efforts to find counsel to represent him in this matter, but he has

not yet satisfied the Court that these efforts were reasonable or sufficient. Plaintiff merely placed

three asterisks on a list of outgoing contacts and indicated that he has not heard back from the

firms or attorneys listed. The dates of these contacts were March 14, 2022, and he filed this suit

in late May 2022. However, without a copy of the written communications or summary of its

contents, the Court cannot assess whether he actually sought representation in this case. He should

provide a copy of any written communications sent to or received from attorneys he contacted

about representation in this matter or summarize them for the Court in his next motion.

At this stage, Plaintiff also appears capable of representing himself. He is a high school

graduate who is taking psychotropic medication for mental health conditions. However, he has

adequately stated four claims, and this lawsuit is being served on the defendants. Once they answer

or respond to the Complaint, the Court will enter a scheduling and discovery order with deadlines

and instructions for litigation. If Plaintiff deems litigation too difficult as this case proceeds, he

may file a new motion for recruitment of counsel.

Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives screening under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, as follows:

• COUNTS 1 and 5 survive screening against LARANA HILL, KYLE

SPRADLING, and GARY RUSHING;

• COUNT 3 survives screening against GARY RUSHING; and

• COUNT 4 survives screening against KYLE SPRADLING.

IT IS ORDERED that COUNT 2 against Defendant LARANA HILL and COUNT 6

against ALL DEFENDANTS are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. In addition, JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE is

DISMISSED without prejudice for the same reason.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as it pertains to Jackson

County Jail is DISMISSED as MOOT.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendants LARANA HILL and

JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE as parties in CM/ECF and ENTER this Court’s

standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.

With respect to COUNTS 1, 3, 4, and 5, the Clerk is DIRECTED to prepare for

Defendants LARANA HILL, KYLE SPRADLING, and GARY RUSHING: (1) Form 5 (Notice

of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of

Summons). The Clerk should mail these forms and a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1) and this

Memorandum and Order Severing Case to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by

Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to

the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps

to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full

costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with that defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his

or her last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed

above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained by the

Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs

under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his

application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 12/19/2022

s/ J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit

and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants

will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60

days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that

it will take 90 days or more. When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a

Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.

Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need

not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.