Opinion

Dawson v. Wall

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Jan 9, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, R72570, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 20-cv-431-DWD

)

CHAD WALL, )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Christopher Dawson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”),

brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights while at Pinckneyville. Plaintiff claims Defendant Wall retaliated

against him from March 1, 2019, through July 1, 2019, by denying him yard time, access

to the barbershop, and cleaning materials. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 30) on the issue of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative

remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff did not respond despite being notified of the procedures to

respond. (Doc. 32). The evidence supports Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, so summary judgment will be granted, and

Plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed for failure to exhaust.

BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2020, another Judge of this District entered an Order that severed this

claim into the present complaint. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff opted to proceed with this case, and

the Court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. 18). The sole claim in

this complaint is Count 1, which alleges First Amendment retaliation against Wall for

denying Plaintiff yard time, access to the barbershop, and cleaning supplies from March

1, 2019, until July 1, 2019.

Defendant argues in his summary judgment motion that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as to this claim because during the relevant time he only filed

one grievance that mentioned Defendant but did not mention these specific claims. Two

other grievances during the relevant time were not fully exhausted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff submitted three grievances between March 1, 2019, and December 31,

2019, that concerned the barbershop, yard time, and cleaning supplies. First, on March

4, 2019, Plaintiff submitted Grievance #645-03-19, wherein he alleged that cleaning

supplies were not being passed out regularly. (Doc. 31-1 at 23). The grievance does not

mention any staff by name. Grievance #645-03-19 was fully exhausted at the institutional

level, and it was timely appealed to the Administrative Review Board (ARB). (Doc. 31-1

at 21). The grievance was denied at all levels.

On April 16, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance #1155-04-19,

wherein he alleged that a correctional officer denied him yard time. (Doc. 31-1 at 19-20).

The grievance mentions Defendant Wall but does not allege retaliation. The Warden

deemed the grievance a non-emergency on April 19, 2019, and the counselor responded

on April 24, 2019. After receiving the counselor’s response, Plaintiff transmitted this

grievance directly to the ARB. The ARB requested additional information about

Plaintiff’s exhaustion at the institutional level, but the grievance was never fully

exhausted. (Doc. 31-1 at 18).

On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff submitted Grievance #1711-06-19 on two issues and he

marked it an emergency. (Doc. 31-1 at 7). First, he complained that internal affairs staff

were harassing him because he was placed in segregation. Second, he complained that

Defendant Wall and other officers have stopped him from going to yard or barbershop.

On June 7, 2019, the Warden deemed the grievance a non-emergency. On June 17, 2019,

Plaintiff transmitted the grievance to the ARB, but it was returned to Plaintiff for

institutional level responses from the counselor, grievance officer, and CAO. There is no

evidence the grievance was ever exhausted at the institutional level or the ARB. (Doc.

31-1 at 6).

In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleged “I file a grievance on yard, hygiene

issues, I sent response to Springfield. I grievance malice issues. No grievance were ever

return.” (Doc. 2 at 4). In the body of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged as to Wall, “I

grievance issues and nothing was done for over three months. Lieutenant Wall would

claim I wasn’t on list or I wasn’t in compliance he would make lame excuses to why I

couldn’t go to yard along with excuses of me not getting barbershop, cleaning supply.”

(Doc. 2 at 6). Plaintiff included only one grievance form with his complaint, which was

an ARB denial of a January 19, 2019 grievance about staff conduct. (Doc. 2 at 13).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In

determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex

Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is

not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an

evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to

exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). After hearing evidence, finding

facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the claim to

proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th

Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no

genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.

Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021); Miller v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., 2017 WL

951399 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2017).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring

a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion

requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”

Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and

at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,

1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the

administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process

outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).

The regulations first require an inmate to file his grievance with his counselor within 60

days of the discovery of an incident, occurrence, or problem that gave rise to the

grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). Administrative regulations require the

grievance “contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject

of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If

the names of the individuals are unknown to the offender, he can still file the grievance

but “must include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id.

Further, the Seventh Circuit has held that an inmate is required to provide enough

information to serve a grievance’s function of giving “prison officials a fair opportunity

to address [an inmate’s] complaints.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011).

