Opinion

Tsukerman v. Law Firm of Becker, Hoerner & Ysursa

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Jan 10, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense”

How later courts described this case

  • “District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MIKHAIL S. TSUKERMAN. )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-2666-SMY

)

LAW FIRM OF BECKER, HOERNER & )

YSURSA and THOMAS J. HUNTER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Mikhail S. Tsukerman filed this pro se action against the Law Firm of Becker,

Hoerner & Ysursa and Thomas Hunter. Tsukerman’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma

Pauperis ("IFP") (Doc. 2) is now before the Court. For the following reasons, the motion is

DENIED, and Tsukerman’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent party may commence a federal court action without

paying required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the inability “to pay such

fees or give security therefor” and stating “the nature of the action, defense or appeal and the

affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Tsukerman has

demonstrated his indigence and inability to pay the costs of commencing his lawsuit through his

motion and accompanying affidavit. However, the Court’s inquiry does not end with a

determination of indigency.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires careful threshold scrutiny of a Complaint filed by a plaintiff

seeking to proceed IFP. The Court may dismiss a case if it determines the action is clearly

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir.

2003) (“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits

spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense”).

In the Complaint, Tsukerman alleges that Defendants harmed him when they successfully

defended his former employer against Tsukerman’s pro se employment discrimination case.

Specifically, Tsukerman states that he brought an employment discrimination case against an

Illinois school district in 2014. The school hired the Defendants to defend it. According to

Tsukerman, the Defendants “conducted the case in bad faith,” rejected negotiations, “never offered

even nominal settlement,” “refused to communicate with [him],” and opposed his motions,

resulting in the case being “dismissed with prejudice on pure technicalities rather than [the]

merits.” Tsukerman asserts claims for conducting the underlying employment case in bad faith,

unjust enrichment, civil rights violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. He seeks compensation for lost wages, as well as pain and suffering. He further requests

$700,000 in punitive damages.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As such, to proceed in federal court,

Tsukerman must establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, which is ordinarily

accomplished through federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. He has not met this burden on the face of the Complaint.

Although Tsukerman asserts that Defendants violated his civil rights, his Complaint does

not state a claim under federal civil rights laws. “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or

the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons

acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir.

2015). The “state actor” predicate to § 1983 liability must be satisfied for this claim to proceed

against each defendant. Here, the Defendants are private citizens, not state actors. Thus,

Tsukerman has no relief available under § 1983.

The remaining claims asserted in the Complaint are state law claims; this Court does not

have federal question jurisdiction over state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Nor has Tsukerman

alleged diversity jurisdiction. “[T]he diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires

complete diversity.” Big Shoulders Capital LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande R.R., Inc., 13 F.4th

560, 571 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “This means no defendant may share the same state

citizenship as any plaintiff.” Although Tsukerman states that he is a Missouri resident, the

Complaint does not provide sufficient information to discern the citizenship of the Defendants.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court

is DIRECTED to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2023

News HU. Cpe

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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