If the complaint is not resolved through the counselor, the grievance may be

submitted to a grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations

in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e).

The CAO then provides the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id.

An inmate may request that a grievance be handled on an emergency basis by

forwarding it directly to the CAO. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. If the CAO determines

the grievance “should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be

notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergency, in

accordance with the standard grievance process.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c).

If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with

the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s

decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer

and CAO to his appeal. Id. The ARB submits a written report of its findings and

recommendations to the Director, who them makes a final determination. 20 ILL. ADMIN.

CODE § 504.850(d), (e).

B. Analysis

Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) and accompanying

Memorandum (Doc. 31) on May 6, 2022. Per Local Rule 7.1, Plaintiff had 30 days to file a

response.1 Plaintiff did not file a response within 30 days of Defendants Motion. Without

a response, the Court considered the available record evidence, and still construed it

broadly in Plaintiff’s favor.

Grievance #645-03-19 discusses Plaintiff’s complaint that he was not receiving

cleaning supplies, and this grievance was fully exhaust to the ARB. However, grievance

#645-03-19 is not sufficient to exhaust the claim against Defendant Wall because in the

grievance Plaintiff does not mention any staff members by name, nor does he describe

them using physical characteristics, or shift duties, etc.. (Doc. 31-1 at 23). An inmate may

file a grievance if he does not know the name of the subject, but to properly exhaust a

claim, he must at least describe the unnamed individual. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

504.810(c). Plaintiff’s grievance does not satisfy this requirement, so it is not sufficient to

exhaust his claim against Defendant Wall. It also makes no mention of retaliation, so it

is further insufficient.

Grievances #1155-04-19 and #1711-06-19 are not sufficient to exhaust the claims

against Defendant Wall because neither of these grievances were properly exhausted at

the institutional level before Plaintiff transmitted them to the ARB. Plaintiff filed both

grievances as ‘emergency’ but the CAO deemed both a non-emergency. The forms noted

that Plaintiff would need to pursue the grievance in a normal manner. (Docs. 31-1 at 7,

19). There is no evidence that either of these grievances was fully exhausted at

Pinckneyville. In both instances, the ARB requested further information about

1 Plaintiff was notified of this obligation by Defendant’s May 6, 2022 Notice. (Doc. 32).

exhaustion at Pinckneyville, but there is no evidence that Plaintiff responded to these

requests from the ARB, which left the grievances unexhausted.

Grievance #1155-04-19 was written on April 16, 2019, the counselor responded on

April 24, 2019, and the ARB sought further information on May 16, 2019. (Doc. 31-1 at

18-20). A grievance log supplied in support of summary judgment shows that the

counselor’s response was returned to Plaintiff on April 24, 2019, but it was never received

by the grievance office for the second level of institutional review. (Doc. 31-2 at 1-2).

Grievance #1711-06-19 was written on June 5, 2019, and it was deemed a non-emergency

by the Warden on June 7, 2019. (Doc. 31-1 at 7). The counselor’s response box is blank.

(Doc. 31-1 at 7). On June 17, 2019, the ARB sought more information about exhaustion at

Pinckneyville. (Doc. 31-1 at 6). The documents submitted by Defendant show that

Plaintiff did not properly pursue exhaustion of these two grievances. Additionally, it is

evident from his full exhaustion of Grievance #645-03-19 that Plaintiff understood the full

grievance procedure, and he was able to access it.

In addition to the grievances discussed above, the evidence submitted by

Defendant includes other grievances during the relevant time that were properly

exhausted. For example, on June 5, 2019, the ARB denied Plaintiff’s appeal of an April

10, 2019, grievance about portion sizes for meals and facility transfers because it

concluded the issues were handled appropriately at the facility. (Doc. 31-1 at 9). This

grievance, and others show that Plaintiff knew how to exhaust the grievance procedure,

and he simply failed to do so for his claim against Wall.

Based on the available evidence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to create

a genuine dispute of fact on summary judgment, and he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as is required to pursue a lawsuit against Defendant Wall.

DISPOSITION

The Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant

Wall is (Doc. 30) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant is DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter

judgment in favor of Defendant and to CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2023 U. tL, ip ane

“7

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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